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Abstract:  
Between 1989 and 1995 American policymakers struggled with breakup of Yugoslavia. The greatest challenge 
facing American officials was not ancient hatreds or the complexities of diplomacy but their own inability to define 
objectives which could be reconciled with the region’s importance or lack thereof to the United States. The United 
States wanted to preserve Yugoslavia, but not enough to pay the costs needed for success. Later, the United States 
wanted to secure an independent Bosnia, but not enough to jeopardized interests elsewhere in the world or to risk 
American lives. Virtually every major Yugoslav player in 1989 was convinced that securing American support was 
vital to their own success. That American officials failed to reconcile themselves to their actual leverage prevented 
the United States from taking advantage of this belief. Instead, it was Croatia led by Franjo Tudjman who filled the 
vacuum.  Ultimately, the United States settled for an end to the fighting in the region on whatever terms could be 
sold domestically and international as a victory. Tudjman delivered that victory on the ground in exchange for 
American legitimization of his objectives, and then used the prospect that America would only legitimize a peace 
on his terms to secure the agreement of the other Yugoslav parties. America secured a peace agreement, but one 
that was less favorable to all parties except for the Croats than could have been achieved earlier.  
Utilizing newly declassified documents and multiarchival research, this Thesis will demonstrate how a failure to 
reconcile means with objectives defined American policy towards Yugoslavia, and how Franjo Tudjman’s grasp of 
this dynamic enabled him to emerge as America’s partner in the region.  
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Glossary 
ARBiH – Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Hercegovina 
BTF – Balkan Task Force, CIA Committee Chaired by Norman Schindler charged with Balkan 
analysis 
CIA – Central Intelligence Agency, US external intelligence and operations service 
FOIA – Freedom of Information Act, legislation allowing for the release of classified documents 
JNA - Yugoslav Peoples’ Army / Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija – JNA, in Serbo-Croatian 
HDZ – Croatian Democratic Union, Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica, in Croatian 
HV - Hrvatska Vojska 
ICTY – International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia 
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Orginization 
NDH - Quisling Second World War Croatian Independent State – Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, run 
by the Ustaše and headed by Ante Pavelić 
OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
SVK - Srpska Vojska Krajine, Army of the Serbian Krajina 
TO - Territorial Defense Organization; Teritorijalna Odbrana in Serbo-Croatian 
UNPA – United Nations Protected Areas, a designation given to regions within Croatia’s 
international borders controlled by Serb forces after the Vance Plan of January 1992, patrolled 
by UN Peacekeepers 
VRS - Vojska Republike Srpske, Army of the Republica Srbska 
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Introduction 
 
Between 1991 and 1995, American foreign policy was preoccupied with events in the 
former Yugoslavia. Once representing Cold War possibilities of nonalignment, Yugoslavia 
became a symbol of the inevitability of ethnic conflict in multi-ethnic societies. In 1989, 
Sarajevo was known as the host of the 1984 Olympics and the location of the 1914 
assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand which triggered the First World War. By 
the 1992 US Presidential elections, it became symbolic of how the focus on American interests 
to the exclusion of morality left the Bush Administration open to charges of moral obtuseness 
by its Democratic opponents. After Bill Clinton won that election promising to end the fighting 
in Bosnia, his failure to do so became emblematic of his own ineffectiveness. The belated 
“triumph” at Dayton, in 1995, was a compromise with realism, made on terms which candidate 
Clinton would have denounced three years earlier. At Dayton, the Clinton Adminstration 
accepted terms regarding borders and refugee rights which enshrined the results of “ethnic 
cleansing” within Bosnia, and only managed to hold the Dayton talks in the first place with the 
aid of Croatian arms, a circumstance which made even the commitments Zagreb made 
regarding minority rights of dubious value. Nonetheless, those compromises represented 
concessions on values rather than interests  If the Clinton team failed to secure the moral 
causes they had charged their Republican predecessors with abandoning, they secured the key 
objectives the Bush team had fought for. The validity of Yugoslavia’s pre-1991 borders was 
recognized as sacrosanct. The principle that international borders, if not the make-up of 
populations within them, could not be altered by military force was reaffirmed. Most 
importantly, the war in Bosnia, along with the Serbian-Croat conflict which had divided America 
from its allies, and weakened its prestige in the eyes of both the American public and the 
Islamic world was ended. 
If Dayton was not a triumph for humanitarianism, nor the realization of all of the goals 
the Clinton team set out for itself in January of 1993, it could be considered a solid success. But 
that was not the story that emerged. History is rarely black and white, but historiography 
aspires to a more dramatic contrast, especially when it is written by politicians and journalists 
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rather than academics beniftting from distances of time and space. If the failure to end the 
conflict in Yugoslavia symbolized the limits of American power, many writers after 1995 cited 
Dayton as evidence of what American power could do when applied to humanitarian causes. 
Samantha Power, who covered the Bosnian conflict as a journalist, expounded on these themes 
in her Pulitzer winning A Problem from Hell: America in the Age of Genocide, which contributed 
to Power’s appointment as Barack Obama’s Ambassador to the United Nations. 2 Power would 
struggle to apply the “lessons of Dayton” to conflicts in Syria, the Ukraine, and Yemen, 
encountering no more success than her predecessors in the period 1989-1994.  
 This Thesis does not reject the importance of the international actors with regard to the 
struggle over the former Yugoslavia between 1989 and 1995. Instead, it will place that agency 
in perspective. Conspiracy theories to the contrary, no international actor was as invested in 
the outcome of the conflicts as the domestic actors themselves. The overriding interest of both 
the Bush and Clinton administrations, as well as European states like Britain, France and 
Germany, was to end a war whose continuance posed far greater risks to their interests than 
the victory of any of the participants. The desire of many Bush officials to preserve a united 
Yugoslavia, or of Clinton officials to fulfill campaign promises to “roll back Serb aggression”, had 
to be pursued in a manner subordinate to domestic political considerations. Power saw the 
difference between Dayton and the failed Vance-Owen plan in the willingness of the United 
States to use power to achieve the former, and the refusal to have done so in support of the 
latter. The idea that the “force” Power described either did not exist in 1993, or was limited in 
its extent and use was ignored. This Thesis will argue that little “choice” was involved. The 
restrictions on American policy were structural rather than intellectual. This was was often 
recognized by American officials at the time. General Colin Powell always mainted that external 
military force could never “impose” peace, while Anthony Lake, National Security Adviser 
during Clinton’s first term concurred that “successful negotiations proceed from balance of 
 
2 Power, Samantha and American Council of Learned Societies. A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of 
Genocide (Basic Books: Ann Arbor, 2002). 
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power realities.”3  The inability of American policymakers to compromise on the resources they 
were willing to dedictate to the region meant that they were to have no choice but to 
compromise with that partner, who would turn out to be Franjo Tudjman of Croatia. 
 Just how far American officials went in compromising with Tudjman on their core 
objectives, and how far Tudjman succeeded in achieving his goals which did not align with 
American interests his something this Thesis will try to address.  It could be argued  that on 
certain core principles, such as the idea that international borders could not be changed by 
unilateral force, American objectives were both consistent across Adminstrations, and 
ultimately achieved in the Dayton Settlement of 1995. While those objectives may have 
manifested in different ways; in the form of maintaining Yugoslavia as a united entity prior to 
the fall of 1991; in the form of preserving the Yugoslav-era Republican boundaries as the 
borders of the new successor states after that date. American officials did not bend from that 
principle even when the parties themselves showed a willingness to do so. Even in the case of 
Croatia, those such as Tudjman himself who aspired to unite the Croats of Bosnia with Croatia, 
such objectives were abandoned in deference to American wishes. How then could it be argued 
that Tudjman was anything less than a junior partner of the United States, a “junkyard dog” in 
the words of an American official, paid in table scraps? 4   
 When analyzing the extent of Tudjman’s success, and measuring it against American 
objectives, it is important to recognize the distinction between American “objectives” and the 
American “policies” used to achieve them. The latter are only evaluated by what eventually 
happened, whereas the former consider the process by which that outcome occurred. The 
United Kingdom won the First World War, but that in no way implies that the policy of landing a 
force at Gallipoli was a successful or wise policy. The same is true when it comes to American 
policy towards Yugoslavia.  It is true that if we skip to the end of the story, there is ample 
justification for why Richard Holbrooke considered Dayton a personal triumph, and the Clinton 
 
3 Senate Hearing 105-424—Hearing on Nomination of Anthony Lake to be Director Central Intelligence (March 11th, 
12th, 13th 1997). p.102..  
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/hearings/105424.pdf: Accessed August 23rd 2019 
4 Holbrooke, Richard, “To End a War: Excerpt” The New York Times May 20th 1998 
http://www.nytimes.com/books/first/h/holbrooke-war.html: Accessed September 3rd 2019 
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Adminstration was more than satisfied with the outcome. It ignores, however, the story of the 
six years which proceeded it. If America achieved in 1995 a settlement in which all parties 
agreed to recognize the Yugoslav-era borders as international, American officials failed to 
achieve such a settlement in 1991, 1992, 1993, or 1994. They also failed to prevent the breakup 
of Yugoslavia in 1989-1991. All policies either end in success or failure, but many policies fail 
before they succeed. US policy in the former Yugoslavia was widely seen as a failure, especially 
by its own practioners until 1995. American objectives were ultimately accomplished on 
Croatian terms, using Croatian force, and through Croatian methods, especially in the Krajina. 
American officials achieved their peace and their borders, but in order to do so they had to 
aquiece in Croatian military action, in Croatian intervention in Bosnia, and in Croatian impunity 
from retribution for violations of domestic and international law. They had to become 
complicit. America may have “hired” Zagreb, but they hired them on Croatian terms, and 
assumed responsibility for Zagreb’s actions no matter how much they attempted to shake it. 
There is a reason why, years later, American officials are still trying to shake Carl Bildt’s 
suggestion that the Croatian reconquest of the Krajina during Operation Storm constituted 
“ethnic cleansing.”5  
How much the events in the Krajina, or the compromises on Bosnia’s internal 
arrangements bothered American policymakers, is, nonetheless, a legitimate question, and at 
the core of this Thesis. American policy-makers had clearly been bothered by the prospect of 
such a decentralized Bosnian state enough to reject the Cutileiro Plan in early 1992, and  
Zimmerman “had no hesitation” in suggesting that the US should refuse Croatian requests for 
help in acquiring weapons in early 1990, which “would only increase the Croatian government’s 
capacity to oppress its Serbian citizens”.6 Zimmerman later regretted the rejection of the 
Cutileiro plan, but if American policy changed, so did the men who made it. In November of 
1992, George Bush lost reelection, at least in part, this Thesis will argue, because of a perceived 
failure to adapt to the complexity of the post-Cold War world, especially in the Balkans. Despite 
 
5 Carl Bildt, Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia, (London: Weidenfeld Orion, 1998. P. 80) 
6 Zimmermann, Warren, Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its Destroyers (Times Books: New York, 1996, 
p.95). 
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having campaigned on a platform which critized the lack of moral fervor of the Bush 
Adminstration, it would be the Clinton Adminstration which would make compromises, first on 
methods – undermining the enforcement of an arms embargo that the United States had 
proposed itself – and then on objectives, accepting a settlement where most, if not all earlier 
objections to the Cutileiro plan were  forsaken. After a first year of his Administration, 
chronicled in the third Chapter of this Thesis, in which Clinton attempted to fufill his campaign 
promises to take a more instransigent moralistic stand, the President and his advisers seemed 
to grasp that they had misunderstood the message of the American public. They had not 
opposed the policy the Bush Adminstration had pursued to end the war in Yugoslavia but rather 
the failure to do so. Having won election denouncing, to use the words of Vice President Albert 
Gore, the ‘moral obtuseness’ of the Bush Adminstration’s approach, the Adminstration would 
conclude that in fact the Bush Adminstration had been “morally obtuse” in a manner opposite 
to that in which they thought. 7 Rather than missing the moral issues at stake, Bush, Baker, and 
Zimmerman had made too much of them, and Gore, who had denounced them for being too 
compromising in 1992, would play a leading role in encouraging Tudjman to use arms to settle 
diplomatic disputes the Vice President found frustrating, even when it meant going behind the 
back of the rest of Adminstration, as Chapter 5 will chronicle.  
One would be correct in noting that even if the preceding analysis is true, and that 
various US policy ininiatives to achieve American objectives in Yugoslavia failed between 1989 
and 1995, it was a change in American policy that led to success in 1995. In that case, the 
Croats merely were lucky, and benifited from developments in Washington that they could 
neither have triggered nor resisted. Here Thesis' main conclusions  break more dramatically 
with the diminishment of Croatia’s role. Even if the US was committed to a settlement in the 
region which preserved international borders and ended the fighting, there was no reason why 
Tudjman was the one to deliver it. His proxies, the Bosnian Croats, were the weakest party in 
Bosnia, and their agreement or rejection of peace accords was irrelevant to the ultimate 
success of such negogiations as was proven time and again. It was the Serbs who needed to be 
 
7 “The Crisis in Kosovo” U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on European Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations, May 6th  
1998 https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/007608888: Accessed May 25th 2014 
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brought to the table, and the only man who could do that was the Serbian President Slobodan 
Milošević. This was a conclusion the international community held in 1993 when it was the 
centerpiece of the Vance-Owen process, and it was still the position of American policy-makers 
in 1995, who as we will see, were more interested in securing Milošević’s endorsement of any 
Bosnian settlement than they were concerned with the views of the Bosnian Muslims. What is 
surprising then is not that the US worked with local actors, but that it ultimately used Tudjman 
to bring Milošević to the table, rather than sacrificing Tudjman and Croatian interests to 
achieve a settlement with the Serbs, Muslims, or between the two. As will be shown, avoiding 
that outcome was the overriding priority of Croatian policy from 1991 to 1994, and while 
American diplomats like Peter Galbraith occasionally used the prospect to try and coerce 
Zagreb, as chronicled in chapter 3, Zagreb not only avoided that outcome but averted it. 
Croatia, despite having the least to offer in Bosnia, arguably ended up being “paid” the most for 
in the Dayton settlement.  
Croatia may have been a junior partner, but it was a junior partner to the only external 
power that mattered, and just as importantly, a junior partner on the winning side.  Tudjman’s 
understanding of both the extent and the limitations of American power enabled him to avoid 
the pitfalls encountered by his Muslim and Serb counterparts. 8 Critically, Tudjman understood 
what an American need to compromise meant. If he could make Croatia’s objectives appear as 
prerequisites for any stable outcome, as he did in 1991 with independence, and again in 1995, 
by making clear that no peace settlement could last as long as the Krajina continued to exist, 
those objectives would become America’s. Tudjman’s compromises were on matters he could 
not reconcile – a partition of Bosnia, in order to incorporate into Croatia proper  the Bosnian 
Croats could never be reconciled with a settlement once it became clear that the Muslims 
would never agree to such an outcome, and the US would never force them to do so. It is true 
Milošević would have had a harder time making concessions as he had more Serbs in Croatia 
 
8 Tudjman, Franjo, Horrors of War: Historical Reality and Philosophy (Rev. ed., M. Evans: London, 1996); 
Tuđman, Franjo, ‘Nationalism in Contemporary Europe’, East European Quarterly, Vol 87. Issue 3, 1981; 
Djuraskovic, Stevo  ‘Nation-building in Franjo Tuđman's Political Writings’ Croatian Political Science Review, 2014, 
51:5, pp.58-79. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/286448709_Nation-
building_in_Franjo_Tudman's_Political_Writings: Accessed April 16th 2016 
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and Bosnia to concern himself with, but part of being a good poker player is knowing the 
strength of one’s hand. Tudjman knew the strength of his hand and played it well, even getting 
off a few bluffs for good measure as he arguably did over Sector East in 1995. Most 
importantly, he understood the need to collect his winnings, which is why he ensured all of his 
key objectives were not up for discussion before agreeing to attend Dayton. 
Key to Tudjman’s success was his relationship with the United States. Tudjman was not 
above appealing to other actors when advantages could be gleaned from doing so. In 1991 he 
focused heavily on lobbying the German government, and in 1992 he tried to interest the 
Islamic World in backing Croatia’s conflict with the Serbs, but in both cases it was not because 
he believed the support of either party would be decisive on its own, but in order to influence 
those who were. The appeal to German public opinion and later political elites was designed to 
leave American policy-makers with no alternative but to accept the breakup of Yugoslavia, 
while sidelining other European actors who were less friendly such as France and Britain, while 
appeals to the Islamic world were designed to pressure Sarajevo. While not ignoring Russia or 
the EC, Croatia viewed their role as important only insofar as it influenced Washington. Neither 
could endorse a settlement in the face of American opposition, or block a settlement which had 
American support and that of the local parties themselves.Tudjman, unlike Milošević, or even 
less visionary Croatian nationalists in Bosnia, understood that ultimately no settlement could be 
final unless it had the support of the United States, and just as importantly what the United 
States would and would not support. Here, Tudjman’s great strength was to understand not the 
strength of his influence in the United States, but its weakness. For all the assistance Croatia 
might gain from successful public relations campaigns, effective lobbying, and the influence of 
the Catholic Church, it was not enough to alter the core objectives previously mentioned. The 
United States would not abandon Yugoslavia in favor of an independent Croatia as long as a 
united Yugoslavia was viable, and after 1992, the United States would not accept any 
settlement which destroyed the legal integrity of the Bosnian state, nor cease to recognize the 
Sarajevo government as legitimate. Tudjman could wield influence both in Washington and on 
the ground in the region to maneuver within these constraints but not alter them.  
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Croatian policy, instead adapted itself to the motivations behind the US positions, such 
that they could only be accomplished on Croatian terms. The US commitment to a single 
Yugoslavia was not, as will be seen in chapter 2, abandoned merely because fighting broke out. 
The outbreak of fighting did not change the view of figures such as Zimmerman and 
Eagleberger that creating more borders by recognizing the Republics would exacerbate the 
causes of conflict. As long as there seemed to be a viable Yugoslavia whose borders could be 
upheld, maintaining Yugoslavia was always preferable in their minds to enforcing the 
adminstative boundaries of the Republics. The United States abandoned Yugoslavia when it 
imploded not at the periphery, with the seccession of Slovenia in June of 1991, and the 
outbreak of fighting in Croatia over the summer, but rather when the central authorities ceased 
to exist. The breakdown of both the Presidency, leaving a Serbian rump, combined with the 
defection of Prime Minister Markovic from the Yugoslav cause, left no legitimate political 
authorities around  and the prospect that a state could be restored., Moreover, the military had 
already shown neither the aptitude nor the stomach for assuming political authority. The 
United States turned to the Republics when there was no Yugoslav government left to claim 
sovereignty, and it was to Tudjman’s credit that he met the challenge of both appearing to try 
to make Yugoslavia “work” in 1991, and ensuring that when the crunch came it fell apart in the 
center. That work in Belgrade mattered more in the end than what happened on the 
battlefield.  
Once Yugoslavia was gone, in fact if not in name, the United States commitment to the 
inviobility of borders fell upon the legal authorities that remained capable of excercising 
sovereignty, namely the Republican governments. The question was not whether the 
administrative borders drawn by Tito were ideal or made sense ethnically; they made sense in 
one vital respect, they each corresponded to a “government” which had a “President” and 
could be assigned legal responsibility. For Washington, the logical continuation of support for 
the sovreignty of the Yugoslav Federation over its territory was  to champion the sovriegnty of 
republican governments over their’s. In the case of five of the Republics this approach made 
sense. Whatever the flaws of the Milošević or Tudjman governments, they were generally 
recognized as the legitimate governments of Serbia and Croatia, and the same was true in 
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Slovenia and Macedonia. The critical flaw in this policy lay in Bosnia, where the “President”, 
Alija Izetbegovic, was the leader of one of three ethnic groups, and the government was seen as 
partisan if not illegitimate by the others. Having rejected partition too soon, as American 
officials would later concede,  the only option was to strengthen Bosnia’s government, in this 
case its Muslim government enough, such that it could fufill the role American policy envisaged 
for it - exercising soviregn authority over the republic’s borders   
Tudjman, despite his designs on Bosnian territory, and his doubts about the longterm 
viability of any Bosnian government built on a predominantly Muslim basis, eventually not only 
accepted this as an unchangeable basis of US policy, but forced the Bosnian Croats to do so as 
well. It was by recognizing what he could not achieve, in this case a partition of Bosnia, which 
allowed him to achieve virtually everything else, by posing as an ally who could deliver what 
Washington needed - Croat and Serbian acceptance of republican boundaries. That said, 
acceptance extended to gurranteeing Croatia’s control of its own 1991 territorial claims made 
this objective compatible with his own. For all the influence Croatia wielded in Western 
capitals, Croatia’s strongest advocates, men like Peter Galbraith in 1993-1994, and Richard 
Holbrooke and Vice President Al Gore in 1994-1995, backed Croatia because Croatia, unlike the 
UN, Milošević, Russia, or the EC, appeared able to actually deliver a settlement.  Tudjman did 
not change core US objectives. He accepted them in a way which allowed him to achieve 
everything else.  
Tudjman also grasped something else about the geopolitical environment in which the 
Yugoslav conflict was taking place. From the fall of 1991, when American efforts to delay 
recognition of the Republics forced Washington into conflict with Germany’s push for unilateral 
recognition, the conflict took on the overtones of a geopolitical conflict. As will be seen in 
chapters 2 and 3, fears of setting a precedent for a potential Soviet collapse drove American 
policy under the Bush Adminstration, just as a desire to avoid humiliating Russian President 
Boris Yeltsin appear as a constant refrain in American intelligence briefings during the early 
months of the Clinton Adminstration. American policy-makers were quick to fob off the blame 
for the failure of “Lift and Strike” onto America’s European “allies”, and the latter were equally 
quick to leave Washington with the blame for torpedoing the Vance-Owen Peace plan. In both 
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cases the charges were unfair, but they illustrated a key point which Tudjman was to grasp. By 
the end of 1993, conflict between Europe, America, and Russia was less about policy, as none of 
the three intended to actually dedicate the resources neccisary to intervene directly, and more 
about assigning blame for the lack of action. America might well have been the power with 
which Tudjman partnered in 1994 and 1995, but when he took action in August of 1995, EU and 
Russian influence in the region was revealed to be a paper tiger. Europe and Russia were 
sufficiently relieved to be done with the conflict, that they were willing to allow the United 
States to settle it provided it was settled.   
That is why this Thesis is less concerned with the events which occurred in Dayton, Ohio, 
in November 1995 than with the developments which made that conference possible. The 
Dayton Conference is arguably documented more thoroughly than any other event during the 
break-up of Yugoslavia, whether in the form of the participants’ memoirs, secondary sources, or 
even the State Department’s officially commissioned history.9 There is little to add to that 
existing body of literature within the scope of this Thesis, and coverage that would do justice to 
the importance of the Dayton conference and the wealth of material available could come only 
at the cost of other topics given the 110,000 word-limit of this Thesis. The scope of this Thesis is 
therefore limited ot the period prior to Dayton, with developments there covered only insofar 
as they directly affect the core arguments, such as Croatia’s efforts to ensure that the issue of 
Eastern Slavonia was on the agenda. Dayton is ever-present, the foreordained end-point of the 
events chronicled, the proverbial ghost at the feast, yet it is precisely because the terms and 
conditions of the settlement ratified at Dayton were pre-determined by the events chronicled 
before the conference ever met that this Thesis will focus on those events rather than the 
narratively exciting but tale of a Dayton conference which was little more than a ratification of 
the situation which had already been established by Croatian arms. 
 A lack of primary sources is a problem for many contemporary writers, with secondary 
sources often predating primary access to sources which only became available years later. 
Balkan Battlegrounds, written by two military analysts from the Central Intelligence Agency, is a 
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collation of open source analyses, based upon primary sources for events, while relying on 
secondary sources only for the political narrative.10 In the Eye of the Storm, by Ante Gugo, was 
commissioned to promote a Croatian view of the conflict.11 Brendan Simm’s Unfinest Hour 
alleges that a cabal of British civil servants obstructed the efforts to support Bosnia’s Muslims.12 
David Rief’s Slaughterhouse and Michael Sells’ The Bridge Betrayed make a similar allegation, 
but identify different perpetrators of this crime.13  Anodyne titles do not necessarily indicate 
greater impartiality. Croatian journalist Mihailo Crnobrnja’s The Yugoslav Tragedy conceals a 
pro-Croat bias behind a neutral-sounding title, just as German journalist Viktor Meier’s 
Yugoslavia: A History of its Demise hides a pro-Slovene one. The contrast with the wider field 
makes near objectivity achieved by Allan Little and Laura Silbur’s 1995 The Death of Yugoslavia, 
the more impressive.14 It formed the basis for a wildly-acclaimed five-part BBC documentary 
series on the conflict, and was used by the authors of CIA’s Balkan Battlegrounds as their 
secondary source.  
The greater availability of primary sources produced by the passage of time has 
exacerbated the bias through placing a premium on selectivity. The existence of a source or 
record does not guarantee its accuracy, and the sheer volume of evidence now available 
renders a concrete analysis of all sources impossible. The result is a tendency among authors to 
identify primary sources which support their narrative, which then rises or falls based on the 
reliability of that evidence.  Ana Trbovich, in her A Legal Geography of Yugoslavia's 
Disintegration, fills a unique gap in the field, testing the positions adopted by the Western 
states and international actors against the standards set by international law and their own 
Badinter Commission, only to find them wanting. The work’s persuasiveness is undermined, 
however, by an uncritical acceptance of Krajina and Bosnian Serb sources. While such sources 
are of vital importance, Trbovich accepts demographic figures at face value which are at odds 
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with the official census data, as well as electoral results where the total votes exceed the total 
population of the regions concerned. The citations are not incorrect, as documents exist which 
purport to confirm the figures cited. Nevertheless, these numbers are not just at odds with 
other sources, as is often the case with personal recollections, but are outright impossible. As 
the legal claims are based on the “facts” established by these sources, Trbovich’s conclusions 
are undermined as well.15  
Unreliability is not the only risk that authors face when managing documentary 
evidence. Due to the sheer volume of material now available, there is a temptation to embrace 
a narrow focus on a specific set of sources. Joseph Glaurdic did so, producing an excellent 
examination of the transcripts of phone conversations between Serbian President Slobodan 
Milošević and Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić. Released by prosecutors, these sources 
provide an insight into how the Serbian leadership perceived the conflict, supporting the theory 
that their ambitions changed in response to events, even as they plotted with elements of the 
army to establish a “Greater Serbian State”,16 but it is possible to exaggerate the importance of 
the sources, especially if a researcher has invested years in examining them. Glaurdic concludes 
that Milošević’s ambitions, which he himself proved changed in response to developments 
driven by other, non-Serb actors such as the Croats, Slovenes, Army Generals, and Bosnian 
Muslims, were the driving force behind almost every political development in Yugoslavia from 
1988 onwards.  Josip Glaurdic’s The Hour of Europe: Western Power’s and the Breakup of 
Yugoslavia, is brilliantly researched and compellingly written. It is far from clear if the research 
and analysis, which on an event-by-event level is excellent, support the conclusion that a 
preconceived plan by Slobodan Milošević to make himself master of Yugoslavia destroyed the 
state.17 Glaurdic thereby does what so many others did before him, including the Yugoslav 
politicians themselves. He analysed the outcomes along with the events that preceded them 
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and concluded that the motivation of the actors was to accomplish the outcome in question. 
Sometimes this reflects the reality, but far more frequently it retroactively projects the 
certainty of hindsight onto actors who had to make decisions in a chaotic environment. 
Glaurdic effectively chronicles Milošević’s actions and analyses their consequences but fails to 
prove that those actions aimed to achieve those specific consequences. 
 The preceding discussion of the works of Trbovich and Glaurdic is not intended to 
denigrate other works, many of which cover much of the same material with as great if not 
greater depth and objectivity.18 Rather, the intention was to highlight the works of these two 
authors as examples of analytical flaws which can afflict even high quality literature when it 
comes to the topic of Yugoslavia’s collapse. The research and writing of this Thesis has entailed 
a constant struggle to avoid similar pitfalls. I began this project precisely because I had 
preconceived notions about the end of Yugoslavia which I wished to challenge. Some to these 
persist even now, six years later. Far more have fallen by the wayside as my research has led 
me to change my beliefs about a host of issues. I entered this project believing that Colin Powell 
had been wrong, and that the “Vietnam Syndrome” which allegedly made a generation of US 
military officers unduly squeamish about the use of force was real. Initially, this Thesis was 
intended to provide a chronicle of Dayton as a triumph of American policy, a successful 
example of the utilization of limited force to achieve limited political ends, one which could be 
contrasted with the disastrous efforts towards regime change undertaken by George W. Bush in 
Iraq after 2003. Instead I discovered that this narrative was a myth: that it had been Croatian 
arms which had delivered an agreement at Dayton on Croatian terms, a success which 
American officials were desperate enough to claim as their own. By the end of this project, I 
had concluded that Dayton itself was ultimately unimportant. It merely ratified decisions which 
had already been made. At most, it involved the US, Croatia, and Serbia bullying the Bosnian 
Muslims and Serbs into agreeing to terms which had already been agreed beforehand. To the 
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extent that this conclusion is at odds with the narrative presented by much of the field, this 
Thesis will be biased towards my own viewpoint.  
No authors writing on a contemporary conflict or event can ever be fully satisfied with 
their use of sources. If they are, then something has potentially gone wrong during the research 
process. Sources which were unavailable at the start of this project became available by the 
end of it, and it is likely sources that were unavailable when this Thesis was submitted may 
become available by the time it is read. For example, when former Secretary of State James 
Baker donated his documents to Princeton University, it was on the condition that they remain 
confidential for 100 years from his birth or until after his death.19 He subsequently approved a 
number for use by researchers at the end of 2018. Many of the documents utilized in 
subsequent chapters were released over the course of the project, and it is reasonable to 
suppose that relevant sources will continue to become available at a similar rate. It is possible 
that future sources will substantially alter the basis on which our conclusions were reached., I 
feel that the release of further sources may illuminate two issues in particular. First, Al Gore’s 
role in the events of 1994 and 1995. The absence of either the former Vice President’s personal 
papers, or any form of memoir has forced me to construct a picture of his role based off the 
recollections and communications of other actors. While I believe the portrayal presented in 
Chapters 4 and 5 is well-supported, it is still conjectural in many places. Secondly, while not a 
particularly key focus of this Thesis, the degree to which Milosevic may have explicitly 
coordinated with Tudjman during the summer and fall of 1995, as opposed to implicitly as 
chronicled in Chapter 5, may be revealed by the full release of Tudjman’s presidential records. 
At this time we also only have conjecture, and the strong suspicions of multiple sources. 
While occasional use has been made of European sources, this has primarily been for 
the purpose of providing an outside perspective on American policy. The wealth of materials 
available placed a comprehensive study of the European or international perspectives of 
American policy towards Croatia beyond the scope of this Thesis. A balance needed to be struck 
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with the need to maintain the focus of the project as well as the requirements concerning 
length. The same can be said regarding the interviews. I personally interviewed Peter Galbraith 
at his Cambridge Massachusetts home and corresponded with Lord David Owen by email. 
Inquiries made to other figures, including Al Gore, were declined. While I feel that the project 
would have benefited from additional interviews with specific individuals, I do not believe tht 
there is a deficit of interviews among the sources used. 
The major challenge faced while working on this Thesis was less a lack of sources, and 
more the often-uneven nature of their availability. This was particularly evident when it came 
to the American side. Compared to past administrations, fewer senior officials under George H. 
W. Bush and Bill Clinton published their recollections; the published works were generally far 
shorter than the mammoth volumes which defined their predecessors under Reagan and Nixon, 
and rarely did they deal with Yugoslavia. Bush himself, in the pseudo-memoir he co-wrote with 
his National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, does not explicitly mention the policy towards 
Yugoslavia at all, except in passing.20 Neither Scowcroft nor Lawrence Eagleburger published a 
set of memoirs, a far cry from the three mammoth volumes produced by their mentor Henry 
Kissinger, nor did Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Thomas Niles. James Baker’s The 
Politics of Diplomacy does address Yugoslavia, albeit for around nine out of nearly 600 pages, 
more than a third of which are dedicated to his trip to Belgrade in June 1991.21 Defense 
Secretary Richard Cheney finally published a book two decades after the events, primarily 
focused on his tenure as Vice President in a later Bush Administration.22 Condoleezza Rice also 
primarily focused on her tenure in the Bush Jr. Administration in her official memoirs, along 
with a volume chronicling her childhood in segregation-era Alabama. While she authored a 
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book on German unification with fellow NSC staffer Philip Zelikow, Rice has not published any 
memoirs dedicated to the first Bush Administration.23 
 Bill Clinton’s My Life is a mammoth work of over 1,000 pages, whose length proves an 
outlier in an administration where senior officials left either short works or none.24 The 
memoirs of Warren Christopher and Madeline Albright are both relatively sparse, clocking in at 
under 350 pages in Christopher’s case, and deal only to a limited degree with US policy towards 
the ex-Yugoslavia before Dayton.25 National Security Adviser Anthony Lake published no 
memoirs, nor did Vice President Albert Gore Jr. or his National Security Adviser, Leon Fuerth, 
who oversaw the US sanctions policy towards Serbia. US Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith 
has provided hundreds of pages of interviews, including more than 60 pages to this author but 
his intended memoirs remain unpublished as of 2019. 
 This silence among senior policymakers has left a rhetorical vacuum, to be filled by 
those who have been only too happy to speak up. Warren Zimmerman’s book, chronicling his 
tenure as America’s last Ambassador to Yugoslavia, has become a defining work, partially 
because there is so little on the American side to rebut it. 26 Richard Holbrooke’s To End a War 
became a definitive account of Dayton in the historical narrative.27  Richard Holbrooke’s papers 
became public only after his death, when they were used for an official biography to be 
released in 2019.28 Christopher Hill and Strobe Talbott have both published memoirs but, apart 
from a childhood spent in Zagreb, the former had no further interaction with the region until he 
was drafted there by Holbrooke as his deputy in mid-1995, while Talbott is primarily concerned 
with the relations with Russia.29 
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 A debt is owed to the Clinton Presidential Library, which released more than 2,500 
pages of documents related to the war in Bosnia, including minutes of meetings of the 
“Principals;” i.e. senior national security officials such as the Vice President, Secretary of State, 
CIA Director, and the “Deputies”, their chief staffers. Also released were reports by the Central 
Intelligence Agency’s Joint Balkan Task Force. Documents from the Department of State, by 
contrast, are available only through individual FOIA requests, with the result that the volume of 
material, while plentiful, is uneven chronologically. Until recently, the Bush [Sr.] Presidential 
library declined to release more than an index of which files exist, and James Baker, while 
turning his personal papers over to Princeton, postponed their release until after his death.30 
However, a number of State Department cables from the Bush years have been released, 
including a large portion of the reports from embassies and consulates abroad such as those in 
Belgrade and Zagreb, but not internal communications within Washington which will only 
appear after Baker dies. Any author researching this period must express their incalculable debt 
to the Oral History projects of the Miller Center on Presidential history and the Association for 
Diplomatic Studies and Training for Foreign Affairs Officers.31 Together, they provided hundreds 
of pages of recollections from the key players, involving, insights that would otherwise have 
been missing, given the lack of memoirs or relevant official documents.  
Events surrounding the collapse of Yugoslavia in the period 1989-1992 were heavily 
documented during the trial of Slobodan Milošević, perhaps the highest profile prosecution 
attempted by an international body since Nuremberg in 1946. Franjo Tudjman’s potential 
ambitions for Bosnia were a subject of Slobodan Milošević’s trial, as well as those of the Serbian 
leaders of Eastern Slavonia and Krajina, Goran Hadzić, Milan Babić, and Milan Martić, but 
despite the best efforts of the defense teams of the latter three, no real interest was shown by 
the Court in interpreting Croatian motives during most of the subsequent two years.32 The 
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prosecutors of Croatian Generals Ante Gotovina, Ivan Čermak, and Mladen Markać set 
themselves a low bar, simply alleging that the “joint criminal enterprise” by the Croatian 
government for the removal of the Serbian population of the Krajina “came into existence no 
later than at the end of July 1995”.33 An effort to sue L-3 Communications, the successor to 
Military Professionals Resources Incorporated, a firm made up of retired US military officers 
which trained the Croatian military in “democratic institution building” between 1994 and 
1995, was filed by a group of Serbs in 2010.34 It was dismissed on the grounds that the US 
judicial system lacked jurisdiction over events in the former Yugoslavia before it could proceed 
to the “discovery phase” which might have shed light on the firm’s activities in Croatia.35   
 Nonetheless, the volume of primary sources available were copious and presented 
serious challenges in terms of presentation. One of the challenges of academic writing lies not 
in developing research, but rather presenting the results in a full cited manner. Of the tens of 
thousands of pages of documents that are available regarding the period covered by this Thesis, 
including diplomatic cables, legal testimony, expert reports, intelligence estimates, minutes of 
meetings, and memoirs without official English translations or releases, the vast majority are 
available only in digital form. While it is possible to obtain physical copies of FOIA documents 
from the US Department of State, or of submissions to the ICYT, they are merely copies of the 
digital resources. Academic style-guides have yet to fully catch-up with this phenomenon, much 
less reach consensus, and there are real questions as to what documents are – are the notes 
prepared for the Director of the CIA after a meeting the minutes capturing the actual words of 
particpents? Or merely paraphrases? Who wrote cables with Embassy Belgrade or Consulate 
Zagreb but no name attached? The Ambassador? And how should one cite documents that 
were released in bulk. A prime example are more than 650 pages of the minutes of the 
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meetings held by President Franjo Tudjman in his palace in Zagreb with his closest advisers and 
foreign officials. Submitted by the defense team of Slobodan Praljak, the Croatian Army’s 
liaison with the Bosnian Croat forces, they are a small selection of a much larger and 
inaccessible archive.36 President Tudjman recorded all of his conversations, as was discovered 
when Stipe Mesić succeeded as President in 1999, including explosively more than fifty with 
Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević. None of the Tudjman-Milošević conversations are included 
in the transcripts made available to the ICYT, though details of a number were eagerly leaked 
by those around Mesić to the Western press.37 Not only is the selection biased, but the English 
translation is also dubious with rampant misspellings. Finally, the documents are not invidiually 
available, but rather provided in a single PDF document. When used in this Thesis I have sought 
to deal with these challenges by presenting them verbatim as they appear in the original 
translation except in cases where names are misspelled where I have altered them for 
consistency. I have also provided a full-citation in this paragraph(footnote 38) as well as in the 
bibliography. Otherwise, where documents have been drawn from this archive, I have made 
reference to the document’s title, “Annex III” and a page number where it can be located by 
following the link to the original. The alternative was to commit to 70-100 word citations each 
time a document from this resource was mentioned. In the cases of the memoirs of former 
Serbian President Borisslav Jovic and Yugoslav Defense Minister Veljiko Kadijevic, both of which 
never saw official English releases, but had unofficial translations made available through the 
ICYT, I uploaded copies to my google drive, links to which can be found in a citation and the 
bibliography. 38  Page numbers in subsequent references refer to these versions. State 
Department Cables and CIA documents include direct links where possible. As the page 
 
36 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia “Prlić et al. (IT-04-74)” Annex III: Presidential Transcript 
Evidence November 3rd 2008, http://icr.icty.org/LegalRef/CMSDocStore/Public/English/Motions/NotIndexable/IT-
04-74/MOT7245R0000324738.pdf: Accessed November 30th 2018   
37 Sherwell, Philip; Petric, Alina “Tudjman Tapes Reaveal Plans to Divide Bosnia and Hide War Crimes” The 
Telegraph June 18 2000 https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/bosnia/1343702/Tudjman-tapes-
reveal-plans-to-divide-Bosnia-and-hide-war-crimes.html: Accessed November 22, 2019 
38 Kadijević, Veljko, My View of the Break-Up: An Army Without a State, Excerpt, Exhibit P449a, ICYT Translation, 
Copy Uploaded by Author August 29th 2019 https://drive.google.com/open?id=1FCWkcLfM0PVd-9VU5QaD0RzU-
J8-MPpD; B. Jović.The Last Days of the SFRY, Belgrade, 1992, p.325. From ICYT Translation Uploaded to Daniel 
Berman Google Drive, https://drive.google.com/open?id=1-M87Kce4RWVHDAOj9Md2ssh5CnFTxUc5: Accessed 
June 11th 2019 
 28 
numbers differ between versions of the same documents made available within the CIA’s own 
“Virtual Library” and the 2100-page pdf document released by the Clinton Library, I have tried 
to utilize links to the former when possible.  
No amount of creative footnoting can erase the political motivations which lie behind 
the selective release of documents. Yugoslavia collapsed in a manner which caused vast 
devastation to an entire region, and ruined millions of lives. Something or someone must have 
been responsible for this. The “blame game” for Yugoslavia’s collapse was already well under 
way long before the old federation broke up, fought out in testimony before the US Congress 
for instance, and only intensified thereafter as the stakes soared.39 The simplest answer was to 
blame the Yugoslavs themselves, following the lead of Robert Kaplan’s Balkan Ghosts in seeing 
the origin of the conflict as lying in “ancient hatreds”.40 If Kaplan’s effort was too ecumenical, 
there was no shortage of sources blaming almost everyone, though the Serbs rapidly became a 
favorite target in the West. In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the Western media were seeking 
the next Saddam Hussein and the Serbian cause provided a ready-made villain in the form of 
Slobodan Milošević.41 In a 1991 cable to Washington, Zimmerman declared ““I have no doubt if 
Milošević’s parents had committed suicide before his birth rather than after I would not be 
writing a cable about the death of Yugoslavia”.42 Zimmerman’s own characterization, echoed by 
Louis Sell and other biographers of Milošević, was that of an opportunist, and an opportunist 
needs real opportunities to exploit. By implication, that opportunity to exploit nationalism 
would have existed regardless of Milošević’s birth. Kosovo was placed under martial law back in 
1981, five years before Milošević rose to power in Serbia. What about Milošević’s efforts to 
recentralize power within Yugoslavia by destabilizing other Republican leaderships? Did this 
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lead to escalation on all sides? That is the case made by Josip Glaurdic.43 While authors of this 
“school” differ over the degree to which the Serbian grievances were legitimate, and whether 
the responses of the other actors were wise or proportionate, all seem to agree that it was the 
Serbian actions under Milošević against Kosovo and then during the “anti-bureaucratic 
revolution” which destabilized Yugoslavia. Whether Milošević or the Serbs sought control of a 
majority in the state presidency out of an ambition to rule Yugoslavia, or as a byproduct of his 
support for centralization within Serbia, the result was the same, creating a political and 
constitutional situation in which no Croatian or Slovene government could remain in 
Yugoslavia. 
The narrative of Milošević’s guilt conveniently absolves other Yugoslav actors of 
responsibility. If no self-respecting government of Slovenia or Croatia could remain in 
Yugoslavia as it existed by 1991, then it did not matter what the governments who were in fact 
in office in 1990-1991 did. Kučan may have been self-interested and reckless, indifferent to the 
fate of the rest of Yugoslavia, and Tudjman a racist nationalist, but even the most liberal or 
federalist leaders would have had to move to secession. As the agency of Kučan and Tudjman 
counted for nothing, the actions they did take can be forgiven. It is in this way that authors like 
Viktor Meier can concede that Tudjman was a racist who missed multiple opportunities to 
reassure Croatia’s Serbian population, but nevertheless absolve him of responsibility for the 
violence which followed.44 It is also how the overwhelming majority of Western observers were 
able to absolve Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegović of responsibility for helping to start a 
war that he had no way of winning. Izetbegović’s critics, such as Lord David Owen, could see 
their work dismissed by a New York Times writer as a “self-serving memoir” which “overlooks 
many things, of which the most basic is this historical fact”.45 
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 Lord Owen was not the only dissenter.46  Some Serbian writers tried to portray the anti-
bureaucratic revolution as an indigenous populist movement rather than a conspiracy, and 
made a case for Serbia’s actions.47 The flaw in many of these works is they fail to answer the 
charge they are intended to rebut. While many authors assign malicious motives to Serbs 
and/or Milošević, the argument is not ultimately about the motivation behind Milošević’s 
actions or those of the Serbian leadership, but about whether those actions posed an 
existential security threat to other republics. They also ignore the fundmental truth. Regardless 
of whether Milošević sought domination of a multiethnic Yugoslavia, to create a Serbian 
“rump”, or merely pursued policies as the opportunity arose, he was guilty of one offense that 
could never be levied at Tudjman. He was guilty of failure. That guilt explains theambivalence 
felt by Serbian authors towards Milošević, who now had to decide whether it was Milošević, the 
Serbian people, or both who were being falsely maligned. By comparison, Croatian and Muslim 
authors had an easier task. Both Tudjman and Izetbegović had internal critics, but they mainly 
differed on domestic politics, and perhaps how the war came about. After 1992, there was little 
disagreement within either community regarding the justice of their cause.48  
 It was not only authors who displayed insufficient sympathy to the plight of Bosnia’s 
Muslims who found themselves crowded out of the public discourse in the 1990s. Also sidelined 
were those who argued that the resurgent nationalism and the leaders who exploited it were 
both the symptoms rather than the causes of Yugoslavia’s problems. Often presented by those 
with first-hand experience of Yugoslavia before its collapse, whether it be high-ranking Yugoslav 
Titoist officials such as former President Dizdarević or Susan Woodward who spent years 
studying Yugoslavia’s economy for the Brookings Institute, this narrative focused on crimes of 
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omission rather than commission.49 First in the dock on charges of negligence was Marshal 
Josip Broz Tito himself, who endowed Yugoslavia with a constitution designed to decentralise 
power, and an economic system addicted to foreign borrowing. In the 1980s, as Yugoslavia was 
“forced” to adopt policies of austerity by the international actors, namely the IMF, the 
differences between richer and poorer republics increased even as those same international 
donors pushed for a greater centralisation of economic decision-making. With the internal 
boundaries having deliberately been drawn on ethnic lines, these economic conflicts then 
became ethnic.  The real villains were the international actors who invested their hopes in the 
central government of Prime Minister Ante Marković and his economic reforms, but then failed 
to provide actual financial support for this.50 
 Economic forces undoubtedly drove the political ones in the 1980s, just as in the Soviet 
Union. Yet, just as in the Soviet Histories, of which there are several, which focus only on the 
problems facing the regime in the late Brezhnev era rather than the role of Gorbachav, there is 
something about the structural explanations which seems centered on what was a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for the collapse of Yugoslavia. Analyzing the origin of problems can 
help to identify a cure but tends to do little to cure them on its own. Hitler may have been 
brought to power by the harshness of the Treaty of Versailles but, as the failure of 
appeasement showed, his ascension changed the nature of the problem from one of 
international relations to one of Hitler. Modifying the treaty failed to mollify him. Whatever the 
origins of the ethnic tensions in Yugoslavia, by 1991, the major fault lines were no longer 
economic but ethnic and security based, as James Baker and other Western diplomats found 
when they did belatedly offer financial support, that might have made a difference two years 
earlier. 
 Separating political from economic factors is furthermore futile as reform in any field 
would have encountered resistance from the same vested interests. This leaves us back where 
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we started, with the question of agency. Did Yugoslavia collapse or was it murdered? And if so, 
was it murdered by Milosevic and/or Tudjman, or did Markovic and his allies fail to save it? The 
answer to these questions, as will be chronicled in chapter one, is that while these individuals 
were dispensible, their roles were not. The same factors that made a prospective effort by a 
figure like Milosevic to dominate Yugoslavia a mortal threat to the unity of the common state, 
would have ensured that any successful effort by Markovic or anyone else to liberalize 
Yugoslavia’s political and economic systems would have posed the same threat to the same 
vested interests, who would have had the same power and motivation to breakup Yugoslavia. 
The 1974 constitution made it impossible for any political figure to reform the system 
economically without amassing the power necessary to become another Tito. Unless a figure 
succeeded in that objective, reform was impossible, and the state would collapse under the 
burden of austerity and national bankruptcy. If someone succeeded, or threatened to succeed, 
a security dilemma would be created for every other political leader and faction in the country. 
In the event, it was the efforts of Slobodan Milošević to become another Tito that links the two 
theories. It does not matter if Milošević acted out of ambition to rule Yugoslavia, a desire to 
advance Serbian interests at the Federal level, or as self-defense against efforts by the Slovenes 
to use the Federal institutions to threaten his position in Serbia and Kosovo. By mid-1990, 
Milošević was perceived as controlling three if not four out of the eight votes in the Presidency, 
which made any reform impossible without him, and unacceptable for the Slovenes with him. 
Tudjman, for all his nationalist ambitions, was not opposed to working with Milošević within 
Yugoslavia or outside. If his ultimate ambition was sovereignty, he was willing to settle, as had 
his hero Vladko Maček in 1939, for co-dominion.51 It was only after it became clear that 
Milošević had no interest in co-rulership on Tudjman’s terms and the departure of Slovenia left 
Croatia isolated that the decision was made to fight for independence. This was symbolic of a 
pattern that was to be repeated many times and is chronicled throughout this Thesis. Tudjman 
was a fanatic when it came to ends, but the most flexible Yugoslav leader when it came to 
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means. He would work with anyone, although he preferred the strongest potential partner. In 
Yugoslavia that had been Milošević. After the breakup, it was the US. 
This Thesis is divided into five chapters, with the first chronicling US policy towards 
Yugoslavia from the start of the Bush Administration through to the outbreak of fighting in June 
1991. The figure of Warren Zimmerman will be a central focus, as his failure is a microcosm of 
the American policy-failures in the region. Zimmerman pursued a forward policy, attempting to 
influence domestic Yugoslav policy and browbeat the key players. Zimmerman sent mixed 
messages about American objectives, while lulling Washington into a false sense of security 
which delayed any high-level decisions about Yugoslavia’s future until it was too late. While the 
both the policy Zimmerman pursued, and the methods by which he pursued it proved to be 
failures, this chapter will highlight the extent to which any other policy was possible given the 
constraints of American policy. Not one of Kucan, Zimmerman, Tudjman, or Milošević did much 
to resolve Yugoslavia’s problems, but this chapter will raise the question as to whether their 
absence would have changed the outcome. 
The second chapter covers events from June 1991 to the recognition of the 
independence of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia in 1992. It will argue that it was not the outbreak 
of fighting in Slovenia, but the subsequent decision of the Serbian and Slovene leaders to 
withdraw the Army from that republic which marked the end of any prospect of Yugoslav unity. 
Despite Tudjman’s nationalist ambitions, it was this final victory of the republican leaders over 
the federal government which rendered Croatian independence inevitable. The international 
community had sought to keep Yugoslavia together not because it was morally committed to 
the unity of the federation but because this seemed the easiest way to avoid combat. The 
departure of Slovenia made it impossible for Yugoslav unity to coexist with an end to armed 
conflict. Now, the only way the international community could secure an end to armed conflict 
would be to recognise the internal Republican borders as international borders. What was at 
stake in the fighting in Yugoslavia in autumn 1991 and the diplomatic maneuvering between 
Germany and the US, was not whether the independence of Croatia and Slovenia would 
ultimately be recognized, but when and under what conditions it would be granted. For Croatia, 
unilateral recognition was desirable not because it promised a resolution to the conflict in the 
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region but precisely because it did not. Recognition as part of a general settlement in 
Yugoslavia might require binding concessions from Zagreb regarding minority rights 
domestically as well as changes to the international borders. By contrast, unilateral recognition 
maintained Zagreb’s legal claims to whatever territory the Croats did not control militarily in 
1992. If Tudjman could not retake those areas in 1991, it preserved his right to do so if he ever 
gained the necessary military strength. 
The third chapter examines how the Yugoslav conflict played out in American domestic 
politics. It will cover the 1992 Presidential election, followed by the efforts of the incoming 
Clinton Administration to establish a policy which would fulfill the promise made during the 
campaign to be more assertive against “Serb aggression”. Clinton’s victory marked the 
culmination of a strategy, pursued by the Democrats from 1991 onwards, to use foreign policy 
in general, and Yugoslavia in particular, to erase memories of their opposition to the Persian 
Gulf war by outflanking Republicans on human rights. Yet, the very opportunism of this policy 
created difficulties when it succeeded. The Clinton Administration was divided between those 
who had genuinely embraced the change of direction, and those who had embraced it out of 
opportunism. The Administration struggled to commit to a policy, especially one which took 
seriously the tradeoffs in policy choices. By the end of 1993, the high level decision-making had 
fallen into a chaos from which it would never fully emerge. Nonetheless, if the Clinton 
Administration could not agree on its aims, the struggles of 1993 provided clarity regarding 
what the US did not want to happen in the region. The deliberations over the Vance-Owen plan 
made it clear that the Clinton Administration was unwilling to reconcile its conditions for a 
settlement in Bosnia to the military balance on the ground. The rejection of “Lift and Strike” 
made it equally apparent that the US was unwilling to use its own military to change that 
balance. By a process of elimination, the US had already embraced policy constraints which 
pointed inevitably to a reliance on Croatia. 
The fourth chapter will examine the origins and development of the American-Croatian 
alliance. By mid-1993, Croatian forces were in retreat in Bosnia, Zagreb was threatened with 
sanctions, and there was the prospect of a Muslim-Serb settlement at Croatian expense. Both 
Tudjman and American activist officials shared a common interest in continued resistance by 
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the Bosnian Muslims against the Serbs, albeit for different reasons. Zagreb extricated itself from 
a war it could not win, while convincing American officials that the result was a triumph of 
American policy. Zagreb emerged with an explicit American commitment to the reintegration of 
Serb-occupied territories, along with implicit support for a build-up of the Croatian army. From 
near disaster in mid-1993, Zagreb was sufficiently strong by early 1995 to engage in 
brinksmanship with the UN, the Serbs, and even those in Washington who were less eager 
about taking action. America, by contrast, has compromised itself, not just through the decision 
to support Croatia but also by the means through which the policy was carried out, including 
not only the violation of the UN Arms Embargo but also providing a green light to Iranian Arms 
shipments. 
The fifth chapter brings these strands together. Croatia has secured its diplomatic 
position with regards to the US and the Bosnian Muslims, and although not everyone realizes it, 
the Krajina Serbs as well. While some American officials in Croatia see this as an opportunity to 
secure a settlement between Zagreb and the Knin, the Croatian leadership takes advantage of 
the international situation to evade pressure to embrace any concessions to its own Serbian 
population. With the collapse of the Bosnian Muslims’ military position, threatening the 
domestic political strength of those American officials in Washington associated with sanctions, 
desperate American policy-makers urge the Croats to take military action. Croatia is not only 
able to secure American support for Operations both Flash and Storm, but also to condition its 
behaviour in Bosnia on securing promises of the return of Eastern Slavonia along the Serbian 
border. The Dayton Agreement which ends the war in Bosnia is hailed as a triumph of American 
diplomacy but the result conforms far more to the preferences of the Croats than to those of 
either the Bosnian Muslims or the Serbs. Croatia receives control of the entirety of its 
internationally-recognized territory with a newly-homogenous population. The Bosnian 
Muslims are denied any state of their own, while the Serbs are prevented from unifying. 
By the end, I hope to have gone some way towards redressing the balance in English 
secondary writing regarding Croatia’s role in the Yugoslav wars. Ideally, the reader will have 
found their preconceptions challenged regarding exactly who wielded the agency, and which 
party manipulated the other in the American-Croatian relationship. While Croatian émigrés and 
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other ethnic lobbies will feature, as will American geopolitical interests, the focus will be on the 
role of Franjo Tudjman and his inner circle in the relationship, along with the behaviour of their 
key counterparts on the American side. I also hope to highlight the actions of Vice President 
Albert Gore and his staff in the formation of US policy. Any examination of the period which 
looks at the key decisions, whether to sign the Washington Agreement in 1994, to launch 
Operations Flash and Storm in 1995, and not to take Banja Luka that autumn cannot help but 
conclude that it was Tudjman, rather than Gojko Sušak, a Croatian lobby, or rogue military 
actors who made the decisions. By the end of this Thesis, in fact, one might wonder whether 
the American policy-makers were even making their own decisions, or simply conforming to 
those of Tudjman. 
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Chapter 1: The US and the Breakup of Yugoslavia 
 
On the Precipice of an Abyss 
 
Arnold Toynbee is commonly credited with describing history as “one damned thing 
after another”. At one level Toynbee is correct. History is the study of events which happened. 
However, what happened cannot be the entire story of history. We need to understand why 
things happened. Not for purely academic or analytical purposes, or to avoid repeating the 
mistakes of the past, but because it is impossible to judge events properly in isolation. Even 
Toynbee’s quote appears very different in its context.52 As for historical events, for every battle 
that occurred, assassination that succeeded, and revolution that transformed the world there 
was an unfought battle, a failed plot, and a suppressed riot. Arguably, most potentially world-
changing events never happened. Understanding why they did not occur is critical to 
understanding why the events that did happen did occur. 
History is perhaps better described as an iceberg. At the top, visible to all, is what 
happened. Below the surface lie the underlying causes of those events, forces which could 
easily have been manifested in different ways but were not. A prime example lies in 1989, the 
year when the Berlin wall fell, Communism collapsed in Eastern Europe, and the Cold War 
“ended”. It was also the year when a similar anti-Communist protest movement was crushed in 
China with implications for world history perhaps as great as the success of the Eastern 
European revolutions. Lost somewhere between the two were events in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia 
seemed to be following the same script as Poland and Hungary. A new reformist government 
had taken office under Ante Marković, who the then-American Ambassador Warren 
Zimmerman described with gushing praise. “He had very western ideas about how to develop 
the economy”, Zimmerman recalled, “I took George Soros to see him once, and Soros left the 
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meeting after we had two hours of the Marković treatment saying, ‘that was the most 
impressive leader he had met in Eastern Europe’.”53 That year was also the 600th anniversary of 
the battle of Kosovo, a celebration of which Zimmerman boycotted, thereby alienating the new 
Serbian President Slobodan Milošević.54 With hindsight, within three years, Yugoslavia would no 
longer exist, Milošević’s actions would appear key and Marković would be not more than a 
footnote. That is the way events turned out. But was this inevitable? And if so, why? 
Warren Zimmerman is fatalistic in his conclusions. “Analytically if you asked me if I 
were a professor, I would have said this isn't going to work. It is going to fall apart and there is 
going to be war”, he recalled in 1996. “But, my job was not just to be an analyst; it was to do 
with what could be done, and Washington was very strongly on the side of trying to hold 
Yugoslavia together at least until it was possible to work something out to prevent a war.”55 
Peter Hall, Britain’s last Ambassador to SFR Yugoslavia, went further, suggesting “the mistake 
the West made over Yugoslavia in general was to think that it was feasible and possible to 
maintain a federal unitary Yugoslavia. It wasn't. The divisions were much too great”.56    
Yugoslavia undoubtedly faced problems. When Marković took over, the country was 
facing a debt crisis, the result of the easy borrowing during the 1970s when Oil Crises made it 
easy for Belgrade to access loans.57 When the oil prices plummeted during the 1980, loans were 
called in and borrowing became harder.58  The design of the Yugoslav state made it peculiarly 
dependent on borrowing not only for economic but also for political stability. Embracing the 
concept of “self-management”, which was to be the ideological calling card of Yugoslavia, power 
was decentralised from the central government and Party to those at the level of the six 
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republics and two autonomous regions.59  Milovan Djilas, a close colleague, had urged Tito to 
invest his federal institutions with real power by allowing multiparty competition, but all that 
Djilas gained was Tito's enmity and persecution after 1954.60 The problem was that “self-
management” stood, not for democracy, but for decentralisation. It decentralised the power of 
both the party and government to republics which were explicitly defined as sovereign by the 
central government, and then erected a wall between them such that no one could build a 
powerbase beyond a single republic. For Tito, institutions were about dispersing power and 
preventing its concentration, not wielding it. Rather than seeking to create forums for 
compromise, Tito tried to avoid conflict by giving every group security by making their republics 
impregnable political fortresses. “The constitution of 1974 defined the republics explicitly as 
states (article 3) and made them into independent agents of political decision-making”, Viktor 
Meier wrote in his history of Yugoslavia's collapse, and “every republic or province enjoyed a 
veto right in practically all affairs of any importance.”61 Only Tito stood above the system.  He 
was not indispensable to Yugoslavia because, without him, ethnic war would naturally break 
out. Marshal Tito was indispensable because he constructed a system which made him so and 
deliberately was unable to function without him, or another figure whose influence 
transcended the republican borders. As no legal mechanisms transcended these except for the 
army, such power could only be based on extralegal mechanisms or military force.   
Tito’s 1974 Constitution critically reserved the right to levy taxation for the Republics, 
probably to avoid complaints of exploitation from the richer Republics. Slovenia’s per capita 
GDP in 1991 was $12,618, nearly double that of Croatia’s at $7,179, and almost three times that 
of Serbia at $4,810.62 A uniform, equal tax levied at the Federal level would see wealthy 
Slovenia paying a share of the national revenue that was out of proportion to its population, 
much of which would be spent on poorer areas. As the poorest regions of Yugoslavia were 
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Bosnia and Kosovo, it was easy for Slovenes to associate high taxes with subsidizing Muslims, 
Serbs, and Albanians. A federal government with the power to tax elected by universal suffrage 
would virtually ensure this outcome, as the Slovenes constituted a mere 10% of the population, 
while contributing 20% of GDP.63 Contrary to later claims made by the Slovene leaders and their 
apologists, that Slovenia was a champion of democracy and free-market reform within 
Yugoslavia, the economic disparities with the rest of the federation made the prospect of either 
political or economic liberalisation a mortal threat to the position of the Slovene leadership. 
Democracy on any sort of Yugoslavia-wide level, presumably on the basis of one-person one-
vote, would have almost invariably led to exactly the sort of progressive taxation described 
above, which would have hit Slovenia hardest, as would have been the case in almost any other 
democracy worldwide. Yet if Slovenia, and to a lesser extent Croatia, had a reason to fear the 
consequences of a Yugoslavia-wide democracy regarding their position, the leaders of every 
republic had reason to fear the consequences that democracy or economic reform might have 
on their own power. Having wrested control of economic and fiscal policy from Belgrade, and 
with it the control of housing and employment for most of the population, the republican 
leaders had no intention of surrendering this either through privatisation or genuine self-
management at the factory level. Even democratisation at the republican level was suspect, as it 
too might cost the leaders their positions. It was only when threatened by Belgrade with the 
prospect of economic and political liberalisation at the federal level that the republican leaders 
dared to gamble on holding multi-party elections themselves. When they did so, it was not to 
enable liberalisation, but to be in a better position to resist it. The resort to democracy by the 
Republics as a last-ditch defence of their privileges would only come when Yugoslavia had 
reached the point where the only available options were reform or collapse.  
After Tito’s death in 1980, the federal government was too weak to challenge the 
Republics, and too dominated by Republican appointees to have any desire to do so. The main 
impact of the decentralisation of taxation was to impair, not democratisation at the national 
level, but fiscal solvency. Belgrade had liabilities to pay, not least the army. Not only was the 
army a major political actor, with a role enshrined by the 1974 Constitution, but in the context 
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of the Cold War it guaranteed Yugoslavia’s security against invasion. Whether real or not, the 
prospect of invasion was also a guarantee that Western aid would continue to flow. This 
required a steady source of revenue. The 1974 Constitution assumed that taxes would be 
collected by the Republics and transferred to Belgrade voluntarily. While Tito was alive, his 
personal authority over every Republic’s Party Central Committee justified this assumption. In 
Tito’s absence, the Federal government had to find another way to compel the Republics to 
collect taxes or another source of revenue. Tito, however, had removed almost all of the 
mechanisms by which the Federal government could accomplish the 1974 Constitution. All 
except one.64 
While denied the ability to levy taxation, only the Federal government could borrow 
money internationally.  This not only freed the Federal government from reliance on transfers 
from the Republics, but also provided the Republics with another vested interest in the 
preservation of a Yugoslav state. Not only could Federal expenditure be financed by loans, but 
this money could also be transferred to the Republics in the form of subsidies. Local elites could 
then avoid the political costs not just of taxation but also of unemployment and the higher fuel 
prices that would raise the need to make hard fiscal choices. The Republics were encouraged to 
run themselves at a deficit, funded by borrowing from the Federal government which itself 
followed suit. The reason why the Republican leaders, whether in Slovenia or Kosovo, needed 
Belgrade was because Belgrade funded the industries which employed their populations, 
enabling them to avoid the unpopular measure of raising taxes. While richer Republics such as 
Slovenia could raise funds in the absence of federal subsidies, it would be unclear what benefit 
they would then be receiving from the Yugoslav government which justified subsidising the 
poorer regions of the country. In the meantime, the costs of remaining in Yugoslavia increased 
as the Federal debt burden ballooned, creating an incentive for the richer Republics to consider 
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secession as a means of escaping responsibility for the debts they had so enthusiastically helped 
to accumulate. 
The long-term impacts were devastating. Had the Federal government lacked access to 
international loans, the only options available to Yugoslavs would have been either to provide it 
with a steady revenue stream or witness the collapse of the state. In the international climate of 
the early 1980s, with the Eastern bloc intact and the Cold War ongoing, even the most 
recalcitrant Republican leader would have recognized that the breakup of the Federation would 
have constituted an invitation to chaos and foreign intervention. Without loans, the Republican 
leaders would have been forced to work out a stable system of revenue for the Federal 
government. A Yugoslavia dependent for its survival on its own economic resources would have 
been pressured into adopting economic reforms to utilize those resources more effectively far 
earlier. Instead, both economic and political reforms were delayed until the federal government 
had run out of money. Milka Planinc, who served as Prime Minister between 1982 and 1986, 
reflected that the party had become “the main source of conflicts and conservatism. In Tito's 
time changes were still possible if Tito was convinced they were necessary. But after him”, she 
reflected in 1998, “[t]here was no money any more to satisfy everyone's needs”.65 By the time 
reforms became necessary, the international situation had changed due to the ending of the 
Cold War. Yugoslavia was now dispensable to the Slovenes, while the enormous debt burden 
which had accumulated during the preceding years made reforms vastly more expensive than 
would have been the case at an earlier stage. “That was really the thing that began the 
movement toward the breakup of Yugoslavia, the Slovene calculation that they couldn't do it in 
Yugoslavia, they had to do it independently”, Warren Zimmerman wrote years later. 
Zimmerman lamented the failure of the Slovenes to step “forward as the champions of 
democracy in Yugoslavia”, but in doing so he missed the interconnected nature of economic and 
political matters.66 Zimmerman confused a symptom, namely the nationalism which he saw 
epitomised by the rise of Slobodan Milošević and later Franjo Tudjman, with the refusal of the 
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“Western” Slovenes to present an alternative liberal model of Yugoslavia. Slovenia’s position 
could only ever be federalist and conservative in nature, as was the case during the 1980s when 
Slovenia blocked economic and political reforms, or secessionist and liberalism. Yugoslav 
liberalism was a threat to, not the aspiration of, Slovene nationalism. 
The interconnected nature of economic and political factors can be seen in the case of 
the autonomous region of Kosovo. The poorest region of Yugoslavia, it became symbolic to 
those in the richest, Slovenia, of the unpopularity of transfer payments, and the belief that 
“their money” was being wasted. The Serbs had the opposite issue; namely, independence from 
Serbia which the direct relationship with the Federal government allowed Kosovo. Nominally a 
province of Serbia, but with an Albanian majority, under the 1974 Constitution, Kosovo was 
given a republic’s attributes, having its own Assembly and Representative in the Federal 
Presidency, but denied official status in an effort towards compromise which satisfied no one. 
Albanians pushed for the status of a full republic, believing that their position could never be 
secure within Serbia.  Even non-nationalist Serbs felt that Kosovo’s autonomy was aimed at 
undermining the Serbian position within Yugoslavia, and saw Albanian aspirations to acehive 
republic status as an effort to dismember Serbia.67 Zimmerman reflected that “Serbs could 
argue credibly that they could be outvoted two-to-one in their own supposed sphere of 
influence”.68  
Yugoslavia’s problems did not become unsolvable because Milošević advocated 
Serbia’s interests any more than that it collapsed because the Slovene leadership advocated 
those of Slovenia, or Kosovo those of the Albanians, what they felt were theirs. Yugoslavia 
collapsed because there was no system at the federal level to reconcile mutually irreconcilable 
interests. All economic and political systems produce winners and losers, and all policies that 
differ from the status quo produce relative winners and losers even if there is a net benefit 
overall. Democracies do not prevent such problems from arising, nor avoid conflicts over whom 
the winners and losers should be. Zimmerman observed, “[I]n the United States, France, the 
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United Kingdom, and Germany racist demagogues have been politically active, but they have 
rarely been able to clear the hurdles and obstacles thrust in their way by the need to win and 
hold the support of electorates...but Yugoslavia had no such democratic obstacle course”. As 
such, “a clever political manipulator like Milošević could exploit the nondemocratic elements of 
Yugoslav communism for his own nationalistic purposes”.69 Yugoslavia's problem in the post-Tito 
era was, therefore, not that it was not a democracy or was a dictatorship, nor that the situation 
it faced was unsolvable. Rather, the system itself promoted extremes. In his decentralisation, 
Tito had laid a time-bomb that was even more explosive than the one that Stalin had planted in 
the Soviet system. If the “wall” erected between the republics held, effective government would 
be difficult at the federal level; the inability to solve problems without bringing down the “wall” 
incentivised the leaders to try and find ways to achieve this. If they succeeded, the system 
provided no middle ground between Milošević achieving Serbia’s legitimate interests in Kosovo 
and hegemony over Yugoslavia as a whole.  
Marković’s “political program” was simply to implement sufficient economic reforms to 
regain the Federal government’s access to the international financial markets. That was the 
motivation for and limit of his commitment to effective monetary and financial policy across the 
whole territory of Yugoslavia. Even this limited program threatened to spark fierce Republican 
opposition. Marković appears to have believed that, once the Federal government’s fiscal power 
was restored, its political power would follow. His plans depended on securing access to foreign 
financing to enable structural reforms, not implementing structural reforms in order to attract 
foreign capital. As few private lenders would be attracted by such an investment, Marković 
seemed to expect that the US and other Western governments would provide the loans 
themselves in the form of a political investment, as had been the case in the past. The failure of 
this aid to materialise “infuriated Marković because he kept saying, what good is your rhetorical 
support if you can't come forward with hard cash”, recalled Robert Rackmales, a US diplomat 
working in Belgrade at the time, “But it's very hard to justify [this] in a situation where the IMF 
and other international institutions, and our own analyses saw the Federal government as 
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impotent.”70 Marković had no solution other than a return to debt-financed governance, and 
never developed one beyond warning of the increasingly dire consequences if his program 
failed due to a lack of financial support. 
 Marković was correct. The IMF and other international actors failed to grasp how 
Yugoslavia’s economic problems were inherently political in nature. Their economic criticisms 
were accurate but based on a limited framework which perceived the support of Marković and 
the Yugoslav government as a purely economic, rather than political, investment. Robert 
Hutchings, who headed the European Desk for the National Security Council from 1989 to 1992, 
later reflected that, without a willingness to invest financial resources, the policy of supporting 
Marković should have been abandoned. He further observed, “Was Marković Yugoslavia’s last 
hope or was he already marginal to the real political struggle over the future of the federation? 
If the former was true, we should have lent him all possible support. If the latter, we should 
have concluded that Yugoslavia was already doomed and begun preparing for its dissolution”.71 
The US, however, was under no obligation to defer to the IMF. Doing so was a choice. It made 
perfect sense for the US not to invest money into Marković’s program on the basis of IMF 
doubts if the US interests were purely economic, but if the US objective was to secure, not an 
economic return on the investment but, rather, a political one in the form of preventing the 
breakup of the country, then this became nonsensical. Unlike the IMF, which could claim only to 
have purely economic interests in Yugoslavia, the US explicitly did have political interests. 
Somewhere along the line, the priorities had become confused and the decision-making had 
gone awry, not least because Milošević’s actions in Kosovo followed rather than preceded the 
decline in federal authority, only truly beginning in 1989. Even if all Marković achieved was to 
hold Yugoslavia together only so long as he received what were in effect international subsidies, 
with hindsight, a billion dollars or so a year to hold Yugoslavia together peacefully would have 
been a bargain for the US if not the entire world. 
In 1989, American policy-makers failed to see enough value in preserving Yugoslavia to 
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justify not just the financial aid that Marković was requesting but also the political costs of 
providing it. In early 1989, Condoleezza Rice, a staffer under Scowcroft at the National Security 
Council, completed a policy review. It concluded that, whereas in previous periods the distance 
from Moscow had been the criterion for measuring the relative “moderation” of regimes in 
Eastern Europe, criteria that benefitted not only Yugoslavia but also Romania’s Nicolae 
Ceausescu, who presided over what was perhaps the most brutal and eccentric regime within 
the Eastern bloc, now it should be defined by respect for human rights and a move towards 
political and economic reform.72 “No longer could it be argued that Yugoslavia's unity and 
territorial integrity were essential to America's vital security interests”, Warren Zimmerman 
would write in a 1996 Rand Institute report on Yugoslavia’s breakup, elaborating “It now 
became possible for members of Congress to isolate and advance specific aspects of policy 
toward Yugoslavia, such as human rights and ethnic preferences or dislikes.”73  
 “By the time of my return in 1989”, Zimmerman reflected in his memoirs, “Kosovo had 
become the most serious European human rights problem west of the Soviet Union”, and 
“nowhere was there more concern than in the United States.”74 This concern manifested in a 
Congressional reaction, which greatly curtailed the maneuvering room in which American 
officials could operate. Diaspora groups had long wielded political influence in the US, and 
substantial Albanian (and, as we will see later, Croatian) communities lived in North America. 
Michael Mandelbaum, a prominent academic who would be offered and decline a senior role in 
the Clinton Administration, observed that while “all presidents have catered to important 
domestic constituencies…In the post-Cold War era, without an overarching principle to guide 
the nation's foreign relations, it is all but inevitable: the promotion of domestic interests is the 
default strategy of American foreign policy”.75   Zimmerman reflected how “During 1989-1990… 
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a pro-Albanian coalition formed among those who had ethnic Albanian constituents 
(Representative Joseph Dioguardi, an Albanian-American, and Senator Alphonse D'Amato), 
those who habitually cultivated the support of ethnic groups (Senator Bob Dole), and those who 
saw Kosovo more as a pure human rights problem (Representative Tom Lantos)”.76 Lantos, a 
holocaust survivor, may have seen Kosovo as a pure human rights problem, but the examples of 
D’Amato, Dioguardi, and Dole had far much more partisan motivations. They were Pro-Albanian, 
a bias that was fully displayed when the House Foreign Relations Committee in 1986 spent two 
days holding hearings into the “persecution of the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia”. The hearing 
featured a one-sided witness list, including three Albanians, Ekrem Bardha  the Chair of the 
Albanian-American Republican Clubs of America, Sami Repishti the Chair of the Foreign 
Relations Department at Malverne High School in Malverne, New York, and Albert Tochess, a 
geography professor at Salem State College in Washington, who lectured to the committee on 
the Albanian nationalist claim that “the entire western portion of the Balkan peninsula was 
populated by the ancient Illyrians, known in Roman times, from whom the modern Albanians 
claim descent”. Serbian representation was limited to Congresswoman Helen Bentley of New 
York. 77  
A victim of this Congressional reaction was Zimmerman’s predecessor, John Scanlan, 
who was recalled following a campaign led by Rep. William Broomfield (R-MI), angered at 
Scanlan’s response to the arrest of Pjeter Ivezaj, an Albanian activist and naturalised American 
citizen, in 1986.78 In the Congressional hearings which followed, Scanlan, a career civil servant, 
was subjected to a tirade by rep Phil Crane(R-IL), who demanded “Where is the State 
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Department when we need them?”79 Scanlan’s travails helped to create a perception that 
partiality towards Yugoslavia or the Serbs was a domestic liability in the face of the Congress 
Congressional Albanian lobby. Senior Bush officials were uniquely vulnerable to this charge. 
Scowcroft had been Air Force attaché in Belgrade during 1966-67,80 while Lawrence Eagleburger 
was a former Ambassador to Yugoslavia under Jimmy Carter, and both had worked with 
Yugoslav firms on behalf of Kissinger Associates while out of office. Eagleburger would be 
dubbed “Lawrence of Serbia” by critics of the US policy who regarded him as Pro-Serb, although 
the then Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jezensky noted that “in our several encounters he did 
not show such a bias at all”.81  
 While the Bush team’s Pro-Serbain bias was largely mythical, senior 
Administration officials had other biases which influenced their manner of response to the 
Congressional pressure on Yugoslavia. The most prominent of these appears to have been a bias 
towards excessive self-confidence. Senior officials trusted their own knowledge, experience, and 
judgement, doubting the value of external advice. “The closeness and congeniality among the 
key cabinet officers and their deputies, including particularly Deputy Secretary of State Larry 
Eagleburger, also had the effect of narrowing the range of opinions and options that found their 
way into the policy debate”, Robert Hutchings would reflect later.82 This was matched by a 
distrust towards those outside the magic circle on the part of many Administration officials, 
which Hutchings himself reflected in his opinions of the intelligence community. “The 
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intelligence community’s role was to demonstrate that any possible course of action was 
fraught with danger or otherwise doomed to fail, while advancing the seemingly inconsistent 
view that events in the outside world were driven by deep impersonal forces not susceptible to 
human intervention”, he would recall later, in a logically ironic justification for freezing the 
intelligence Community out of the policy debates.83 Mark Danner, in the New York Review of 
Books, concluded of the Bush team, “their information on and familiarity with Yugoslavia was 
quite out of date, and yet because they had a sense of the place and thought they knew what 
was going on there, they felt they could rely on their instincts and ignore the reporting coming 
out of the country”.84  
The culture of the Bush Administration also bred doubts about Marković’s prospects. 
According to his biographer, David Schmitz, “Scowcroft believed that the Reagan Administration, 
having first gone too far to one extreme with its bellicose attacks on the Soviet Union and its 
attempts to win the Cold War through an arms race in the first term”, then swung too far, based 
on “an unwarranted assumption that the changes in Soviet attitudes and rhetoric, or perhaps 
the accession of Gorbachev to power, signaled the end of the forty-year confrontation between 
East and West”.85 Marković looked dangerously like a discount Gorbachev, and the 
Administration never fully invested in Marković to the same degree as the State Department. Of 
the 56 recorded meetings of the full National Security Council between 1989 and 1991, not a 
single one listed Yugoslavia as the main item on the agenda.86 President Bush had four 
conversations with Yugoslav leaders: a meeting on September 25th 1989 with Presidency head 
Janez Drnovšek; another with newly-appointed Prime Minister Ante Marković on October 13th 
1989; a phone conference with Borislav Jović, chair of the collective presidency, on October 1st 
1990; and a final phone call with Marković again on May 20th 1991, during which he urged the 
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Prime Minister to seek EC mediation.87 If there was a “Marković strategy”, it was carried out by 
the Department of State, not the President or his inner circle. The choice of Zimmerman, who 
as US representative to the CSCE was closely identified with support for human rights and 
democracy in Eastern Europe, was motivated less by a desire to support human rights in 
Yugoslavia than to appease Congressional sentiment.88 The Administration never seriously 
asked Congress for money to support Marković’s reforms.  
Marković was unable to charm Congress into compensating for the lack of executive 
branch engagement. “When Marković visited the United States in the fall of 1989, there was a 
disastrous meeting on the Hill with a number of Senators and Congressmen in which Marković 
was blamed for everything Milošević was doing despite the fact that he totally disapproved of it 
and there was nothing he could do about it”, Zimmerman bemoaned in 1996, “There was just 
very little understanding on the Hill of the particular dilemma that this very good man who was 
trying to create a western style market economy and democracy, the difficulties he was 
having.”89 Congress showed virtually zero interest in Yugoslavia’s economic problems, preferring 
to view national issues purely through an ethnic lens. Senate Hearings held in February 1991 on 
“Civil Strife in Yugoslavia” presented a forum for representatives from various ethnic lobby 
groups, such as the Slovenian-American Heritage Foundation, the Albanian American Civic 
League, and the Croatian American Association, to express their demands, and for members of 
Congress to pander to them. While the Serbian American Federation was represented by a 
single speaker, no member of the Senate was willing to speak on behalf of the Serbian position, 
requiring Representative Helen Bentley of Illinois to make the trek from the House.90 Assistant 
Secretary of State James Dobbins was treated like a hostile witness, forced to ward off claims by 
Senator Joe Biden that he “did not recall the Administration being so insistent on Soviet Unity” 
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and that the US risked “being more Yugoslav than the Yugoslavs”.91 Senate Republican leader 
Robert Dole of Kansas attacked Zimmerman directly, complaining that “In August 1990, I led a 
Senate delegation to Yugoslavia and stopped in Zagreb, Belgrade and Priština. Albanians were 
beaten and tear-gassed in our presence, but  Zimmerman seemed more concerned that we 
emphasize support for the unity of Yugoslavia - insisting that we include such a statement in our 
press release”.92  
It was testament to just how limited the resources Zimmerman had to work with were 
that he struggled to support Yugoslav unity in press releases.  Had the Yugoslav republics been 
able to reach an agreement even on a new constitutional order, the US would have been hard 
pressed to find it acceptable without a restoration of full Albanian autonomy in Kosovo. Aware 
of this, the Slovenes, who had hitherto cared so little about the Kosovar Albanians they had 
objected to subsidising in their provinces, became champions of their rights.93 “Slovenes did not 
want anything more to do with the Balkans, to which Croatia, with its many tangled issues, still 
very much belonged”, observed Viktor Meier, otherwise a Slovene apologist.94  The Slovenes 
had this luxury, enjoying a homogenous existence at the margins of Yugoslavia. The Serbs, by 
contrast, spread throughout Yugoslavia, with substantial minorities in Croatia, Bosnia, and 
Kosovo, could not so easily place economic self-interest above security, nor could the Croats, 
who would have to deal with a Serb minority, or Bosnian Muslims who would have to deal with 
a Republic in which, despite representing a plurality, were outnumbered by Serbs and Croats, 
neither of whom would accept the rule of the other. 
If Milošević made a single decision that led to the break-up of Yugoslavia, it was to 
encourage rather than try and prevent Slovene secession. Janez Drnovšek recalls that, in August 
1990, when he was serving as chair of the Yugoslav Federal Presidency, “Milošević and Borisav 
Jović informed him that Slovenia would be allowed to depart the federation peacefully on the 
basis of a referendum”. Milan Slovene President Kučan conceded in turn, after a meeting on 
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January 24th 1991, that “Yugoslavia should respect the right of the Serb nation to live in one 
state”.95 The Serbs would have happily let the Slovenes abandon Yugoslavia, and the Slovenes 
were happy to abandon the Albanians, but the Croatians would have no such option for an 
amicable settlement, and the option of compromise that they did have was dashed when the 
Croatian electorate followed their Slovene counterparts to the polls.  
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The General and the shadow of history 
  
 
The results of the first multiparty elections in Yugoslavia, held in Slovenia on April 8th 
1990 did not upset the American calculations. In a meeting of opposition politicians with 
Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger during a visit to Belgrade, Peter Jambrek, 
representing the Slovenian opposition (DEMOS), both expressed confidence in forming the next 
government, and “was the only one in the room who answered yes when Eagleburger asked if 
anyone favored the end of Yugoslavia as a unified country”.96  Neither Eagleburger nor 
Zimmerman paid much attention to another guest at the event, Vladmir Šeks, who represented 
the Croatian Democratic Union, a party running in Croatia’s upcoming elections.  Šeks added to 
the impression that he was a crank representing a fringe outfit when he launched into a long 
argument supporting the expansion of Croatia into Bosnia.97 Most observers expected a victory 
for the reformed Croatian Communist party under Ivica  Račan over an opposition divided 
between the right-leaning HDZ led by former General Franjo Tudjman and a liberal coalition led 
by former Croatian Spring-era party leaders.98 With the anti-Communist vote split, the superior 
resources of the apparatus of the party which had governed Croatia for 45 years should have 
carried  Račan’s party to victory.  It came as a shock when, three weeks after the Slovene 
elections, the Croatian Democratic Union won a majority of the Croatian Parliamentary seats, 
albeit with only 42% of the votes cast.99 
The Communists had “failed to reckon with the outside money that flowed from 
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Croatian emigrants, mostly in the United States and Canada to Franjo Tudjman's Croatian 
Democratic Union, or with the highly effective nationalist campaign Tudjman had the resource 
to run”.100 Žarko Puhovski, a professor of political philosophy at Zagreb University and a 
frequent critic of the government, recalls the impact of the campaign well. "We were shocked”, 
he said, "Tudjman at this point was just a retired general sitting in a cafe, and suddenly he had 
more money than anybody. It dominated everything”. [Later Defense Minister Gojko] Sušak 
said: "It was maybe a couple of million dollars”, shrugging modestly, then breaking into a wide 
grin, "But here it was like it was a trillion. We had posters all over”.101   
A victory “bought” on these terms was, from the outset, at risk of being mortgaged to 
the right-wing émigrés who had financed it. While the vast majority of the party’s 1990 voters 
had little in common with Susak, who as a Herzegovinian was not even from Croatia proper, the 
money vital for victory had come from abroad, where Tudjman had sought to tie the HDZ to 
Croatian nationalist traditions while keeping such links in the background at home. “There will 
not be revenge, the HDZ will come out for full equality of all citizens in Croatia”, regardless of 
their ethnicity”, Tudjman promised before the second round of voting. 102  To counteract any 
association with exiled apologists for the World War II fascist regime, Tudjman cited his family’s 
role in fighting the Ustaše during the Second World War, a struggle in which the future Croatian 
leader lost his younger brother. Tudjman expressed vitriol and contempt for those on the far-
right who embraced Ustaša symbols, condemning them as, “misled youth or fanatics who 
cannot -they have not realized that Germany could not have been built on Hitler, they have not 
realized that Croatia could not be built on [Ante] Pavelić[Ustaše wartime leader] and therefore, 
they are unintentionally, serving their opponents”.103  Tudjman nonetheless showed a 
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willingness to let bygones be bygones, at least among Croats, warning his advisers “we must not 
forget that the majority of Croatians were in favor of NDH not the Ustašas but the NDH”, and 
welcomed their support. “I do not care if he was an Ustaša in the World War Two. I care that he 
is a Croat, that doesn't preach Ustaša ideology.104 He even drew an equivalency with Serbian 
history, informing an interviewer in 1993 “Not all Ustašas in the Independent State of Croatia 
(NDH) were fascists, not all committed crimes, just as from the Serbian point of view, not all 
Chetniks were fascists and perpetrators of crimes”.105 
In 1990, Tudjman needed the votes of Croats who did not care for the WWII regime, 
and the money of émigrés who expressed a nostalgia for it.  Furthermore, achieving power did 
not negate Tudjman’s need for émigré money. Their support was useful for remaining in power 
because they were rich and powerless within Croatia.  Without a firm domestic base, émigrés 
like Sušak could wield influence in Croatia only through Tudjman. In turn, the émigrés’ 
relationship was with Tudjman rather than the HDZ as such, and hence only Tudjman could 
access the émigré community’s financial and other resources. Tudjman was as indispensable to 
the HDZ as Tito had been to the Yugoslav Communist party. Any effort by the HDZ’s domestic 
wing to oppose him would encounter his control of finances, whereas attempts by the émigrés 
to act independently would founder due to a lack of support. Playing the factions off was 
central to Tudjman’s political strategy until his death, as  Mesić and a host of would-be émigré 
power-brokers would learn at the cost of their career.106  Tudjman “publicly supported the 
moderate, reformist line on most issues, privately he consistently protected and supported the 
minority hardline conservatives and their policies”.107  The HDZ might have been in power and 
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may have included diverse figures and factions but none were capable of taking action 
independently of Franjo Tudjman. 
Tudjman took power at a moment when the actions of the Federal emilitary authorities 
had created a feeling of crisis among large parts of the Croatian population that were not 
conducive to magnanimity. With the cooperation of local officers in the local Territorial Defense 
Force formations, the JNA launched a campaign to seize the Croatian and Slovenia TOs’ 
weapons the very day the new DEMOS government was due to take office in Slovenia, and 
between the Croatian elections’ first and second rounds. The Slovenes had prepared for this 
move, and were able to save more than half of the weaponry. In Croatia, where Račan had yet 
to hand over power to Tudjman, the disarmament proceeded more successfully.108  The greatest 
impact of the Army’s action was political rather than military in nature. The perception that 
Serbian officers of the TO and the Croatian Ministry of the Interior had cooperated with the 
Army provided a pretext for purging the security services.109 This transformed the Croatian 
police into a political army of the HDZ.  Miroslav Tudjman, the President’s son and head of 
domestic intelligence, recalled how the “Croatian political leadership recommended that in 
newly created IC [intelligence community], only young persons should be employed, that do not 
have any communist past, that were proven patriots”.110  
If Tudjman believed in reconciliation between Croats across ideological lines, he did not 
extend this generosity to Serbs. “Tito let the Serbs discriminate against us”, Tudjman explained 
to Ambassador Zimmerman on the morning of his election victory.111 Reversing this meant not 
only ensuring the police and TO’s “loyalty”, but also reconstructing the cultural environment 
that, in his view, had “destroyed the moral values of Croatian society”.112 ”Serbs are 11% of the 
population, but they make up 40% of government workers”, he told Zimmerman, and “in the 
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police and media the situation is even worse. Seventy-five percent of police are ethnic Serbs, 
and so are six and a half of the seven top editors.”113 114 Regardless of the accuracy of the 
numbers, which seem to have excluded those who identified as Yugoslavs or other non-Croat 
categories from the 11% estimate of Croatia’s overall Serb population but then cited the % of 
non-Croats within given institutions, it demonstrated that the Croatian president saw 
proportionality, not civic equality, as “fairness”.  
There is a parallel with the way in which Kosovo had become a symbol for Serbs, where 
it was necessary not only to remedy the Serbs’ actual concerns within the region but also 
symbolically to reinforce their victory by destroying any Albanian “claim” through autonomy. 
Similarly, HDZ went beyond the needs of pragmatism and sought to obliterate the idea that 
anyone other than the Croats had a rightful claim to Croatia. The new Croatian Parliament 
adopted the checkerboard flag used by the 1941-45 NDH which Tudjman defended by pointing 
to its usage since medieval times.115 The new constitution altered the definition of Croatia from 
the  ”national state of the Croats, the state of the Serbian people in Croatia, and the state of 
nationalities who live there” to one where the Serbs were just another minority, and refused to 
budge in the face of Serb outrage and American pressure on a matter of wording.116 The names 
of Marshal Tito and other “antifascist” fighters vanished from streets names to be replaced with 
those of individuals who, in many cases, had supported the other side in 1941-45.117 This 
seemed nonsensical to outsiders such as Zimmerman, and Hutchings, who described Tudjman 
as “a romantic lost in dreams of a glorious Croatian past that never was”, but so was the Serbian 
leadership, investing enormous political capital in a struggle to control a Kosovo which was less 
than 20% Serbian.118 It was also very real to the Serbs of Croatia, who had experienced 
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genocide at the hands of Ante Pavelic’s forces using the exact same checkerboard flag, and 
proclaiming many of the same slogans that were used during the Second World War.119 
The new Croatian leadership envisioned an independent Croatian nation. Tudjman 
spoke, in his victory speech, of the “1000-year dream” of Croatian independence, and the first 
HDZ Prime Minister Stipe Mesić, who would later break with Tudjman, said the goal of 
independence was set but the timeline was open to discussion. “One could not fix a deadline 
for this aim”, according to Mesić, “or say whether it would become reality immediately or only 
in 10 years. The eventual goal, however, was fixed”.120 Nonetheless, Croatia’s claim to the land 
populated by ethnic Serbs rested on Yugoslavian law, and Tudjman maintained Croatian support 
for Federal institutions as long as they exerted some influence on the JNA’s actions.121  
Relations with the US were initially coolZimmerman shared the sentiment of most of 
his subordinates in the region in 1989, who were also apt to see in the HDZ a dangerous revival 
of Ustaša memories. Robert Rackmales, his deputy in Belgrade, recalled that “Well, relations 
were strained with Tudjman too because what immediately happened is that...and he had some 
very unsavory characters coming in, he brought some people back from the United States with 
World War II backgrounds”.122  Tudjman resented this, often citing extensive criticism of the US 
in the local press, but ultimately “Tudjman knew very well that his only chance of achieving 
independence was with a degree of western sympathy. So he would never have stiff-armed the 
United States the way Milošević did”.123 The Croatian state media highlighted any signs of 
recognition from Washington, such as when the state press reported in 1990 that “that “Dr. 
Tuđjman (...) informed President Bush of the situation in Croatia and Yugoslavia”. The meeting 
 
119 Bookbinder, Paul, ‘A Bloody Tradition: Ethnic Cleansing in World War II Yugoslavia’, New England Journal of 
Public Policy, 2005, 19:2, pp99-109. 
120 Judah. Tim, Croatia Reborn New York Review of Books August 10th 2000 Issue 
http://www.nybooks.com.gate3.library.lse.ac.uk/articles/2000/08/10/croatia-reborn: Accessed January 15 2018 
121 Presidential transcript of the Minutes taken at the 39th session of the Supreme State Council of the Republic of 
Croatia, November 18th 1991 Annex III p. 8 
http://icr.icty.org/LegalRef/CMSDocStore/Public/English/Motions/NotIndexable/IT-04-
74/MOT7245R0000324738.pdf: Accessed January 12th 2019   
122 Interview with Robert Rackmales by Charles Kennedy” May 11, 1995, in “Yugoslavia Country Reader” p.533 
http://www.adst.org/Readers/Yugoslavia.pdf: Accessed June 11th 2019   
123 Ibid., p.533. 
 59 
with Bush lasted under two minutes.124  
Tudjman lacked the ability to destroy or save Yugoslavia in 1990. While Tudjman had 
the power to intensify or deescalate the Serbs-Croats conflict within Croatia, it was beyond his 
ability to prevent Slovenia from leaving Yugoslavia. Once Slovenia left, conflict between Croats 
and Serbs within Croatia would become unavoidable not due to ancient hatreds or present 
fears, but because of insoluble differences over the future. It would be unacceptable to even 
the most Federalist Croats to remain in a Yugoslavia without Slovenia, and most Croatian Serbs 
shunned the prospect of becoming a minority in even a tolerant, independent Croatia. Tudjman 
and Milošević treated the ethnic tensions within Croatia, not as a conflict to be solved, but as an 
opportunity to maneuver for position prior to the real struggle which would follow Slovenia’s 
departure. Both Milošević and Tudjman used the conflict to consolidate their respective 
positions as leaders of their people rather than as chief executives of their republic. This cast 
both leaders as villains in the eyes of Warren Zimmerman, who maintained that, if the Serbs 
could merely be persuaded to extend autonomy to the Kosovar Albanians, and the Croats to 
their Serbs, somehow this would influence the Slovenes and Yugoslavia would be saved.   
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US-Serbian Relations 
 
If the Slovenes and Croats were moving away from even a limited federal model for 
Yugoslavia, far more the democratic one envisaged by Marković, the group with the most to 
lose if the federal project failed was also on poor terms with the US. The Serbs had every 
reason of wish to preserve Yugoslavia, given their distribution across the republics of Bosnia 
and Croatia but, rather than serving as allies, they became the major targets of Zimmerman’s 
resentment and ultimately the scapegoat for his failure. 
Early on, Zimmerman came into conflict with Serbian president Slobodan Milošević, 
who had invited the foreign diplomatic corps to an event in Kosovo marking the 600th 
anniversary of the 1389 Serbian battle. Zimmerman, after calling a meeting of his staff at the 
embassy, decided not to attend, a decision also followed by the Western diplomatic corps with 
the exception of the Turkish Ambassador”, who said he went because he had a different view of 
the battle since his country had won it”.125 Milošević took the snub personally. ” Milošević was 
very upset, I learned later. He blamed me for the fact that almost none of the western 
embassies had gone, and he decided simply to refuse to see me”, Zimmerman recalled later. 
“That was a boycott that lasted until January of 1990, so I had been in the country almost a year 
before I got to see the primary politician in it.”126 
Zimmerman seemed to relish his non-relations with Milošević as proof of virtue.127 
Milošević may have responded by refusing to receive Zimmerman for almost a year, a mistake 
he later regretted but. from the perspective of Zimmerman’s objective – preserving Yugoslavia, 
improving Kosovo’s human rights situation – preemptively destroying a relationship with one of 
Yugoslavia’s most powerful figures, especially over a purely symbolic matter, was unproductive 
and petty.  Rather than initiating reconciliation, Zimmerman openly cultivated the Serbian 
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opposition, especially Vuk Drašković and his wife, who dined regularly at the embassy.128 
Milošević himself told Zimmerman’s successor, Rudy Perina, that Zimmerman was plotting with 
Drašković to kill him.129 Had that been so, it would have made the policy pursued regarding the 
Serbian leader more justifiable from the perspective of American interests, indicating that, 
rather than intending to irritate and provoke the problem (Milošević), Zimmerman’s dalliance 
with the Serbian opposition was an effort to remove it. Instead, Zimmerman merely ensured 
that his advice carried no weight with Milošević or his inner circle.  
In alienating Milošević, Zimmerman misjudged the nature of his mission. Congressional 
interest in US Yugoslav policy was driven by ”human rights” issues, and appeasing domestic 
criticism motivated the Bush Administration, but US policy embraced the actor, Marković, who 
represented issues that Congress did not care about – economic reform, unity – and alienated 
the actors who could influence the situation on the ground in Kosovo or Croatia; namely, 
Milošević and Tudjman. This was unfortunate - as the Serbs could not impose a settlement on 
the other republics of Yugoslavia, they could, as Zimmerman found with Marković’s lack of 
influence over Kosovo, block one. Moreover, ultimately, while recognising that both the Serbs 
and Slovenes were threats to “democracy” and “unity”, Zimmerman adopted a policy of 
coercion towards the former and appeasement towards the latter. This could not be justified on 
any grounds apart from personal hostility towards Milošević; namely, the reality that the goals 
of American policy, economic reform and democratisation, required Serbia to pay the 
transaction costs. Serbia, with much of Yugoslavia’s outdated heavy industry and loss-making 
state companies, would suffer from any transition to a liberal market. Simultaneously, Serbia 
was being told that it had to “give up” Kosovo for Yugoslavia to join Europe. American officials 
such as Zimmerman were dimly aware of Kosovo’s importance to to Serbs on an intellectual 
level, and accepted that Serbs had been mistreated under Albanian rule; Zimmerman later said 
that “on a scale of 10, we could say what the Serbs were doing to the Albanians was about nine, 
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but what the Albanians had been doing to the Serbs was about three”.130 The US could seek to 
secure minority rights for Serbs in the province, and discourage Albanian moves to secede from 
Yugoslavia but Zimmerman called it an outrage that “Serbs are running Kosovo against the 
wishes of 90% of the people who live there”.131  
Nonexistent Serb-American relations rendered Zimmerman’s hostility towards Tudjman 
an irritant rather than a threat to the Croatian leader. While finding Milošević malicious, 
Zimmerman had only contempt for a whom Tudjman he saw “not only as an ardent nationalist, 
which he was, but as an almost buffoon– like character, temperamental, humorless, racist 
toward Serbs, probably anti-Semitic, given to pomposity, and often poorly briefed”.132 Whatever 
Tudjman’s moral character, this was a blatant underestimation of a man who had already 
demonstrated the political skills to run circles around Milošević and perceive how Zimmerman’s 
feud with Milošević created a climate in which Tudjman could operate secure in the knowledge 
that, whatever issues he might have with Zimmerman, America would never back his Serbian 
enemies. The US had no leverage over anyone. The Serbs had no reason to work with an actor 
whom they regarded as hostile, the Slovenes knew the US would not coerce them, and the 
Croats knew that, whatever the US thought of them, it disliked the Serbs more.   
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Sleepwalking towards Calamity 
 
By the end of 1990, it was evident that Marković’s program was in trouble.  “Faced with 
deepening national divisions, growing economic difficulties, and Republic’s leaderships 
determined to go their own ways, Yugoslav federal institutions are divided and increasingly 
irrelevant”,133 Zimmerman wrote to Washington on September 27th 1990.134 Zimmerman had no 
difficulty identifying the causes of failure. “Marković’s efforts to straddle the fence on such 
controversial issues as confederation versus federation and Kosovo have eventually led to an 
erosion of support for his government”, reported the Ambassador, unhelpfully failing to suggest 
which positions Marković should have adopted on those issues.135  Writing four years later, 
Slaven Letica was blunter, writing in a review of Zimmerman’s memoirs, “Unfortunately, Ante 
Marković is, like Warren Zimmermann himself, more of a loser”.136  
American Intelligence Agencies agreed with Letica’s assessment. On October 18th 1990, 
a National Intelligence Estimate entitled “Yugoslavia Transformed” was submitted to the 
National Security Council. Compiled by a team consisting of representatives of the Central 
Intelligence Agency(CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency(DIA), National Security Agency(NSA), and 
the Department of State, it predicted that Yugoslavia “will cease to function as a federal state 
within one year, and will probably dissolve within two”.137 “[T]he economic reform launched by 
then-Federal Prime Minister Marković and his effort to create an all-Yugoslav political party”,  
would be unlikely to succeed as “it is highly improbable that Slovenia and Croatia will agree to 
surrender the authority to the federal government that he has sought in order to implement the 
reform's next phase”. Noting that “the key question for Serbia is the fate” of the Serbs who 
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dwell outside the borders of Serbia”, it predicted that “the most plausible scenario for inter-
republic violence is one in which Serbia, assisted by disaffected Serbian minorities in the other 
republics, moves to reincorporate disputed territory into a greater Serbia, with attendant and 
bloody shifts of population”.138 As for the American options, “Any US Statements in support the 
territorial integrity of the old federation will be used by federal leaders to strengthen their case 
against republic attempts to assert their independence”, while “statements by US officials on 
behalf of national self-determination will be used out of context by republic leaders to rally 
support within their national constituencies against central control”.139 
According to Hutchings, “No one in the policy community disagreed with the main 
thrust of these judgements -only with the smug finality with which they were rendered”, yet on 
September 27th 1990, Zimmerman sent a wire to Assistant Secretary of State for European 
Affairs Thomas Niles, possibly in response to the NIE, entitled “Whither Yugoslavia?” Warning 
that “over the next six months or so Yugoslavia is almost certain to experience a period of 
heightened change, instability and turmoil, as various efforts are made to come up with a new 
Yugoslav architecture”, he conceded that “Whether Yugoslavia will ultimately survive this 
process as a united country is an open question”, adding “we are not counting her out yet”.140 
Zimmerman’s optimism was encouraged by his personal contacts,  noting that “while almost all 
Yugoslavs, including senior officials, acknowledge that a breakup of Yugoslavia is possible, at 
this point, few officials, judge a split to be inevitable”, and “Former Yugoslav President 
Drnovšek – a pro-Yugoslav Slovene – recently put the odds of Yugoslav survival at 50/50 in a 
private interview”.141   
Scant attention is paid to the individual actors or to the “nationalist” factors in the NIE 
report, where the major focus is on economic and constitutional differences. Serbian, Slovenian, 
Albanian, and Croatian nationalism only feature as a consequence of the breakdown of the 
state due to the preceding factors. The “fate of the Serbs who dwell outside the borders of 
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Serbia” is a vital problem, but one which will only arise when Yugoslavia no longer exists. By 
contrast, Zimmerman’s cables seemed to blame all of Yugoslavia’s problems on Tudjman and 
Milošević. Zimmerman called Milošević “one of the most duplicitous politicians the Balkans has 
ever produced”, declaring “I have no doubt if Milošević’s parents had committed suicide before 
his birth rather than after I would not be writing a cable about the death of Yugoslavia”.142 
Tudjman’s victory, “brought to power a crypto-racist regime hostile to Serbia and to the 
Yugoslavia it erroneously believed Serbia controlled.143 To argue that Yugoslavia’s problems 
were solvable, Zimmerman embraced the belief they were the artificial result of individual 
actors. If the resurgence of nationalism was being stirred up by a conspiracy of Milošević, the 
Serbian secret police, and Tudjman, then their removal would banish those tensions also. In a 
level of denial bordering on rewriting history, Zimmerman would assert in 1992 that “Slovenia 
would almost certainly have tried to remain in Yugoslavia if Serbia had a less aggressive 
leader”.144 Zimmerman provided Washington with a counterview intelligence assessment so 
“deterministic that it suggested no possible avenue for American policy that might avert or at 
least contain the violence attending Yugoslavia’s seemingly inevitable disintegration”.145 What 
he failed to do was provide it with a viable policy. Nowhere was this more evident than in his 
dealings with the army.  
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Building to a Crisis 
 
Zimmerman’s actor-based analysis exercised a pernicious influence over his judgement. 
Zimmerman blamed Milošević’s actions in Kosovo for the decline in federal authority, rather 
than seeing that decline as contributing to Milošević’s success. Similarly, Zimmerman seemed to 
view the tensions between the Army and Republican militias, not as an outgrowth of political 
tensions, but rather as the result of distrust and misunderstanding. It would be enough to lobby 
the individual actors to remain in communication with each other, and to avoid actions like 
trying to disarm the paramilitaries which might “raise tensions”. To the half-Serb/half-Croat 
Minister of Defense Veljko Kadijević, the Ambassador conceded that “the Yugoslav army had a 
point in its desire to prevent the proliferation of armies in the still-sovereign state of Yugoslavia” 
and that “after all the United States had fought a rebel confederate army to maintain its unity, 
as Kadijević never tired of reminding me”.146 The proliferation of Armies was a political problem 
and Zimmerman instructed Kadijević on December 11th 1990 that “the proper role of a military 
is to defend the country, not to engage in domestic politics.147 Two months later, following 
revelations of Croatian arms’ smuggling, Zimmerman warned Kadijević that Yugoslavia could not 
be held together by force”.148 Zimmerman told Chief of Staff Blagoje Adžić that “the JNA was in 
danger of losing its favorable impression in my country. The threat of force against Croatia was 
going down badly…I urged a reasonable dialogue, without accusations and smear tactics. I 
assured Adžić that we were pressing the same approach on Tudjman”.149  
Many American policy-makers would come to regret the JNA’s failure to intervene. 
Craig Nathan, writing for the US Department of Defense, suggested that “in the confused 
circumstances of  1990-91 the JNA would have been acting within its prerogative had  it seized 
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the initiative, declared a state of emergency as a pretext for dismissing nationalist leaders in 
Ljubljana, Zagreb, and Belgrade”.150 While believing that “forces in the Fifth Military 
Region[encompassing Slovenia and much of Croatia] are among the Army's most capable units 
and probably could seize key republic facilities such as government buildings and 
communications facilities within hours,” CIA Analysts worried “the discipline of enlisted men 
would be gravely tested by orders to fire on civilians or even on TO units.”151 Consequently, 
“sustained or large-scale violence, as would probably occur in fighting against Slovene or 
Croatian forces, would, in our view, shatter the troops' discipline, carrying a risk that “the Army 
would probably fracture along ethnic lines, leading to wholesale desertions and intra-unit 
violence”.152 The JNA would get one shot, and it was on the issue of defining a political objective 
that its efforts would fail. 
The Yugoslav Army’s tragedy was not that the US prevented action, but that the Army 
could never decide where to aim its single shot. Borislav Jović later recollected his thoughts 
about the generals in April 1990: 
 
If they {generals] meet resistance I ask them whether we are in a position after that to get other 
democratically elected authorities that will be on our side. No response....we will not be able to 
find new democratic authorities, there will be bloodshed, we will have to enforce martial law for 
at least a year, we will be isolated from the world, through such action we would disrupt any 
effort for a peaceful solution to the political crisis, speed up Slovenia's secession, and reinforce 
the Albanians' resistance.153 
 
While united by a desire to remove Kučan and Tudjman, the Army could never decide 
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with whom they wished to replace the republican leaders. Future Croatian Chief of Staff 
General Anton Tus, then commanding the Yugoslav Air Force, recalled that “the West was not 
disinclined to tacitly support a coup d'état. My proposal was that Marković, in the capacity of 
prime minister should take over the Ministry of Defense and try to prevent a coup, both in 
Belgrade and in 'recalcitrant' republics”.154 The Army’s desire to receive orders from someone 
was demonstrated by the events surrounding the failure to elect Stipe Mesić as Yugoslav 
President. Arguing that, as a member of the pro-independence HDZ, Stipe Mesić could hardly 
be expected loyally to execute the duties of a President of a state whom he wished to cease to 
exist, on May 15th 1991, the Serbian bloc called for a vote, producing a 4-4 deadlock, leaving 
Yugoslavia without an executive.155 Janez Dronvšek, the Slovene representative on the 
Presidency, saw “the crucial question at the time was who would control the army”, an 
interpretation that led to speculation that the army was behind the move to block Mesić.156 157 
“The supreme commander of the armed forces can transfer the execution of definite actions of 
commanding and leading the armed forces to the federal secretary for national defense”, 
stated Article 20 of the Constitution, implying that, if the President were unable or unwilling to 
function, control of the army then devolved to the Secretary of National Defense.158 Tudjman 
himself saw the army’s hand behind the blocking of Mesić, informing the French daily 
newspaper Le Monde on April 17th that “The army cannot prevent Croatia from becoming a 
democratic country”.159   
It served the Croatian leadership’s purposes to claim that the army was behind the 
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obstruction of Mesić, but this appears to have been untrue. Jović himself maintained that the 
motivation for blocking Mesić’s accession had less to do with his views on Yugoslavia, and more 
with the lines of communication that the liberal Mesić kept open with the Serbian opposition, 
regarding which he was arguably a worse offender than more hardline members of the HDZ.160 
Rather than conniving over the move, the Army refused to take power, displaying behavior that 
Jović termed frivolous.161  Jović recalls that both Kadijević and Adžić confronted himself and 
Milošević after Mesić was blocked, with Kadijević calling this a “mistake”, and Adžić threating to 
arrest the Serbian leadership.162 At a time when the Army was searching for a source of 
authority and legitimacy, the decision to block Mesić, leaving the Presidency paralysed, denied 
it both when the clock was kicking down to the scheduled date of Slovenia’s seccession on June 
26th. 
Zimmerman joined Kadijević and Adžić in blaming Milošević for the crisis. “The first 
thing is that Slobodan Milošević and nobody else started this crisis, and he, along with his ally 
Jović, is pushing it to dangerous extremes”, Zimmerman cabled on May 20th.163 The Ambassador 
was correct insofar as he blamed Milošević for the crisis, but he proceeded to extend his case 
too far, concluding that Milošević’s action represented not only a preconceived plot against 
Yugoslavia, but the only plot against Yugoslavia then in motion. “In his[Milošević’s] tactics 
against Croatian President Tudjman, he has won every time, his negotiating techniques leaving 
the slower witted Tudjman gasping for breath”, Zimmerman informed Washington, proceeding 
to warn that Slovenia would do “exactly what Milošević wants”; i.e. push for unilateral 
secession, “something Kučan understands”, but “the Slovenes are too self-absorbed to care 
[about Yugoslavia]”.164 Zimmerman believed that the independence deadline announced by the 
Slovenes and Croats on June 26th was a negotiating tactic to force the seating of Mesić. The 
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Croatian leadership believed that the Presidency’s destruction would merely free up the army 
to attack Tudjman’s government, as confirmed by Kadijević’s memoirs.165 Tudjman was fully 
aware that Croatia was in no position to resist such a move.166 Zimmerman allowed his 
obsession with Milošević to cause him to ignore the Slovenes’ behaviour, who by this point were  
pursuing independence without “regard for what they knew would be tragic consequences for 
others”, according to David Gompart of the US National Security Council.167 They had 
announced their intention to leave Yugoslavia on June 26th 1991 back in December 1990, long 
before Mesić’s seating had ever become an issue, and and Mesić’s non-election is not even 
mentioned on the Slovene government’s official timeline of Yugoslavia’s dissolution.168 
This was the context in which Secretary of State James Baker arrived in Belgrade on 
June 19th. Hitherto, Yugoslavia had attracted scant high-level attention. Defense Secretary Dick 
Cheney’s planned visit to Belgrade in 1990 had been scrapped out of concern regarding the 
behavior of the army in Croatia and Kosovo.169 On May 20th, President Bush spoke with Prime 
Minister Marković on the phone, pledging full US support for Yugoslav unity, but this was 
followed by a suggestion that Marković should look elsewhere for action. Bush proposed that 
Marković seek EC or other international mediation, asking if there was anything in his power 
that he could do to assist.170 Baker’s visit was not a result of this discussion, but rather of a 
diplomatic accident. Secretary of State Baker had been planning to visit Albania following a 
CSCE summit in June, and was informed that failing to visit Belgrade while stopping in Tirana 
would be seen as an insult. Consequently, he added a day-long trip to the Yugoslav capital to his 
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itinerary.171 Zimmerman, in his memoirs, implies that Baker arrived with the authority to make 
a concrete offer of economic aid, debt forgiveness, and with European consent, the prospect of 
accelerated entry to the European Community if Yugoslavia remained united.172 This ad hoc 
origin squares more with the confused messages delivered over the course of the Secretary’s 
visit, which was undertaken without a full staff.173 As for the “authority”, economic aid, debt 
forgiveness, and possible EC membership were for Europe to grant, not America. Congress did 
not authorize any new aid and, having refused to do so when Kosovo was the only issue at 
stake in 1990, was highly unlikely to do so when conflict in that province had been compounded 
by fighting in Croatia. Baker was in Belgrade publicly as a representative of the CSCE, and only 
informally of the US.  
The ambiguous origins of Baker’s mission help to explain its message’s ambiguous 
interpretation. Over a period of fewer than 24 hours, Baker met with Marković, along with the 
six republics’ leaders. His remarks often seemed more like a stream of frustrated consciousness 
than a fully scripted message. He warned  Slovenia against unilateral secession; Croatia that 
Yugoslavia’s breakup posed a military threat to the republic’s security; and Milošević that “in his 
opinion, Milošević had scuppered Marković’s program and blocked the appointment of the 
Croat Stipe Mesić, and was responsible for the civil war that the country was heading for”.174 
While all of this may well have been true, as Baker did not propose to do anything himself, or 
have the US do anything, it was reasonable for those whom he addressed to assume that he 
wished them to take action. By rebuking every interlocutor and actor in turn for their actions, 
he failed to clarify what they should do or, more importantly, what the US reaction to any 
further actions would be. Montenegrin President Momir Bulatović recalled that, in Baker’s 
briefing notes, “there were just two lines [about Montenegro]:—the smallest republic in 
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Yugoslavia.—a possible fifth vote for Mesić”. Bulatović recalled being informed that “if we didn't 
vote for Mesić, there would be a great crisis and war would start. I agreed with him that war 
would start, but I didn't expect Mesić's election would stop it”.175 The then-Slovenian Defense 
Minister Janez Janša recalls how “we received a report from the intelligence department 
according to which [US Secretary of State] Baker, after being presented with the ratio of forces 
between the defense capabilities of Slovenia and the units of the JNA, which was preparing 
itself for intervention, convinced himself of the possibility that the federal forces could put 
Slovenia in order in a little over two hours”.176 When fighting broke out, “the JNA generals 
believed, they claimed, that they were ‘only doing what Mr. Baker told them.”177 Drnovšek 
claims that the Secretary’s remarks served ”as a signal that the international community would 
turn a blind eye if the federal authorities wanted to settle the situation in Yugoslavia and ensure 
the continued functioning of the federation”.178 Baker himself insists that he argued against the 
use of force with Marković and the Army: “Resorting to force will be exploited by those who 
want to break up the union. The use of force would also lose for Yugoslavia the support of most 
of the international community”.179 Baker claims that he foresaw declarations of independence, 
but not military efforts to realise them. “I told the President [Bush] that we’d need to work with 
the Europeans to maintain a collective non-recognition policy against any republic that 
unilaterally declared independence, as a lever to moderate behavior”, Baker later wrote,180 but 
he had told Bulatović that what he wanted was Mesić’s election and Slovenia to remain in 
Yugoslavia, merely cautioning against the risk of using of force. Even within the Administration, 
there were those who felt that the nuance of any such message had been lost in translation. 
Hutchings, who admits to advocating for the visit, concedes that this was a “mistake”, and that 
“by warning equally against unilateral declarations of independence and the use of force to hold 
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the federation together, we seemed to be sanctioning the latter if the Slovenes and Croats 
resorted to the former”.181 Even German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher, who was 
later among the strongest champions of recognition for Slovenia and Croatia, only warned his 
Yugoslav counterpart, Budimir Lončar, “the YPA [JNA]  should not act rashly or irresponsibly”.182 
By warning them against “rash or irresponsible” action, he also implied that “action” itself could 
be justified. At most, Baker, by issuing warnings but failing to make demands, allowed his 
interlocutors to believe what they wished to believe, a dangerous error when dealing with 
desperate men. At a meeting with Jović and Milošević following Baker’s visit on June 21st, 
Kadijević declared “that Yugoslavia could be saved because Ante Marković was willing to help”, 
adding that “The only reason why the international community is against us is the Mesić issue. 
We have to rectify the situation. Tomorrow we have to appoint Mesić'”.183  
Baker’s visit did result in the election of Mesić to the Presidency. Nonetheless, it was 
universally considered a failure because avoiding conflict rather than Mesić’s election was the 
US goal. Baker’s failure to convey that message was to lead directly to the outbreak of violence 
upon Slovenia’s secession. That violence would then be used to justify a policy of 
disengagement on the part of the US. American officials who would blame Yugoslav politicians 
for failing to listen, rather than themselves for failing to speak clearly. “The United States went 
in there in the person of Jim Baker and said, ‘Here is how you should handle this. We don’t need 
a war in the heart of Europe, etc.’ But they were not going to listen”, recalled Margaret 
Tutwiler.184 “I think Baker knew at the time he came that the odds were long against his 
success”, Zimmerman spun in his usual manner, conceding that Baker “did the best he could 
with a very bad hand of cards, and he failed.”185  “The real impact of the visit was on U.S. policy, 
because the intractability of the conflict and the bloody-mindedness of republic leaders led 
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Secretary Baker and others to wash their hands of the whole mess”, Hutchings recalled.186  
Baker “thought they [Yugoslav leaders] were all to a greater or lesser extent, mostly greater, 
lying to him, dissembling”, Rackmales recalled later, adding “He also felt that he had gotten 
some assurances from the Slovenes that the Slovenes later said was just a misunderstanding on 
his part. So when the Slovenes a few days later went ahead and announced their independence, 
he felt personally betrayed.”187 “It was a war only extreme nationalists such as Slobodan 
Milošević and Franjo Tudjman could want”, Baker reflected, adding “Once unleashed the conflict 
acquired a perverse logic of its own.”188  
 
Was Failure Inevitable? 
 
It is easy to ascribe blame for Yugoslavia’s breakup, and various individuals have been 
attributed with responsibility for this. Slobodan Milošević’s takeover of the governments of 
Kosovo, Vojvodina, and Montenegro, along with their seats in the collective Presidency, created 
a security dilemma for the other republics. The victory of the HDZ at the Croatian elections and 
the subsequent provocations of Franjo Tudjman’s government created fear among the Serbian 
minority in Croatia, undermined moderates, and fed the flames of rebellion while provoking the 
Federal Army into barely concealed hostility. The Army, by repeatedly contemplating a coup 
but never acting, ensured that neither Croatia nor Slovenia could view the military as a neutral 
party and, as a consequence, its power seemed unlikely to survive any political settlement. The 
situation was arguably exacerbated by the changing international environment in which 
Yugoslavia’s importance was rapidly declining, there were global macroeconomic forces in the 
1980s against which Belgrade had no defence, and the outside actors appeared unwilling, 
particularly the US, to invest more than words in mitigating them. More tragically, the Gulf War, 
 
186 Hutchings, Robert, American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War (Johns Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, 
1997, pp.309-11). 
187 Interview with Robert Rackmales by Charles Kennedy” May 11, 1995, in “Yugoslavia Country Reader” p.533 
http://www.adst.org/Readers/Yugoslavia.pdf: Accessed October 13th 2015 
188 Baker, James, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace 1989-1992 (Perigee: New York, 1995, 
pp.478-483). 
 75 
and the rapidly-deteriorating situation in the Soviet Union meant that interested parties within 
the American Administration never took the time to reconcile their opposing views or to 
standardize the policy, with the result that, for over a year, Warren Zimmerman was allowed to 
run a borderline personal policy in which he appeared to view himself not as an outside referee 
but as a participant in the Yugoslav drama. 
If these factors made Yugoslavia’s collapse probably, it is unclear if any of them were 
responsible for its failure on June 26th 1991. Had Milošević not come to power, or the Serbs not 
seized control of four votes in the Federal Presidency, the threat of Serbian domination would 
have been removed, but the Yugoslav institutions would still have remained far too strong for 
the Slovenes yet far too weak for any serious economic reform of the type pushed by the 
international community. Had Tudjman and the HDZ failed to win the Croatian elections, or 
been less provocative once they did so, it would have been harder for Serbian radicals to find 
support and Croatia’s international image would have improved, but this may merely have 
delayed events rather than change them. Any Croatian government may have been forced to 
demand greater autonomy if not outright independence from a Yugoslavia lacking the Slovenes. 
Serbian radicals who identified any independent Croatian state with the Ustaše would still have 
pushed for “Serbian minority in Croatia” autonomy, still drawn support from a Serbian 
government that was anxious to avoid alienating nationalist opposition groups, and the border 
issue would still have become zero-sum. Moreover, it was unlikely that a military coup, had the 
Army leadership summoned the will to execute it, would have achieved anything more than 
provoking the conflict it wished to avoid.  
Only one actor had both the ability to decide whether Yugoslavia would self-destruct 
on June 26th 1991, and the motive to light the match. Slovenia had neither the internal divisions 
present in Croatia, nor the reason to fear, as Slobodan Milošević did, that it would be punished 
if it unilaterally defied the international community by seceding. Unlike Tudjman and Milošević,  
the Slovenes never took any interest in the talks about saving Yugoslavia. Had they decided to 
delay their declaration of independence, it is impossible to see how the Croats would not have 
followed, and the crisis could have been postponed, perhaps indefinitely. It was to the Slovenes 
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that Baker aimed his appeal in Belgrade, and it was their rejection which made any action or 
desires by the other actors irrelevant.   
 77 
CHAPTER 2: From War to Recognition back to Cold War  
 
On the night of June 25th 1991, Slovenia declared independence, seizing control of the 
border posts. For Ljubljana, the move seemed low-risk. With Mesić still unseated, there was no 
constitutional civilian commander-in-chief, and Slobodan Milošević had pledged not to oppose 
Slovene secession.189 This calculation proved flawed. Persuaded by Baker’s visit that the US 
opposed secession, the JNA command turned to Prime Minister Marković, who ordered the JNA 
to retake control of the frontier posts on the Slovenian border.190 Marković’s dubious 
assumption of executive power in ordering the army into Slovenia might have paid dividends 
had the operation proved successful. Even a stalemate might have lent prestige to both his 
cabinet and army command, creating an alternative centre of authority to the republican 
leaders. Instead the military operation was a fiasco. At 3,000, the JNA force was far too small to 
pose any serious threat to the more than 30,000-strong Slovenian territorial defense forces, 
which rapidly blocked JNA columns on the roads and blockaded barracks throughout Slovenia. 
The JNA’s morale, already low, collapsed, accelerating the Yugoslav army’s disintegration. 
If success has many fathers, failure is an orphan, and the fiasco launched a round of 
recriminations between Marković and Kadijević in which they competed to deny any 
responsibility for, and implicitly control over, events. Kadijević blamed Marković for pushing the 
JNA into an adventure for which they were poorly-prepared and could never win.191 This was 
unfair. Kadijević and his generals alone were responsible for the military failures of an operation 
of which Marković had no role in planning. Marković’s mistake was to compound the political 
damage caused by Kadijević failures, first by approving the operation, then by denying this 
action. The latter was particularly insidious. Had Marković stood by the operation even after it 
“failed” to defeat the Slovenes, he would have been able to enter subsequent negotiations over 
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Yugoslavia’s future as a key player with influence over the Army. The Generals would have found 
a source of legitimate authority separate from the state presidency, allowing them to support 
Yugoslavia without allying itself with Milošević’s Serbian ambitions. Markovic’s refusal to 
commit himself had exposed the Army command to charges of mutiny. Despite contemporary 
awareness from Zimmerman that “He [Marković] was a party to the army's attack on Slovenia”, 
the Prime Minister tried throw the blame onto a “rogue” military command:192 “Everybody 
supported this. This was the right kind of policy and it is a very bad thing that we did not stick to 
that policy longer than we did”.193 “The son of a gun acted as usual — washing his hands off of 
everything”, Kadijević complained of Marković.194 Zimmerman labelled the Slovenes’ handling 
of the conflict “the most brilliant public relations coup in the history of Yugoslavia”, but it was 
Markovic’s failure to disclaim responsibility which exposed the Army leadership to charges of 
mutiny and helped legitimise the subsequent hostile behaviour of the Croats and later the 
Bosnian Muslims towards the JNA.195  
Another casualty of Markovic’s alibi regarding the Army having gone “rogue” was the 
international effort to keep Yugoslavia together under its existing institutions. Mesić was finally 
elected President on June 30th, while the EC negotiated an agreement between the Republic’s 
leaders at the Croatian resort of Brioni on July 7th, under which the declarations of 
independence of Slovenia and Croatia would be suspended for three months while talks were 
held on Yugoslavia’s future. In the meantime, the status quo of June 25th would be restored, 
implying that the JNA would be able to reoccupy positions along the Austrian border. 196 Slovene 
acceptance of the Brioni Accords had been a close-run thing, and it was only after personal 
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appeals by Hans Dietrich Genscher and Dutch Foreign Minister Hans Van De Broek that it was 
passed by the Slovene Assembly.197 As a concession to critics, second resolution requiring the 
Janez Drnovšek to introduce a proposal in the Yugoslav Presidency for the withdrawal of the 
Army from Slovenia. According to Drnovšek, “The Slovene leadership was sceptical, believing it 
to be very unrealistic, although they agreed that it would not hurt to propose such a resolution 
in the Assembly.”198 To the shock of the Slovenes, the Serbs themselves embraced the 
resolution. Alleging that Marković was issuing “illegal orders” to the JNA, Borislav Jović at the 
July 12th meeting of the Federal Presidency embraced the Slovenian proposal  to withdraw the 
JNA from Slovenia.199 The proposal was passed on July 18th with the four “Serbian” votes plus 
that of Slovenia, with Bosnia and Macedonia abstaining and Mesić in opposition.200 The move 
consolidated Serbia’s control over both the military, where it “invalidated the legitimacy of all 
those within the Yugoslav Army who had been willing to take up the cause of Yugoslav unity”, 
and the civilian institutions which the Slovenes soon abandoned.201  
The Slovene-Serb move transformed Croatia’s position. Zimmerman, in his otherwise 
alarmist wire of 20 May, had noted that Tudjman was playing “smart” by avoiding any sort of 
provocation on Croatian territory, although the Ambassador was concerned about the pressure 
that the Croatian president was under from his own hardliners.202 Tudjman’s determination to 
avoid being drawn into open conflict was reinforced by international warnings to “hold back 
Slovenia since the EC prefers Yugoslavia because its disintegration would spark the fires of 
conflict throughout the Balkans and would also potentially stimulate the disintegration of the 
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USSR”.203 According to Croat historian Dusan Bilandzic, only reluctantly was Tudjman forced to 
“hold onto Kučan by his coattails because if he [ran] off, Croatia [would] be doomed”204. The 
[Croatian] declaration of independence on June 26th was nominal, and Tudjman failed to 
withdraw Croatia’s representatives from the federal institutions. The three-month moratorium 
on independence already set an expiration date regarding Croatia’s ability to utilise those 
institutions.  If Slovenia left at the end of the three-month period, Mesić would again find 
himself in a minority in the Presidency, and Croatia would probably have to follow Slovenia out 
of the Federation, regardless of its immediate preferences. A Presidency without Slovenia was 
one in which “centralists” controlled a majority via the votes of Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro, 
and Vojvodina.  
The events of July 12th made Slovenia’s departure a certainty after three months. 
Frustratingly for Mesić, with the JNA withdrawing, the Slovenes increasingly wanted nothing 
further from Yugoslavia’s central institutions, even while nominally remaining members. Janez 
Drnovšek recalls that, throughout July and August, Mesić “called us [SFRY Presidency] together 
over every minor conflict, and every clash between the Serbs and Croats. The sessions were 
endless, even running through the night, and with a permanent impasse of four votes to four.205 
Drnovšek’s suggestion that it was too much trouble for Slovenia’s representative to concern 
himself with “every clash between the Serbs and the Croats” is a fitting epithet for Slovenia’s 
role in the breakup of the country. Tudjman himself would bemoan, a decade later, how cleanly 
the Slovenes had got away with destroying Yugoslavia. “That Tribunal was formed to be against 
us, then against Milošević and others”, the Croatian President complained in 1999, shortly 
before his death. “No mention of Kučan, who contributed the most to the breakup of 
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Yugoslavia, etc.”206 
Without the Slovenes, Mesić faced a hostile majority, which vastly reduced his ability 
to influence the military or wider federal government’s policy. Croatia, which had every interest 
in preventing fighting in June 1991, from July onwards had an interest in not allowing it to end 
lest the international community should decide it preferred Croatia in a Slovenia-less Yugoslavia, 
especially if it had a Croat President in Mesić, to the chaos of secession. On July 18th 1991, when 
Tudjman visited German Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher, the Germans 
refused to discuss recognition and merely repeated their opposition to any party’s use of 
force.207  Tudjman now needed to “internationalize the conflict in Croatia, rather than to fight 
back with military force, hoping that the European Community and the United States would 
recognize Croatian independence, and put pressure on Belgrade to halt its aggression against 
Croatia”.208 That required two actions; establishing that the situation was unstable, and, 
secondly, placing the blame for this on the JNA, with the implication that, as long as the army 
remained on Croatian soil, the fighting would continue.  
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Yugoslavia on Washington’s Backburner  
 
The outbreak of fighting in Yugoslavia came at a bad time for the US. Events in the 
Soviet Union, on edge since the bloodshed in Lithuania in early 1991, along with fighting in the 
Caucuses between Azeris and Armenians, seemed to be reaching its culmination with the 
completion of a new Union treaty.209 210 On August 1st, even before the failed coup in Moscow, 
President Bush made a speech in Kiev to Ukrainian legislators warning that "Americans will not 
support those who seek independence in order to replace a far-off tyranny with a local 
despotism. They will not aid those who promote a suicidal nationalism based upon ethnic 
hatred".211 European elites also shared these concerns, even in Germany, where Helmut Kohl 
had informed the Lithuanian Prime Minister earlier in 1991 “With [Gorbachev], we know where 
we stand; what comes afterward, we have no idea”.212 The Balkans situation was viewed mostly 
from the perspective of its potential impact on these more important concerns elsewhere, by 
either setting a precedent or providing a distraction. James Baker later reflected that “unlike in 
the Persian Gulf, our vital interests were not at stake” in Yugoslavia, so “the greater threat to 
American interests at the time lay in the increasingly dicey situation in Moscow, and we 
preferred to maintain our focus on that challenge, which had global ramifications for us, 
particular with regard to nuclear weapons”.213 This was echoed in Britain: "If at the end of the 
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day, the Serbs and the Croats and the Slovenes have decided they're going to have a civil war”, 
commented British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, adding "it's not something at the end of the 
day we can prevent".214 In the 36-page National Security Strategy issued by the Bush 
Adminstration in July of 1991, the only mention of Yugoslavia lies in observagtion that 
“powerful centrifugal forces in Yugoslavia are particularly worrisome.”215 
The US had also recently committed to an open-ended humanitarian intervention in 
Iraq. Following the American victory in the Persian Gulf War, opponents of Saddam Hussein’s 
regime had risen in rebellion only to be brutally crushed by the Iraqi army. The result was a 
humanitarian catastrophe, especially in the north, home to Iraq’s Kurdish population. On April 
5th 1991, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 688, demanding that the Iraqi government 
cease attacking its civilian population, two days after which Secretary of State James Baker 
visited Northern Iraq.216 The US launched Operation Provide Comfort to ensure the delivery of 
humanitarian supplies, which involved a commitment to deploy up to 8,000 troops.217 This 
would be succeeded by Operation Provide Comfort II on July 24th, which would involve more 
than 42,000 sorties by US aircraft by 1996.218 There was little desire to set precedents for Soviet 
hardliners or ex-Soviet Republics’ nationalists by rewarding either “uniliteral secession” or 
“rogue military action”.219 The Soviets themselves vetoed discussion of OSCE action in 
 
214 Kempster, Norman, “U.S Condemns Use of Force to Preserve Unity” The Los Angeles Times, July 3rd 1991 
http://articles.latimes.com/1991-07-03/news/mn-1554_1_united-states: Accessed December 10th 2018. 
215 National Security Strategy of the United States, The White House, July 1 1991, P. 12  
https://bush41library.tamu.edu/files/select-documents/National%20Security%20Strategy%20Report%201991.pdf: 
Accessed November 25, 2019 
216 Friedman, Thomas A., “AFTER THE WAR; Baker Sees and Hears Kurds' Pain In a Brief Visit at Turkish Border” The 
New York Times, April 9th 1991  
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/04/09/world/after-the-war-baker-sees-and-hears-kurds-pain-in-a-brief-visit-at-
turkish-border.html?pagewanted=all: Accessed August 30th 2019. 
217 “Operation Provide Comfort II” Global Security.org 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/provide_comfort_2.htm: Accessed June 14th 2015 
218 Ibid. 
219 United States. Congress. (1992). Command and control of Soviet nuclear weapons: dangers and opportunities 
arising from the August revolution : hearing before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, United States Senate, One Hundred Second Congress, first session, September 24, 
1991. Washington: U.S. G.P.O.  
https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/007608480: Accessed November 20 2019 
 84 
Yugoslavia on July 3rd due to a fear that this might set a precedent for the Baltic states.220 
The Bush Administration was also coming under increasing pressure over foreign 
policy by the opposition Democratic party. Having spent fifteen years attacking Republicans as 
warmongers for believing that the Cold War could be won instead of embracing peaceful 
coexistence, the Democrats had, in early 1991, begun demanding American support for the 
breakup of the Soviet Union. Senators Joseph Biden of Delaware and Claiborne Pell of Rhode 
Island had taken the lead in holding hearings attacking the Bush Administration’s failure to 
support the Baltic States’ independence.221 In June, they held hearings alleging that the 
Administration’s failure to support Boris Yeltsin (who was cold-shouldered during visits to the 
US), combined with putting all of America’s eggs in the Gorbachev basket, was inviting 
disaster.222 Following the failure of the August coup in Moscow, the Democrats claimed that the 
failure to recognize the Soviet collapse’s inevitability was undermining the planning for the 
potential fallout. In mid-September, when Yeltsin and Gorbachev were still trying to patch up 
some form of Union, the Democratic-controlled Senate Foreign Relations Committee pressed 
the Administration to focus on the control of nuclear weapons in the event of a Soviet 
breakup.223 For decades, the Democrats and much of the American left had argued that the 
efforts to subvert or undermine the Soviet Union posed the greatest threat to world peace. 
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Now, they argued, that it was the Administration’s attempts to keep it together that threatened 
violence. 
Privately, Bush Administration officials admitted, by autumn 1991, that the Soviet 
Union was unlikely to survive in its current form. A briefing prepared for President Bush on the 
eve of the October Middle East Peace Conference, held in Madrid, painted a picture of a Soviet 
Union whose collapse was no longer in question. “The authority of the central government is 
probably in irreversible decline”, the briefing declared, and “the rise in nationalist sentiment is 
reaching dangerous proportions. Unless handled carefully by the Center, Ukraine, and Russia, 
there is a rising fear among many here that Civil War could threaten, before concluding at some 
point we may have to recognize that the Soviet/Russian empire has collapsed and that efforts 
to maintain a union whose time has passed could themselves become a source of instability.224 
In particular, Ukraine posed a problem. As Baker observed “The Baltics, maybe you could have 
another little Finland up here. But, if Ukraine were to go, that would clearly mean the end of 
the Soviet Union and it might trigger conflict between Ukraine on the one hand and Russia on 
the other”.225 The Ukraine had an extensive Russian population, and was the base of the Soviet 
Black Sea Fleet. Events in Yugoslavia had demonstrated how dangerous nationalist tensions 
could be when arbitrary legal borders ran along national lines, and where extensive military and 
strategic assets created incentives for ill-intentioned actors to exploit such tensions. Soviet 
officials played up these fears, with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze informing US 
Ambassador Strauss that “all Russia might rise up with demands, including the return of the 
Crimea”.226   
There were many in the Adminstration who feared that even if recognition of the 
Ukraine was inevitable, it should be conditioned on concessions regarding Russian minority 
 
224 What to tell Gorbachev at Madrid, US Embassy Moscow to Secretary Baker October 24th 1991. 
https://foia.state.gov/searchapp/DOCUMENTS/OctNov2014/F-2009-02091/DOC_0C17558477/C17558477.pdf: 
Accessed March 13th 2016 
225 Interview with James Baker by Sara Sievers, September 25th 1996, End of the Soviet Union Oral History Project, 
http://oralhistory.org.ua/en/interview-en/599/: Accessed July 29th 2018. 
226 Ambassador’s Meeting with Shevardnadze regarding Ukraine Referendum, US Embassy Moscow to Washington 
https://foia.state.gov/searchapp/DOCUMENTS/OctNov2014/F-2009-02091/DOC_0C17558558/C17558558.pdf: 
Accessed July 29th 2018. 
 86 
rights and Soviet military installations on its territory. “I took the position that this was political 
leverage that we should retain to use against the new Ukrainian leadership, the leadership of 
the independent Ukraine to make sure that Ukraine agreed to the norms of behavior involving 
nuclear weapons which were stationed on their soil, that we were very anxious to see Ukraine 
and Kazakhstan and others agree to”, Baker recalled, “President Bush went with my view on that 
as opposed to the view of the Defense Department say, my friend Dick Cheney, who wanted to 
see us recognize Ukraine the minute after the vote occurred”.227  
Cheney’s position had the enthuastic support of both parties in Congress. On 
November 21st, the Senate passed a resolution by Dennis DeConcini of Arizona calling for the 
administration to recognize the Ukraine.228  Three days later, the President received a letter 
from the Congressional leaders declaring “It is vitally important that the America side with the 
people of Ukraine, in favor of freedom and democracy, instead of helping to prop up a Kremlin 
still being run by barely reconstructed communists.229 The presence of signatories Newt 
Gingrich and Rick Santorum, two Republican Congressmen associated with the right of the 
party, indicated serious conservative discontent. At a Heritage Foundation event held on 
November 27th, leading conservative foreign policy thinkers demanded that the Bush 
Administration abandon Gorbachev and provide greater support and recognition for Yeltsin.230 
Conditioning recognition would therefore have required the Bush Administration to oppose 
both parties in Congress and a large portion of their own political supporters on an issue where 
the outcome, Ukrainian independence, was already certain.  At the end of November 1991, the 
US announced that it would recognize the Ukraine even before the December 1st referendum on 
secession which passed with 90% support.231  
The decision of the German leaders to embrace the cause of Slovene and Croat 
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recognition closely mirrored how the Bush Administration had been driven by domestic 
pressure to embrace that of Ukraine. In 1990, left-wing Social Democrats and Greens had 
appeared lukewarm regarding German reunification, and been rewarded with defeat and 
destruction at the 1990 elections. The Greens even failed to reach the threshold for election to 
the Bundestag.232 Having missed the train of history once, they were determined not to allow it 
to leave the station without them a second time. The Yugoslav crisis provided a chance to 
outflank Kohl’s Christian Democrats and Genscher’s Free Democrats’ ruling coalition as 
champions of national self-determination for Eastern Europeans living under Communist rule. In 
February, Greens’ leader Hans-Christian Ströbele had suggested that the only viable solution for 
Yugoslavia was a “confederation of sovereign states based on the principle of self-
determination".233 After June 26th, they were joined by the Social Democrats, who denounced 
aggression by the “Serbian” army. The fact that the military campaign in Slovenia had been 
ordered by Marković and was opposed by the Serbian leadership was beside the point. The 
fighting or “aggression” by the “Serbian” army had to end. 
Left to their own devices, Bush and his advisors would have clearly preferred a 
Yugoslav settlement on the model of abortive Brioni accords, deferring questions of 
constitutional reform, borders, and independence to some future date while restoring the 
status quo of Yugoslavia’s existing institutions in the interim. While such an option would have 
been welcomed by Tudjman, Markovic, and Kadijevic, albeit for different reasons, neither 
Milošević nor the Slovene leadership had any interest in accepting such an outcome and had all 
but killed it on July 12th. Nevertheless, the Bush Administration clearly hoped to salvage 
something from Brioni even after this date and remained sufficiently strong politically to reject 
feelers from Zagreb and Ljubljana throughout the summer. These included an awkward effort by 
Margaret Thatcher to act as a go-between for Slovenian Prime Minister Peterle. “Thatcher told 
us she was not asking for a meeting with the President for Peterle, but only wanted us to note 
 
232 Williams, Carol J. "Greens, E. German Leftists Join Election Forces" The Los Angeles Times September 24th 1990 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1990-09-24-mn-955-story.html: Accessed October 14th 2019 
233 Crawford, Beverly, ‘German Foreign Policy and European Political Cooperation: The Diplomatic Recognition of 
Croatia in 1991’, German Politics & Society, 1995, 13:2(35), pp.1-34, p.6, www.jstor.org/stable/23736387: 
Accessed September 3rd 2019 
 88 
he would be in Washington and wanted to meet someone; she had suggested the Vice 
President ”, read a State Department cable.234  
The US policy nevertheless depended on the local actors themselves cooperating to 
impose a “Brioni” solution. Here the prospects were doubtful. The Slovenes had been 
uncooperative prior to June 26th and, with the JNA gone, Mesić’s struggle to retain them in 
Belgrade seemed futile. Milošević, by backing the JNA’s withdrawal from Slovenia, may not 
have played to his historical reputation as a warmonger, but reinforced the existing 
preconceptions in Washington that he constituted a primary obstacle to a settlement. It was 
now almost inevitable that, when American efforts breathe life into Brioni failed, Milošević 
(fairly) and the Serbs (perhaps unfairly) would receive a large share of the blame. Milošević’s 
obstruction was probably an assumption of any policy by this point. More serious were 
questions about the commitment of the actors on whom the US policy had counted to support 
such an approach: Markovic, Mesić, Kadijevic, and, on the periphery, Tudjman. All four had an 
interest in Brioni succeeding once it had been agreed yet, over the course of the summer, the 
commitment of each one of them to making it work appeared increasingly dubious. 
Official US statements in July accepted Marković’s line that the operations in Slovenia 
had been rogue, with President Bush on July 3rd urging President Mesić to "ensure that civilian 
control over the military is re-established and peace restored”, even, as a senior State 
Department official stated that the Administration was unaware whether or not the army were 
out of control.235 Tudjman’s actions indicated that the question was immaterial to the Croatian 
leader. On July 17th, the same day as the public announcement of the vote to withdraw the 
JNA from Slovenia, Tudjman appointed a nine member crisis staff and formed a national unity 
government.236  When Slovenia left, Croatia would have to follow and, at that point, would 
have to fight the Army or abandon the areas claimed or controlled by Serbian forces. Both 
Tudjman and his Serbian foes were aware of this and, over the summer, efforts were made to 
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gain possession of territory, a conflict into which the Army units stationed on Croatian territory 
could not help but be drawn. On July 28th, regular forces provided artillery support for the 
shelling of Vukovar while, on the weekend of August 26th, regular JNA units under Ratko Mladić 
shelled and took the Croat town of Kijevo.237 Tudjman appeared hopeful, like the Europeans 
and Americans, that Mesić would be able to assert some authority over the Army. Unlike the 
Americans, he must have known this control could only be temporary, and unlikely to survive 
long beyond the Brioni deadline. While the international actors hoped, in summer 1991, that 
Mesić, by remaining in place as President could “control” the Army and end the fighting, 
Tudjman hoped that Mesić, by remaining President and failing to control the Army, would 
demonstrate to the US and Europe the futility of any efforts to keep Yugoslavia together. This 
failure would leave the Western powers no choice but to pressure the Army and Serbs to leave 
Croatia. 
As for Mesić, the Yugoslav President seemed to go out of his way to inform every 
listener that his efforts were doomed. On August 17th, Mesić accused the Army of “pure 
aggression”, warning that his “further role in the presidency legalizes this dirty war in 
Croatia”.238 Mesić made a few gestures towards mediation, but even these seemed designed to 
fail. When, on August 31st, Tudjman issued an ultimatum demanding the full withdrawal of the 
JNA within 24 hours, Mesić persuaded the Presidency to accept EC mediation in exchange for 
Tudjman’s suspension of the ultimatum. This served the Croatian objective of involving the 
European Community in internal Yugoslav affairs at little cost. Tudjman ominously warned, on 
September 6th, that this was the last chance for a peaceful outcome.239 A week later, Mesić 
staged a theatrical stunt of his own. On September 12th, Mesić informed the international 
diplomatic corps and media that he had given the Army 48 hours to return to barracks, an 
instruction which had no legal force without approval by a majority of the Presidency. Mesić 
had not even bothered to submit it for consideration.  “We regard this as an attempt to create 
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reasons for an attack against the military in Croatia”, Jović recorded on September 12th, adding 
“If the military does not obey, it will be declared an outlaw and an occupying force in 
Croatia.”240 In his efforts to demonstrate his lack of responsibility for anything that was taking 
place, Mesić found an unlikely ally in Prime Minister Ante Marković. Whether Marković was 
engaged in a cynical game of reputation salvaging in preparation for a post-Yugoslav career or 
had genuinely convinced himself that the army acted in Slovenia against his will, he had by now 
adopted the position he would maintain for the next two decades, even in the face of 
overwhelming evidence at the ICYT. 241 The Marković of 2002 was a pathetic figure, disoriented 
by evidence that contradicted truths of which he seemed to have convinced himself. In autumn 
1991, those “truths” were a propaganda coup for Mesić. Marković’s assertion that the Army’s 
move against Slovenia was the result of a plot with the Serbian leadership was absurd, and 
Mesić, who had voted against Milošević’s proposal to withdraw the Army from Slovenia, knew 
this better than anyone, but the narrative that the Army was a “Serbian Army” in league with 
the Serbian leadership rebutted claims that it was a “national” army, and Marković’s 
pronouncements about a “RAM” plan between the Army and the Serbian leaders to break up 
Bosnia counteracted Western concerns about Tudjman’s own ambitions in regards to Bosnia.242 
Rather than working to save Yugoslavia, Marković also did what he could to torpedo the so-
called “Belgrade Initiative” during summer 1991, a compromise which would have seen a 
united Bosnia remain in Yugoslavia, characterizing it as an effort to “coerce” the Bosnian 
Muslims into remaining in a Serb-dominated state.243  On October 7th 1991, the Yugoslav 
Airforce bombed the Presidential Palace in Zagreb, ostensibly in response to a blockade of the 
Zagreb barracks, while the Prime Minister was meeting with Tudjman and Mesić, an act 
Marković described as “attempted murder”. Kadijević and the Defense Ministry denied the 
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authorization of any such action, and no one was even injured.244 The commander of the 
Yugoslav Air Force at the time was Zvonko Jurjević, a Croat who remained loyal to Yugoslavia 
until his suspension in January 1992, after five EC observers were killed by helicopters under his 
command.245  For Marković, this attack constituted “proof” that the Army was “out of control”. 
By autumn 1991, Marković had, perhaps unwittingly, become a propaganda tool in Croatia’s 
effort to portray the fighting as the result of Serbian aggression rather than the army’s 
response to the attacks on its barracks in Croatia. When Mesić was removed from the 
Presidency, no calls for Marković to resign emanated from Zagreb. 
Far from colluding, the Serbian leadership remained in the dark for much of 1991 
regarding the Army’s goals. “The military…is intoxicated with the idea of a Yugoslavia which no 
longer exists”, Jović complained on June 27th.246  On September 12th, two days before the 
blockade of the JNA barracks by Croatian forces, Jović recorded that “I once again raised the key 
question, for the umpteenth time, the question that constantly preoccupies me: Is our goal to 
defend, with the military, the new borders of the nations that want to remain in Yugoslavia, or is 
it to overthrow the Croatian Government?”247 Nor did international observers believe these 
charges.  In May 1991, Zimmerman had wired Washington to say that “the Army is not in 
Milošević’s pocket, particularly now that he is clearly trying to destroy Yugoslav unity while, on 
July 7th, Kadijević was profiled approvingly in the New York Times as a “moderating force within 
the military” with a “propensity for compromise”, whose initial appointment Slovenia 
welcomed, and who was “described as a keen on keeping the army out of politics”.248 As the 
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fighting spread, international observers retained their confidence in Kadijević’s desire to 
deescalate, even if they were losing faith in his ability to do so. DJ Van Houten, who headed the 
EC mission from September 13th, blamed the Croats for raising the tensions, warning that the 
“JNA, which seems to have been rather reticent in places like Vukovar, does not seem prepared 
to accept further provocation”.249 “Fietelaars [the Dutch Ambassador] repeated the Dutch view 
that the Croats are most responsible for the latest fighting, and he downplayed the 
Genscher/De Michealis appeal for a JNA withdrawal as intended for a domestic audience”, 
Zimmerman wired to Washington on September 16th.250 On September 17th, the deputy head of 
the EC mission informed a US Official that “the past weekend represented "the three worst 
days" he has seen in Croatia.251   
 “Although Kadijević displayed some astute behavior during the crisis of the early 
1990,” a later American officer would conclude the general “was not prepared for partisan 
politics,” and particularly ill-equipped to manage international public opinion.252 In June, 
German Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher’s plane was prevented from landing at 
Ljubljana by the JNA, laying the groundwork for a needless grudge.253 Kadijević also made an 
enemy of Gorbachev. After telling Soviet Defense Minister Dimitry Yazov during a visit to 
Belgrade in 1989 that his “first task should be the removal of the treacherous forces headed by 
Gorbachev.”254 According to his adjunct Dragan Vuksic, “Kadijević repeated several times that 
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the Russians are in the mud up to their knees and that they are in no shape to help themselves, 
let alone us”, but the relationship earned the JNA the hostility of the fading Soviet leader as 
well as Boris Yeltsin.255  
Mentally trapped in the Second World War, Kadijević saw the world through the lense 
of great power rivalries and failed to grasp that the international community prioritized ending 
the fighting in Yugoslavia above all else. If it were impossible to preserve Yugoslavia without the 
prospect of continued violence, then virtually every external actor would abandon support for 
Yugoslav unity. Germany and the US were united on this issue. What separated them was 
disagreement as to whether recognizing Slovenia and Croatia’s unilateral declarations of 
independence would end the fighting as Germany came to believe, or intensify it by 
encouraging the parties to dig in, as Washington believed. The historical German links with 
Croatia in the region may have influenced these calculations on the margin but, ultimately, they 
were a result of a cost-benefit analysis. That meant that, although the US continued to believe 
that recognition would provoke increased conflict, as the fighting increased even without 
recognition, the American motivation for opposing recognition declined. 
Under Kadijević, the JNA decisively lost this political war.  During a visit to Washington 
in July, Prime Minister Antall of Hungary raised concerns about the fighting’s impact on ethnic 
Hungarians, but blamed the Croats and Slovenes for moving too early.256 By the following 
month, when his Foreign Minister visited Washington, the Hungarians were urging the US to 
restrain the JNA in order to prevent further violence, a point made at meetings with Vice 
President Quayle and Eagleburger.257 German journalist Egon Scotland’s death in Croatia ten 
days after Tudjman’s visit to Bonn on July 22nd galvanized domestic opinion in Germany, while 
the Yugoslav army’s withdrawal from Slovenia created concerns even among the supporters of 
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Yugoslav unity in some form that this was no longer viable.258 On September 4th, Genscher 
informed both Tudjman and Kučan that, if the conference on Yugoslavia failed and the violence 
continued, Germany reserved the right unilaterally to recognize their independence.259 “With 
every shot by your cannons and tanks, the hour of recognition moves closer”, Genscher 
announced publicly later that same day.260 This was a curious remark to make if he wished the 
conference to succeed, regardless of whether Tudjman had ever desired a peaceful settlement. 
The Germans had shifted from believing that some form of Yugoslav unity was the best way of 
restoring peace, to a conviction that only a recognition of the seceding Republics, Slovenia and 
Croatia, could bring an end to the conflict. 
American officials, however, retained faith in Kadijević even after they abandoned 
Mesić and Marković but, by September, their communications were sounding more like 
ultimatums.  On September 18th, Zimmerman urged Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin 
Powell to make a personal appeal by phone to Defense Minister Kadijević to restrain his forces 
in Croatia. Conceding that “it is impossible to determine which side was responsible for setting 
off the fighting in Zagreb”, he warned that the “Yugoslav national army bears a special 
responsibility to exercise maximum restraint given its constitutional obligations to protect the 
lives of all Yugoslav citizens.”261 Two days later, Admiral Stane Brovet met with the American 
charge, Robert Rackmales, whom he informed “that the army had launched a major offensive 
against Croatia, which he justified on the basis of Croatia’s complete disregard for the EC-
brokered cease-fires of September 1st and 19th, and the JNA soliders’ intolerable conditions, 
trapped in garrisons in Croatia. Brovet initially claimed that the JNA objectives were limited to 
freeing the blocked garrisons, but later stated that the JNA aims to take back army facilities 
seized by Croatia.” Brovet stressed that Kadijević had apparently telephoned Tudjman three 
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times to secure the lifting of the JNA garrisons’ blockades, “showing emotion in his voice when 
speaking of the trapped JNA soldiers, Brovet left no doubt that the JNA has reached its limit and 
has decided to use all force necessary to achieve its limited goal”.262 On September 21st, 
Kadijević rejected Tudjman’s appeal for another cease-fire, on the basis that “Tudjman had 
consistently failed to implement cease fire agreements in the past”.263 That same day, US Consul 
General in Zagreb Michael Einek had urged Mario Nobilo, a senior aide to Tudjman, to end the 
blockade of the JNA military court in Zagreb to ensure the safety of the nearby American 
consulate, but received no response, adding credibility to Kadijević’s complaint.264  “Aware that 
support for the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia was growing in Germany, he [Tudjman] 
made sure that a number of the cease-fire arrangements that Carrington and Wijnaendts had 
negotiated with him and General Kadijević of the JNA would not work”, Glenny wrote two years 
later, highlighting that “Tudjman not only failed to keep his word but on the day that one of the 
agreements was to take effect, Croatian forces Stormed the barracks in Bjelovar and confiscated 
the JNA’s equipment.”265  US officials, under increasing domestic pressure from the Democrats, 
and already angry at Milošević’ behavior, lashed out publicly at the Army.  On September 25th, 
James Baker delivered a speech to the UN in New York City, where he accused the JNA of 
seeking to create a “little Yugoslavia” by ousting Slovenia, and dividing Croatia.266 Despite these 
accusations, the speech also implied that the US objection regarding the JNA was not to keep 
Slovenia in Yugoslavia but rather, to the extent to which it cooperated with a “Serb plot”, to kick 
Slovenia out and divide Croatia. Even at this late date, Baker held out hope for a return to 
Brioni. 
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Baker’s speech, and US contacts with the JNA, may have convinced Tudjman that the 
dangers posed by continued US support for any zombie Brioni policy which invested legitimacy 
in the JNA and Federal government in Belgrade outweighed the benefits of keeping Mesić in 
Belgrade. “There is a scenario of overthrowing of our authorities in Croatia”, the Croatian 
President characterized US policy to his cabinet the following spring, adding that “Tudjman in 
Croatia, Milošević in Serbia are the main causes of disintegration of Yugoslavia, and therefore, if 
we removed them, the circumstances would be created for the restoration of Yugoslavia in 
some form.”267  Tudjman responded by withdrawing Mesić from the Presidency. If neither the 
Americans nor the Army bothered treating him as President, there was little to gain from Mesić 
remaining in Belgrade. If Mesić remained in office, Croatia legally remained part of Yugoslavia, 
inviting international pressure for settlement based on a continued common state. Mesić 
ceased arranging meetings after September and, on October 3rd, he and the Slovenian 
representative ceased attending meetings altogether. Taking the Croats and Slovenes at their 
word that they were no longer part of Yugoslavia, a majority of the remaining members 
representing the Serb-dominated governments of Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia and Vojvodina 
then voted to allow the Presidency to function with a reduced quorum.268  The Croats implicitly 
recognized this “coup” as legal by withdrawing all of their remaining representatives from the 
Yugoslav institutions. The Croats and Slovenes nevertheless contested the Serb claim that the 
two republics had seceded from a Yugoslav state which continued to exist, instead insisting that 
their withdrawal represented the dissolution of the entire state. The continued existence of the 
Presidency therefore represented a “Serbian Coup”, designed to seize Yugoslavia’s assets.269 
The Croats were engaged in as much of a coup against Yugoslavia as the Serbs, with Bosnia as 
the target. Having come under fire for refusing the JNA’s requests to provide reservists for 
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action in Croatia, the Izetbegović government now had to decide whether it accepted the 
Serbian interpretation by continuing to attend the Presidency, recognizing a rump government 
dominated by Serbia, or the Croatian argument that the state no longer existed, which 
represented a decision for independence and inevitable war.270 
Washington faced the same dilemma after the Croat withdrawal from the Presidency. 
Recognizing a Presidency controlled by Slobodan Milošević would have been domestically toxic 
even had it not been repugnant to policy-makers still smarting over his cooperation with the 
Slovenes to undermine Brioni. Recognizing the Croatian withdrawal meant accepting that there 
was no Yugoslav Presidency, nor could there be one without Croatia. While not quite a 
recognition of Croatian independence, it recognized a Croatian right to destroy Yugoslavia, 
amounting to the same thing in Tudjman’s hands. If Yugoslavia was destroyed, the only 
alternative would be recognition of the Republics. Tudjman grasped this position’s fundamental 
logic, as did former British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington when he opened his conference in 
London to mediate the conflict by accepting the “only proper starting point, namely that 
Yugoslavia was already on the verge of collapse, as neither Slovenia nor Croatia would give up 
their desire for independence”.271 Resisting recognition, the US still found itself driven by the 
unacceptability of recognizing a rump Serbian Yugoslavia in the same anti-Serb direction.  
.  
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From Yugoslav to Croat-Serb Conflict Management 
 
 
By mid-October 1991, American policy-makers had concluded that Yugoslavia’s 
breakup was inevitable. The US “almost certainly will not recognize Slovenia or Croatia in the 
absence of a negotiated settlement”, Deputy Secretary of State Thomas Niles reiterated to 
Austrian Foreign Minister Mock on October 19th, adding “The USG does not require that 
Yugoslavia remain whole, but we will not support recognition of a unilateral act of 
secession.”272  Recognition now became a bargaining chip. “Earned recognition was one of our 
key points of leverage over the combatants”, Baker recalls.273  
US policy required asymmetric concessions from the parties involved. While Croatia 
would be required to make concessions on minority rights, the Serbs would be required to 
relinquish Serb-populated territory in exchange. Serbian claims, whether justified or not, in 
Washington’s eyes, were seen to conflict directly with the goal of general settlement, which 
singled out the Serbs as a particularly obstructive force, deserving of specific punishment. 
When the US backed an arms embargo on Yugoslavia in September at the UN, this could be 
seen as much (if not more) of an anti-Croatian move as an anti-Serb one, given that it was the 
former who had made greater use of the international arms market.274 On October 15th, the US 
had joined the EC in imposing selective sanctions on the republics of Serbia and Montenegro, 
indicating that Washington increasingly viewed their behaviour as the cause of 
destabilization.275  
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Congressional pressure exacerbated this anti-Serb shift in policy. On October 25th, 
Senator Alfonso D’Amato (R-NY) introduced a resolution calling for Croatia and Slovenia’s 
immediate recognition.276 Three days later, the Senate passed without dissent a resolution by 
Senators Claiborne Pell (D-RI) and Al Gore (D-TN), urging the administration to work with the 
UN to support a peacekeeping force in Croatia.277 Yugoslavia, Gore argued, “no longer reflects 
the concept of self-determination, but rather the reappearance of imperialism in all its 
arrogance. It no longer serves any geostrategic purpose for us”.278 On November 7th, Gore, Pell, 
and D’Amato introduced a resolution calling for Croatia and Slovenia’s outright recognition and 
an economic embargo on Serbia if “Serbian aggression” continued, which was referred to the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee.279 The term “Serbian aggression” had now entered the US 
politicians’ lexicon. 
Congressional sentiment had always been anti-Serb, especially over Kosovo, but two 
things had changed. First, the actors were different. The leading hawk on Kosovo, Senator 
Robert Dole of Kansas, was not only a Republican, but the Republican Party’s leader in the US 
Senate. Whatever criticisms he made of the Bush Administration, he was inherently invested in 
its success, and therefore his goal was always to pressure the Administration to change its 
policy rather than use criticisms of the Administration’s foreign policy towards Yugoslavia to 
damage it politically. While D’Amato was a Republican, Gore and Pell were Democrats, and 
Gore had run for President in 1988. It was the Democratic Party’s decision to adopt an anti-
Belgrade position which proved crucial. Anti-interventionist, and often sympathetic to left-
leaning regimes in the developing world, Congressional Democrats were the natural 
constituency for an “impartial” line, friendly towards Belgrade. The Democratic Party’s decision 
to adopt an aggressive position in favour of the secessionist republics created a situation in 
which Dole, having represented the leading pro-Albanian voice for years in the Senate, now 
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symbolised the most pro-Administration position within Congress.  The split was now between 
those, like Dole, who might accept American support for a continued Yugoslavia that met their 
(by this point) impossible demands for Kosovar autonomy and constitutional reform, and those 
in the Democratic Party who saw Croatian and Slovene independence as a fight for freedom, 
and would accept nothing less than the independence of any republic which wanted it. The 
chance to cause difficulties for the Bush Adminstration may have provided as much motivation 
to Democrats as passion for Zagreb. 
The Bush Administration had at least two reasons to oppose early recognition. First, it 
undermined the existing efforts to reach a settlement between the parties by conditioning it on 
concessions or a settlement between them. Secondly, Germany’s unilateral efforts, threatened 
seriously to split structures such as NATO and the European Community which the US held 
dear. These problems were exacerbated by the perceptional gulf between Bonn and other 
actors. Ostensibly, German Foreign Minister Genscher believed that his government’s 
willingness to back Carrington’s efforts in the Hague, and forgo recognition in order to avoid 
removing pressure on Croatia to make concessions, represented a major German gesture 
towards the American, French, and British position.280 The German government believed that it 
had agreed to support the Hague process in September on the understanding that, should this 
fail, recognition would inevitably follow. European and American officials, along with diplomats 
on the ground, believed that the Germans had agreed to forgo the push for early recognition 
entirely, with recognition at most something to be considered if Lord Carrington’s efforts failed. 
Evidently misinterpreting what his counterparts had agreed to in September, Genscher saw the 
French, British, and American efforts to forestall recognition as an effort to renege on their 
promises.281 Even had Genscher been correct about what had been agreed with other Western 
leaders, Germany’s own embracing of the Hague process was open to question.  Genscher had 
told Tudjman that Germany would grant unconditional recognition in the event efforts towards 
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a settlement failed as early as September 4th.282 Chancellor Kohl confirmed to Tudjman by 
telephone on November 12th that “Austria, Germany and Italy would go for the separate 
recognition of Croatia, if the European Community do not accept it”.283 Secretary Baker, in his 
memoirs, recalls confronting Hans Genscher at the November 28th 1991 NATO summit, alleging 
that Germany was openly assuring Croatia of recognition behind both NATO and the EC’s 
backs.284   
The German government’s attitude enraged their international counterparts. Former 
US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, in the process of negotiating a cease-fire between the 
Croatians and Serbs, told Zimmerman “My friend Genscher is out of control on this. What he is 
doing is madness”.285 British Ambassador in Belgrade Sir Peter Hall described Genscher as 
“almost fanatical in his support for an independent Croatia”.286  This was a view shared by 
almost all EC representatives in Belgrade, including the German Ambassador to Yugoslavia, who 
protested against his own government’s policy.287 UN Secretary General Perez De Cuellar 
denounced it as an “insane step” in a letter to the Dutch Foreign Minister and current EC 
President Hans Van De Brock, prompting Genscher to reply that “encouraging those forces in 
Yugoslavia who were already then fighting against a successful end of the peace process in 
Yugoslavia”.288 Zimmerman wired back on December 6th that “Recognition of Croatia would set 
off an unpredictable chain-reaction which could derail eventual deployment of peace-keepers 
and spread fighting outside Croatia to Bosnia and, perhaps, beyond”, Zimmerman informed 
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Washington on December 6th.289 The US managed to push a resolution through NATO, calling 
for recognition to be granted only as part of an overall settlement, but this proved a hollow 
victory, as the Germans quickly indicated that they did not believe that the NATO resolution 
bound them to refrain from lobbying for EU recognition.290 The US also pushed its views with 
the British, whose Foreign Minister Douglas Hurd indicated that he agreed with the American 
position, but not to the extent of undermining the ongoing Maastricht negotiations, and as such 
expected recognition to go through.291  
Resistance to the German pressure was handicapped by a lack of credible alternatives 
apart from delay. Director for European Affairs at the NSC Robert Hutchings conceded that 
“Absent a credible military alternative that the United States was willing to propose and then 
support, however, we had no answer to the German argument that recognition was preferable 
to passivity in the face of brutal aggression”.292 If the US had ceased to recognize the rump 
Presidency, imposed sanctions which discriminated against Serbia, and signaled out the JNA as 
the aggressor, was there much prospect of any settlement maintaining Yugoslavia? If not, was 
there any scenario in which Croatia and Slovenia did not receive recognition? Even Baker 
considered this unlikely.293  The US and UN resented Germany giving away Bonn’s recognition 
for free, thereby devaluing the rest of the international community’s leverage.  
German recognition may have been shortsighted but was an accomplished fact, and 
American policy-makers now had to decide whether to follow it. While conceding in January 
1992 how “an argument can be made that non-recognition gives Washington credibility as a 
neutral arbiter – and unique leverage in Serbia”, CIA analysts concluded “that Serbian leaders 
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would view it primarily as a means of playing Washington off against the Europeans”.294 
Furthermore, “it would reinforce the inclination of Slovenia and Croatia to focus on sorting out 
their relationship with European states”, while “some Europeans – especially in France and 
Germany – would see it as evidence supporting their suspicion that Washington's engagement 
in Europe is lessening”.295 By contrast, “the Serbs, as well as the Croats and Slovenes, probably 
would view US recognition as a simple acceptance of the new realities”, and “it might help 
counter the view that the US is less focused on European problems these days”.296  
 If the US was going to “get anything out of recognition”, the perception had to be 
fostered that recognition was not inevitable. This was undermined by the dynamics in Congress, 
where Democrats championed recognition to embarrass the Administration, and Republicans, 
rather than defending the Administration’s conditional line, joining with the Democrats on the 
issue to avoid being outflanked. In late January, Republican Senate leader Robert Dole of Kansas 
introduced a resolution demanding Croatia and Slovenia’s immediate recognition, co-sponsored 
by 28 Senators including almost the entire Republican leadership.297 “Merely applauding the 
collapse of Communist states such as the Soviet Union, or passively observing the dissolution of 
Communist states like Yugoslavia, does not represent an effective American policy”, Dole, who 
had previously taken a leading role in agitating on Kosovo, wrote to George Bush, adding “We 
have learned that in dealing with the new republics of the former Soviet Union. We must re-
learn it in forging a sensible, realistic policy towards Croatia and Slovenia”.298  If recognition 
were inevitable, and conditional recognition a depreciating commodity, then the Administration 
needed to rapidly find conditions it could exchange for recognition before the latter lost all 
value to the combatants. The discussion within the Bush Administration from January 1992 
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onwards became less a debate over recognition, and more a search for conditions on which it 
could be granted, and it was as an answer to this question which no one had forced the US to 
ask that American officials settled on Bosnia.  Germany may have made the eventual 
recognition of Slovenia and Croatia inevitable, and the Congressional pressure mounted on the 
Administration to grant that recognition quickly. “Croatia was the first nation to acknowledge 
the United States as a legitimate nation during the Revolutionary War. It is time we reward that 
courageous action with an equally bold gesture – recognize the independent Republic of Croatia 
today!”, declared Congressman William Tauzin of Louisiana with no sense of historic accuracy, 
given that Croatia had not been an independent state and the Habsburg monarchy of which it 
was part not grant recognition until 1797.299 “In my view, it is in our national interest at this time 
to extend immediate diplomatic recognition to Croatia and Slovenia, and to establish mutually 
beneficial relations with these new countries”, wrote Senator David Durenberger in early 
March.300 Noticeable by its absence in the Congressional rhetoric is a concern for Bosnia. Even 
Senator Dole, who had championed the Muslim Kosovar Albanians’ cause for years, excluded 
any demand for Bosnia’s recognition from his Senate resolution. Nor were the European powers 
keen on forcing the issue of Bosnian recognition, with even Germany sceptical.301 Only Kučan, 
impatient to resolve the question of recognition and be done with Yugoslavia split the 
difference, urging that “Bosnia be recognized as soon as possible”, albeit with a strong system of 
local autonomy.302  
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Who then pushed for recognition of Bosnia, far less insisted that the question of 
Bosnia’s future be decided not through negotiations but as prerequisite for any other Republic’s 
recognition? The answer was the Bush Administration.303 Why? “My concern all along has been 
that a half-way policy on recognition would invite Slovenian and Croatian adventurism in B-H 
and in Macedonia. That is still my concern”, wrote Lawrence Eagleburger to James Baker, 
adding “Anything short of recognizing all four republics seriously weakens the principles upon 
which questions of recognition have been dealt with by us over the past months”.304 “Early and 
decisive Western action to recognize Bosnia-Hercegovina would present both Belgrade and 
Zagreb with a situation which would be difficult to overturn at the present juncture”, read 
Secretary of State Baker’s notes for a March 10 summit with EC leader.”305 “We should lift 
sanctions on Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia at the same time we recognize their independence”, 
wrote Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Thomas Niles, even as he conceded 
“There are in fact some doubts as to Croatian President Tudjman's commitment to human 
rights in Croatia and the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Hercegovina”.306 US recognition of Bosnia 
would, according to Zimmerman, “give Milošević a strong signal on both Bosnia and Croatia, 
and restrain Tudjman from military adventurism. In setting conditions for establishing 
diplomatic relations with all the successor states, including Serbia/Montenegro, we should 
insist on an explicit commitment to recognize the other republics within 1974 borders.”307 
US suspicion of Milošević was longstanding by this point. Birthed in the fights over 
Kosovo, and nurtured by Zimmerman’s feud with the Serbian leader, it seems to have infected 
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the top Administration due to the conviction that he had sabotaged the post-June 26th 1991 
efforts to achieve a Yugoslavia-wide settlement.  As for Tudjman’s interest in Bosnia, the 
Croatian leader made no secret of his thoughts. “Tudjman told visiting German politicians that 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was  absurdly large and that, in principle, he favored dividing it”, the CIA 
reported, guessing that “Tudjman may be calculating that picking up parts of Bosnia-
Herzegovina will make it easier politically to give up some Croatian territory under Serb 
occupation in an eventual settlement.”308 This was echoed by US diplomats. “Croatian President 
Tudjman devoted virtually all of a 90 minute, January 14th call by the ambassador on the 
reasons why the US should support a Serb-Croat accommodation dividing up Bosnia”, US 
Consul General Michael Einik reported to Washington on January 16th 1991, adding “Using 
arguments that can only be defined as racist, Tudjman warned of the demographic threat of a 
Muslim fundamentalist state linking Bosnia via the Sandjak and Kosovo with the near east.”309  
In January, Tudjman told Zimmerman that “he and Milošević are again discussing this issue as 
well as Serb and Croat leaders in B and H”, and “that the army supports such a solution to avoid 
war in Bosnia”, prompting Zimmerman to ask “how can Croatia expect the US to hold the line 
on rejecting Serbian efforts to change borders in Croatia, when Croatia embarks on similar 
action in Bosnia?”310 Discussions with Croatian officials other than Tudjman, including Foreign 
Minister Šeparović, who claimed that “a large majority within the Croatian leadership 
understand the danger of such an approach”, led Zimmerman to believe that, if the US took a 
strong stand against partition, this “silent majority” of Croatian officials would push Tudjman 
into abandoning his Bosnian plans.311 US Ambassador to the UN Thomas Pickering reiterated to 
Croatian Prime Minister Gregurić a week later that “the US was shocked to hear Tudjman 
advocate the dismemberment of Bosnia in a recent conversation with Ambassador 
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Zimmerman”, and “the United States strongly believed that if such sentiments represented 
Croatia’s policy, they were a serious mistake, and contrary to Croatia’s interests as they would 
legitimize changes in borders by force”.312 Gregurić “assured Pickering that Croatia had no claim 
to Bosnian territory, and to repeat such “follies of the past” would be akin to the claim by some 
Serbs that almost all of Yugoslavia is Serbian.” Senior Adviser to the Croatian President Mario 
Nobilo insisted that Tudjman has been “talking as a historian” in his conversations with 
Zimmerman.313 
It is worth asking why the prospect of a Serb-Croat accommodation at the expense of 
Bosnia was so horrifying to American officials, especially if might resolve the issue of the Krajina 
without the need for further conflict. For one thing, Zimmerman’s hostility towards Milošević 
and Tudjman had now spread to the rest of the Administration. Milošević, with his actions in 
Kosovo, his undermining of Markovic, and his sabotage of Brioni, was seen if not as the prime 
cause of Yugoslavia’s problems, then doubtless as a prime cause of America’s problems in 
Yugoslavia. Tudjman’s provocations of the JNA, sabotage of the presidency, and intrigues with 
Berlin had effectively extorted recognition. If Yugoslavia survived, there would be no need to do 
anything about Bosnia. Secondly, the Gulf War had left America the predominant power in the 
Middle East, while Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir’s defeat by Yitzhak Rabin after 
President Bush had cut off aid to Israel brought to power a Prime Minister willing to push for a 
peace deal with the Palestinians.314 The perception that America was party to “selling out” 
Bosnia’s Muslim population would have undermined America’s credibility in the Islamic world, 
and made American officials reluctant to pressure Sarajevo into concessions.315  
Focused on Zagreb, Belgrade, Riyadh and Jerusalem, American policy-makers gave too 
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little consideration to whether their policy would help Bosnia. Vitally, they failed to reach a 
consensus regarding the degree to which Bosnia’s problems were homegrown, the result of 
organic desires among the indigenous actors not to live together, and to what extent those 
conflicts were being artificially stirred up from outside: if the former, then the priority was to 
reach a settlement between the Bosnian parties; if the latter, then the prerequisite to any 
settlement was either deter Croatia’s Tudjman and Serbia’s Milošević’s ambitions to divide 
Bosnia between them or to appease them elsewhere. The policy of recognition was justified on 
the grounds of deterring external threats, but at the cost of exacerbating the internal tensions 
by removing the Muslim government’s incentive to compromise. Simultaneously, the 
recognition offered Tudjman something he already had from Europe and expected to receive 
anyway from the US within good time; little to Milošević, who was already isolated; and nothing 
at all to Bosnia’s Serbs. 
The Central Intelligence Agency was sceptical that Bosnia’s problems were primarily 
external, fearing “Bosnia-Hercegovina's prospects are dim, even if Serbia and Croatia move 
towards a settlement316…Serbs in several regions, including the Bosnian Krajina, Old 
Hercegovina, and scattered smaller areas have declared autonomy, adopted constitutions, and 
elected their own officials”, while notwithstanding their supposed view of Muslims as ‘allies’, 
“Croats in west Hercegovina have done the same”.317 The Republic's “200,000 strong territorial 
defense force” had “fractured along ethnic lines”, while “the bulk of TO units are probably 
responding only to local commanders, increasing the risk of clashes between TO units with 
Army troops”.318 
Arguing that Bosnia had already fractured on the ground, the CIA suggested that a 
voluntary partition held out better prospects of avoiding conflict than trying to force a phantom 
multi-ethnic government’s recognition, that was already seen as just another ethnic party to the 
conflict. “The most positive outcome we foresee”, the Agency's Office of European Analysis 
wrote, “is one in which the moderates manage to guide the republic through a “negotiated 
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division” with Serbian areas uniting with Serbia, Croatian enclaves joining Croatia, and the 
Muslims either joining Croatia or carving out a Muslim state from what remains.”319 The CIA 
conceded “this outcome would be extremely difficult to achieve given the republic's patchwork 
ethnic distribution”, and that “even assuming that all of the players have the best intentions, it 
could not be carried out without extensive population shifts”. “Unless a solution can be found to 
the broader Yugoslav problem which preserves economic links between the Yugoslav republics, 
an economically viable Bosnia seems unobtainable”, the CIA report emphasised, Bosnia would 
“either fall under the sway of Serbia or Croatia, or look beyond the Balkan peninsula to Turkey, 
Saudi Arabia, Iran, or Libya for economic, political, and perhaps military support.”320 
That final line regarding a non-viable Bosnia looking “beyond the Balkan peninsula” to 
Iran or Libya for economic support shows the Central Intelligence Agency’s engagement with a 
question that had been hitherto mainly ignored by the US policy-makers when deciding what to 
do about Yugoslavia. Just how important was Yugoslavia, or in this case Bosnia, to the US?  For 
the new Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Robert Gates, was less concerned over the 
ownership of villages in the Balkans than the fear that “some Bosnians might turn to Qadhafi 
and other radical Islamic states if help were not immediately forthcoming from other sources”, 
which would “add an Islamic-Christian element to the bubbling Balkans cauldron”.321 In an 
agency traditionally led by directorate of operations graduates, Gates, a master of internal 
politics, was the first analyst ever to rise to the top. While Gates had begun his career as 
Scowcroft’s assistant during the Nixon Administration, and returned as his deputy under Bush, 
Gates ingratiated himself with both parties. By 1992, he had served five Administrations and 
would eventually increase this to seven by serving as Secretary of Defense under George W. 
Bush and Barack Obama from 2007 to 2010. One did not generally achieve this degree of 
longevity without an inclination to bow to the inevitable rather than fight lost battles. A unitary, 
sovereign Bosnia looked quite lost by early 1992. 
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The CIA’s proposals were met with moral indignation, often with wishful thinking 
sufficing for cost-benefit analysis. “As to the nature of a settlement”, the April 1992 National 
Intelligence Estimate began, “some Intelligence Community agencies”, which it identified as the 
CIA and National Security Agency, “maintain that negotiated and internationally supervised 
border changes and population transfers within Yugoslavia will be required.”322 As for the 
opposing view, “Other agencies”, which it identified as the State Department, Marine Corp, 
Army, and Air force, in effect the Departments of State and Defense, “hold that negotiated 
border and population shifts are generally unworkable and will result in additional violence, 
economic dislocation, and violations of minority and individual human rights”.323 This argument 
neatly bypassed the question of whether such unwelcome developments were inevitable if 
recognition were to be granted to Bosnia without partition. Partition was rejected because it 
would not resolve every problem in Bosnia, in favor of a policy of recognition which was not 
predicted to any.  
Under Gates, the CIA showed a cold realism. Conceding the Muslims faced a choice 
between “the plague and cholera” they tried to identify the best option given the reality of 
limited American interests and Muslim weakness.324 The Muslims faced the choice of opting 
independence against a Serb minority’s will, which made up nearly a third of the population, 
with the Bosnian Croats’s dubious support, who opposed a Muslim-dominated Bosnia almost as 
much as the Serbs, or remaining in Yugoslavia as a minority.  Izetbegović's deputy Eyjub Ganić 
justified the rejection of Yugoslav option to Warren Zimmerman in December 1991 with the 
argument“We've had plenty of time to see how Milošević deals with minorities in Serbia the 
Hungarians, the Muslims, and the Albanians. We'd be crazy to make ourselves vulnerable to 
that kind of oppression.” 325 Yet according to Stolenberg, Ganić “was among the most 
unforgiving” in identifying with those who felt that the party of Bosnia’s Muslims should seek 
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solutions on the battlefield in order to seek an Islamic state326 If self-determination was defined 
in terms of civic rights to vote and work, then that might be possible in a rump Yugoslavia but, if 
defined as Bosnia’s Muslims’ ability to build an Islamic state, that could only be accomplished 
through independence. Fatally, it could only be accomplished through independence as a 
unitary state, and therefore on terms unacceptable to Bosnia’s both Serbs and Croats. If the US 
policy-makers prime concern, from Zimmerman to the State Department, had been to 
safeguard the Bosnian Muslims’ interests, they would have seen their role as aiding them in 
making the best choice from the available options.  
American policy’s greatest casualty was the Lisbon Peace Conference of March 1992 
where the Muslims, Croats, and Serbs reached an agreement mediated by Portuguese Foreign 
Minister Cutileiro, only for the Muslims to withdraw their consent. Ambassador Zimmerman 
conceded, in his memoirs, that the deal was “not all that bad”, and probably the best the 
Muslims would get”.327 “In the hindsight of history”, Zimmerman wrote years later, “Cutileiro's 
plan, although it introduced for the first time the concept of Bosnia's division”, would probably 
have worked better for the Muslims than any subsequent plan including the Dayton formula, 
since the divisions would have closely followed the actual ethnic percentages of the population, 
and “drawing on my instructions to support whatever could be worked out between the 
European Community and the three Bosnian parties, I encouraged Izetbegović to stick by what 
he'd agreed to.”328 Zimmerman is contradicted by other sources. In 1993, a senior State 
Department source noted that “while it was never committed to paper, the policy was to 
encourage  Izetbegović to break with the partition plan”, and when Izetbegović agreed to the 
Lisbon terms “we were very surprised he did that”.329 According to Richard Johnson, who was 
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the Yugoslav desk officer at the State Department, Secretary Baker "told the Europeans to stop 
pushing ethnic cantonization of Bosnia”.330 British diplomat Anthony Parsons argued that 
Izetbegović “should have been denied recognition until he could demonstrate that the structure 
of the new state was acceptable to all three communities”, and even Ganić himself would take 
to suggesting that it had been a mistake to side with the Croats against the Serbs, rather than 
vice versa.331 Even then-National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft believed “If we had sat down 
with the Europeans and said look, let's agree on what we'll do and what we won't do, and let's 
go to the Yugoslavs and say look, we don't think you ought to break up, it doesn't make any 
sense, but if you insist, here are the rules that we're going to insist on, it might have been 
prevented.”332 That was not the policy adopted at the time. Zimmerman and other American 
officials may be telling the truth when they claim that they did not tell Izetbegović to reject the 
deal, but they had already determined that US policy was to oppose Bosnia’s partition, and the 
Lisbon agreement de facto represented partition. Izetbegović failed to grasp that the American 
officials had not rejected partition because they supported a unitary Bosnian state in general or 
the Muslims’ cause in particular, but due to concerns that had little to do with Bosnia per se. 
American officials, perhaps not wholly comprehending their actions, were using Izetbegović to 
spite the Serbs and Croats, a course for which his people would pay dearly. 
Any chance of the policy of recognition working as a deterrent was dependent either 
on backing it with force or, failing that, creating the impression that force was on the table. 
While the CIA observed how “an imposed settlement by the international community would 
provide a positive model for resolving ethnic conflicts in the Balkan region and elsewhere”, 
recognition was not “imposing” much of anything on its own.333. Hutchings reflected that “like 
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the Germans, we had no strategy to accompany the “internationalization” of the conflict, only 
the vague belief, or vain hope, that this course was preferable to denying recognition and 
consigning Bosnia-Hercegovina to mercies of Milošević in a rump Yugoslavia”.334 Assistant 
Secretary of State Ronald Johnson would defend the policy in similar terms to Tudjman, 
conceding that “international recognition is not the guarantee for the stabilization of the 
situation”, but nevertheless arguing that “that this would be a signal with which we would show 
that we care of the importance of the borders and the integrity of Bosnia.335 Johnson 
undermined that signal’s potency by proceeding to tell Tudjman, on April 20th, in Zimmerman’s 
presence, “I cannot see any chances that the NATO might intervene in the situation in 
Bosnia”.336The  Croats were understandably confused as to what the US wanted from them. 
Washington, having been pushed into recognising Croatia begrudgingly due to domestic 
pressure and the realities of the international situation, could not answer this question. The 
decision to press forward with Bosnia’s recognition under the Izetbegović government had been 
an act of spite, undertaken without a wider strategic plan, as Hutchens conceded. Intended to 
deter Croatia and Serbia, it left America even more dependent on Croatia for its policy in the 
region.  
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Recognition of Neutrality’s Failure 
 
 
Engaging in counterfactuals is dangerous for historians, not least because it is so 
tempting. With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to believe that we can identify not just what 
the actors did wrong, but what they could have done to succeed. In the case of American policy 
towards Yugoslavia, engaging in such speculation seems gratuitous. The options available to 
policy-makers are a product of at least two variables: the goals that a policy is designed to 
achieve and the resources available to pursue them. A policy of supporting Marković with a loan 
of several billion dollars might well have made a difference to his reform programme’s fate, but 
that money was unavailable. That should have resulted in a decision either to find the money, or 
to set a different objective that did not require it. Instead, American policy-makers went out of 
their way to adopt a proactive stance, trying to freeze conflicts and mitigate tensions rather 
than promote any sort of viable settlement. Initially the primary concern had been Yugoslav 
unity, followed by fears of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo.337 After that came a resolution of the 
conflict in Croatia between Zagreb and the rebel Serbs, which following the EU recognition of 
Croatia, which most American policy-makers accepted would have, at least nominally, to be 
within the context of Croatian sovereignty.338 At all stages, the goal was to restore the status 
quo ante or, failing that, freeze the conflicts at the next stable level without any concern 
regarding whether this actually resolved the underlying causes.  
Nowhere was the gap between objectives and means greater than during the decision-
making process which led to Bosnia’s recognition. Robert Hutchings laments how “the United 
States rejected lead of its own Intelligence Agencies by accepting the preferences of the parties 
themselves for partition”, because of the drawbacks of the idea of partition, without giving any 
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real consideration to the merits of the alternative that the policy-makers embraced by 
default.339  A unitary Bosnia could only be accomplished by a Muslim military victory, while a 
united Bosnia within Yugoslavia would provoke a Croat-Serb war, as Alija Izetbegović himself 
later conceded.340 The only option that might be accomplished without bloodshed (though it 
also would be the logical consequence of conflict) was partition. Hence Tudjman's stated 
position that, after discussions with Milošević, Karadžić and the Army leadership, they “agree 
that the only solution is to divide up Bosnia between Serbia and Croatia”.341 The agreement that 
Tudjman envisioned may have taken little account of the Bosnian Muslims’ interests, as he was 
only “willing to leave the Muslims a small area around Sarajevo”, but he made a relevant point 
that the Muslims “may not like it, but a stable Balkans is possible only if there is a change in 
Bosnia's borders, no matter what the Muslims think”.342 By contrast, the US decision to obstruct 
a consensual partition may have allowed officials to feel that they had washed their hands of a 
dirty business, striking a blow against Tudjman and Milošević’s ambitions, but in regards to the 
Bosnian people, this was a moral abdication of astounding proportions. 
While the “moral” commitment to Bosnia led figures like Warren Zimmerman to adopt 
a position of hostility towards Franjo Tudjman before 1992, after that year, it increasingly 
created the impression that those most responsible for the “aggression” against Bosnia, the 
Serbs, were the villains, and that the Croats, by virtue of being their enemies, were not their 
equals. Rather, they provided the only hope for a Serbian defeat. Richard Holbrooke might term 
the Croats America’s “junkyard dogs” but it was Tudjman and his government who would turn 
the American officials’ desperation to help Bosnia into an embracing of the Croatian cause.343 In 
order to win Croatian support for Bosnia, Americans would embrace the idea that Croatia’s own 
rebel Serbs were the equivalents of their Bosnian compatriots, and that support for Croatia’s 
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victory over them would lead to the government’s victory in Bosnia. 
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CHAPTER 3 Foreign Policy in the 1992 Election and the 
Clinton Experiment 
 
When George Bush was defeated in America’s first post-Cold War election in 1992, few 
blamed his loss on the scenes of carnage that were then unfolding in Sarajevo. Historical 
judgments of the 1992 elections have tended to embrace a perspective encapsulated by Bill 
Clinton’s campaign slogan “It’s the economy, stupid”. In this narrative, a President with a 
successful foreign policy was brought down by an overwhelming tide of economic discontent, 
as Americans, after five decades of politics defined by geopolitical threats across the ocean 
(first Nazi Germany and then worldwide Communism), retreated into the domestic isolationism 
that had defined their early history. Contemporary works of triumphalism, such as Francis 
Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man, have been recast with the hindsight that has 
emerged following the events of September 11th 2001 as evidence that the 1990s represented a 
“vacation from history”, with historians such as Haynes Johnson and William O’Neil adopting 
titles such as the Best of Times and a Bubble in Time for their chronicles of the decade.344 
Robert Kagan implicitly accepted this view when he entitled his own book on American Foreign 
Policy during the second Bush Administration The Return of History and the End of Dreams.345 
Was this truly a “vacation from history”? As much as it makes for a dramatic narrative 
for historians to view the 1990s as an era when America’s foreign policy problems were solved, 
and the 2000s as the time when history “returned with a vengeance”, the early 1990s were far 
from a time of American exuberance. Far from viewing their world as a time of opportunity, 
Americans in 1992 expressed in polls, focus groups, and their November ballots an anxiety 
about the future that was consistent with that expressed during the crisis years of 1932 and 
1980, and again in 2008. Missing was the expected sense of triumphalism. Americans in 1992, 
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far from feeling exuberant over winning the Cold War, were increasingly convinced that George 
Bush and James Baker were in the process of rapidly losing the peace.  
How had this happened? How had the President who won the Gulf War less than two 
years before and presided over the Iron Curtain’s fall and the Soviet Union’s breakup persuaded 
Americans that he was incapable of managing the ensuing peace? The answer lies partially in 
Vilnius, Kiev, and Zagreb, but most prominently by 1992 in Sarajevo, where Bosnia’s collapse 
and the Bush Administration’s ineffectual response increasingly came to define a failed, 
immoral, and ineffective foreign policy. Equally importantly, these failures provided the 
Democrats, in the person of their 1992 ticket of William Jefferson Clinton and Albert Gore Jr., 
with something they had lacked for decades - the ability to present themselves as possessing a 
foreign policy capable of solving America’s problems where the Republicans proved incapable. 
Contrary to the view that Americans voted for isolationism in 1992, they cast their ballots for a 
candidate who called for airstrikes and direct military intervention in Bosnia, rejecting an 
incumbent whose Secretary of State had said, regarding Bosnia, that America had “no dog in 
that fight”.346 Focus groups showed that Bush was remarkably vulnerable, as “the public does 
not believe that the Cold War ended under President Bush’s watch, nor do they credit the 
President with being the primary motivator behind the Cold War’s demise”.347 Seeing the “end 
of the Cold War as a process”, many felt that “now we must/should care for our former Cold 
War enemies”.348 
There was another, equally ominous warning for George Bush that emerged from the 
campaign focus groups. In contrast to former President Jimmy Carter, whom voters viewed as a 
hard-working but ultimately incompetent chief executive, voters viewed Bush as a highly 
competent leader who could have resolved America’s economic and security problems “if he 
had cared to try”.349 Ironically, George Bush’s earlier successes, whether in the Gulf, former 
Soviet Union, or as Vice President, worked against him, by raising questions regarding why the 
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same management was not being duplicated elsewhere in 1992. If Bush and Baker genuinely 
deserved credit for managing the Soviet Union’s breakup in a manner that did not result in 
violence, why did they seem so utterly incapable of doing likewise for Yugoslavia? Was it simply 
not important enough for them to invest the effort? Did they simply not care? Comments, such 
as James Baker’s famous remark that America had “no dog in that fight”, certainly reinforced 
this perception.350 
Bush’s apparent indifference regarding Bosnia fed into a wider anxiety that had been 
building for some time, arguably since before he had even been sworn into office. The US 
economy had begun to slow down in the middle of Reagan’s second term, with real GDP 
growth falling from 4.45% in 1987, to 3.84% in 1988, and to 2.78% in 1989, before bottoming 
out at 0.65% in 1990. With domestic economic “fundamentals”, poor, 351  even at his apogee, 
Bush was seen as a President “whose foreign policy triumphs have outshone a sparse domestic 
record”.352 
Yet, the explanation that George Bush’s political travails came down to the “economy, 
stupid”, as would become Bill Clinton’s 1992 campaign slogan, is too simplistic and not actually 
supported by the underlying data. After hitting rock bottom in 1990, GDP growth then 
rebounded to 1.23% in 1991, and to 4.33% in 1992.353 George Bush’s popularity had been 
highest in the aftermath of the January 1991 Persian Gulf War, when the economy was at its 
lowest point, and the best year of his presidency economically, 1992, was the worst politically. 
It is true that 12 years of Republican rule made Bush at least partially responsible for the 
problems that had emerged before his inauguration, and the term “Reagan-Bush” proved 
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almost as much of a disadvantage in 1992 as it had been an asset four years earlier. It seems 
that the real problem was not Bush’s failure to revive the economy, but that the American 
public’s negative mood had fallen so low that few were inclined to believe the White House’s 
claims that the recession had ended. In 1992, Bush was not fighting a well-considered critique 
of his economic policies so much as a general sense of discontent at where the last 12 years had 
brought the country, like that faced by Margaret Thatcher’s Tories in Britain. In an era in which 
the 1980s’ enterprising entrepreneurs became the sleazy trader of Wall Street, the real estate 
developer Donald Trump, or indicted junk bond kingpin Mike Milken, Reagan and Thatcher’s 
free-market policies began to appear to many like the indulgence of greed.354 While it would 
have been an amusing irony if America and Britain had turned against the free-markets and 
capitalism at the very moment when the Eastern Bloc was turning towards them, that does not 
appear to have been the case, as evidenced by the US Democratic Party’s decision (and the 
UK’s Labour Party) to embrace the Reagan-Thatcher revolution’s essential principals. Rather, 
Americans were inclined to see Bush and his team as not up to the task, and their doubts 
preceded their vocalization by opposition politicians.  As early as September 1991, the same 
polls which gave Bush lopsided leads against potential Democratic challengers also showed less 
than half of voters favouring his reelection.355    
It is misguided to see the 1992 election as a battle between a “successful” foreign 
policy record for the incumbent administration and a dismal “domestic” one. Foreign policy was 
subject to the general feeling of malaise. What was important electorally was not just what 
Bush did in specific cases, but what he was perceived as doing in general. When the narrative 
was one of triumph, he appeared politically invincible but, when it was one of decline versus 
Japan, with many Americans unable to appreciate the Soviet Union’s collapse out of fear that 
America was following in its footsteps, his position disintegrated. The major question hanging 
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over the 1992 election was never going to be whether foreign policy was important but, rather, 
which foreign policy was going to matter, and how it would be assimilated into the 
overreaching narrative which would define how Americans viewed the incumbent.  
Bush obviously preferred a campaign that focused on what had happened on his watch 
as much as what he had done. On that metric he should have been unassailable. He had not 
only won Desert Storm but had also presided over the extinction of every major Democratic 
foreign policy issue of the last decade. The Soviet Union was gone, as were the Sandinistas in 
Nicaragua, while Apartheid in South Africa was on its way out. There was even reason to 
believe that the Arab-Israeli conflict might be ending. Democrats had been on the wrong side of 
these issues, against Contra Aid, the Reagan Doctrine, and the Persian Gulf War. A November 
1991 memo from Bush communications manager Fred Malek put this in stark terms: “The 
President needs a strategy that neutralizes Democrats on domestic issues so his foreign policy 
successes can be the deciding factor in the 1992 elections”.356  
If George Bush was looking for a strategy that “neutralized” domestic issues so that 
foreign policy issues could serve as “the deciding factor” in the campaign, Democrats sought 
the opposite - some way to neutralise Bush’s foreign policy successes in order to focus on his 
measly domestic record. Even better, from a Democratic perspective, would be if Bush’s 
conduct of foreign affairs could somehow be tied directly to his domestic failings. Events, and 
the Bush Administration’s attitude itself provided a lifeline. The charge against the Bush 
Administration’s domestic record was one of ineffectiveness, which made any perception that 
American foreign policy was ineffective particularly dangerous. While it may seem intuitive to 
see the Soviet Union’s collapse as a geopolitical triumph for the US, it was far from clear that 
this was the case for the Bush Administration. Since the Administration had been hesitant to 
back the secessionist movements in the Baltic States, and later the Ukraine, and seemed to 
desire Soviet Union’s preservation, the Soviet collapse could be portrayed as having happened 
despite rather than because of American policy. The same was true of Bosnia. Not only had the 
US backed a united Yugoslavia’s preservation over the Albanians, Croats and Slovenes’ national 
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claims, but it had failed in doing so. Even on its own merits, the policy looked mistaken. Rather 
than a moral case, it had been cast as a realpolitik one. A unified Yugoslavia made war less likely 
but, having prioritised unity over the risk of war, the Bush administration had ended up without 
unity and with a war, which it now appeared unable to stop, in Bosnia. Defense Secretary 
Richard Cheney would concede that with “the benefit of hindsight”, the US should have been 
more open to partition357 but even in doing so he was still thinking in terms of realpolitik. That 
was the defense Condoleeza Rice, then at the NSC would make to charges that the Bush 
Adminstration was not doing more to prevent humanitarian tragedies. “Global communication 
has contributed to this sense of having to be in all kinds of places at once, Rwanda one day, 
Somalia another, Haiti another, she told an interviewer in 1994, warning “if we run from 
humanitarian disaster to humanitarian disaster, we will be all over the map with nothing to 
show for it in a very few years.”358 This perspective might have been realisitic, as Clinton and his 
officials would come to learn themselves over the following years, but in 1992 Democrats were 
more interested in discussing morality.   
The perception of Presidential indifference to “human” concerns had dogged George 
Bush for years and, in 1992, participants told a Democratic focus group that Bush “had no 
understanding or commitment to ordinary people”.359 Bosnia tied these threads together, 
creating a narrative that Bush’s foreign policy, rather than functioning as a refuge from his 
domestic indifference, actually encapsulated it. That the charge had some basis in fact, insofar 
as many in the Bush Administration did not see the conflict as black and white, increased its 
effectiveness. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney, a dedicated Cold Warrior if there ever was 
one, recalled years later that it was a “very difficult conflict” with “no good guys and bad guys”, 
mocking those who had seen the conflict in moral terms. “There were those like Maggie 
Thatcher, who to this day I’ve heard her argue the case”, Cheney paraphrased as “’This is 
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Germany, 1939. You’ve got to stop the Serbs. They’re going to overrun Western Europe if you 
don’t take them out,’” before noting, “I never believed that.”360 However accurate, this nuance 
was ineffective politically. Anti-Communist Eastern Europeans who had formed a major base for 
the Republican party for decades, and had overlapped heavily with those blue-collar workers 
suffering due to Republican policies on trade, only added to the linkage. Croatian Americans 
had donated heavily to the insurgent challenge to President Bush launched by Patrick Buchanan 
in the Republican primaries and, according to the President of the Croatian-American 
Association, “They are so angry that they would rather vote for Tito, if he were alive, than for 
Bush”.361 Patrick Glynn saw the failure in Yugoslavia as part of a wider flaw in American policy: 
“U.S. handling of the Yugoslav crisis is in fact a case study in how not to conduct foreign policy 
in the post-Cold War world, combining lack of intellectual rigor and carelessness with what 
Senator Al Gore has termed ‘moral obtuseness’ about the conflicts and issues at stake”.362 
“Moral obtuseness” was the challenge levied at the Administration’s handling of 
Bosnia, implying at once both indifference to the conflict’s moral dimension, and the apparent 
incomprehension displayed by realists like James Baker that such a dimension could even exist 
or matter. The words were those of Al Gore, who had been one of the few Democrats to 
support the Gulf War in 1990, and over the course of 1991 had become a leading hawk, backing 
the termination of all US aid to Serbia, and even floating the prospect of dispatching US 
peacekeepers to Croatia in October.363 “Yugoslavia no longer serves any geostrategic purpose 
for us” Gore informed the Senate on October 28th 1991, advocating a total embargo on 
Serbia.364 With Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole, the following month, he co-sponsored a 
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resolution urging US recognition of Slovenia and Croatia which received the support of 52 out 
of 100 Senators.365 After the Bush Administration finally followed Germany in granting 
recognition to Croatia and Slovenia in early 1992, he blamed American policy for causing the 
conflict in the first place. "If we had summoned the moral courage to act”, says Gore, "we could 
have saved thousands of lives.”366  
Without testimony from the former Vice President himself, either in the form of 
interviews on the subject or published memoirs, Gore’s full motivations for embracing Croatia’s 
cause remain a matter of speculation. Gore had pragmatic reasons for the decision. His support 
of the Gulf War, while saving him from the stigma of having opposed an ultimately successful, 
cheap, and victorious conflict, nevertheless put him on the same side as George Bush and in 
opposition to the vast majority of Democrats. Gore, who had already run for President in 1988 
with Richard Holbrooke as his foreign policy adviser, clearly had higher ambitions, which meant 
he needed to break with the Bush Administration while maintaining his hawkish image.367 His 
future national security adviser, Leon Fuerth, had also served in the Zagreb consulate.368 While 
these factors no doubt contributed to Gore’s anti-Serb position, they seem insufficient per se. 
The deepest reason may lie in his character which will be elaborated on later in this chapter. 
Gore saw himself as a man of action, and the unifying theme throughout his life was opposition 
to orthodoxy. That was true not just of foreign policy in the 1980s, but later in his life when he 
embraced the cause of fighting climate change. Perhaps no greater example exists than centre-
right Democrat Gore’s decision to endorse left-wing Vermont governor Howard Dean in the 
2004 presidential primaries.369 In 1991-1992, there could be no more ossified orthodoxy than 
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Yugoslavism among foreign policy hands and, after 1993, that Western and American policy’s 
goal must be to prevent rather than utilise violence. The very strength of those orthodoxies 
might well have motivated Gore to seek alternatives. 
Gore’s charges were, of course, unfair, relying on overly-simplistic characterisations, 
but this hardly set them apart from foreign policy criticisms by opposition politicians dating 
back to the Peloponnesian War.370 What mattered was less their truth or fairness than their, at 
least perceived, effectiveness, and that the Democratic party rated that effectiveness highly 
enough to make them central to their 1992 critique. As we have seen, as early as autumn 1991, 
Democrats in Congress, traditionally the opponents of intervention, had moved to outflank 
their Republican rivals on first the Soviet Union, and then Yugoslav policy. Now, in 1992, the 
Party cemented the strategy by Governor William Jefferson Clinton of Arkansas’s nomination. 
As a governor, Clinton had not been party to the foreign policy battles of the 1980s. On the Gulf 
War, he had hedged enough to claim that he had been in favor, at the time saying that he 
agreed with the arguments offered by opponents but would have voted with the majority out 
of deference for Presidential authority over foreign affairs.371 While he would continue to be 
dogged by questions about his Vietnam War draft record, the Bush campaign’s decision to 
focus on personal attacks rather than Clinton’s policy’s “flexibility” allowed Clinton to establish 
himself as a hawk. With the Gulf War neutralised, Clinton could then go on the offensive in the 
foreign policy field, endeavouring to advance a narrative where the voters’ own doubts about 
Bush’s disengagement from the domestic field were extended to the foreign realm.  
For the Clinton campaign, the strategy was obvious; to portray the Administration’s 
failures as the result of indifference rather than incompetence, and thereby turn its assets such 
as the Gulf War into liabilities. The war in Bosnia, combined with the lack of enthusiasm shown 
by the Bush Administration towards Croatia, Slovenia, and the Ukraine’s secession played a key 
role in this strategy. It ensured that the most prominent foreign policy issue of the Presidential 
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campaign would be an Administration failure, allowing the Clinton campaign to exploit 
longstanding criticism of the Administration for prioritising stability over democracy and human 
rights. "I think there is an inconsistency in a lot of his actions”, Clinton said of his opponent, 
"because of the pull between the impulse, the deep American impulse, to support freedom and 
democracy and his own preference for stability in his relationships with foreign leaders in a 
given area.”372 “We were trying to be proactive and out in front of Bush”, recalled Clinton’s 
Foreign Policy Adviser Sandy Berger,who would go on to serve as Deputy National Security 
Adviser, adding, “In a sense we got to the right of Bush on Bosnia, and we were tougher on 
Bosnia than Bush was.”373 
Clinton, in announcing his selection of Tennessee Senator Al Gore as his Vice 
Presidential candidate, warned against losing the Peace after winning the Cold War: “What we 
need to elect in 1992 is not the last president of the twentieth century, but the first president 
of the twenty-first century”.374  Gore’s selection ensured that the campaign would take a strong 
stand on Yugoslav issues. “I think on Bosnia, Clinton was heavily influenced by Gore, who was 
very hawkish about the fact that we needed to be more interventionist with respect to Bosnia”, 
Berger recalled.375 With Gore and Clinton as their standard bearers, the Democrats were taking 
the offensive on foreign policy for the first time in decades, warning that the new world order 
was in danger of being smothered in its bed through George H.W Bush’s indifference. 
Interviewed by the New York Times in June 1992 when he was still polling in third place behind 
Bush and independent Ross Perot, Clinton painted a picture of an Administration that had 
abandoned its moral moorings. President Bush had been “a little slow on the uptake” on Bosnia 
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and “too cozy” with China according to Clinton, while he had “engaged in foot-dragging” in 
providing aid to the ex-Soviet Republics.376 Clinton even suggested that the US should “shoot its 
way into Sarajevo” if the Serbs continued to obstruct humanitarian operations.377 Clinton went 
even further in August, calling for direct military intervention in Bosnia through the UN Security 
Council. Under the UN Security Council umbrella, “the international community would charge 
Serbian leaders with crimes against humanity, such as genocidal and ethnic cleansing”, while 
the US Navy would tighten the UN embargo against Serbia, and the US would participate in air 
strikes "against those attacking the [U.N.] relief effort in Sarajevo”. 378  
White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater’s called Clinton’s remarks “reckless”, 
suggesting that the Governor had “better do some more homework on foreign policy”, and 
concluding “It's clear [Clinton] is unaware of the political complications in Yugoslavia”. 379  This 
response may well have been prescient but, in the context of the campaign, it looked like the 
Democrats were promising to at least try to do something, while in Al Gore’s words "Bush and 
Quayle have nothing to offer except more of the same”.380 Clinton adviser and former Carter 
Assistant Secretary of State Lesley Gelb even challenged the idea that the Bush Administration 
had an exclusive claim to support of the Gulf War, or Democrats sole ownership of its 
opposition, writing in a New York Times Op-Ed piece in October 1992 that “Few put up stiffer 
resistance to military action in Iraq and Bosnia than Defense Secretary Richard Cheney and Gen. 
Colin Powell”.381 That a senior figure such as Gelb could credibly make such an accusation 
against two individuals widely considered to be Gulf War heroes, and that the New York Times 
would publish this, demonstrated the degree to which the Clinton campaign had succeeded in 
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using the lack of intervention in Bosnia to obscure the lines that had traditionally separated the 
internationalist Republicans from their Democratic foes. 
If the first months of the campaign had been used to exploit the Bosnia issue to 
obscure the traditional lines between the Democratic and Republican visions of the world, in 
the final month before the election, Clinton moved to take ownership for himself of the Reagan 
legacy. In a speech delivered at Milwaukee’s Institute of World Affairs, Clinton recalled that a 
year earlier, in the Ukraine, Bush had “lectured a people subjected to genocidal starvation in 
the Stalin era, warning that their aspirations for independence constituted, and I quote, 
‘suicidal nationalism’”.382 On Yugoslavia, the Governor went further, assailing American policy’s 
very basis of the previous year: “[Bush had sent James Baker to Belgrade], where, in the name 
of stability, he had urged the dying members of the Yugoslav Federation to resist disunion”.383 
In Clinton’s words, this “would have required the peoples of Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia to 
knuckle under to Europe’s last Communist strongman”. He concluded by declaring “I believe 
our nation has a higher purpose than to coddle dictators and stand aside from the global 
movement toward democracy”.384 
The perceived lack of the “higher purpose” of which Governor Clinton spoke, or what 
Vice President Bush had termed four years earlier “that vision thing”, proved possibly the Bush 
campaign’s greatest liability. Ultimately, neither Bosnia specifically nor the foreign policy 
generally defeated George Bush; what defeated him was the perception that he did not care 
while Bill Clinton did. Doubtless, being perceived as insensitive to Americans’ economic 
struggles hurt George Bush considerably. Yet attacks on Bush’s foreign policy, which were 
reinforced in the voters’ minds by constant scenes of shell damage in Sarajevo, played a key 
role in allowing Clinton and the Democrats to portray the incumbent as someone for whom 
indifference to suffering was core policy. At the same time, Clinton used Bosnia as a way of 
establishing credibility with an electorate “that had given up on George Bush”, by establishing 
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himself as a credible alternative who did care, not just about suffering children in Sarajevo, but 
also about the suffering of children and their parents at home.385  Bush could never divert the 
focus of the election away from the economy to foreign affairs, because the Democrats had 
managed to argue that the wider picture of an uncaring, myopic chief executive applied across 
the board, and thereby had added foreign policy to the leger against the President. Clinton 
himself remarked that “It's a desperate thing to say this election ought to be about foreign 
policy when America is being ridiculed around the world”.386 
The Clinton-Gore team won conclusively in November 1992, in large measure because 
they promised a government that would care in place of one that obsessed over 
“complications” in the manner that Marlin Fitzwater had snidely remarked the previous 
summer. Yet, having won, they would have to come face to face with some of those same 
“political complications” to which Fitzwater had referred. Clinton entered office seemingly with 
a mandate to care about the war in Bosnia, and presumably to do something about it, but 
exactly what that “something” would be had been left up in the air. Would Clinton and his 
Administration push for airstrikes, even over European opposition? Would they favour action, if 
it meant having to “shoot their way into Sarajevo”? And what compromises would be required 
in order to achieve these goals? While Clinton had run on America’s failure to manage the 
world, he had simultaneously benefitted from the perception that George Bush was too 
obsessed with it and that he and Baker were far more comfortable with Gorbachev or Kohl than 
with American voters. Having been chosen due to his connection with those voters, Clinton 
would have to manage a team capable of working with Kohl and Yeltsin as well, if he truly 
sought to change matters on the ground in Bosnia. With a limited pool of talent to draw from in 
Little Rock, and a 12-year gap separating him from the last time Democrats had held the 
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presidency, much would depend on how Clinton staffed his Administration. It was also where 
he would rapidly discover that words were easier than actions. 
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Staffing an Administration 
 
               Not since the 70-year old Dwight Eisenhower had given way to the 43-year old John F. 
Kennedy had America seen the sort of generational change that occurred when 68-year old 
George Bush handed power to 46-year old Bill Clinton. The transition was all the greater, 
however, due to the fact that the Democrats had been so long out of office. Normally, an 
Administration can count on three groups of talent: talent from the winning candidate’s inner-
circle, which usually includes staffers who worked on their gubernatorial or senate staff; talent 
from previous Administrations of the same party; and talent from academia or the private 
sector. 
George H. W. Bush’s Administration had drawn personnel from all three sources, 
although not always in a manner that allowed them to work in concert as a team, instead 
relying on an inner circle of loyalists who ran the day-to-day policy. James Baker’s entry into 
politics had been managing Bush’s 1970 Senate campaign, while Scowcroft, Eagleburger, and 
Cheney had all served with Bush during the Ford Administration. The result was a cohesive 
team that was intensely loyal to the President, but also one where the loyalty was returned in 
full. Bush was remarkably reluctant to sack anyone, and resisted pressure to remove either his 
controversial Chief of Staff, John Sununu, or his chief economic adviser, Richard Darman, until 
he had suffered significant political damage. This was compounded by one of the oddities of 
modern American politics. Because the majority of Bush’s previous political career, and hence 
his potential pool of loyal talent, had been in Washington rather than at the state level, they 
had extensive experience of policy-making. At the same time however, the inner circle’s limited 
political experience, since none of the senior figures except for Cheney had been involved in a 
campaign for decades other than Bush’s 1988 election, left the Administration woefully deaf to 
the political sentiment in the country. For Clinton, the reverse would be true.387  
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Clinton would, be an almost complete inversion of his predecessor. The future 
President grew up poor, in a trailer park, before working his way to Georgetown, Oxford, and 
Yale Law School. Having overcome so much to achieve success, Clinton perhaps found it difficult 
to feel empathy for those who had failed, even if he seemed to feel genuine compassion for 
those suffering from adversity. Clinton had experienced one setback in his career, defeat in his 
1980 reelection campaign to become governor of Arkansas, for which he blamed Jimmy 
Carter’s decision to place Cuban refugees in his state. “He screwed me”, Clinton would remark 
of his Democratic predecessor, with whom he would never enjoy a warm relationship.388 
Occurring in a state which had elected Democratic Governors for 102 out of the previous 106 
years, it seems to have conditioned the future President always to place domestic 
considerations first with regards to foreign policy. Clinton also arrived in Washington convinced 
that the Washington Democratic elite had contributed little to his success, and done much to 
obstruct his path. Even as Clinton led in the polls, most Washington Democrats backed 
Nebraska Senator Bob Kerrey’s last minute candidacy early in 1992 and, as late as December 
1991, seemed to be pining for New York Governor Mario Cuomo to enter the race.389 Clinton 
would need some members of the Democratic elite to staff his Administration, but they would 
never be fully part of the team, and, when political expediency demanded sacrifices, it would 
almost invariably be the elder statesmen who were offered up. Their most prominent 
representatives, 1988 Vice Presidential nominee Lloyd Benson at the Treasury, former Arizona 
Governor Bruce Babbitt at the Department of the Interior, and Mississippi Congressman Mike 
Espy at Agriculture, would all be gone by mid-1995. Other would-be appointees failed to make 
it even that far. Having promised to appoint a female Attorney General, the President was quick 
to abandon his first two choices when they fell foul of the immigration laws. Two academics 
with close ties to the First Lady also saw their nominations derailed when they made the 
mistake of trying to fulfill their duties too diligently. Jocelyn Elders, who was Clinton’s first 
nominee for Surgeon General,  did not make it to confirmation after publicly musing that 
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masturbation could be healthy for teenagers, while Dr. Lani Gurnier, nominated to head the 
Civil Rights division, withdrew after being dubbed the “quota queen” by the press. Gurnier, a 
political scientist from Harvard University, had focused her research on the role of racial, ethnic 
and religious minorities within democratic societies, and had publicly mused about ways of 
granting them representation, including a suggestion regarding guaranteed influence for white 
South Africans above their pure mathematical strength.390 In the process, the Administration 
lost the chance to employ the world’s foremost experts on ethnic and religious strife in 
democratic systems when it confronted many of the same issues in Bosnia. Clinton, in 
withdrawing Gurnier’s nomination, referred to her views as “indefensible”. Gurnier, reflecting 
on the experience during a commencement address at Hunter College a year later, argued that 
avoiding issues does not make problems go away, and remarked that “I believe that if silence is 
the price of admission, it is also the cost of doing the job”.391 Silence on key issues could be 
expected from many of Clinton’s intimates, including his first Chief of Staff Mack McLarty, an 
classmate from kindergarten with no prior governmental experience, and  Strobe Talbott and 
Sandy Berger, two of Clinton’s Oxford classmates who became head of Policy Planning at the 
State Department and Deputy National Security Adviser respectively. Assistant Secretary of 
State for Policy was considered the premier intellectual position within the foreign policy 
apparatus, having previously been held by George Kennan, the author of the doctrine of 
containment. Talbott would arguably grow into the role in a way in which McLarty, who would 
last less than a year, and Berger, who would end his career pleading guilty to charges of 
smuggling classified documents out of the National Archives, never would.392 
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The Clinton Administration’s First Foreign Policy Team 
 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, the challenge that Bill Clinton faced in constructing his 
foreign policy team was enormous. It is unsurprising, then, that the end product was perhaps 
less than the sum of its parts in terms of effectiveness, and often seen as ideologically 
incoherent. Not only was it divided between Clinton’s longstanding allies, refugees from 
academia and Washington insiders but there was the additional burden of bridging the gap 
between a Democratic party which had voted 46-8 against using force to remove Saddam 
Hussein from Kuwait, and a new President who had promised that, if elected, he would make 
America a “catalyst for a collective stand against aggression”.393 Which type of Democrat would 
the voters get? The New Democrat that Reagan’s UN Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick had 
considered supporting? Or the second coming of James Earle Carter III?394  
 As a former Governor with limited foreign policy experience and no history within 
Washington politics, it is hardly surprising that Clinton opted to avoid committing to any 
particular foreign policy vision, instead preferring to balance the competing factions and 
outlooks. Time would prove that this was a decision to prioritize domestic considerations in 
foreign policy formulation, one which would leave the Administration vulnerable to fait 
accompli by Tudjman and even its own rogue officials. In January 1993, however, no one 
seemed less likely to go rogue than the men whom Clinton selected to serve as Secretaries of 
Defense and State. 
For Defense, Clinton tapped Les Aspin, who had served as Chair of the House Armed 
Services Committee since 1985. He had been outspoken as a Clinton surrogate on Bosnia during 
the campaign, declaring in Congress in October 1992 “If we say it is all or nothing and then walk 
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away from the use of force in the Balkans, we are sending a signal to other places that there is 
no downside to ethnic cleansing. We are not deterring anybody”.395 Rather than advancing 
these views in office, the charge against Aspin was that he was too weak, and he would be 
“faulted for not reigning in Powell, especially on using American forces in Bosnia. Aspin neither 
challenged Powell's strong opposition nor tried to muzzle him”. Having spent seven years 
interrogating Pentagon officials on everything from procurement to promotions, a political 
appointee with no military record like Aspin could not compete with Powell for the top brass’s 
loyalty. He found himself out of the loop, most embarrassingly when he announced a 
suspension of humanitarian flights in Bosnia after consulting Powell but not the President.396 
Aspin would be fired after less than a year following a disastrous raid in Somalia which saw 18 
Americans killed.397  
Aspin’s successor, William Perry, had served as Undersecretary of Defense for 
Research and Engineering under Carter, but in contrast to the long-serving politician Aspin, 
Perry had never held public office.  Regardless of his knowledge of military issues, Aspin had 
views on politics, being sceptical of intervention in Bosnia and one of the strongest voices 
against NATO expansion.398 Perry was a far less politically sophisticated actor, occasionally to 
the point of naivety, as when he was the sole American representative at the May 1998 funeral 
of Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Sušak whom Perry eulogized as a man who brought 
democracy to Croatia and peace to the region, before quoting Shakespeare: “now there goes a 
man, we shall never see his like again”.399 In 1998, Croatia was an international pariah, and 
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Perry caused serious embarrassment to a Clinton Administration that preferred to forget its 
past relationship with Zagreb. 
New Secretary of State Warren Christopher had led both Clinton’s Vice Presidential 
and Foreign Policy search committees, and served as Cyrus Vance’s deputy under Carter. He 
seemed to perceive the conflict in Yugoslavia as an inconvenience that had been forced upon 
him, musing in June 1993 how Germany “'bears particular responsibility'' for the conflict in 
Bosnia through its “premature” recognition of Croatia and Slovenia.400 Christopher had received 
the position as much for what he was not, as for what he was. “Mention Christopher”, the New 
Republic wrote of him, “and the adjective that comes back again and again is "able" though 
another is "uncharismatic"--though not always in a pejorative sense.”401 Liberal internationalists 
and those on the right were to be less charitable. William Safire suggested that “Warren 
Christopher may be the most inept secretary of state since Edward Stettinius”402 while 
Christopher Hitchens, writing in 2008, recalled Clinton Adviser Sidney Blumenthal referring to 
Christopher as “a blend of Pontius Pilate with Ichabod Crane”.403  
Head of the Council on Foreign Relations Peter Tarnoff, who became Christopher’s 
deputy, attracted greater controversy. In August 1991, Tarnoff had argued “Any Western 
insistence on what amounts to unconditional surrender by Iraq will only complicate Arab efforts 
to resolve the crisis peacefully”.404 Tarnoff also advocated foreign policy in which the US shifted 
resources to domestic affairs in a journal article published in summer 1992.405  “This is no 
longer a matter of hawks versus doves”, wrote the Editors of the New Republic, adding “These 
appointments leave us fearing that the mind that led him to side with the majority of 
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Congressional Democrats against the Gulf war was in fact the truer one. He [Clinton] has 
created the foreign policy apparatus that Michael Dukakis would have created.”406  
Clinton attempted to balance fears about excess dovishness by making James 
Woolsey, a prominent hawk who had worked for Reagan, the new head of the CIA.  Woolsey 
soon found himself isolated when “the President quickly gave up on the daily intelligence 
briefings by the CIA Director, preferring to read the intelligence himself”.407 Woolsey would not 
meet with Clinton privately even once during the first two years of the Administration, leading 
him to joke that "It wasn't that I had a bad relationship with the president. It just didn't 
exist”.408 Robert Gates later reflected that “more than any other government department, CIA’s 
influence and role are determined by its relationship to the President and National Security 
Adviser, a relationship that finds expression almost exclusively in the CIA Director’s personal 
relationship with those two individuals”.409 George Bush had mistrusted his first CIA Director, 
William Webster, a Reagan appointee, partially leading him to discount warnings about the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 410  As a Republican, Woolsey was also isolated from other members of 
the President’s foreign policy team, most of whom had served together under the Carter 
Administration.  
National Security Adviser Anthony Lake epitomised the Carter Alumni. He had served 
on Henry Kissinger’s staff, before becoming Director of Policy Planning under Carter.411 Instead 
of moving to either Wall Street or a Think Tank after Reagan’s victory, he had instead retreated 
to the tiny Mount Holyoke College in Western Massachusetts, where he taught for the next 
decade. The job of the National Security Adviser was to bridge factional gaps in order to provide 
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the President with the information necessary to make decisions and Lake shared the 
President’s frustration with the battles of the past. “In the 1970s and 1980s, every four years 
we refought the Vietnam within the party”, Lake would explain later.412 During the Carter 
Administration, he had witnessed Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Adviser 
Zbigniew Brzezinski tear the administration apart through their rivalry. Lake made “internal 
collegiality” his highest principle, and helped to kneecap both Holbrooke and Brzezinski’s bids 
for senior roles because he felt them to be anything but collegial.413 After the 1992 election, 
Lake expressed to incoming Clinton appointees his “hope to see a year from now and beyond a 
group of senior national security officials who are as collegial and amicable as they are 
today”.414 
 A Georgetown professor and daughter of Czechoslovakia’s pre-1948 Ambassador to 
Yugoslavia who had fled to the US after the Communist coup in 1948, the new UN Ambassador 
Madeline Albright would test Lake’s patience.415 Albright had studied for her PhD under 
Brzezinski and seemed to follow her mentor in antagonising colleagues, several of whom seem 
to have regarded her as having been “inflicted upon them by an unannounced, yet very real 
government affirmative action committee”.416 With Holbrooke, who shared her antipathy to 
Lake as well as most of her ideological views, she would develop a deep rivalry that was more 
“about politics, personality, and power”, as the two battled to succeed Christopher as Secretary 
of State.417 Albright won that battle, but the war continued through leaks. One Administration 
insider leaked of Albright, “He [Holbrooke] was in Vietnam when she [Albright] was raising 
babies. So why should he defer to her?" Albright’s friends gave as good as they got in turn, 
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noting that Holbrooke’s diplomacy was “done in such a neuralgic and transparent way that it's 
icky”.418 During the 2000 election, Albright was heard to remark, “I hope Gore gets elected, but 
I’ll be damned if Holbrooke is going to succeed me”.419 
In January 1993, Albright was personally isolated, and Holbrooke, the youngest 
Assistant Secretary of State in American history under Carter, was only offered the 
Ambassadorship to Germany through Strobe Talbot’s efforts, and then only after an agonizing 
nine month wait.420 In ordinary circumstance, Albright’s isolation would have resulted in an 
early resignation on some issue of principle, and Holbrooke’s sinecure a quick return to the 
private sector, as real influence would have been blocked by Lake’s hostility, who controlled 
access to the President. Holbrooke and Albright, however, did have access to one figure who 
mattered immensely, namely Vice President Albert Gore Jr. and it was this connection that 
would allow them to bypass and eventually displace Christopher, Lake, and Woolsey’s 
influence. Gore was one of the most skilled bureaucratic infighters in an administration with no 
institutionalized system for decision-making, aided by direct access to the President. “The Vice 
President was usually the last person he [President] talked to before reaching a foreign policy 
decision. Which not a bad place to be when you are trying to persuade the ever-persuadable 
Clinton”, observed Time Magazine in a glowing 2000 profile.421 Unlike Secretary of State 
Christopher, whose priority was risk avoidance, or Anthony Lake, who prioritised consensus, 
Gore wielded this influence in favour of a clear policy agenda. James Woolsey recalled “my 
hunch is that, had he been President, we would not have waited two-and-a-half years, if I may 
put it in blunt terms, to kick Serbian butt in the former Yugoslavia”.422 
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Gore adopted a hands-on role regarding policy formation, often attending National 
Security Council meetings, and sending a representative if absent. “I included Leon Fuerth, the 
Vice President’s National Security Adviser in everything—in my small morning staff meetings, 
and—well almost everything” Lake later recalled, adding “If, occasionally I forgot to include 
him, it was the one time that I can recall where the Vice President would get testy. I might get a 
call from the Vice President, saying, ‘No, I want Leon there.’”423 Fuerth was the only senior 
administration figure with a background in the Balkans, albeit from early in his career when, as 
a professional foreign service officer, he had served as Consul General in Zagreb. This may have 
influenced both Fuerth and the Vice President’s approach to the region.424 The Vice President’s 
office demonstrated a clear interest from the start. “When Clinton took office he appointed 
Leon Fuerth, Vice President Gore's Security Advisor, as his Czar for handling the sanctions 
aspects of what was to be this new policy of sanctions enforcement”, recalled Victor Comras 
who oversaw the sanctions enforcement for the State Department.425 For the next two and a 
half years, Fuerth and Gore would fight all efforts to trade any form of sanctions relief on 
Belgrade for political concessions, and ultimately even oppose confidence-building measures 
such as economic exchanges between the Croatian government and Serb-controlled territories 
if this meant weakening the sanctions on Belgrade and Pale.426 When not only Fuerth, but later 
Richard Holbrooke and the Vice President himself, took a leading role in the region, especially in 
terms of relations with Croatia, this would prove vital. By 1995, Gore would in effect be running 
his own American policy in the region, which would go a long way towards supplanting the 
official one.427 
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Richard Holbrooke had served as Gore’s foreign policy adviser during his ill-fated 1988 
campaign, and would have played a key role in 1992 had Gore had his way.428 Holbrooke made 
repeated efforts to break in, a process that took the form of gushing missives, informing 
Governor Clinton that “your public statements have made real difference, especially in pushing 
the Bush Administration into doing more than they otherwise would have done”, and 
positioning himself as a “Bosnia” specialist. 429  Holbrooke, who had no previous background in 
the region, but warned that Bosnia “would be George Bush and Larry Eagleburger’s revenge if 
Clinton Wins”, claims that his interest in the area developed following a trip to Croatia and 
Bosnia (but not Serbia) at the invitation of Winston Lord, Vice Chair of the International Rescue 
Committee, in August 1992.430 Holbrooke wrote a feature in Newsweek, warning “the US, and, 
to an even greater extent, the European Community may be undermining not only the dreams 
of a post-Cold War common European house, but also laying the seeds for another era of 
tragedy in Europe”.431  
After the election, Holbrooke lobbied aggressively for “a special trouble shooter role” 
for Bosnia, approaching the Clinton transition team in the weeks after the election, and Tony 
Lake in person during mid-December 1992, who promised to “keep in close touch”.432 This lack 
of official endorsement did not prevent Holbrooke from embarking on a trip of his own to the 
region over New Year, including a meeting with Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granić, who 
warned him that, if the UN “did not restore the Krajina to its rightful owners, another war 
between Serbia and Croatia was inevitable”.433 The Administration, however, showed little 
interest in sending Holbrooke to Bosnia. When a job offer came, it was for the Ambassadorship 
to Germany, and it arrived in June 1993, partially in response to a New York Times story 
reporting rumours that Holbrooke was being considered for the Ambassadorship to Japan.434 
While Holbrooke would eventually play a key role in Bosnia, his return to favour would be 
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conditional. Gore’s efforts to secure Holbrooke the office of Secretary of State in 1997, after the 
resignation of Warren Christopher, failed.435 Gore remained loyal to Holbrooke, and it is likely 
that only 527 votes in Florida prevented Richard Holbrooke from achieving his lifelong ambition 
of serving as Secretary of State after the 2000 election.436 
Michael Mandelbaum, a prominent Professor at John Hopkins who had helped to 
guide the Foreign Policy team during the campaign and studied with Clinton in England, turned 
down the post of Policy Planning Chief at the State Department. Mandelbaum was a realist, 
sceptical of the changes that the end of the Cold War had brought, and may have felt out of 
place in Clinton’s team.437 Mandelbaum was to become a leading critic of several 
Administration policies, most prominently its efforts to expand NATO to the East. The fact that 
he was to dissent from outside the Administration rather than from one of its most important 
perches was to have a significant impact on policy development.438 It also illustrated one of the 
weaknesses of Lake’s approach to staffing. As with Holbrooke, Lake seemed hostile to allowing 
any major rival centres of authority to develop, and those likely to dissent were either not hired 
(Holbrooke), discouraged (Mandelbaum) or sidelined (Woolsey). In 1993, this served to render 
the decision-making inefficient, and their implementation, in the rare cases where decisions 
were made, ineffective. In attempting to secure his own power in his office of National Security 
Adviser, Lake would ultimately undermine the office’s power itself, with consequences which 
would sink his bid for leadership of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1997.439 After 1994, this 
would allow the official National Security Council to be increasingly bypassed, as its inability to 
reach decisions either positively or negatively encouraged officials to pursue their own agendas 
in the absence of any clear policy to the contrary. 
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Policy in the Balkans in the Early Months of the Clinton Administration: 
The Limits of American Power 
 
 
The Clinton Administration took office at a moment when a clear US position was 
more vital than ever if the Vance-Owen process were to succeed. The outgoing Bush 
Administration’s actions were a poor guide. James Baker’s departure and  replacement by 
Lawrence Eagleburger, who was far less able to resist pressure from within the government and 
public opinion, led to a drift of American rhetoric in what appeared to be an anti-Serbian 
direction, especially after Slobodan Milošević defeated Serbian-American businessman Milan 
Panić in the December Serbian elections. Zimmerman had been no friend of Slobodan Milošević 
or the Bosnian Serbs but had combined this with a distaste for Franjo Tudjman, and an abiding 
distrust of Croatian motives. Many younger officers, with no experience of a unified Yugoslavia, 
lacked Zimmerman’s hostility towards Croatia and increasingly saw the Serbs as the outright 
villains of the conflict. American Consul General in Zagreb Ronald Neitzke was a prime example. 
Until the US recognized Croatia in April 1992, the consulate in Zagreb was subordinate to the 
Embassy in Belgrade, a situation that Neitzke resented, regarding Zimmerman’s operation as 
Yugoslavist if not Serbophile, and objecting to the suggestion that “Croatia's and Serbia's 1992 
human rights reports should be drafted “in tandem”.440 “I was reporting frankly what I saw, 
much of it ugly, based on the enormous number of sources available in Zagreb at that time” 
Neitzke recalled, “but it was not the way Embassy Belgrade saw things, and they were used to 
being better informed, or thinking themselves better informed, and prevailing.”441 This outlook 
was evident in a March cable that Neitzke sent regarding the human rights situation in Croatia, 
in which he conceded that, “Although the Croatian Government continues to view Human 
Rights issues as political questions”, it seemed “Western pressure on this issue has had some 
success, at least in terms of attitudinal shifts by Croatian leaders”. The cable noted that, “in 
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recent, Tudjman has continued his human rights offensive, holding cordial meetings with 
delegations from Helsinki Watch, the EC, and a local Amnesty Committee made up of Serbs and 
opposition figures”.442 Recognition, and the failure to dispatch a full-time Ambassador, gave 
Neitzke the freedom to pursue his conviction that Zimmerman had been wrong about Croatia. 
“Tudjman had come a long way in 1992, or so it seemed, from the erratic, ultra nationalist 
greedily eyeing Bosnia that Warren Zimmerman thought he was dealing with, to the more 
measured and reserved man I found on my arrival, to the Tudjman as self-perceived statesman 
following the London Conference of August 1992, where he had first tasted international 
respectability – and liked it”, recalled Neitzke.443 444 In an end of the year summary, US 
diplomats in Zagreb assured Washington that “The highest levels of the Croatian government 
have pledged that all crimes against citizens will be punished to the full extent of the law”. By 
contrast, ‘International legal experts who queried the Serbians regarding their ‘so-called’ legal 
system found the answers evasive, inaccurate, and mendacious.’ According to a reliable source, 
the legal system there ‘does not exist...So-called judges carry out extremist policies directly 
against non-Serbian minorities.’”445 Regarding freedom of religion, the report noted that there 
were “two mosques, a synagogue, and orthodox churches” in Zagreb, whereas “there is 
virtually no freedom of religion for non-orthodox believers in Serbian-controlled areas of the 
UNPAS”.446 The embassy staff rejected the use of the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ for Croatian 
actions, suggesting it be replaced with “forced resettlement”, as “the term ‘ethnic cleansing’ 
should be reserved for the specific pattern of terrorist clearing actions of Bosnian Serbs”.447  
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Lawrence Eagleburger had once remarked that, while US policy provoked dissent, “it 
never got above the fifth floor of the State Department – this above the desk officer level”.448 In 
autumn 1992, a senior political appointee, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, added 
his voice. Wolfowitz, who would later play a key role in the 2003 American Invasion of Iraq, was 
not one to be moved by Neitzke’s moral arguments. He was, however, concerned that, if a 
Serbian military victory were unacceptable and the US did not enable the Bosnians to buy arms 
in order to “defend themselves”, Washington would find itself with little choice but to send 
ground troops, risking their lives in the future. Wolfowitz claims that his arguments made an 
impression on Powell, as they did not require direct action by the US military, but were derailed 
by a State Department worried about the legal precedent of unilaterally abandoning the arms 
embargo.449 The US military supported action as long as it involved diplomatic and not military 
consequences (i.e. lifting or evading the arms embargo), while the State Department favoured 
military action but opposed diplomatic costs (i.e. air strikes or action by the US military, but no 
unilateral violations of the arms embargo). This deadlock between the option of dropping the 
arms embargo, or direct military action, would persist until a mixture of both was imposed on 
the US decision-makers in 1995, almost against their will. 
While both military action and ending the arms embargo were ruled out by the 
Departments of Defense and State respectively, Eagleburger made two moves which would 
influence the options available to the Clinton Administration in the Balkans. The first had a 
directly bearing on the Yugoslav conflict, while the second, although seemingly unrelated, would 
end up undermining any prospect of serious military intervention in the region. The first was the 
“Christmas Demarche”, on December 25th 1992, delivered by Robert Rackmales as an “oral 
message” from George Bush to Slobodan Milošević  warning him that “in the event of conflict in 
Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the US will be prepared to employ military force against 
Serbians in Kosovo and in Serbia proper”.450 The message, which was also delivered to Albanian 
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leader Ibrahim Rugova, made it clear that the threat of US intervention would not apply in the 
event that an Albanian insurrection was the trigger for conflict.451 How this would be parsed was 
left unclear, even to the authors.452 While never required to be put into effect, the Clinton team 
found they had taken on a preexisting American commitment to employ military force over 
Kosovo, but not, for some reason, Bosnia. At best, this was an exercise in conflict limitation. War 
had already broken out in Bosnia, but had yet to spread to Kosovo, and there may have been 
hope that, by warning Milošević off, they could prevent this from happening. The second 
development was President Bush’s decision to deploy American marines to Somalia as part of a 
UN mission to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid. The decision attracted broad support from 
leaders in both Houses of Congress, and in public at least from President-elect Clinton, but 
involved the American military in a peace-keeping operation that would rapidly descend into 
“peace-making’.453 This commitment would make American leaders, both military and civilian, 
reluctant to undertake another as long as the Somalia mission lasted. When the American 
attitude towards the Vance-Owen process was raised in early 1993, President Clinton asked his 
advisers “can we get out of Somalia first?” before making any commitment to sending troops to 
Bosnia.454 
The media were, with a few exceptions, almost unanimously anti-Serb, influencing not 
only Congress but also policy-makers. Richard Holbrook records, in a footnote to his memoirs, 
that “as journalists reported at the time, the American government had concluded by the early 
summer of 1992 that the Serbs had carried out close to 90% of all the atrocities in Bosnia and 
Croatia”, without citing any specific statement or article.455 Holbrooke, was probably one of the 
less partisan interventionists, insofar as he did not hold the Serbs responsible for the breakup of 
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Yugoslavia, instead critiquing the German decision to recognise Slovenia and Croatia.456 Other 
future officials did not make even these concessions. Madeline Albright and Richard Shattuck 
travelled to Croatia in early January 1993, visiting Zagreb and, after some obstruction by the Serb 
authorities, Vukovar. 457  The trip followed on the heels of a series of Congressional visits 
championed by Democratic Congressman Frank McCloskey of Indiana, who had already played a 
key role in lobbying for Croatia’s recognition.458 While McCloskey had at least met with Serbian 
leaders in Belgrade during his previous trips, as had Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware who spoke 
with Milošević during his own late 1992 trip, the future Clinton officials made no effort to do so. 
This media campaign and the change of perceptions it helped to promote were due in 
no small part to the able assistance of the PR firm, Ruder Finn. The new contract marked a sea 
change from the amateurish efforts that Croatia had made in 1990 in Washington. Tudjman’s 
official representative in Washington, Frane Golem, had become famous in émigré and political 
circles for buffoonery. One Congressman described meetings with Golem “as analogous to 
asking someone for the time and receiving a lecture on how to make a clock instead”.459 An 
editorial in the daily newspaper Danas noted that “A well-qualified staff of public relations 
experts in the US is much more effective than two well-trained divisions in Croatia”.460 Zagreb 
arguably got more than two-well trained divisions-worth from the contract with Ruder Finn. In 
a 1993 interview, James Harf, who managed the portfolio for Tudjman, described “managing to 
get Jewish opinion on our side” as his greatest achievement, especially given that “reading his 
[Tudjman’s] writings, one could accuse him of antisemitism”. According to Harf, “We won by 
targeting Jewish audience. Almost immediately there was a clear change of language in the 
press, with the use of words with high emotional content, such as ‘ethnic cleansing & 
concentration camps’, etc., which evoked images of Nazi Germany and the gas chambers of 
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Auschwitz”.461 This new line of highlighting Serbian “atrocities” was typified by the video 
coverage of Britain’s ITV news of the Trnopolje internment camp on August 7th 1992 which, 
arriving on the back of a special by Roy Guttman in Newsday the preceding week, focused 
attention on the purported parallels between the Serbian camps in Bosnia and those used by 
the Nazis during WWII.462  Harf took personal credit for the Nazi comparison: “When the Jewish 
organizations entered the game on the side of the [Muslim] Bosnians, we could promptly 
equate the Serbs with the Nazis in the public mind”.463 
The Croatian effort did not go uncontested. In 1991, Slobodan Milošević had 
contracted the London firm of Saatchi & Saatchi which had run Margaret Thatcher’s 
Conservative Party’s campaigns during the 1980s.464 In the long run, this proved a poorer choice 
than that made by Zagreb. Saatchi specialised in influencing elite opinion in London, and 
arguably succeeded in pushing both the Conservative Party and the civil service in a Pro-Serb 
direction, but it had no history of lobbying work within the US.465 Furthermore, Milošević rather 
than the Bosnian Serb leadership was Saatchi’s client, and he had less interest in defending 
them, as opposed to establishing a distance from them. The net effect was to leave the public 
relations war uncontested over Bosnia, especially after Ruder Finn was also retained by the 
Izetbegović government.466  
The success of the Croatian PR effort was reinforced by American decision-making’s 
peculiarly political nature. Unlike in the UK, where most officials below the cabinet level are 
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permanent civil servants, and the Ministers are themselves elected officials, every member of 
the American national security apparatus apart from the President is appointed. Even the Vice 
President, often a prominent figure in his or her own right previously, is elected on a ticket with 
the President. Except for the Vice President, who can be either a pivotal figure or a ceremonial-
figurehead, excluded from all real power depending on relations with the President, every 
figure can be sacked by the President. This creates a system where not only is loyalty to the 
President, but also the priority is the President’s political interests rather than national ones.  
This tendency was partially restrained under George H. W. Bush because many of the key 
figures – Scowcroft, Baker, Cheney – had all worked together for years, but Bush’s 1992 defeat 
had reinforced the lesson. A foreign policy which is incognisant of the President’s political 
interests will prove short-lived.  
Bill Clinton had won the election defining “Serbian Aggression” as a problem, and 
Bush’s failure to respond to this as a justification for removing the incumbent. Whether this 
reflected the factual reality was beside the point. Clinton’s political credibility was tied up with 
this vision of the Balkans being the reality. Clinton and his Administration needed to defeat 
“Serbian Aggression”. If the facts were more complicated, then it was the new national security 
team’s task to reconcile them with the facts that Clinton needed. 
  That the Clinton team considered Serb responsibility for the Yugoslav conflict a closed 
question was illustrated by the questions that the transition team submitted to the Intelligence 
Communities Joint Balkan Task Force after the election. Established on June 12th 1992, its 
positions did not always match those advanced by Robert Gates or, later, James Woolsey. 467 
Headed by Norman Schindler, who would later become DCI (Deputy Director of Central 
Intelligence) for Nonproliferation, in charge of assessing the Iranian and Iraqi efforts to develop 
weapons of mass destruction, it was designed to be a resource for political decision-makers, 
rather than an advocate for the intelligence community.468 The Administration did not request 
 
467 Memo: Establishment of Interagency Balkan Task Force June 12 1992 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1992-06-12.pdf: Accessed March 3rd 2018 
468 Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, Statement by Deputy Director, DCI Nonproliferation Center,  
“A. Norman Schindler on Iran's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs  to the International Security”, 
Proliferation and Federal Services  Subcommittee of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee (as prepared for 
 
 154 
an analysis of the possible solutions to the conflict and, unlike in 1991, the intelligence analysts 
made no attempt to offer one. There would be no discussion of partition’s merits this time 
around. Instead, all potential options involved means of either aiding Bosnian Muslim forces or 
exerting pressure on the Serbs, with concerns focused on the players’ possible responses, such 
as the European allies, the Islamic world and Russia, as well as the effectiveness of the current 
sanctions regime.469  The responses echoed the media in concluding that Slobodan Milošević was 
set on creating a “greater Serbia”.470 While the European nations’ concerns about their troops’ 
security on the ground, which would lead them to resist air power alone as a mechanism, were 
flagged, it was almost assumed they would fall into line with whatever Washington decided. 
Greater concern was reserved for Russia’s domestic situation.471 Whether forceful action was 
desirable went unquestioned. The question was “how” to accomplish the goal of “rolling back 
Serbian aggression” rather than “what” the goal should be.472 Even had they wished to, potential 
objectors, like Mandelbaum, were on the outside looking in, while the campaign’s rhetoric 
committed the new national security team to a view of the conflict in which the Serbs were 
primarily at fault. Ironically, this was to leave the Administration without either a “how” or a 
“what” when it sought to abandon the Bush Administration’s belated acceptance of Vance-Owen.  
When the Clinton Administration’s “Principals” gathered to take stock of American 
policy in the region on January 28th 1993, the parameters of the discussion had already been so 
constrained as to render the meeting more like an administrator board meeting than a discussion 
of high policy. 473 This may explain why. over the course of the next few months, the “Principals” 
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increasingly left the discussions to their deputies rather than attending them in person. General 
Colin Powell, the most senior Bush Administration holdover, opened the proceedings with a 
description of the Bush policy’s baselines:  “to deliver humanitarian assistance (using air power 
if necessary), support UN/EC mediation (but not necessarily the Vance-Owen proposals), refuse 
to accept borders changed by force or to legitimize ethnic cleansing, condemn war crimes, seek 
No-Fly enforcement, and arm the Bosnian Muslims”.474 Deputy National Security Adviser Sandy 
Berger then attempted to reconcile this with the highlights of the Clinton campaign’s promises 
of “enforcing No-Fly, being more aggressive about delivering relief assistance, and considering 
lifting the arms ban on Bosnia”.475 It was a repeat of the discussion that Paul Wolfowitz had 
experienced with Powell and Eagleburger three months earlier. The result was similarly negative. 
It had been determined what the US could not do rather than what it could. A lone voice in the 
room was the new CIA Director, James Woolsey, who urged the principals not to isolate Serbia 
when no serious alternative means of influencing the Bosnian Serbs existed, a dissent which may 
have been a further step towards his own isolation.476 
Woolsey’s wider point, that it was perfectly acceptable to feel unhappy about the 
available options but that the imperfection of the options that did exist was not a reason to 
reject them when potentially preferable alternatives such as air strikes had already been ruled 
out, was especially pertinent to the Administration’s attitude towards the Vance-Owen peace 
process. In theory, Clinton’s Democratic Administration, in which one of Vance’s former 
Deputies served as Secretary of State and another as National Security Adviser, should have 
been more sympathetic to his efforts than the Republican Administration which had appointed 
him. Yet, Vance’s relations with his former Deputies were poor to nonexistent. In 1980, 
Christopher had been briefed about Desert One, the Carter Administration’s plan to use military 
force to rescue the hostages from Iran, and been instructed not to inform Vance of the 
operation. Upon discovering the deception, Vance resigned, thereby publicising dissent within 
 
474 CIA Post-Meeting MFR on 28 Jan 1993 Principals Committee Meeting on the Former Yugoslavia January 29th, 
1993  
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1993-01-29.pdf: Accessed October 12th 2017 
475 Ibid. 
476 Ibid. 
 156 
the Administration’s highest ranks amidst an election campaign.477 Vance had, nevertheless, 
recommended Christopher for the office of Secretary of State. Therefore, the fact that one of 
his protégés would help to torpedo his plan was “particularly painful to Vance”.478 For 
Brzezinski’s student Albright, Vance’s image as a well-meaning but naïve appeaser of autocrats 
would have come naturally and she could have easily been the source cited by the New 
Republic when it reported “Vance stands in particularly low esteem for pusillanimity in facing 
down the Iranian mullahs in the 1970s and for appeasing the Serbs today”. 479 Vance’s British 
partner David Owen recalls that he was “shattered to arrive in the US at the end of January 
1993 to discover that informed opinion, even among many good friends, believed that Vance 
and I were somehow rewarding ethnic cleansing and aggression”. Owen, never one to avoid the 
spotlight, returned this partisan tone willingly, both at the time and later in his memoirs. “The 
Clinton administration is perfectly entitled to have its own policy on the Balkans”, Owen told 
Foreign Affairs, adding “But the United States, particularly now that it is the sole superpower, 
also needs continuity in its foreign policy.”480  
  The Clinton Administration’s public statements about the Vance-Owen plan were far 
more moderate than Owen’s tone implies, with Christopher telling a Senate Sub-Committee 
that the US supported the "process" without necessarily supporting the results.481 This position 
was not far from that of Eagleburger, who had told both Vance and Owen in December that 
their plan “was likely to end the bloodshed and was the best possible solution for nations 
unwilling to take stronger methods”.482 Even much of the media conceded that “the Vance-
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Owen plan was hardly perfect, but its imperfections matched the imperfections of Bosnia – and 
Yugoslavia – as countries”.483  
    In his memoirs, Owen alleges that the Administration exaggerated the differences 
between itself and the Vance-Owen team, noting “In July 1992 I had argued publicly that 
selective air strikes should be used to tip the balance against the Bosnian Serbs, almost exactly 
at the same time as candidate Clinton was arguing the same case during the election 
campaign”.484 Here lies the rub. Owen’s actual objection appears less that the US somehow 
“opposed” his plan, and more that the Clinton Administration was unwilling to use military 
force to compel the parties to accept his plan. The US did ultimately support the plan 
diplomatically and, further, was willing for the first time to provide peacekeepers in the event 
of the parties agreeing to the plan. Whatever misgivings they had about the Vance-Owen plan, 
the Administration “Principals” reached an agreement in January and February 1993 that it was 
the only game in town and that the US should support it, including indicating a willingness to 
provide troops for enforcement.485 What the Clinton Administration refused to do was to 
commit to using American military power to impose the plan on the parties, something there 
was never much chance of at a time when the US was not even using force to protect 
humanitarian operations.486 Owen knew that this meant that the plan was doomed, for the very 
reasons that Vice President Al Gore expressed on February 5th: “The current Vance/Owen plan 
would need to be not only enforced but imposed. Then we would have the worst of both 
worlds. Vance/Owen has a terrible map, and would require lots of American blood and 
treasure”.487 Even Serb agreement to the Vance-Owen plan was seen as something that would 
do little to increase its viability without enforcement, as the Joint Balkan Task Force concluded 
on March 10th: “Barring the introduction of an external force strong enough to compel them to 
desist, the Serbs are unlikely to stop until they have achieved that goal. If the Vance-Owen talks 
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have had an influence on Serb actions, it more likely is in persuading them to accelerate the 
pace of their efforts to achieve their goals before a settlement is reached…The Serbs are not 
likely to withdraw from any territory they occupy barring the arrival of an international force 
able and willing to compel them to do so”.488 Therein lay the conundrum.  The Vance-Owen 
plan could not be implemented, except through the use of American force, but, if they were to 
use American force, the Clinton Administration wanted a better map in exchange.  
American officials can be forgiven for failing to evince enthusiasm for a process which 
required the US to pay the lion’s share of the cost for a plan that it had not created. No decision 
was made to reject Vance-Owen, privately or publicly. Christopher expressed this ambiguity.  
On February 5th, he argued “We should be more aggressive in describing our negative position 
about the current Vance/Owen plan and the only way we would get people to agree is to be 
prepared to enforce a settlement”. At the same time, however, he maintained that “we should 
not throw out Vance/Owen at this point and do it ourselves. If an agreement can be reached, 
we should commit the U.S. to a greater degree of enforcement”.489 The US did not doom 
Vance-Owen; the need for the US to intervene for the plan to work did.  Owen may or may not 
have had a point when he bitterly lamented that the US did eventually assert itself in 1995 in 
order to enforce a plan at Dayton which was in some ways less attractive than his own, but 
what he misses is the fact that the key assertion in 1995, as we will see, came not from 
Washington but from Zagreb. 
The Clinton Administration did not kill the Vance-Owen plan; it refrained from 
investing military resources in compelling compliance, seeing the cost as too high for the 
settlement on offer. Such a decision was perfectly defensible if the US was prepared to invest 
greater resources to achieve a more favourable settlement for the Bosnian Muslims, coerce the 
Bosnian Muslims and Croats into accepting a settlement which would not require American 
military imposition, or indifferently allow the conflict to continue indefinitely. What made the 
Clinton Administration’s rejection of Vance-Owen a mistake was that the Administration 
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rejected all of these options. The Administration wanted a better map which would 
nevertheless require less American effort to impose on the parties. This was impossible. The 
Vance-Owen trade-offs were inherent to every other plan which did not reflect the existing 
balance of military force on the ground. The Clinton Administration discovered this when 
tasked with devising their own alternative. They produced a plan which had all the weaknesses 
of Vance-Owen but none of the strengths.490 In  May 1993, Clinton sent Christopher to Europe 
to present the concept of “lift and strike”, a lifting of the arms embargo which was perceived as 
disadvantaging the Muslim forces, followed by the launch of air strikes on Serb forces. If the 
objections to Vance-Owen were the justifiable belief that the plan was inviable without the 
“stick” of the US force, then what was “lift and strike” other than the missing component of the 
Vance-Owen effort, denuded of a map, plan, or clearly-defined objective? What were the air 
strikes supposed to hit? What would the US require the Serbs to agree to in order to stop 
them? Was the US committed to a Muslim military victory?  Would it even work? The CIA 
thought not, arguing that supplying “weapons to the Bosnian Muslims and launching 
multinational airstrikes against Serb positions would not have any lasting effect on the Bosnian 
Government's military situation, but would probably lead to the breakdown of the Vance-Owen 
talks and the shutdown of UN humanitarian relief missions”.491  
   Proposing to flood Bosnia with large quantities of weapons in pursuit of no clear 
purpose could hardly have been expected to be warmly welcomed in Europe. “Britain is ready 
to risk a full-scale confrontation with the US if President Bill Clinton tries to lift the United 
Nations arms embargo on Bosnia” warned the Independent.492 Sir Jeremy Greenstock, then 
heading Yugoslav policy in Whitehall, recalled how the British “thought that that would just 
prolong the war, would not bring people to the table. The Americans would end up supplying 
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the Bosnians with arms; the Serbs would be very difficult to defeat militarily, but the Bosnians 
would never let go, so you’d have a much longer Civil War in Yugoslavia than if you got them to 
negotiate”.493 French President Mitterrand informed Christopher of his belief that there was no 
need for a policy which would see more weapons flooding into the Balkans.494 It is possible that 
the European leaders might have been more receptive to the proposed air strikes without a 
lifting of the arms embargo. The Independent had also reported that ”Mr. Major, Douglas Hurd, 
the Foreign Secretary, and Malcolm Rifkind, Secretary of State for Defense, will tell Cabinet 
colleagues today that they are prepared to back air strikes”, as a “lesser evil” if the US was 
resolved on “lift and strike”.495 
  If the British were willing to let the Americans experiment with a policy of air strikes 
that lacked any clear military or political objectives, there was someone who was far less 
cavalier about risking American lives simply because no one had any better ideas. “Our main 
problem, in addition to everything else”, Madeline Albright later recalled, “was Colin Powell.”496 
“He saw Bosnia as another Vietnam and he was going to stop it”, Nancy Soderberg explained.497 
Powell’s “constant, unwelcome message at all the meetings on Bosnia was simply that we 
should not commit military forces until we had a clear political objective”.498 Powell had little 
patience with others in the Administration who saw military action as a substitute for a political 
settlement in the region. At one point early in the Administration, Madeline Albright cornered 
him and asked “’What are you saving this superb military for, Colin, if we can’t use it?’ I thought 
I would have an aneurysm… American GIs were not toy soldiers to be moved around on some 
sort of global game board”, Powell wrote later.499  
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When confronted with the idea of “lift and strike”, Powell could easily have turned 
Albright’s question back to her: “what are you planning to use this superb military for, madam 
ambassador? What map do you wish to impose, what peace plan do you envision, what 
demands will you make?” Powell perhaps underestimated the options that a series of 
Muslim/Croat military successes might open as they did in 1995, but in 1993, that was neither 
US policy nor anyone’s proposed policy. When proposed by Paul Wolfowitz the preceding 
autumn, Powell had come out in favour of it, only to have it scotched by the State 
Department.500 In Powell’s view, the problem in Bosnia was political; namely, what did the US 
want to happen, and the military could solve that problem by making it happen only after the 
politicians had defined what “what” was.501 All other military hypotheticals involved lobbing 
bombs and then waiting to see if that produced a political solution, and any American officer 
who had lived through Vietnam could be forgiven for feeling sceptical about that.  
A hero after the success of the Gulf War, Powell was widely rumoured to be a 
potential Republican candidate for President in 1996. Clinton trod carefully around the General, 
giving Powell neither cause for complaint nor any issue that could serve as pretext for a 
principled resignation. When Powell expressed public opposition to plans to allow gay people to 
serve openly in the military, Clinton dropped the proposal.  "They're terrified of him”, stated a 
White House official, adding "He's too independent.”502  The consequences of a principled 
Powell resignation in objection to a mission in Bosnia that then suddenly went wrong, providing 
a political “I Told You So” moment, was too risky for a President who was not known for risk-
taking. Powell “was not a constructive player on Bosnia”, according to Nancy Soderberg, who 
“effectively tied Clinton’s hands, because you can’t get this done if you don’t have a Joint Chiefs 
of Staff Chairman who will come up with options for you”.503 
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   Political constraints left Clinton administration without a policy, as US support for 
Vance-Owen or any other plan was equally dependent on solving the Gordian knot of 
enforcement/implementation. “President Clinton believes that we must move toward a 
settlement, building on the [former Secretary of State Cyrus] Vance - [Lord David] Owen plan, 
that is just, workable, and durable, and that preserves Bosnia as a state. US participation comes 
with the expectation that Europe, which is most directly affected, will play a leading role and 
redouble its concerted efforts”, the Secretary of State declared after his doomed trip to Europe 
to sell “Lift and Strike”.504 This was, however, in and of itself, an admission that the US did not 
see “Lift and Strike” so much as an alternative to the Vance-Owen plan as something that was a 
prerequisite in order for any sort of settlement to work. “None held high hopes for Vance-
Owen”, the minutes of a two and a half hour Principals meeting on Bosnia, held on April 7th, 
recorded, but  “No decisions were taken on the future direction of Yugoslavia policy should 
Vance-Owen fail.”505 Tony Lake floated air support for the Bosnian Muslims without lifting the 
arms embargo, while Powell advocated pressuring the Muslims to accept a deal, but neither 
was able to gain much support from any other power centre.506 Yet even this was merely a 
process without the all critical objective; namely, a settlement that the US wished to work 
towards. Powell noted this, arguing that air support made no sense, as even if it proved, to 
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some degree, effective in shifting the military balance in favor of the Muslims, that would be 
just as likely to raise their demands as to encourage the Serbs to accept a current deal. If it 
failed, it would leave the US committed to escalating its commitments. “The 'do-something' 
group really have an obligation to say what it is ought to be done'' Christopher exclaimed in 
response to a New York Times op-ed criticising his performance in Europe.  ''I've yet to hear a 
plausible basis for dealing with the situation in Bosnia that would not require hundreds of 
thousands of troops.”507  
Advocates of intervention could point to a successful landing in Haiti the following 
February, where the mere threat of force sufficed to remove a military junta. While 
encouraging “the minority of Clinton advisers who regard military action as a necessary tool of 
foreign policy”, US action in Haiti succeeded because it met Powell’s test.508 The US objective in 
Haiti, the reinstallation of a democratically-elected President, was both clear-cut and, by 
definition, limited. Ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide’s restoration was non-negotiable; 
everything else, including an amnesty for the military and civilian plotters who had ousted him 
along with placing restrictions on his authority, was open to discussion. The real analogy in 
Bosnia would have been to a limited effort to coerce Serbian acceptance of the Vance-Owen 
plan through a threat of force, paired with a threat to abandon the Muslims to their fate if they 
rejected the terms (as the US did to Aristide). Yet, considering Vance-Owen insufficiently 
desirable to justify the cost of greater American involvement, the Administration declined 
either to define a settlement or to reduce their goals to bring them in line with the resources 
available. In the process, the mistakes made by the Bush Administration during 1989-1992 were 
repeated. The US still needed to decide between scaling back its ambitions or finding additional 
resources. Ultimately, those at the top never would, leaving it to Al Gore, Richard Holbrooke, 
and others, such as soon-to-be Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith, to do so, dragging the 
rest of the US government along in their wake. Their approach would be to square the circle not 
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by investing greater US resources but by borrowing Croatia’s military power. As with all 
borrowing, this would come at a cost far greater than the loan’s proponents anticipated.  
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The End of the First Year 
 
                “There has been a tendency to shift responsibility - crucial to successful leadership” 
Wolfowitz wrote of the Clinton Administration’s approach to foreign policy, “away from the 
President and toward subordinates; away from the US and to its allies, for example the 
Europeans on Bosnia or the Japanese and South Koreans on North Korea; and away from this 
administration and toward its predecessor with the rhetoric of ‘inherited crises’."509 This was a 
poignant observation. The Clinton Administration had, doubtlessly, inherited the situation in 
Yugoslavia from its predecessor, but Bill Clinton had explicitly run against George Bush in 1992 
on the basis that he could do a better job of managing such “crisis”. The obstacles that Clinton 
and his team identified were not imaginary. Colin Powell did oppose military action without a 
political objective; America’s allies had doubts about the wisdom of lifting the arms embargo on 
the Muslims alone; and the Vance-Owen plan demanded a lot from the US for an imperfect 
outcome, but politics is about reconciling objectives with the means available. Instead, 
obstacles became excuses for inaction. The Clinton Administration failed to define a foreign 
policy for the US. They had rejected Bush’s focus on “stability” but had not found anything to 
replace it with, much as they had rejected Vance-Owen, but also rejected “unilateral force”, the 
only viable alternative.  “They tried, and failed, to turn American foreign policy into a branch of 
social work” Mandelbaum lamented.510 Thomas Friedman wrote, in the New York Times, that 
"In Bosnia, failure has left Mr. Clinton in an exquisite bind. He can escalate, introducing 
American ground troops—something he has pledged to avoid. Or he can reconcile himself to 
the fact that his attempts at humanitarian intervention have produced bloody, unforeseen 
consequences”.511 
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              Reflecting on the 1992 Presidential campaign, Colin Powell recalled, three years later, 
that there was no foreign policy issue upon which the Clinton Administration had been more 
critical of its Republican predecessor than the war in Bosnia.512 Facing a President who was 
considered a national hero following the Gulf War, and who seemed to have won the 
ideological contest against the Soviet Union globally, the Clinton campaign sought to use Bosnia 
to turn Bush’s strength into a liability. The Bush Administration’s management of foreign 
affairs, detached, dispassionate, and conducted in terms of leaders, governments, and 
backroom deals, was portrayed as an immoral approach that subordinated human rights and 
democracy to short-term deal-making. Bosnia had tied a number of these threads together. The 
Bush Administration’s penchant for stability and support of Gorbachev and the Chinese 
leadership in Beijing portrayed the Administration as the enemy of the “people” of the 
communist and former communist world. Bush, rather than becoming the man who won the 
Cold War became the man who sought to preserve its relics, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, 
and seemed determined to allow an unprecedented historical opportunity to pass America by. 
Moreover, if anyone doubted Bush’s actions’ moral consequences, one only had to turn on CNN 
to view Sarajevo’s ruins. In effect, Yugoslavia allowed the Clinton Administration to take credit 
for the end of the Cold War over which Bush had presided. 
               One reason why Bosnia worked so effectively for Clinton in 1992 was that Bush’s 
freedom of action was limited by the fact that he was already President and could not promise 
undeliverables. Once President, Clinton came face to face with many of the same challenges 
that Bush had faced. In addition, Clinton inherited a deeply-divided party. Hawks and doves 
coexisted with difficulty within an Administration that tried to pursue coherent policy outcomes 
while unwilling to pay the price for success, domestically or internationally. The result, perhaps 
predictably, was the perception of failure which dogged the first year of Clinton’s foreign policy, 
whether in Somalia or Yugoslavia. A side-effect of the failures of 1993 was a number of senior 
figures’ departure and the side-lining of others, such as Secretary of State Christopher. In their 
place would rise a new generation of policy-makers who would first bypass their superiors in 
order to implement policy in Bosnia, and then use success in the Balkans as currency in their 
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struggle to control the Administration. For the opponents of intervention, the victory won in 
1993 would prove to be both fleeting and pyrrhic in nature. 
 
  
 168 
 
Chapter 4: From the Ashes of Failure: US-Croatian Relations 
1993-1994 and the Reinvention of American Policy in the 
Former Yugoslavia  
 
 
When the Clinton Administration took office in January 1993, US policy towards 
Croatia appeared non-existent. Amidst the efforts to create a coherent foreign policy team and 
reach some sort of consensus on policy towards Bosnia and the Vance-Owen process, the 
Clinton Administration had little time to spend determining a policy towards Croatia, which in 
January 1993, more than eight months after recognition, still lacked a nominated Ambassador. 
Ronald Neitkze continued to represent American interests in Zagreb, yet it was increasingly the 
Croats rather than the US policy-makers who were taking the initiative. After a slow start in 
1991, and a mixed record of success with the Bush Administration, Zagreb was determined to 
avoid repeating the mistakes it had made with the new Clinton team. Throughout autumn and 
winter 1992, Tudjman personally hosted Richard Holbrooke, Madeline Albright, and a 
Congressional delegation led by Frank McCloskey in Zagreb.513 McCloskey had played a leading 
role in the House as an advocate of first Croatia and then Bosnia. The erstwhile champion of the 
Kosovo Albanians, Republican Senate leader Robert Dole of Kansas, had been transformed by 
the November 1992 election from the White House’s lieutenant to leader of the opposition in 
the Senate.514 At the end of his December 1992 trip to Zagreb, McCloskey had praised 
Tudjman’s “contributions to peace” while declaring that “genocide is raging unchecked in 
Europe. Western policy based on negotiations, sanctions and peacekeeping has failed. We need 
a more forceful and coherent strategy which confronts, instead of acquiescing in Serbian 
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aggression”. Assisting McCloskey to draft his remarks was the Democratic Staff Director for the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee and future US Ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith.515 
Tudjman had bigger plans than simply entertaining guests. The Croatians were 
planning a military operation within Croatia which would not only violate the cease-fire terms 
but also take advantage of its conditions. Serb gains in 1991 had left parts of Croatia almost 
isolated, and the Maslenica bridge’s destruction, northwest of the city of Zadar, had left 
Dalmatia accessible to the rest of Croatia only by ferry.516 When Cyrus Vance mediated an 
agreement between Croatia and Belgrade in December 1991, the bridge and surrounding area 
had remained under Serbian control. Other aspects of the agreement had been more 
favourable towards the Croats. The JNA had withdrawn from internationally-recognised 
Croatian territory while the Krajina Serbs had turned their heavy weapons over to UN control. 
UN Peacekeepers would patrol the demarcation line between Krajina Serb- and Croatian-held 
territory. Over the following 12 months, the strategic picture envisioned by the December 1991 
agreement had altered dramatically. In December 1991, the JNA remained just over the border 
in Bosnia, able to intervene on the Serbian side if fighting resumed. Following Bosnia's 
secession in April 1992, the former JNA units had either been withdrawn into Serbia proper, or 
been converted into Bosnian Serb units which were fighting within Bosnia itself. By January 
1993, only “Sector East” the area of Slavonia, mainly around the devastated city of Vukovar, 
which was directly adjacent to Serbia, remained directly subject to JNA (now renamed Yugoslav 
Army - VJ) intervention.517 It is hardly coincidental that the cease-fire would hold until 
December 1995 in Sector East, despite the sabre-rattling on both sides.  
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The Maslenica Bridge was located on the opposite side of Croatia, as geographically 
distant from Sector East as possible, and so offered a juicy target for Tudjman. In the event of 
an attack, the Krajina Serbs would not have immediate access to their heavy weaponry, while 
the VJ was no longer able to retaliate, leaving only the international community in a position to 
intervene.518 To blunt international criticism, Zagreb could argue that the Serbs had violated 
their obligations under the Vance Plan to open transport routes and facilitate the return of 
refugees.519 Admittedly the argument about refugee return applied more strongly to Sector 
East where the pre-war Croatian population amounted to nearly two thirds of the total than to 
the historically Serb-majority area around Maslenica.520 Zagreb’s real target was as much 
Washington as Knin. With Clinton’s victory, Neitzke speculated “Tudjman hoped for a change in 
U.S. policy… but, as all the signals out of the early Clinton Administration pointed to continued 
U.S. reluctance to get involved, Tudjman was quicker than many to see that those hopes were 
misplaced; Croatia was going to have to take the initiative”.521 Operation Maslenica would 
imply to Washington that a failure to resolve the UNPAs issue to Zagreb’s satisfaction risked the 
resumption of fighting and perhaps a wider conflict. The experience of autumn 1991 had taught 
the Croatian leadership that the absence of fighting, rather than the nature of any peace, 
motivated Western leaders. Tudjman had used that knowledge to portray the JNA’s presence in 
Croatia as the cause rather than the result of the Croatian-Serb conflict. To prevent Washington 
from becoming too comfortable with the post-Vance status quo, it was vital to show that some 
fighting was inevitable unless Croatia’s demands were met. Moreover, starting a war with 
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Belgrade, for which Croatia would be blamed and probably defeated in, would prove 
counterproductive. 
“Operation Maslenica” was finely calibrated to achieve this middle ground, with the 
Croatian Army aiming to seize the bridge along with the buffer zone around it and then push for 
a cease-fire that would consolidate those gains.522 It was launched on January 22nd 1993, 36 
hours after Bill Clinton was sworn into office and during Defense Minister Sušak’s pre-
scheduled visit to Washington, ensuring that he would be available to offer explanations to the 
Administration in the unexpected event that America objected forcefully to the Croatian 
move.523 Croatian forces advanced more than seven kilometers, securing both the bridge and 
adjacent airport, after which the operation ceased. With their heavy weapons under UN 
control, the Serbs were only able to field light military police.524 “We limited our operation to 
that area only because of the international circumstances”, Tudjman told his advisers, noting 
that the operation “has a much greater meaning than just opening of the route. Serbs have 
been forced out of the area, which is for them most fertile, which was in their hands, and on 
which they based their concept that that could be their coastal area.”525  
The UN Security Council condemned the Croatian action, and threatened sanctions.526 
The EC was displeased at observers’ treatment, who were detained. “It is clearly stated that EC 
monitors are to have clear freedom of movement”, complained an EC representative, adding 
“This breaks a memorandum of understanding between the EC and the Croatian 
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government”.527 Tudjman, however, was more attentive to lack of response from friendlier 
quarters. Helmut Kohl did not cancel an upcoming trip to Zagreb, while British Ambassador 
David Heny insisted “that the solution of the status of the so-called Krajina must be sought 
within the Republic of Croatia”.528 In Belgrade, President Dobrica Ćosić called for intervention 
but, more importantly, Milošević “did not say a word”.529 Washington’s reaction was what truly 
interested the Croats. “The European bureau at State reacted with near-hysteria…they didn’t 
want the Croats stirring things up, rekindling another hot front, as it were” Neitzke recalled.530 
These fears did not seem to extend to the top. Sušak met with Assistant Secretary of State 
Graham Engley, who advised the Croat “not to stretch military actions further than Maslenica, 
and not to advance more than that far”.531 The Croatians were free to repulse fierce Serb 
counterattacks from January 27th until early February before a cease-fire emerged. The 
Croatians would probably have had to cease their advance in any case, as their superiority in 
firepower diminished, as Serb forces retook the heavy weapons that they had previously 
handed over to the UN.532 
 ‘Operation Maslenica’ proved a geopolitical triumph for Zagreb because Tudjman 
grasped the fears that motivated US policy-makers as well as the domestic limitations under 
which they operated. 533 Maslenica had shown how easily an unhappy Zagreb could provoke 
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exactly that outcome. Equally important, Tudjman sensed that Washington would have a 
harder time selling sanctions on Zagreb domestically. Shortly before the Maselnica operation, 
Tudjman had feted a visiting Congressional delegation of Senator Dennis DeConcini(D-AZ) and 
Congressman Frank McCloskey(D-IN), after which the latter informed reporters "If the U.S. 
were to take care, proportionally speaking, of the same number of refugees, it would have to 
provide for 45 million people, which is quite unconceivable”.534 Senator DeConcini 
“congratulated President Tudjman on his commitment to democracy, human rights and the 
freedom of the press and praised his efforts to find a political solution to the crisis”.535 In April, 
Senator Joseph Biden of Delaware, a leading Democratic member of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, submitted a report on human rights in the region, but this focused on the 
US failure to take a stand against Serbian atrocities, while citing the Croatian government as a 
reliable source.536 After the failure of “lift and strike”, McCloskey accused the Administration of 
being an accomplice in the genocide in Bosnia, stating that "when it comes to real action to get 
the arms embargo lifted from the Bosnian Government, the administration opts out”.'537 In this 
environment, any effort to sanction Croatia in order to deter escalation would involve the 
Clinton Administration clashing with Congress. Tudjman calculated correctly that, provided that 
Croatia stopped short of open conflict with the VJ, Washington would find it cheaper to 
appease rather than coerce Croatia. 
 
If Tudjman and his government were the winners of Operation Maslenica, the losers 
were the Krajina Serbs. The Croatians’ blatant violation of the Vance Agreement had failed to 
prompt intervention from either Belgrade or the international community. On the contrary, the 
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US appeared to respond, not by punishing the Croats, but by trying to appease them.538 
Washington increasingly viewed Knin’s continued autonomy as a destabilising element, much 
as the JNA’s presence had been perceived in autumn 1990. The only resolution which promised 
to remove the risk of conflict was reintegration with Croatia.539 In March 1992, Assistant 
Secretary of State Ronald Johnson had told the Croatian President that the “question of the 
long-lasting status of the minorities in Croatia will be very important” for to its US relations.540 A 
year later, when the question arose of whether Tudjman should be invited to the US to attend 
the Washington DC Holocaust Memorial Museum’s opening, no mention was made of Croatia’s 
treatment of its Serbian minority.541 
Tudjman’s attendance at the Holocaust Museum’s opening was a subject of 
controversy, one that was related not to Tudjman’s actions as Croatian President, but rather to 
his writings as a historian, which appeared to excuse antisemitism. “Tell me who asked 
Tudjman to come to Washington for the opening of the museum”, asked famed Nazi hunter 
Simon Wiesenthal, on learning of the Croatian President’s scheduled attendance.542 Ronald 
Neitzke was at least one answer to Wiesenthal’s question, having worked to secure the 
Croatian President an invitation through a series of cables to Washington. “I later learned, I 
think Reggie Bartholomew told me, he was then Special Envoy for the former Yugoslavia, that 
that cable had been carefully read at senior levels and had had an impact. No one offered a 
mea culpa – Eagleburger and Scowcroft were by then out of the picture. Tudjman was invited 
and did attend the ceremony, where, as it turned out, he was roundly condemned by Elie 
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Wiesel” recalled Neitzke.543 The museum was quick to corroborate the State Department 
pressure. “We were advised by the State Department to invite the Bosnians, the Slovenians and 
the Croatians”, a spokesman noted, adding that the State Department also advised that no 
Serbian representatives should be invited. The Serbs’ exclusion added a touch of irony to the 
Museum’s claim that "We're well aware of Mr. Tudjman's book and statements, but we're not 
opening the museum to preach to the choir”.544 Elie Wiesel, who had spent time in a 
concentration camp as a young boy, commented that Tudjman’s “presence in the midst of 
survivors is a disgrace”.545 Wiesel might have been even more outraged had he known that, 
prior to the trip, the Croatian President had informed his advisers “I am going to Washington, at 
the invitation of Jews, for the opening of the Holocaust Museum...with the purpose of 
normalization of relations with the Jews”.546 Tudjman’s reaction showed how the Croats viewed 
the enthusiasm of Neitzke and those like him for engaging with Zagreb. Ironically, Neitzke 
himself was about to be supplanted by someone who would make Neitzke look like a Tudjman 
sceptic for, in summer 1993, the Clinton Administration finally got around to dispatching a full 
Ambassador to Zagreb. It would be a fateful choice. 
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The New Team in Zagreb 
 
Peter Galbraith, who would arrive in Zagreb in July 1993, was not a career Foreign 
Service officer, like Neitzke or Zimmerman. The son of the famed economist John Kenneth 
Galbraith, the younger Galbraith had spent a decade with the Democratic Staff on the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee. He had traveled to Iraqi Kurdistan after the Gulf War, forging 
links with the Iraqi opposition, and in the process becoming a fierce critic of the decision to 
leave Saddam Hussein in office.547 This was representative of a personality which valued 
personal interaction and first-hand observation over research or expertise. “I think one of the 
advantages I had as an ambassador was I really approached it free from any of these 
prejudices” Galbraith reflected of his tenure in Croatia, adding “I didn’t have any emotional 
attachment to any side in the conflict before I became an ambassador there.”548 This was an 
odd claim by the co-author of a Senate Foreign Relations Committee report on ethnic cleansing 
by Serbian forces in Bosnia that Galbraith had produced after a single trip to the region in 
1992549 but, to Galbraith, his lack of background in the region beyond that trip made him a 
more impartial arbiter than professionals who had worked on Yugoslav issues all their lives. 
Galbraith’s critics, of whom there would be many, found different terms than “impartial” to 
describe him, including “abrasive”, “self-important” and “pompous”, in a profile of his 2012 
campaign for governor of Vermont.550  
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Galbraith had met Neitzke when he visited Zagreb as a representative of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee. “No lack of self-confidence, and a tinge of early Charlie Wilson”, 
Neitzke recalled, adding “But also smart and determined to ferret out evidence of what he too 
had heard was happening in Bosnia.”551 There was something ominous about this comparison. 
Charlie Wilson had been a Texas Congressman who, believing US policy was too passive in 
opposing Soviet moves in Afghanistan, had taken it upon himself to develop personal 
relationships with Mujahedeen leaders and then use his position in Congress to funnel money 
and weapons to them.552 Wilson had seen his role not merely as advising on policy but also as 
setting it and, if dissatisfied, following his own, but Wilson had been elected. Galbraith had 
been appointed to every office he had ever served in, including the Ambassadorship to Zagreb. 
Even before arriving in Zagreb, Galbraith had concluded that the Croatians were being unfairly 
stigmatised, complaining that “Tudjman had never been popular at all with the State 
Department or with the Bush administration or with the Clinton administration”.553 As someone 
who believed that “the only way out of the Bosnia wars was through Croatia”, Galbraith “was 
convinced that you didn’t need to like Tudjman to be able to do business with him”. 554 
Conceding that Tudjman “believed in greater Croatia meaning that he basically felt that about 
half of Bosnia really belonged to Croatia, not only Herzegovina which is almost entirely a Croat 
area, but central Bosnia, Sarajevo possibly, and Banja Luka which is the principal Serb town”, 
Galbraith believed that Tudjman would be a better partner than Milošević because he was “an 
extremely principled man”, and it “was very difficult for him to engage in any guile whatsoever 
because his beliefs would always come through”. While “The war of the Bosnian Serbs was 
reasonably popular [in Serbia]”, he explained, “The Croatia war in Bosnia was unpopular with 
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the Croatian public”.555 Tudjman’s top priority was Croatian authority’s restoration over the 
United Nations Protected Areas (UNPA), and it was an article of faith in Washington that, as 
Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah put it, Tudjman’s highest priority was acquiring American 
support.556 It was also one that the US was willing to support fully on the same basis that 
Washington had pushed for Bosnia’s recognition the previous year - the sacrosanct status of 
international borders. However, the policy’s purpose was now different. In 1992, there had 
been hope that, if Bosnia were recognized within its own borders, the Serbs and Croats would 
realize that fighting would achieve nothing. Similarly, in 1992, the US had recognised the Krajina 
as part of Croatia and hoped that Zagreb would reach a settlement with the Serbs and behave 
in Bosnia. By 1993, American officials like Galbraith were less naïve. What they now hoped was 
that recognising a principle which tied Zagreb’s claims to the Krajina to the Izetbegović 
government’s pretensions to speak for all of Bosnia would give Zagreb an incentive to support 
the Bosnian Muslims, even at the cost of abandoning the Bosnian Croats.  
Galbraith’s preconceptions were strengthened by his personal interactions with State 
Department officials. Policy towards Croatia was the only issue that he had “encountered 
where people within the Foreign Service were so openly in disagreement and so open about 
expressing their disagreement”.557 This was reinforced by a meeting with State Department's 
Desk Officer for Croatia Steve Walker, who would soon resign in protest at the Administration’s 
”Pro-Serb” policy, along with Bosnia Desk officer Marshall Freeman Harris and deputy Desk 
officer for Yugoslavia George Kenney.558 Walker warned Galbraith of hostility to Croatia in 
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Washington and that, if Galbraith “didn’t get out quickly the decision would be made not to 
send an ambassador at all”. 559  
Galbraith accepted from Walker a draft introduction for Tudjman including “clear 
support by the United States for the territorial integrity of Croatia within its internationally 
recognized boundaries, as well as calling on the Croatians to support the territorial integrity of 
Bosnia Herzegovina”.560 Stressing that “Croatia has an important role to play in resolving the 
crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina”, Galbraith told Tudjman at their first meeting “we hope and 
expect that Croatia will do everything in its power to stop the senseless violence and bring 
about a peaceful solution to the conflict that will address the concerns of all parties, including 
the Bosnian government”.561 Rather than a rogue initiative, Galbraith’s instructions reflected 
the mood at the top of the Administration, even if Walker had not realized it when briefing 
Galbraith. At the UN, the new US Ambassador, Madeline Albright, whom Tudjman noted “is 
very highly placed in the American Cabinet”,  had visited Zagreb during the transition. 562 In 
March 1993, the US sponsored and carried a Security Council resolution declaring that the 
UNPAs were “integral parts of Croatia”.563 “What this episode signaled to me was that 
Washington – which knew well the legal merits of the UNPA issue – was so determined to keep 
the lid on at least one Balkan problem that they were willing to go from threatening sanctions 
on Zagreb to endorsing the Croatian position nearly in the blink of an eye” Neitzke recalled.564 
The linkage of the “UNPAs/Krajina” issue with Croatian cooperation in Bosnia was already 
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Administration policy, with future-Assistant Secretary of Defense Graham Engley telling Sušak 
during the transition that “those two were connected”.565 President Tudjman informed Bosnian 
President Alija Izetbegović in March that Vice President Al Gore “told me on three occasions 
that they expected Croatia and BH to cooperate most closely, to make things easier for them in 
that way, and it would also make reconstruction easier for us”.566 Even if Galbraith doubted 
that the “Balkans were a personal priority for Tony Lake or for Warren Christopher”, they 
clearly were for other senior officials, 567 and they now had someone, Tudjman, on the ground 
pushing their preferred policy, albeit an individual with an active reputation for rogue initiatives 
and exaggeration - and the perfect fall guy if things went wrong.  
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Policy in Action: Galbraith in Croatia 
 
 
Galbraith followed up his arrival with a trip to Vukovar, producing banner headlines in 
the Croatian press, and within a month becoming one of the most popular diplomats in 
Zagreb.568 In contrast to Vance, who had seen his role as mediating a conflict between two 
parties without prejudice in December 1991, Galbraith did not believe that the US was in the 
region to enforce a settlement on the Knin Serbs and the Croatian government, but to assist the 
parties to reach a compromise, should they wish to do so. Nevertheless,  in order for the US to 
help them, they would have to accept that their future lay within Croatia.569 Galbraith’s 
precondition for mediation with the Croatian Serbs was that they accept the Croatian position, 
with only the details of the implementation subject to potential compromise. Active American 
military support was still ruled out, as Neitzke learnt in early 1994 when he travelled to 
Washington only to be told that “while some in the White House wanted to hit the Serbs hard, 
no one in the White House had been able to convince the JCS to use ‘their army’ to do so”.570. 
Galbraith’s strategy did not require American force, instead recognising that there was no 
shortage of force in the region. What there was, however, was a shortage of legitimacy. In a 
land under an arms embargo, the weapons used to fight were illegal. With repeated UN cease-
fires, the military operations and the gains and losses amounting from them were illegal. In fact, 
even the combatants themselves were, arguably, illegal. These layers of illegality piled up to 
form a knot. What the US could do, by action or inaction, explicit support or implicit silence, 
was to provide a different source of legitimacy which could legitimize others’ actions; namely, 
 
568 Kinzer, Stephen, “A U.S. Envoy To the Croats Uses Candor.” New York Times (1923-Current File), 1993, p.A5. 
569 Interview with Peter Galbraith” by Charles Stuart Kennedy” March 19th 1999, The Association for Diplomatic 
Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project p. 126 http://adst.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/09/Galbraith-Peter-W.pdf: Accessed June 11th 2019 
570 Interview with Ronald Neitzke by Charles Stuart Kennedy” December 1st 2006, in “Yugoslavia Country Reader” 
The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Oral History Project p.170 http://adst.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/Neitzke-Ronald-J.toc_.pdf: Accessed June 11th 2019   
 182 
the Croatian Army when it took upon itself the sort of actions that the US was unable to 
persuade its allies to support. For the first time in American policy towards Yugoslavia, policy 
was being constructed around the means available to implement it. 
Given the connections that the Croatian government had developed in Washington 
since 1991, it would have been difficult for Galbraith to have bluffed Tudjman and his inner 
circle into acting on the threat of sanctions unless that threat was real. He detected in 
Washington a real “desire to impose sanctions on Croatia from those who were the idealists 
and who had taken up the cause of Bosnia”. Galbraith saw his role as avoiding three 
bureaucratic pitfalls: “On one hand I had to demonstrate that Croatia was capable of doing 
better; two, I had to demonstrate that sanctions would be harmful; three, I had to be damn 
sure that I wasn’t seen as an apologist for Croatia. The moment I began to excuse Croatian 
actions or to deny that they were taking place, then the immediate response would be that 
Galbraith has gone local, clientelist, let’s just miss what he has to say”.571 
Neitzke, in Galbraith’s view, had gone local, or at least drafted cables which raised 
serious questions in Washington regarding his conclusions’ reliability. “He [Neitzke] would 
rewrite them at great length, delaying them from going out for days and would take out the 
criticisms of Croatia” Galbraith recalled. Yet the problems went beyond mere bias or advocating 
for Tudjman to attend the Holocaust Museum. Neitzke had also sent cables causing Washington 
to question, not his information’s objectively, but its very reliability. Neitzke had wired 
Washington at the end of August 1992 to warn “There are conflicting reports as to the extent to 
which HV (Croatian Army) forces may be deployed in B-H, ranging from the Croatian 
government position that no units are deployed to allegations that at times many thousands of 
such troops have been present in Bosnia”.572 The cable urged the State Department to “ensure 
that the term ‘soldiers’ really meant the Croatian Army (HV) rather than criminals and 
extortionists dressed in khaki”.573 Galbraith believed that Neitzke acted in this way for two 
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reasons: “First, I think he [Neitzke] felt that Croatia was not as bad as Serbia. I think he was 
reacting to the old establishment, the Yugoslav hand phenomena. I think he was concerned also 
that by reporting lots of bad things that the Croatians were doing, this might lead to sanctions 
on Croatia”.574 By contrast, “My [Galbraith’s] view was the opposite. I figured the more critical 
my cables were of Croatia, the more credibility I would have in Washington in making the case 
against sanctions on Croatia. I can tell you, as a tough-minded person taking on the Croatians, 
that this approach of sanctions will do more harm than good”.575 Galbraith “also realized that it 
would be deeply demoralizing for the staff to have an ambassador that they saw as an apologist 
for Tudjman”.576 Neitzke himself would later come to view Galbraith as excessively “”chummy” 
with the Croatian President, “for example, vacationing alone with the Tudjmans, the whole 
Tudjman family, at Tito’s old villa on Brioni, an intimacy that Peter reveled in, and his using a 
[Croatian] Defense Ministry villa on the Adriatic for private getaways”. 577 Echoing this charge, 
the National Review would later suggest that the 2007 testimony Galbraight would provide to 
the US Senate in favour of partitioning Iraq would be influenced by his status as a Kurdish 
regional government consultant.578 
Galbraith is defensive about such criticisms. “People raised the issue of why we didn’t 
protest against Croatia human rights violations which was constantly raised during my time as 
ambassador” he recalled, adding “I had to point out that certainly I was under no illusions 
about the character of Tudjman, but until 1995 he didn’t have his hands on anybody. After he 
got his hands on people [presumably Krajina Serbs, though Tudjman exercised control over the 
nearly half of Croatia’s Serbs who lived outside the UNPAS], he demonstrated his character, and 
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at that point I protested in the most vehement way possible.”579 Both Galbraith and Neitzke 
shared the Americans’ tendency to view Tudjman as possessing less agency than appears to 
have been the case, an impression that the Croatian President encouraged. “The expat 
Herzegovinians played an outsized role in Croatia’s defense effort and were disproportionately 
represented in Tudjman’s wartime Government.”580 This was a questionable deduction. Stipe 
Mesić was later to testify that, rather than the Herzegovinian tail wagging the Croatian dog, all 
of the major decisions regarding Bosnian Croat policy were made in Zagreb. 581 Mesić recalled 
that, when he “repeatedly told Mate Boban that they had a single enemy and needed the 
support of the international community”, Boban responded that “he had no politics, they were 
made in Zagreb”.582 
Neitzke was concerned that Galbraith’s arrogance made him gullible. In contrast to his 
earlier attitude, Neitzke began to distrust the Croats, remarking after the Maslenica operation 
“This was a dance that would be repeated several times in the following two years – Tudjman 
saber-rattling and threatening to move if the international community didn’t do something to 
get him back the UNPAs – and we or the UN giving him enough, just enough, to get him to 
stand down for a while”.583 This did not make the Croatian leader unique in a region where 
leaders gambled aggressively with Western patience as a matter of routine. It did, however, 
make him manipulative. “He read the situation correctly, took major but prudent risks, and in 
the end got most of what he wanted. He certainly read us right, what he could and couldn’t get 
away with”, Neitzke recalled of the Croatian President.584 Galbraith not only believed in the 
policy of forging a Muslim-Croat alliance to push back the Serbs in Bosnia, but also that the 
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Croatians saw this as being in their own interests as well. “He [Galbraith] proposed to me that 
we decide on the borders, and after that to get the weapons and go against the Serbs” Granić 
informed the Croatian cabinet in January 1994. As for Galbraith, Tudjman informed Prime 
Minister Nikica Valentić “Yes, yes, he is not level headed, as a man. But he is pursuing the 
policies that she [Madeline Albright] has talked about”, 585 presumably a reference to Albright’s 
discussions with Croatian officials  at the UN, where she was outspoken in her view that 
“Serbian Aggression” represented the major threat to peace in the region. 
If Galbraith placed too much trust in his Croatian associates, he was prone to distrust 
the officials within his own government. The Ambassador saw most State Department Yugoslav 
experts as biased. “These were people who knew the old Yugoslavia, who loved the old 
Yugoslavia and felt that it had an important role in the Cold War”, was how Galbraith described 
them, adding, “They regretted its breakup, and felt that sanctions on Serbia were justified, but 
that Tudjman was also responsible for the breakup.”586 Seeing these ‘Yugo-nostalgists’ as 
hostile to his policy, Galbraith tended to interpret their viewpoints or advice as attempts to 
undermine or block his policies, developing a penchant for personal diplomacy and secrecy 
which would prove problematic for him in the future. 
That penchant for running a one-man show, combined with the “tinge of early Charlie 
Wilson”, were on full display when it came to Galbraith’s interest in seeking ways to provide 
greater support for the Bosnian Muslim forces. Shortly after arriving in Zagreb, on August 1st 
1993, Galbraith visited Šefko Omerbašić, a Muslim cleric and prominent leader of the Zagreb 
Muslim community.587 While Galbraith claimed that this meeting was purely courtesy, and 
Omerbašić denied to the Congressional sub-committee that he saw Galbraith again, the 
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investigators found evidence that “Galbraith and Omerbašić met a number of times between 
August 1993 and April 29th 1994”.588 Omerbašić was believed to play a key role in coordinating 
support for Bosnian Muslim forces from the wider Islamic world, and Gojko Sušak had 
complained to Tudjman about the cleric’s efforts to recruit fighters in Croatia.589 He had also 
been a major presence in securing Croatia’s invitation to the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in December 1992, where efforts to end the arms embargo 
on Bosnia were the main topic of discussion.590 Galbraith reported to Omerbasic that he had no 
issues with Islamic fundamentalism during their initial meeting, which would have been news to 
the CIA.591At the time, these arguments were purely academic in natue. Weapons would only 
help the Muslims push back the Serbs if used against the Serbs and, in early 1993, the Serbs in 
Bosnia were increasingly bystanders to the fighting between Muslim and Croat forces. Finding a 
way to end this conflict and unite both against the Serbian enemy would become the focus of 
American policy for the next nine months. 
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The Art of the Deal 
 
US policy towards the Arms Embargo was moot while the primary fighting in Bosnia 
was between Muslim and Croat forces. Why would Zagreb act as a pipeline for the supply of 
arms to Muslim forces who would use them against Croats? The US was not alone in seeing its 
interests threatened by the Muslim-Croat conflict. What is striking is how little reason the 
Croats or Muslims themselves had for the conflict. A Muslim defeat in Bosnia would be a 
disaster for Croatian hopes to retake the Krajina, as it would free up Bosnian Serb forces to 
support their compatriots in the event of a Croatian offensive. Croatia’s status as a major 
destination for Muslim refugees provided Zagreb with a further reason to fear Sarajevo’s total 
collapse.592 The Bosnian Muslims, in turn, depended on Croatia for military supplies and the 
Bosnian “government” of Alija Izetbegović had signed a military pact with Zagreb in 1992, 
legitimising the Croatian army’s presence on Bosnian territory.593  
Nonetheless, clashes between Croat and Muslim units were already common in 1992. 
They often involved foreign Mujahidin who had arrived to fight for the Bosnian government and 
seemed disinclined to differentiate between Catholic allies and Orthodox enemies in what they 
believed to be a holy war against Christians.594 Tensions also arose over the distribution of 
supplies entering from Croatia, with one of the early clashes being a fight between two mafias 
over a fuel shipment.595 Different interpretations of the causes and responsibility regarding the 
outbreak of the Muslim-Croat fighting in Bosnia can be found in Charles Schrader's The Croat-
Muslim Civil War in Central Bosnia 1993-1994 and the Central Intelligence Agency's Balkan 
Battlefields, with the former portraying the conflict as the result of deliberate Muslim 
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aggression and the latter arguing that it started at the local level without the explicit decision of 
either leadership. The truth probably lies somewhere between the two. It seems implausible 
that either the Izetbegović or Tudjman governments would have deliberately sought a war in 
1993, and there were too many clashes followed by patched up agreements for the fighting to 
have been centrally directed initially. Yet the dynamics of the conflict, an inability to defeat the 
Serbs on the battlefield, and the fact that the Muslim-Croat alliance was negative, i.e. anti-Serb, 
with the Croats and Muslims holding opposite views on the prospect of a unitary Bosnia, meant 
that a failure to reach a settlement, especially if due to the dissatisfaction of one party with a 
deal that satisfied the other, would inevitably produce a conflict at some point.  
The Bosnian Croats and Muslims had fundamentally different war aims, united only by 
their opposition to the Serbian goal, both in Croatia and Bosnia, of establishing a right to secede 
and join Serbia. The vast majority of Croats and Serbs in Bosnia (Tudjman estimated nearly 90%) 
were uninvested in an independent Bosnian state.596 Still, for most Croats, some form of Bosnia 
was living under Serbian rule, especially after the bloodshed of autumn 1991 and, if union with 
Croatia was impossible due to the international community’s commitment to the state borders’ 
sanctity and Zagreb’s own need to uphold that principle, they would fight for a “Bosnia”. By 
contrast, Bosnian Muslims were fighting not just to avoid Serb rule, but for a “state”, preferably 
a unitary one governed by majority rule, which as a large plurality they would probably 
dominate.597 Many Muslims increasingly favoured an Islamic state, including Izetbegović himself 
who, according to his own public relations expert in Washington, “strongly supported the 
creation of a fundamentalist Islamic state”.598 
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The prospect of an Islamic state was as horrifying to many Bosnian Croats as a Serbian 
victory, as most Croats had no more desire to be a powerless minority in a Muslim state than a 
Serbian one. Tudjman feared “that small [Islamic] state would be a center of terrorism for the 
next 50 years, but also a center for expansion of Islam in Europe”.599 While both Muslims and 
Croats had an interest in preventing a Serbian victory on the battlefield, when it came to peace, 
both the Croats and Serbs had more in common, preferring as decentralized a state as possible. 
The release of the Vance-Owen plan brought these differences into the open. The Plan fulfilled 
all of the Bosnian Croats’ political objectives. It avoided both a union with Serbia and a unitary 
Bosnia under Muslim rule. For the Croats, continuing the war to “defeat the Serbs” as the 
Bosnian Muslim leadership seemed to wish, would not only cost lives and money, but to do so 
would be to pursue an objective, a unitary and potentially Islamic Bosnia, which was 
antithetical to Croatian interests. Tudjman told Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegović in 
January 1993 “we do not see a possibility of a military resolution to the problem to the 
advantage of the Muslims and the Croats”, and warned him “you cannot wage this war 
bypassing Croatia and without Croatia “.600 Tudjman believed that he had the majority of 
Europe’s support, and read aloud [to the Croatian leadership] a letter purportedly from British 
Prime Minister John Major to Douglas Hurd defending a policy of obstructing the arming of the 
Bosnian Muslims as a “realistic policy that is in the best interests of a stable Europe in the 
future, whose value system must remain based on a Christian civilization”.601 The letter itself 
had been denounced by the British government as a hoax, and Tudjman’s presentation of it to 
his cabinet as reliable provides an insight into his perceptions of British policy.602 
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The Croatians did not “withdraw” from the war following the Vance-Owen agreement 
due to some sort of secret plot by Tudjman or Sušak. The Vance-Owen agreement, along with 
various other plans proposed throughout 1993 by the international community, and Owen 
fulfilled Croat strategic and political objectives better than a Muslim-Croat military victory 
would. Izetbegović’s refusal to accept any of these agreements was increasingly seen by Zagreb 
as the main impediment to ending the war and a threat to the efforts to reintegrate the Krajina. 
Both Bosnian Croat leaders and Zagreb accepted the Vance-Owen plan, and it was unclear to 
many Bosnian Croats why the Serb Assembly’s refusal to ratify the agreement should negate its 
provisions regarding the Croats and Muslims, both of whom had accepted it. Bosnian Croat 
leaders thus moved quickly to try and take control of territory within the proposed cantons 
thought to contain Croat majorities, demanding that the Muslim units within those territories 
either withdraw or agree to subordinate themselves to Croat authority.603 The Bosnian Muslim 
leadership, on the other hand, had signed the agreement only under international pressure in 
the hope that doing so would result in either Serb concessions or greater support for their own 
cause following a Serb rejection. They saw no reason to cede large parts of Bosnia to the Croats 
when they had received neither the territory promised from the Serbs nor increased 
international support following the Serb rejection. Increasingly dubious of the Croat alliance’s 
military value, especially after Serbs took the city of Jajce in late 1992 amid accusations of 
Croatian “betrayal”, the Muslims [or ‘the Izetbegović government] felt that, if it could not 
strengthen it political position through victories over the Serbs, it could do so at the expense of 
the Croats.604  
The Muslims possessed overwhelmingly superior manpower, while the support that 
the Croatian Army was able to provide to the Bosnian Croats through artillery and incursions 
into Bosnian territory was only available in the regions adjacent to Croatia. Croats in central 
Bosnia, where the Muslims had an overwhelming superiority, often resorted to cooperation 
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with the Serbs. 605 Proximity to Croatia allowed the Bosnian Croat Army (HVO) to hold onto 
much of the Mostar area with HV support. The conflict elsewhere adopted a pattern of isolated 
Croat detachments being surrounded in villages by overwhelmingly superior Muslim forces, 
forcing the villages in question’s evacuation.606 On June 18th 1993, Mate Boban’s deputy Dario 
Kordić revealed that the HVO had suffered 2, 000 casualties while more than 60, 000 Croats had 
been driven from their homes, leading the Bosnian Croat leadership to call for all Croats aged 
between 18 and 60 to report for military service.607 “”As their troops advance against the 
Croatian forces, Bosnian Government officials said they saw little reason to sign any plan that 
does not meet their territorial demands” The New York Times reported in September, going on 
to note “The Bosnian official said that the Sarajevo Government hopes its military can seize 
Mostar, which the Bosnian Croats have named as the capital of their republic and Prozor 
farther north”. "Mostar is the key”, the official said.”608  
For the US, it did not matter why the fighting had started, but merely that it needed to 
end. This fighting made a mockery of the Administration's “Lift and Strike” proposal, not least 
because it was evident that no alternative policy existed. “What was possible in ‘91 and ‘92 was 
no longer possible in ‘93. Once the UN had deployed extensively to Bosnia, it wasn’t possible 
easily to do the lift and strike policy – lift the arms embargo and strike at the Serb forces 
attacking Bosnia cities for a number of reasons” Galbraith reflected.609 As for airstrikes, whom 
would they hit? Neither the Croats nor the Muslims were free to launch attacks on the Serbs 
that would take advantage of them. As such, the Croat-Muslim war had to end before anything 
else could be accomplished, so this became the US priority and, if the Muslim rejection of the 
peace proposals was the problem, then, contrary to the European conclusion that this required 
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pressure to be applied on Izetbegović and his government, it meant that the Croats had to be 
pressured into making concessions against their interests in Bosnia. 
The US policy, beginning with the March 30th UN resolution 815 declaring the Krajina 
an intrinsic part of Croatia, and aggressively implemented by Galbraith after his arrival, sought 
to trade Croatian concessions in Bosnia for support for Zagreb’s objectives in the UNPAS.610 
Gone was any ambiguity about Croatia's borders; suggestions that Croatia was at fault for the 
secession of the Serb-held regions due to its own policies; or that its sovereignty over the 
regions might be contingent on either its treatment of minorities or winning over the rebel Serb 
leadership. The US would not abandon pressure on these points – it would continue to push 
Tudjman on human rights matters and seek to arrange some sort of autonomy for the Krajina 
Serbs, but within the context of a mediator. As far as the US was concerned, the Krajina was 
part of Croatia; Zagreb's authority must be established there and while the US, as Croatia’s 
friend and as a party that was concerned about the Krajina Serbs’ well-being, hoped that it 
would be achieved peacefully and with guarantees of autonomy, that reintegration would not 
be contingent on some minimum level of concessions or the Krajina Serbs’ consent. This 
message was communicated through the Serbian press, whom Galbraith informed “The only 
acceptable solution is to return the territory to Croatia so that the people who lived there can 
return”, along with “a system of compensation for the damage to the property paid for by 
Serbia”.611 This was hammered home by Galbraith a month later when he visited the Prevlaka 
peninsula next to Montenegro to “underscore the commitment of the United States to the 
territorial integrity of a country which does extend down the Danube to this beautiful Kotor 
bay”.612 American officials doubted that Tudjman would give up his claims to any of this 
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territory willingly, and there was a further hope held by many in Washington that strong 
international diplomatic support for reintegration would make it less likely that Zagreb would 
resort to unilateral force, as it had in January, or at the very least that it would force Croatia to 
consult with the US before doing so.613  
If, in the eyes of US policymakers, the military balance between the Croatian 
government and the Krajina Serbs ultimately foreordained an ultimate settlement on Zagreb’s 
terms, and it was America’s duty to persuade Knin of that fact, then the inverse was true in 
Bosnia. There, the military balance, combined with the international community’s sentiments, 
meant that the Bosnian Croats could only lose. They lacked the ability to defeat the Bosnian 
Muslim military, and more importantly, would not be allowed to defeat the Bosnian Muslims 
militarily even if they could manage to do so. US policy was not about simply persuading Zagreb 
of the morality of cooperating with the Muslims but, rather, about clarifying the lack of 
alternatives. In this sense, events on the ground, namely the series of defeats suffered by the 
Bosnian Croat forces, facilitated this task.  
Until the end of 1993, Sušak and Tudjman seem to have assumed that the West would 
eventually be forced to recognize the Bosnian state’s collapse as a fait accompli if the Sarajevo 
government failed to defeat the Bosnian Serbs. The consequence would be acceptance of a de 
facto partition. The Vance-Owen plan was followed by tacit American support for a joint 
Zagreb-Belgrade proposal which amounted to a de facto three-way partition, a proposal that 
was then explicitly endorsed by David Owen and Vance’s replacement Thorvald Stoltenberg in 
the form of the “Invincible plan” of autumn 1993 that was signed on a British Aircraft carrier.614 
Both proposals were rejected by the Bosnian Muslims and, despite the endorsement by the US, 
Britain, and France, and the role played by Owen and Stoltenberg, the international actors 
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made few efforts to pressure Izetbegović to change his mind.615 Instead, they responded to 
Sarajevo’s rejections by pressuring the Croats for further concessions, giving the Bosnian 
Muslims an effective veto on any settlement. No settlement was worth making for the Bosnian 
Serbs unless it secured international recognition, without which Belgrade could not escape 
economic sanctions, and no settlement could secure that international recognition without 
Muslim acceptance. This gave the Izetbegović government perhaps its only major point of 
leverage. The Muslims could offer an end to the war to the Serbs and, most importantly, an end 
to economic sanctions to Belgrade. The Croats could add little or nothing beyond local military 
cooperation when the Serbs already held the military advantage. While the Bosnian Serb 
leadership might have accepted a deal with the Croats to partition Bosnia in theory, Belgrade 
needed something that Zagreb could not offer. 
In 1992 and early 1993, Tudjman consulted regularly with David Owen, who acted as a 
source on supposed international preferences.616 The proposals to Milošević were made 
contingent on American approval.617 Tudjman grasped that any such a deal would be worthless 
without international ratification. The main change over the course of 1993 was the realization 
that this could only come from the US. “The Germans had done what the Croatians had wanted 
in ‘91. They had secured international recognition, but the Germans didn’t have either the will 
or the military resources that the United States did” Galbraith explained, adding “So, when the 
Croatians looked for somebody to rescue them, they knew that that rescuer wouldn’t be 
Germany. They knew the only country that was capable of rescuing them was the United 
States.”618  
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In September 1993, Galbraith told the BBC that the Bosnian Croat Army “have 
committed crimes in the prison camps, which are identical to those crimes committed this past 
year in Serbian prison camps”, and declared that “it is impossible to have normal civil relations 
with organizations who commit such crimes as have been committed in camps run by the HVO 
in Bosnia”.619 Then Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights John Shattuck recalls that, 
when he visited Vukovar in January 1994 with US Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine 
Albright, “Galbraith encouraged Albright and me in our meetings and press comments to focus 
on the issue of Serb war crimes against Croats. By demonstrating U.S. concern for the Croatian 
victims of Serb atrocities in Vukovar, we might be able to persuade Tudjman to cooperate with 
the new war crimes tribunal, which was simultaneously beginning to investigate Croat atrocities 
in Bosnia”.620 Albright, obliged and, after a meeting with President Tudjman in which he 
boasted about “liberating Bosnia from barbaric Muslims”, commented that “he [Tudjman] is 
very much aware of the concern of the United States about the activities of the HVO in 
Bosnia”.621 622 The US was not the only power sending this message. In September, Tudjman 
bemoaned to Mate Boban that “Over the past 14 days, I received at least five or six official 
notes from the European Union, the United States of America, France and Germany. They all 
requested that we make as many concessions to the Muslims as possible and they all 
threatened us with sanctions because of the Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina”.623 
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To Tudjman, sanctions represented something far more terrifying than their potential 
economic cost. They implied an abandonment of Western support for Croatia’s territorial 
integrity, which Galbraith warned “has been significantly undermined by the government of 
Croatia. While insisting on respect for its territorial integrity and the reintegration the Krajina, 
Croatia has worked to undermine the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Hercegovina”.624 Yet while 
observing how “Croatia’s actions have served to undermine the very principles in which Croatia 
has an enormous stake; territorial integrity and the non-recognition of gains from ethnic 
cleansing”, Galbraith held out the prospect that, if it cooperated with the Bosnian Muslims, 
“Croatia will take a big step on the way to becoming our partner in the Western community”.625 
Unlike the Serb public, who often failed to distinguish between the Serbian state and 
the places where Serbs lived, Croatian nationalists, especially those in Croatia, drew a far 
clearer line between the Croatian state for which they had struggled and Croatians who 
happened to live outside its current borders. The state rather than the people was the focus of 
Croatian nationalism, dating back to Ante Starčević’s concept of Croatian “state right”.626 When 
push came to shove, Croatians would sacrifice their compatriots in Bosnia for the benefit of 
Croatia itself, an outlook shared not only by their President, but even by Sušak, the ostensible 
spokesperson of the “Herzegovinian lobby”. “Sušak, whatever you may think of him, has 
realized that people lived a normal life in Croatia even before he returned to Zagreb”, the 
Croatian President observed to his then Prime Minister in late 1992, lamenting that “Many of 
our politicians from the diaspora still do not understand this”.627 Tudjman had not wavered 
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since 1990 in his belief that international ratification was the prerequisite for any lasting gains 
in the region.  
Neither Tudjman nor Sušak were opposed then to a settlement in Bosnia that was 
more favourable to the Muslims than the one they had pursued in 1992, nor to coercing their 
Bosnian Croat protégés into accepting it, if they could be persuaded it was favoured by the 
major powers. In 1991, 1992, and early 1993, they did not believe this, instead remaining 
convinced that “neither the world nor Europe can accept the existence of an Islamic state in 
Europe”, and that the Russia and Germany were committed to a greater Serbia as a stabilising 
regional force.628 Croatian political objectives in Bosnia reflected Zagreb’s view of the great 
power preferences more than any long-standing metahistorical national ambitions. They 
believed that the great powers did not want a unitary Muslim state and therefore opposed one, 
while seeking an accommodation with Serbia. In 1992, this meant pushing for a decentralised 
yet independent Bosnia with strong enough Muslim-Croat cooperation to prevent absorption 
into Serbia. In 1993, informed by the Vance-Owen and subsequent “Invincible” plans and 
believing that the Europeans and international mediators favoured a Croat-Serb 
accommodation, Croatia pursued that end. After all, it was the international mediators who 
focused on bringing Karadžić and Milošević onboard. Tudjman correctly noted that the Croats 
had accepted every international proposal. 629 When Tudjman presented a joint peace plan with 
Milošević, this was not per se an effort to partition Bosnia between them, but rather an 
attempt to please international opinion, as he believed that this was what the international 
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community wanted.630 In late 1993, however, when Izetbegović’s government showed an 
interest in accepting a partition for the first time, provided it included sea access, Tudjman was 
outraged to see the international community embrace a proposal that could only be fulfilled at 
Croatian expense. “Access to the sea” for any Muslim sub-state meant control of Bosnia-
Hercegovina’s only internationally recognized port of Neum, which was 98% Croat according to 
the 1991 census.631"The fact is that Bosnia and Herzegovina will be divided” a Bosnian official 
explained to The New York Times, adding “We can do nothing against the Serbs militarily. The 
Croats are not only weaker, they sold us out to the aggressor”.632 Galbraith went so far as to 
inform Tudjman that, if sanctions were imposed on Croatia, the cost of lifting them would be 
Neum’s cessium. 633 Tudjman expressed anger at the international mediators’ betrayal during a 
meeting with US Ambassador to the UN Madeline Albright on January 6th 1994 in Zagreb. The 
proposal seems to have contributed to the Croatian decision to abandon the pursuit of an 
international mediated settlement in favour of the military option of an alliance with the 
Muslims, as favoured by the US.634 If the results of a successful mediation, whether by David 
Owen or anyone else, were no better than the consequences of military defeat, then there was 
far less reason to avoid the military option. 
An internationally-mediated settlement might also cost Croatia the Krajina. Zagreb’s 
military and diplomatic ascendency over the Krajina Serbs arguably depended on the conflict’s 
continuance in Bosnia. While the fighting there lasted, the Bosnian Serb Army was in no 
position to defend their compatriots in Croatia militarily. Furthermore, if the West did achieve a 
settlement in Bosnia, they would be committed to its maintenance, and likely to look 
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unfavourably on Croatian military actions against Knin, which might restart the fighting in the 
region. As long as the Croatian President remained convinced that, if he held out long enough, 
the West would either enforce, or be forced to accept, a settlement that allowed for a partition 
of Bosnia without any corresponding concessions regarding the Krajina, he had no reason to 
make concessions to Sarajevo. Once Tudjman was convinced that the US would tolerate a 
Serbian-Muslim settlement at Croatian expense before accepting a Croat-Serb partition of 
Bosnia, Croatia would be faced not with a choice but an imperative: to escape a Serb-Muslim 
agreement at all costs. It was un surprising that, when faced with this prospect, Zagreb folded. 
What was more surprising is that Zagreb, faced with impending disaster, managed to demand 
payment from the US for any agreement with the Bosnian Muslims, an implied support for 
Zagreb’s recovery of the Krajina.  
  
 200 
 
The Washington Agreement of 1994 
 
During his early months in Zagreb, Galbraith’s major point of contact was Croatian 
Foreign Minister Mate Granić. “Whenever I would go to see Granić and read demarches some 
of which had very strong language, complaining about Croatian behavior, he never got angry. 
The response was always, ‘Oh, yes, well, we recognize that there are problems. We’re trying to 
correct them. We just haven’t been able to do so. We’ll try to do better ’” reflected 
Galbraith,635 adding, “Whether the Croatian Foreign Minister was in a position to deliver 
changes in policy was less clear”. “Granić was always personable, pleasant to deal with, and 
very bright”, Neitzke recalled, adding “But he wasn’t a Tudjman insider, at least not in the sense 
that Sušak and others were. Granić was not one of the HDZ, the ruling Croatian Democratic 
Union, hard-liners. There were times when Granić seemed a bit too ready to please, appearing 
to support positions that didn’t quite reflect Tudjman’s, and certainly not Sušak’s, views.”636 
Defense Minister Gojko Sušak, as a Herzegovinian, may have wanted Herzegovina in 
Croatia but cared even more, on some level, about the Croats’s survival there, and the best 
guarantee for them was a powerful Croatia. “Sušak was himself a proud Herzegovinian, and he 
kept a close eye on Bosnian Croat interests. When Sušak perceived Herzegovinian interests 
threatened, he was not averse to straying from Tudjman’s guidelines” Neitzke recalled, noting 
“Tudjman and Sušak knew by then that if they were ever to get the UNPAs back they’d have to 
do it themselves, militarily.”637 These “pipelines” had been a major source of supply for the 
Croatians in 1992 and even into early 1993, with effective US acquiescence. “The Americans 
never protested. When they asked, we would say that our original weapons were simply 
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hatching babies” Sušak recalled in a 1996 interview.638 With the Bosnian-Croat war raging, the 
US and Europe had no reason to turn a blind eye to these shipments, while the Islamic nations 
which Tudjman had wooed so aggressively in 1992 had no desire to see the weapons used 
against the Bosnian Muslims.639 By late 1993, Sušak concluded that the arms embargo was 
unlikely to be formally lifted until a general peace was declared and that, if Croatia wished to go 
into that general peace holding the Krajina, then it needed the weapons beforehand. This 
meant that the US attitude was important, and the US desire that weapons and supplies should 
reach the Bosnians was clear by the end of 1993.640 Sušak may have shared Tudjman’s 
scepticism about a Bosnian Muslim state’s viability in the long run, but it was apparent to him 
that the best way of securing American support, or at least indifference to Croatia’s military 
build-up, was to sell it as a means of supporting the Muslims.641  
If the Bosnian Croats had little leverage remaining over the Muslims, Zagreb held 
plenty over Sarajevo. Bosnia's weapon supply lines ran through Croatia, and the Muslims had 
seen their arms supplies slow to a trickle.642 A victory over the Bosnian Croats would only 
slightly enlarge the rump that the Muslims would be left with after a settlement with the Serbs, 
and they would pay for those marginal gains with the enmity of neighboring Croatia. Muslim 
Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić had become increasingly alarmed by what he saw as a willingness 
on the part of others around the Bosnian President to settle for a partition that would leave a 
rump Bosnian state, provided that it would be Islamic in character, and viewed an agreement 
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with the Croats as the last chance to save a unified, multiethnic, secular Bosnia.643 Viewed by 
“most American officials”, as “the Bosnian leader with the broadest vision - an eloquent 
advocate of a multiethnic state”, according to Richard Holbrooke, Silajdžić was the “only 
Bosnian official who seemed genuinely to care about economic reconstruction of his ravaged 
land”.644 According to Galbraith “in September of ’93, the Croatians called me, the German 
ambassador and the Turkish ambassador and announced a surprise. The Bosnian Croats and the 
Bosnian Muslims had agreed to form a federation and that that federation would be 
confederated with Croatia”.645  
There may have been some truth to this story, at least insofar as the actors’ motives 
were concerned. Both the Croats and Muslims knew that America wanted an agreement and 
both wished to please Washington. However, the American involvement appears to have gone 
further, including the provision of a ready-made draft agreement for the parties. Granić, when 
presenting the proposal to Tudjman, observed “these are completely developed documents, 
evidently done by experts”, noting that “Redman [US Representative to the Contact Group] has 
indicated that he is very familiar with their content”.646 Croatian Deputy Foreign Minister 
Miomir Žužulj informed Tudjman that “this was an American initiative from the very top, which 
means it comes from President Clinton and that he is informed”, while another US Envoy 
Reginald Bartholomew “mentioned in passing that if you didn't accept it, you surely knew that 
solitary rooms were waiting for you somewhere down there”.647 “There” almost certainly 
meant the Hague, and Bartholomew’s statement was a threat to prosecute the Croatian 
leadership for “crimes” in Bosnia alongside their Serbian counterparts. This implied that 
Tudjman and his government could be treated in the same way as Milošević, who was currently 
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facing crushing sanctions to force the Bosnian Serbs to make concessions. Other American 
officials made no secret of Washington’s role. “Redman’s effort, which produced the 
Washington Agreement of March 1994, was one of the very few energetic, disciplined U.S. 
diplomatic undertakings in the whole ex-Yugo mess prior to Dayton”, reflected Neitzke, perhaps 
unwittingly undermining the official line that the Federation was a purely indigenous effort. 
Neitzke was more sceptical of Galbraith’s own view of his centrality to the process, “But the 
suggestion that he [Galbraith] was the key player in achieving the Washington Agreement, and 
that he worked against the backdrop of many months of continuing Croatian atrocities as 
Tudjman sought to carve out a Greater Croatia, is way over the top”, he later claimed. 
Nonetheless, he also added that “Peter [Galbraith] did have a small but important role in the 
Washington Agreement, however”.648 
Silajdžić stood at the most conciliatory end of the Bosnian Muslim political spectrum, 
at least when it came to cooperation with Croatia. “I have never mentioned this before, but on 
the eve of the signing of the [Washington] agreement creating the Federation of B-H, Haris 
Silajdžić told me in Washington that the SDA, at a secret meeting, had divided between 55% 
who favored the Federation and 45% who preferred a tripartite division” Granić recalled more 
than a decade later.649 He also alleged that “the only people who up to then had been for a 
unified Bosnia-Herzegovina were Silajdžić, Krešimir Zubak and myself”.650 In opposition stood 
Bosnian Vice President Ejup Ganić, who now championed the idea that Bosnian Muslims should 
have made common cause with the Serbs in 1991, and had threatened that “terrorism would 
start all over Europe”, if Bosnia was abandoned. 651 However much Ganić might desire a unitary 
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Islamic Bosnia, he had no more chance of achieving it without American support than Tudjman 
did of regaining the Krajina, and the Americans made clear to both that they wanted a Croat-
Muslim agreement.652 Whatever their military successes against the HVO, the Muslims 
continued to lose ground against the Serbs, who had successfully conquered the valley of the 
Drina river earlier that year. This left the enclaves around Goražde, Srebrenica, and Žepa 
isolated and the Muslims had little prospect of reversing these Serb gains while also fighting the 
Croats. Sarajevo had even less chance of continuing the war without military supplies or even 
essentials like food, which the conflict with the Croats had closed off along Croatia's border. As 
Galbraith would tell the US House Foreign Relations Committee in 1996, “The Bosnian people, 
left unarmed against the Serb aggressors, had barely survived the winter of 1993-94. Without 
help, we doubted they could survive another year”, views echoed by Charles Redman and, a 
year later, by Anthony Lake, who informed the Senate that the Bosnians were “in deep trouble” 
and while they “probably were not in danger of imminent collapse, it was certainly heading that 
way”.653 It is unnecessary to play up the precariousness of the Muslim position to explain 
Sarajevo’s acceptance of the Washington Agreement. It was a good deal for the Bosnian 
Muslims. While failing to meet their maximum ambitions, it was as favourable to them as 
Vance-Owen had been to the Bosnian Croats, and offered far more than the Muslims could 
have hoped to win on their own on the battlefield or through a deal with the Serbs. The 
agreement saw a Bosnian Croat submission to remaining in a Bosnian Muslim-dominated state, 
in exchange for Western diplomatic support and the Bosnian Muslims failure to make a 
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separate peace. The Muslims had no interest in making a separate peace if they had Western 
diplomatic support, and therefore conceded nothing of substance. The Croats were making 
concessions to the Muslims, not reaching a compromise, and it was Washington which was in 
turn compensating, or hinting that it would compensate, Zagreb. 
As the Croatians were making their concessions directly to the Muslims in exchange for 
prospective future “compensation” from the US, it was critical for the US to stress the value of 
that compensation while also making it clear to Tudjman that his preferred options, a 
decentralised Bosnia on tripartite lines or a partition with the Croat areas going to Croatia, were 
incompatible with American interests. Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs Peter 
Tarnoff told Granić “that Croatia can get a lot from the resolution of this war”, but adding “if 
Croatia is not able to play the role, which will help it, we will have to apply pressure”.654 David 
Owen echoed these warnings, suggesting that “the Serbs will be let go at a price they must pay, 
but you must stay with the Muslims and if you know how to, more or less, you can profit 
too”.655 Even the Vatican applied pressure, with the Pope telling Granić of a papal “great fear of 
Lebanonisation, Palestinianisation” of Bosnia, and that “if we(Croatia) found a solution with the 
Muslims, it would be a good balance towards Serbia”.656 Tudjman told his Cabinet: 
“"Well, Gentlemen, what we have heard about this reversal, in the sense that 
America would attempt to impose such a solution, is not really anything new for us. 
Because we have always known that the West was interested - as was evident in the 
case of Germany - in punishing Serbia, if possible, and forcing us to cooperate with the 
Muslims”.657  
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Tudjman quickly grasped the implications of this. “Tudjman believed that the English 
and the French wanted to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina but that the division was indeed not 
possible or only possible if the USA agreed to it” Miomir Žužulj later told the ICYT, adding “He 
would only have been convinced about this at the beginning of the Washington 
negotiations.”658  
One of the concessions that Tudjman was more than happy to make was that of the 
Bosnian Croat leader Mate Boban, whom Tudjman believed had become a public relations 
liability for Croatia. Tudjman bemoaned to his Cabinet that “Mate alone is to blame for this and, 
to a certain extent, he has done me wrong too, because the entire world from Europe to 
America and the United Nations has been on my back”.659 Galbraith, who had long disliked 
Boban, took pleasure and credit in this denouement. ”A major focus of my effort from 
September of ‘93 on was to get rid of Mate Boban as the leader of the Bosnian Croats” 
Galbraith recalled, noting that, in September 1993, when “interviewed by the BBC [I] basically 
said that Mate Boban might be guilty of war crimes”, comments which were run on page one 
on the Croatian state-controlled press.660 Unlike Milošević, who also found Karadžić  an 
embarrassment, Tudjman and Sušak had no difficulty in dispensing with Boban when they 
decided this was necessary. “Sušak had the trust of hard-line Herzegovinian elements, which 
regarded him as their defender and advocate, and also had the authority, at key moments, to 
secure Bosnian Croat acceptance of compromises such as the Washington Agreement and the 
DPA”, according to a 1998 report.661 Whereas Milošević was publicly repudiated by Karadžić 
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and Mladić over the Vance-Owen plan and left with imposing a “blockade” on the Bosnian 
Serbs, Boban had little ability to resist when he became perceived as a liability by Zagreb.662  
The Croats continued to demand reassurance. A senior Croatian official complained to 
an American official after the January 5th 1994 talks in Geneva that “thanks to the Clinton 
Administration” the Muslims “are intransigent” while Granić expressed fears they had not 
abandoned their ambitions for a unitary state.663 As for Tudjman, Galbraith was concerned that 
the Croatian leader’s “heart was not in it” as late as the signing ceremony, and urged US 
officials to use Tudjman’s Washington visit itself to highlight the advantages that the US was 
willing to offer.664 For the Croats, this was made explicit during a meeting with Vice President 
Albert Gore, Defense Secretary William Perry, and Chair of the Joint Chiefs John Shalikashvili 
before the signing of the Washington Agreement where they commented on “problems” with 
the Croatian army, and made an offer to Tudjman and Granić to take care of financing and any 
other military needs Croatia might have”.665 
The Bosnian-Croat Federation did not end the “war” in Bosnia. On the contrary, it was 
a deal to ensure that the war would continue, motivated by Croat and American fears that it 
might end on undesirable terms. While at the press conference announcing the Agreement, 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher took pains to stress that the Agreement did not exclude 
the Serbs, this seemed unlikely in the near future. Two years later, Administration officials 
would tell the Senate that the Agreement’s major goal was to enable the Bosnian government 
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to fight the Serbs more effectively.666 This shows that the Agreement was more of a military 
alliance than a peace agreement, and that the US role was central, as was the fact that both the 
Bosnian and Croatian governments clearly expected a quid pro quo of some sort. After 
acknowledging that “this would not have been possible without the American leadership 
actively seeking a negotiated settlement in Bosnia”, Silajdžić expressed a wishs that “American 
involvement will continue in order to try and keep our countries within the family of democratic 
nations”.667 Granić was blunter: “We expect in the future very strong support for peaceful 
reintegration of the occupied territory in Croatia, from the international community, especially 
from the United States”.668 
From a Croatian viewpoint, Zagreb had made a down-payment and Washington was 
now obligated to deliver. Almost immediately, the US followed through on the promises that 
Gore and Perry had made to Tudjman in Washington, recommending a contract with MPRI 
(Military Resources Incorporated), a company founded by former high level US military 
personnel including former Chief of Staff (1987-1991) Carl Vuono, to train Croatian officers in 
“democratic institution building”.669 One officer would argue that “democratic institution 
building” was more than a euphemism, crediting the influence of American training on the 
Croatian officer corps with helping to preempt a coup when the HDZ fell from power after 
Tudjman’s death.670 If so, that must have seemed an unanticipated benefit to Tudjman and 
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Sušak, who would hardly have desired to see their Army “depoliticized” in 1994, much less 
sacrifice the Bosnian Croats for that purpose. Another US officer remarked after Operation 
Storm the following year, “The Croatians did a good job of coordinating armor, artillery and 
infantry. That’s not something you learn while being instructed about democratic values.”671 
It was not only training with which the Croatians expected assistance. “The plain truth 
is”, Anthony Lake informed the Senate three years later, adding “we expected that arms would 
flow through for the sake of the Federation. Absolutely. I have no apologies for that at all.”672 
The question of who would supply the weapons was a complicated question for the US. Even 
with its remit restricted to “democratic institution building” and a requirement that its work be 
certified as complying with the UN Arms Embargo on a monthly basis by the US Embassy, 
headed by Galbraith of course, the MPRI’s activities probably exceeded what was legal. Any 
direct supply of weapons to the Croats would be tantamount to a unilateral lifting of the arms 
embargo. Having decided that American policy objectives required a militarily-strong Croatia, 
the Clinton Administration now had to decide just how far they would go, and how many lines 
they would cross, to bring that outcome about. 
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The US, the Arms Embargo, and Iran 
 
The failure of “Lift and Strike” in early 1993, left the Administration’s policy towards 
the embargo unclear. The US had clearly advocated the lifting of the arms embargo, ostensibly 
to help the Bosnian Muslims in a conflict in which the Serbs were implicitly identified as the 
“aggressors”. Did the US support the lifting of the Arms Embargo because it should not have 
existed, in which case the US should welcome efforts to evade it by opponents of the Serbs, or 
was it as part of a wider goal of containing the conflict, in which case America should seek to 
contain any violations? Democrats and Republicans would split over this issue in 1996 when 
asked to investigate whether the Clinton Administration encouraged these violations. The 
Democrats claimed that it had always been the Clinton administration’s policy not only to push 
for an end to the embargo but also to oppose one per se. “When the Clinton Administration 
came in, we had a very different policy from the Bush Administration”, Galbraith would tell the 
House in 1996, adding, “The Bush Administration had supported, and, in fact, cast a decisive 
vote in favor of the international arms embargo against the Bosnians and had worked hard to 
enforce that embargo.”673 “By contrast”, Galbraith testified, “President Clinton felt...that the 
embargo was fundamentally wrong, that it resulted in a situation where the aggressors, the 
Bosnians Serbs, who had all the weapons, were able to attack cities, villages, and engage in 
ethnic cleansing with impunity”, and hence, “the position of the Administration was, in fact, to 
be against the arms embargo, and, in fact, from January 20th, 1993, we were not urging other 
countries to enforce it.”674  
Clinton had indeed campaigned on a platform of lifting the arms embargo, and at least 
initially favoured a policy of “lift and strike”. This opposition was echoed by senior officials 
although often in a more nuanced form. Madeleine Albright had expressed such an 
understanding of the US attitude towards the arms embargo. “The United States has always 
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supported, and continues to support, the lifting of the arms embargo”, she informed a crowd in 
Zagreb on January 6th 1994, adding “The arms embargo has been imposed, as you know, by the 
United Nations, by the Security Council. It is not possible to get a vote lifting the arms embargo. 
We tried and it is not possible.”675  
What then of Nunn-Mitchell, the Senate's own legislative proposal for the US to lift the 
embargo unilaterally? According to Talbott, “We in the Administration were convinced at the 
time, and we remain convinced now, that a unilateral lift of the embargo would have been a 
disaster. It would have encouraged others to pick and choose the resolutions they would abide 
by, such as for example, sanctions against Saddam Hussein”.676 It would have had, in Redman's 
view, “very severe ramifications for our European allies…They had told us very clearly that if we 
lifted the arms embargo that they were going to leave Bosnia...and I think we all believe that 
under those circumstances the Bosnian Government would have been virtually defenseless”.677 
Furthermore, President Clinton had made commitments that, if necessary, the US would send 
in troops to support such a withdrawal if necessary, which seemed likely to be the case. “There 
was certainly going to be a need for US involvement to get them out”, Redman told the US 
House, and that meant that the cheapest way politically of doing so was to avoid the matter. 
Consequently, the Administration continued to hold a veto threat over Congressional action to 
lift the arms embargo unilaterally until summer 1995, when Congressional support for such 
measures surpassed the two-thirds needed to override a Presidential veto.678 As late as 1996, 
the National Security Council press office prepared press guidance “that the United States had 
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always made clear we expected other countries to abide by the terms of the embargo”.679 That 
seems to run counter to Anthony Lake’s 1997 explanation of the policy to the Senate, where he 
argued that the US publicly supported the arms embargo because other countries urged it to do 
so, since the concern “was that if you lifted then United States took on the responsibility for 
what happened there”.680 Lake’s justification echoed concerns that the CIA expressed in August 
1994 regarding the value of a unilateral lift, after which “the Bosnian Government's war aims 
would escalate, leading it to defer diplomatic solutions to the conflict. Bosnian Serb forces 
would strike quickly after a US decision by launching major attacks to disrupt arms deliveries 
and would harass, detain and perhaps attack remaining UNPROFOR units. Belgrade would 
resume full support to the Bosnian Serbs to prevent their defeat”.681  
Subtly ignoring violations of the arms embargo without openly repudiating it allowed 
the Clinton Administration to have their cake and eat it. It would allow weapons to reach the 
Croatians and Bosnians, but without providing a precedent for future embargoes. In the event 
that the Bosnians were caught, the only precedent set would relate to attempting to evade an 
embargo, something attempted by any nation subject to them already, rather than the 
unilateral denunciation of UN embargoes altogether. Galbraith argued that the US position was 
no secret, as “based on my conversations with European ambassadors, that they too knew – 
including the Russians – that they, too, knew that the arms were transiting Croatia to the 
Bosnians, and, to the best of my knowledge, not one of these countries objected to the 
Croatian government”.682 Questioned later by Senator Hatch (R-Utah), as to whether this 
involved America “lying” to its allies, Lake insisted that “there is a difference between secrecy 
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and lying”.683 Some allies were less sanguine about the American officials’ behavior in the 
region. “Holbrooke behaved like a latter-day Metternich, endlessly wheeling and dealing and 
not entirely trusted by anyone, including and indeed especially perhaps by his so-called Allies”, 
recalled Sir Ivor Roberts the British representative to the Contact Group, adding “and, indeed 
subsequent events demonstrated that I was right not to trust him. He was telling us one thing 
and doing something quite different”.684 Events would more than justify Roberts’ view. 
An additional reason why the US adopted this approach was Croatia’s attitude. 
“Croatia would be crucial to any plan to lift the arms embargo”, the CIA noted in August 1994, 
insightfully observing that “Croatian support can be had for a price; it will expect compensation 
in weaponry, increased political and economic assistance from the West, and US help to regain 
the Krajina”.685 A senior Pentagon official would capture this line of thinking in 1995: “There are 
many marriages of convenience in the Balkans, and our relationship with Croatia has been one 
of them. Let's face it, you can't get to Bosnia without going through Croatia. You need their 
ports, you need their lines of communication”.686 Despite these optimistic, and arguably 
condescending pronouncements, Tudjman was distinctly cool regarding any lifting of the arms 
embargo on Bosnia and told Holbrooke as much in September 1994. The Croatian President 
was concerned that this would not only lead to more intense fighting, but would also leave the 
Bosnian Croats at a disadvantage against the suddenly better armed Muslim forces.687 By 
contrast, a situation in which arms were transferred to Bosnia illegally through Croatia with 
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American connivance would allow Zagreb to control which weapons reached the Muslims, in 
addition to taking a share. The very illegality would also leave Zagreb with potential material for 
blackmail against future American pressure. The Croatians therefore sought not only to 
promote an arms pipeline that they controlled, but also to draw American officials into the 
process in order to compromise them, a project that began within a month of the March 20th 
signing of the Washington Agreement. 
On April 22nd 1994, Richard Herrick, the American military attaché in Zagreb, was 
summoned to a meeting with Gojko Sušak. Sušak had a question for him. A “third country” had 
offered to supply weapons and support to the Bosnian Muslims with the Croatians taking a 
share as “payment” and would the US object? The third country happened, however, to be Iran, 
which the US Department of State's 1993 “Patterns of Global Terror” report described as “the 
most active state sponsor of terrorism in 1993”, which “was implicated in terrorist attacks in 
Italy, Turkey and Pakistan; Iran still surveils US missions and personnel; Tehran's policymakers 
view terrorism as a valid tool to accomplish their political objectives, and acts of terrorism are 
approved at the highest levels of the Iranian government”.688 Sušak had raised this question 
previously with American officials. In September 1992, when an Iranian 747 loaded with 
weapons had landed in Zagreb, it had provoked a vigorous response from the Bush 
Administration, especially due to rumors that the plane had brought David Owen to Zagreb to 
investigate.689 In April 1993, with the Clinton Administration now in office, Sušak tried again, 
approaching US Special Envoy Reginald Bartholomew with an inquiry regarding the American 
attitude to Croatia transshipping Iranian Arms. Neitzke counseled a strong negative response, 
as he had when both the Turkish and Iranian governments had floated the idea earlier, in 
February.690 This did not prevent President Tudjman from raising the issue directly in a meeting 
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with Neitzke on May 7 1993, stating that “Iran was knocking at the door”, leading Neitzke to 
reply under instructions from Washington that “the United States did not want Croatia to 
develop a relationship with Iran”.691 Galbraith, however, showed signs almost from the start of 
failing to share Neitzke’s reservations about allowing arms from dubious sources to enter the 
region. One of his first actions in Zagreb was to seek out Sefer Omerbašić who was widely 
believed not only to be involved in smuggling arms to the Muslims but, according to Gojko 
Sušak, also in recruiting foreign Islamic fighters.692 Galbraith would tell the Senate that he saw 
Iran as an international menace, sponsoring terrorism worldwide, but in 1993 he assured 
Neitzke that Iran would not use its newfound influence in the region to attack the US because 
this would not serve Iran’s strategic interests.693 “Peter’s view of the Iranian threat was always 
tempered by his Iran-Iraq prism and the role he had played in helping to expose the horrors 
that Saddam Hussein had perpetrated on the Kurds”, Neitzke recalled.694  
According to the 1996 Senate report “in late 1993 and early 1994, a senior US 
Government official in Croatia indicated interest in a covert action to aid the Bosnian Muslims”. 
“At one point”, according to the report, “the senior US official suggested a cover action 
program in which the US would let Croatia know that we would look the other way if they 
would let arms for the Muslims transit their territory on terms arranged between Zagreb and 
the parties involved.” Most ominously, “the senior US official suggested that the Iranians could 
be the suppliers”. At the time, the CIA moved aggressively to block the proposal, suggesting 
that approval would have to come from the White House, and that “those aspects of the 
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proposal disguised to hide the US hand would place it squarely into the cover action arena”.695 
It now appears that the ‘senior official’ was Peter Galbraith. At the time, however, these efforts 
proved largely fruitless. That was not due to a lack of interest on the Croatian side. This did not, 
by any means, represent the end of Iran's efforts to support the Muslim cause in Bosnia. 
Ambassador Galbraith would later tell the House that “all through this period [1993-1994], and 
during the Muslim-Croat war, there were arms flowing in. They were coming in through Croatia. 
As to the degree of Croatian Government complicity” Galbraith could only speculate, but “I 
presume that they knew about at least some of it”.696 Sušak himself would visit Tehran in 
November 1993.697 The nature of the Muslim-Croat war, and the uncertainty it created both 
about the American attitude to Croatia, and to what settlement might develop in Bosnia limited 
the extent of these exchanges. The Washington Agreement transformed the situation. 
Suddenly the US was committed to Muslim-Croat cooperation against the Serbs, and American 
officials had all but accepted an obligation to assist Zagreb with military rearmament. It was in 
this environment that Sušak appears to have decided to try again. 
When confronted with Sušak’s question, Herrick quickly recognised that he was in 
trouble. The American attitude towards an arms pipeline was a policy question, and he 
informed Sušak that the question needed to be posed to Galbraith, who was currently in 
Bosnia. Upon Galbraith’s return on April 27th, Herrick informed the Ambassador that Sušak and 
Tudjman wished to see him and made clear the purpose of the meeting. That evening, Sušak 
and Tudjman informed the Ambassador that the Iranians had reached an agreement with 
Izetbegović to supply arms through Croatia, and that Sarajevo had requested as a favour that 
Croatia look the other way. By framing the inquiry as a request from the Muslims in Bosnia, the 
Croats placed Galbraith in a position where a negative reply would undermine not just the US-
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Croatian relations but also the far more fragile Croat-Muslim Federation. While claiming to 
prefer a negative reply out of distaste for Iran, despite his recent visit, Sušak suggested that 
Croatia could take a “tax” of 30%, and additionally seize any other weapons that looked 
particularly dangerous. The weapons were going to be used by the Bosnian Muslims to kill 
Bosnian Serbs, and the more members of both groups who killed each other the better, in 
Sušak’s view.698 Galbraith informed Tudjman and Sušak that he had “no instructions” which 
“elicited uncertainty as to what our position was” from the Croats, and was unable to provide 
clarification without cabling Washington, which he promptly did upon returning to the 
Embassy.699 
The question had placed Galbraith in a difficult position. Aware that Washington 
generally favoured such shipments if they could be facilitated, Galbraith was reluctant to reject 
the Croats’ request but, simultaneously, was unwilling implicitly to provide a positive response 
without higher authorisation. As Galbraith told Strobe Talbott a week later, “anything short of a 
statement that the Croats should not facilitate the flow of Iranian arms to the Bosnians would 
be understood as a US Green light”.700 In a testimony to the House Committee, he underlined 
that “if the US said no to the Croatian inquiry regarding Iranian Arms, I think the very fragile 
Muslim-Croat Federation would have collapsed, as the Bosnians would have doubted the 
sincerity of their Croatian allies”.701 The initial meeting not only failed to resolve the Croatian 
question but also moved the dispute to the White House, where the Clinton National Security 
team had to determine their position. The ideal option, where the Croats and Bosnians 
cooperated to establish the pipeline themselves without American knowledge, was now off the 
table. The US would have, at the very least, to register no objections if it wished it to go 
through, and in such a manner that denied policymakers the option of claiming ignorance of 
such a statement’s consequences. Alternatively, if they wished to block it, Galbraith would have 
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to return to make this explicit to the Croat leaders, placing the full responsibility on the US. 
Galbraith could not simply request a meeting in order to provide a non-answer to a question 
that “officially” had not been asked. He needed to be invited by Tudjman and Sušak, and their 
actions would depend on their degree of satisfaction with the answer. If satisfied, they had no 
reason ever to raise the issue again, and America could only directly raise it if intended to 
provide an explicit reply.  
 
The April 29th “Incident” 
 
Galbraith's request for instructions received a reply from Alexander “Sandy” 
Vershbow, misidentified by Galbraith in his House testimony as the Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State for European Affairs but actually Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director 
for European Affairs at the National Security Council.702 Aged 42 in 1994, Alexander Vershbow 
was a career Foreign Service Officer, who had graduated from Yale with a degree in Russian and 
Eastern European Studies before gaining an MA from Columbia's Russian Institute. Between 
1988 and 1991, he had served as the State Department's Desk Officer on the Soviet Union 
before being appointed by President Clinton to serve in a staff position on the NSC, 
coordinating Russian and Balkan policy with the State Department. Later, he would become 
Ambassador to Russia, from 2001-2005.703 Vershbow informed Galbraith that, when he 
returned with instructions, he would be “clearly speaking for the Administration”.704 
 
On April 28th Zagreb time, President Clinton was returning from Richard Nixon's 
Funeral in Yorba Linda, California, which had been held the previous day. Traveling with him 
were Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and 
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National Security Adviser Anthony Lake. While some members who might have favoured aid to 
the Bosnians, such as Madeline Albright, were absent, so too were any Pentagon or CIA 
representatives, who might have opposed any decision that might have the potential of 
drawing the US further into the Bosnian conflict. The presumption of the policy was that 
America's goal was to see the Bosnians receive arms, which coloured the subsequent debate by 
ruling out a negative reply. “Had we done that”, Talbott later told the Senate, “we would have 
exacerbated the already desperate military situation of the Bosnians and very likely doomed 
the Federation of Muslims and Croats.”705 Strobe Talbott later testified that “This was a specific 
exchange that moved our policy in a direction it was already moving in”, concluding that “what 
would have changed something, big time, would have been if our answer to the Croatians had 
been no, we are flat against your letting these arms flow to the Bosnians”.706 A decision was 
taken to get the weapons to the Bosnians if at all possible. The question was now how to 
communicate this to the Croats while limiting US complicity. 
An affirmative reply was also ruled out. “If we had said yes to the Croatians, that is, if 
we had explicitly, affirmatively approved the transshipment”, Talbott recalled, “it would have 
put us in the position of passively and unilaterally supporting a violation of the arms 
embargo.”707 This would pose a serious threat to the US relationship with its allies, and 
potentially force it into greater involvement in the region. “The public disclosure of such a 
posture”, Talbott continued, “would have caused severe strains with our allies who had troops 
on the ground in Bosnia as part of UNPROFOR”, and “had we gone that course it would have 
triggered the precipitous withdrawal of UNPROFOR, and that in turn would have required a 
substantial US troop deployment as part of a potentially very dangerous and costly NATO 
extraction effort.”708 
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The Administration settled on a formula of “no instructions” which allowed the US to 
communicate a lack of objections without technically indicating a preference. Deputy Secretary 
Talbott informed Congress clearly that the US was not providing an answer. “The Croatians 
came to us with a question”, Talbott later told the Senate, “the question was, we are thinking 
about doing thus and such. What’s your view on that? Our answer was, we do not have a view. 
We are giving you a non-answer.”709 Nonetheless, “we expected that hearing a carefully 
considered response from us which was a non-response, the Croatians would go ahead with 
what they clearly intended to do and what the Bosnian government very much wanted them to 
do”.710 
The formula placed Galbraith in a difficult position. The Administration had delivered 
its instructions to him in a manner, technically vague and through oral rather than written 
channels, which enabled Washington to maintain deniability towards him. If things went wrong, 
he could be accused of exceeding his authority, interpreting his lack of instructions as a yes, and 
set up as a “fall guy”, the rogue Ambassador who went off on his own. The way in which he 
received the instructions was, arguably, illegal. The 1974 Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, passed in response to Watergate and the Nixon 
Administration’s perceived excesses, required a “Presidential finding” to authorise covert action 
by the Central Intelligence Agency. This requirement was extended to “covert actions” by non-
CIA government departments when a new Title V was added to the National Security Act of 
1947.711 The latter specified that “except in emergencies, when oral finding may be used for up 
to 48 hours, presidential findings must be in writing...specify each US Government entity that 
will participate in any significant way in a program's implementation, must state whether any 
third party will participate in the program in any significant way, and may not authorize any 
violations of the Constitution or any US statute”.712 The purpose was not to deter covert action 
generally, but rather to ensure that this was properly documented, with a clear chain of 
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accountability. Without such a chain, US officials on the ground, whether State Department or 
CIA, could use vague oral instructions or general statements of policy intent from the President, 
or someone purportedly representing him, to justify covert actions including support for 
governments’ overthrow. By requiring a clear “Presidential finding”, the law ensured that there 
could be no ambiguity. If “covert action” were to occur, it would not be justified on the basis of 
advancing the Administration’s policy goals, but rather because the President himself approved 
it. Importantly, there were no laws “specifying in any greater detail how the Executive branch 
should handle the process of considering and adopting presidential findings”.713 The Executive 
branch and its representatives could do what they liked, as long as they were on record. The 
problem for Galbraith was that none of the instructions he received were on record anywhere. 
Luckily for Galbraith, US Representative to the Contact Group Charles Redman arrived 
in Zagreb the following day, who had “negotiated the Federation agreement in March”, had 
recently spent four days with Secretary of State Christopher, and would be returning to 
Washington the following day to brief senior officials on the Contact Group’s work. He was also 
already scheduled to meet with Tudjman and Sušak that evening. Galbraith contacted Redman 
as soon as he landed. “When I arrived in Zagreb”, Redman recalled, “Ambassador Galbraith 
asked that I come to his residence before going on to the meeting with the Croatian 
officials.”714 After briefing Redman on the question “concerning the transshipment of arms for 
the Bosnian government”, Galbraith placed a “call to Washington to ascertain the response to 
that question”.715 Together, Galbraith and Redman spoke with the “responsible Washington 
official” in Redman's words, who “provided the ‘no instructions’ guidance”. According to 
Redman, only Galbraith discussed the arms issue: “I spoke to the same official to pass on a 
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short debriefing on the work of the Contact Group in Sarajevo and Pale but did not discuss the 
arms issue which I had not been involved”.716  
Armed with “no instructions” from the National Security Team, Galbraith and Redman 
returned to the Presidential Palace the following day, April 29th 1994. When Tudjman again 
asked what the US position would be on the Bosnian proposal, Galbraith responded that “he 
had no instructions”. This time, however, he went further, adding, “Mr. President, pay very 
close attention to what I am not saying”. As the group entered the dining room for dinner after 
the meeting, Redman made his contribution, adding to Tudjman, “It's your decision to make. 
We don't want to be put in a position to say no”. According to Redman, “there was no 
response, no further conversation. I was never engaged on the issue again”.717 With 
Ambassador Redman leaving for Washington shortly after dinner, he and Galbraith had agreed 
that Redman would deliver a report on the meeting with the Croats in person on arriving back 
in the US, and that Galbraith would hold off filing any sort of cable. This might well have been 
the end of the matter, at least as far as the US was concerned. Sušak was happy. Redman had 
managed to do something for the Bosnians after having been present in Sarajevo throughout 
the battle for Goražde. On May 4th 1994, the first transshipment would arrive “with sixty tons of 
explosives and military equipment on board”. Two days later, on May 6th, Iranian Foreign 
Minister Ali Akbar Velayati visited in Zagreb before traveling to Sarajevo where he presented 
Izetbegović with a $1 million cheque.718 
The entire matter had been handled entirely within the National Security Council and a 
compartmentalised selection of the nominal State Department officials who were functionally 
part of the President's inner circle, such as Talbott. The CIA and Department of Defense were 
left out, despite CIA Director Jim Woolsey and Defense Secretary William Perry being members 
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of the National Security Council. This would not been unproblematic had they been informed of 
a change in policy, but those involved were dedicated both to discretion and to the line that 
what they had done did not involve any such change. Had the events of April 29th proved the 
end of the matter, these conflicts might not have mattered. Instead, the Administration’s 
efforts to kill any further discussion of the events backfired spectacularly, and involved 
instructions that Galbraith received from Vershbow not to file any cable with the State 
Department regarding his discussions with Tudjman or the “no instructions” policy. 
Already uneasy, Galbraith consulted Neitzke, who advised the Ambassador to draft a 
cable without submitting it, thereby establishing a paper trail, an act which appeared to 
Congress much like an effort to blackmail his superiors, not to mention an admission that 
Galbraith himself considered his instructions improper.719 Reassured, Galbraith’s belief that his 
actions now represented official policy was reinforced by a meeting between Tudjman and 
Richard Holbrooke that he attended in autumn 1994, where “Holbrooke suggested to Sušak 
that ‘we should go to other countries that might be willing to provide arms to the Bosnians or 
money and basically say to them, we do not object if you decide to violate the arms embargo by 
assisting the Bosnian Muslims or we do not object if you decide to provide money’.”720 
Galbraith himself now approached the local CIA Station Chief. Unbeknownst to the 
Ambassador, Neitzke had already voiced his reservations with the local CIA chief of mission 
who, along with Director of the Croatian Intelligence Service Miroslav Tudjman, was 
increasingly as worried about Islamic fundamentalism as the military threat posed by the 
Serbs.721 Already suspicious, the CIA Station Chief reported Galbraith’s requests to Director 
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James Woolsey in Washington. “My station chief in Croatia had the Ambassador approach him 
and say, ‘Would you help me look the other way as these arms come through?’” then CIA 
Director James Woolsey recalled. He further concluded “My station chief was exactly right in 
coming back and saying, ‘Hey, I can’t do this, right?’” and that “while conceding that’s the 
decision the President gets to make”, he “did not think that was very wise because it ended up 
getting the Iranians into the Balkans in more ways than anybody wanted”.722  
Concerned about whether this was a rogue operation, Woolsey confronted Lake and 
Talbott, both of whom denied that any change of policy had occurred, a position Lake would 
struggle to explain to the Senate during his own confirmation hearings for CIA Director. Lake 
blamed Talbott, alleging “There was apparently a misunderstanding. Director Woolsey did not 
get a clear view of what that decision was, I wasn't there. I can't sit in judgment on that”. Lake 
then defended his own handling, stating “I think I did the right thing by saying, no, our 
instructions were that that should not happen. I assured him that I was unaware absolutely of 
any covert action program”.723 Woolsey disagreed “The CIA did not move weapons to Bosnia. 
We were perfectly willing to do that. We had enough experience in this field, but the policy 
level did not want the CIA to do that”.724 Woolsey resigned at the end of the year, angered by 
both the policy and the decision to sideline his agency 
Woolsey himself may have been unaware of the extent of his own agency’s 
involvement. In 1999, President Tudjman was recorded as informing a Cabinet meeting, “let me 
remind you, we were under an embargo, while the CIA practically cooperated with our service, 
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even going so far as to give us some technical material which they did not give to others”.725 
That cooperation could have occurred after Woolsey left, Tudjman could be in error, or 
Woolsey could be lying, although it is hard to see why he would do so more than a decade later 
and after becoming a political opponent of the Administration. What is clear is that Tudjman 
was clear about the intended signal of the US regarding arms shipments. “As far as I know, 
Washington was never even close to making Croatia’s arms buildup a bilateral issue”, Neitzke 
recalled, adding “On the contrary, at least by mid-1994, Washington tacitly accepted the 
buildup and by the early summer of 1995 had all but embraced it.”726 
Whether Washington played a larger role in the build-up is unclear. Rumours 
abounded not just among the diplomatic community, as Galbraith alleged, but also within the 
American Embassy itself. Neitzke was a major source for the local CIA Station Chief, although 
not the only source as the Democratic Congressional staff sought to portray him in the 
subsequent investigation. On May 14th 1994, the Station Chief reported to Washington that 
Neitze had informed him of how Galbraith and Ambassador Redman had intervened to secure a 
convoy’s release that had been stopped trying to enter Bosnia from Croatia at the Bosnian 
Ambassador’s prompting. Redman conceded in his testimony to Congress that such an 
intercession did in fact take place but that he had no knowledge of any weapons that may have 
been present in the convoy, was uncertain whether his intervention was decisive in its release, 
and was primarily concerned with the “impact on the negotiations” as Contact Group 
representative if the Bosnians were angered. The Democratic “Minority concludes that had it 
not been for this rampant speculative reporting, the May 1994 convoy would have been no 
more significant than the thousands of other convoys that traversed the region during the 
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war”.727 While all of this may have been true, and legally none of it may have constituted a 
“covert action” under US law, it seems implausible that Redman would not have suspected that 
weapons were involved. It is highly likely that thousands of other convoys which traversed the 
region during the war did carry weapons, many of them Iranian. Otherwise, why would the CIA 
headquarters have been sufficiently concerned to instruct the Zagreb Station Chief to pay 
especially close attention to anything which could be construed as US officials’ involvement in 
arms shipments?728 Similar non-denials and ambiguous “clarifications” suffice to discredit other 
reports from Neitzke and the Station Chief. When, prior to a visit by Secretary of Defense Perry 
to Zagreb in summer 1994, the Station Chief “received a telephone call from the Department of 
Defense inquiring about the number of arms shipments the Bosnians were receiving and the 
frequency of those deliveries”, he concluded that the Department of Defense was in the dark. 
The Democratic report’s response was accurately to note that conjecture is not fact, and then 
suggest that “even if the Department of Defense was unaware of the policy response, it was not 
the responsibility of the responsibility of the Station Chief to make an issue of something that 
the Department of Defense had not chosen to raise on its own”.729 There was no mention of 
how the Department of Defense could raise an issue about something of which it was unaware. 
On September 7th 1994, the Station Chief reported that Neitzke “told him that Holbrooke is 
‘driving a plan to arm the Bosnian Muslims’, and that S50 million has been set aside for that 
purpose”. According to the minority staff, this sum merely referred to funding allocated in the 
event of the lifting of the embargo, and further signifies Neitzke’s tendency to spread, and the 
Station Chief to report, “gossip”. While Woolsey was apparently satisfied with the response he 
received from Holbrooke in person, the Director had other sources. On July 4th 1994, Galbraith 
apparently asked the CIA for an opinion on whether $250 million would be enough to arm the 
 
727Final report of the Select Subcommittee to Investigate the United States Role in Iranian Arms Transfers to 
Croatia and Bosnia ("the Iranian Green Light Subcommittee"), with minority views : report prepared for the 
Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives pp.462-466  
https://www.Congress.gov/CongressionalCongressional-report/105th-Congress/house-report/804/1 pp.378-79 
Accessed May 14th 2019 
728 ibid 
729 Ibid., pp.452-453. 
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Bosnians, a request that was passed on to Washington. Holbrooke himself would also inquire of 
the CIA, in early October, whether such a program would be legal.730 
 Two questions arise from this entire affair. The first is whether the US directly supplied 
weapons to Croatia and Bosnia in a manner which was contrary to American law; i.e., using 
taxpayers’ money or with full foreknowledge that embargo violations were being endorsed. The 
second is whether weapons reached Bosnia through Croatia with American connivance and, if 
so, how many. The answer is that they did, but how many is far harder to establish. In 1995, 
there was almost unanimous support across American policy and the political spectra for the 
Bosnians receiving arms, and the major divisions were simply over the methods for achieving 
this and the desired degree of US involvement. Hence, the CIA’s concern was not how many 
weapons the Croatians were receiving, but whether US officials played a role. By 1996, with 
Dayton having ended the war in Bosnia, and the Krajina ancient history, the Congress 
investigators’ priorities were even more parochial. Neither the Republican majority nor the 
Democratic minority on the investigating committee showed much interest in the scale of 
support or its impact on the ground in Croatia. During an election year, the Republicans focused 
on uncovering evidence of direct cooperation between Clinton Administration officials and Iran 
and, failing that, of criminal activity. By contrast, the Democratic minority focused their ire not 
on Galbraith for his actions, nor the Administration officials for leaving the Ambassador 
exposed, but rather on Neitzke and the CIA Station Chief, along with Miroslav Tudjman, for 
their role in exposing the operation. Bizarrely, the Democratic minority report alleges a 
conspiracy involving the sharing of gossip between Neitzke, the local CIA station chief, and the 
leader of the Croatian Intelligence Service, Miroslav Tudjman, “an ultra-nationalist who had 
strong reasons to oppose any arms for the Bosnians in order to maximize Croatian territorial 
gains in Bosnia”.731 The precise target of this conspiracy was unclear, given that Miroslav 
Tudjman was also the Croatian President’s son who had requested approval Galbraith’s 
approval for the Iranian Arms transfers in the first place. Neitzke and the Station Chief were 
condemned for spreading “rank hearsay that amounts to little more than gossip and rumor 
 
730 Ibid., pp.523-531. 
731 Ibid. p. 116 
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mongering with respect to the tales told by the DCM about the Special Envoy. This reporting of 
such gossip and rumor about U.S. officials is not intelligence gathering and, when it contains an 
accusation of illegal activity, is absolutely wrong”.732 Needless to say, this conclusion was at 
odds with Woolsey’s, who maintained that “my station chief was exactly right” in reporting 
such “gossip”.733 As for Neitzke, after the Iranian agents’ activities forced a partial American 
evacuation from Zagreb in 1995, he would denounce Galbraith and the Administration as 
follows:  
 
“How low had we sunk as an Embassy and as a government if we were afraid to take 
eminently sensible measures to defend our own people because that might offend an 
anti-American, terrorist-backing Tehran regime whose arms flow made it possible for 
the Clinton Administration to stand aside watching genocidal slaughter?”734  
 
 How important were the above incidents in preparing the way for Operation Storm and 
ultimately the Dayton settlement? Without a full inventory of what was transported, it is 
impossible to know but it is unlikely that the Iranian weapons played a decisive role for the 
Croats in the sort of combined operations they undertook in autumn 1995, which were heavily 
reliant on the coordination of arms, air support, and artillery, none of which are mentioned in 
reference to the shipments. Zagreb had other sources of heavy weaponry in the former Eastern 
bloc states’ armouries, such as the Czech Republic and Ukraine. The MPRI contract was 
probably far more important in providing the Croatian officer corps with the means to utilise 
the weapons they had acquired, and would have acquired regardless. What was far more 
significant what signal Galbraith and the other officials’ actions represented. If we reject the 
hypoThesis that the “No Instructions” incident was a one-off, and that the Iran was Croatia’s 
only source of arms, the whole affair takes on a new light. Like an iceberg, where only 10% or 
 
732 Ibid. p. 116 
733 Woolsey, R. James, Oral History; Director of Central Intelligence, Interviewed January 13th 2000 , Presidential 
Oral Histories, Miller Center, University of Virginia,  
https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-oral-histories/r-james-woolsey-oral-history-director-central: 
Accessed May 10th 2019 
734 Interview with Ronald Neitzke by Charles Stuart Kennedy” December 1st 2006, in “Yugoslavia Country Reader” 
The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Oral History Project p. 189 http://adst.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/Neitzke-Ronald-J.toc_.pdf: Accessed September 1 2019  
 229 
so is visible above water, the entire affair of the Iranian Pipeline offers merely a glimpse of a 
more general policy, significant only because, through fortuitous (or unfortunate in Galbraith’s 
case) circumstances, it happened to become public knowledge. That iceberg was an American 
policy of strengthening the military power of not just the Bosnians but also the Croats to exert 
pressure on the Serbs without the need for American troops. Whether anything came of 
Holbrooke or Galbraith’s specific proposals, that happened to be reported to the CIA, is 
irrelevant. We know that they were regularly floating such ideas so, doubtless, the vast majority 
would have remained hypothetical. It is possible, though unlikely, that the convoy for which 
Charles Redman intervened to allow into Bosnia was not, in fact, carrying any weapons, but the 
Bosnians and Croats felt confident about appealing to American diplomats to intercede 
regarding convoys in the expectation that there would be no requests for evidence concerning 
their contents.  
 Richard Holbrooke, Peter Galbraith, Wesley Clark and Charles Redman doubtlessly 
wished for weapons to reach both the Bosnians and Croats. They explored a multitude of ways 
to achieve that end. Some failed, but even this was due, not to policy or moral concerns, but 
legalistic ones. The Iran Affair reveals that, for many officials, the American policy was no longer 
in question, the only debate now being which technical means should be used to accomplish it. 
Moreover, the largely effective efforts to ignore Woolsey, who would be gone by the end of 
1994, and Neitzke, showed that what opposition remained could now be bypassed. This was to 
have enormous implications for the following year. 
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After the Washington Agreement 
 
The episode over Iranian arms demonstrated both how far American policy had 
exceeded the limits which had confined it from 1989 to 1993, and also how those limits 
continued to constrain it into 1995. The US finally had a policy which was in accord with the 
resources available: to do everything possible to strengthen the Bosnian Muslim and Croatian 
forces, offer diplomatic cover for the actions of both provided they cooperated, and ensure 
that neither reached a separate peace with the Serbs. By early 1994, it was unanimously agreed 
that the Serbs were the aggressors, that, in Tony Lake’s words “successful negotiations proceed 
from balance of power realities”, and that, in order to achieve better terms, that balance had to 
be changed.735 Nonetheless, the those objectives’ precise nature remained as elusive as when 
Colin Powell had posed the question during the debates over Vance-Owen and “lift and strike”. 
Did the US wish to pressure the Krajina Serbs into making a settlement through the threat of 
Croatian military action, or desire that action itself? Was the goal to force the Bosnian Serbs to 
make concessions for a compromise peace or to enable their defeat and prosecute their leaders 
for war crimes? American officials were not in agreement themselves, as would become 
evident when Peter Galbraith launched his own initiative for a Croatian-Serb agreement. These 
divisions would allow the Croatians, who did have clear objectives of which they never lost 
sight, to manipulate American policy. If in autumn of 1994, no one expected 1995 to be an 
annus horribilis for the Serbs, fewer still saw it as one in which Tudjman would make himself 
arbiter of the Balkans, and the US would emerge with international credit for finally “ending” 
the wars of the Yugoslav succession. 
 
 
  
 
735 Senate Hearing 105-424—Hearing on Nomination of Anthony Lake to be Director Central Intelligence (March 
11, 12, 13, 1997). p.102 https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/hearings/105424.pdf: Accessed 
August 23rd 2019 
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CHAPTER 5: Winning Croatia’s War 
 
By autumn 1994, the US and Croatia had become, as Tudjman had predicted to James 
Baker back in June 1991, allies. It was a peculiarly ‘Balkan’ alliance, of the sort that the historian 
within Franjo Tudjman would have appreciated. While Croatia needed things from the US, such 
as diplomatic support and weaponry, Croatia’s value to the US required Zagreb to possess a 
military capable of taking offensive action, and the diplomatic confidence to use it in pursuit of 
American objectives. Those objectives, themselves, moreover, were becoming indistinguishable 
from those of Croatia.  American officials like Peter Galbraith might credit American strength 
with coercing Tudjman to change course in Bosnia but the Croatian leader had also been 
persuaded by a perception of American weakness. The Clinton Administration remained 
prisoner to the principles it had adopted towards Yugoslavia at the start of its term in office. To 
the conviction that the Serbs were the aggressors and that a settlement on Serbian terms was 
unacceptable morally, had now been added the loss of domestic prestige in front of Congress 
and the American public if the Administration were perceived as backing down on this principle. 
Even if they did not admit it, what the Clinton Administration now needed was less specific 
terms in a peaceful settlement than for this to be preceded by a Serbian military defeat that 
was sufficiently dramatic to enable the Serbs to be portrayed as “defeated” to the American 
public. With the use of American combat troops ruled out, such a defeat could only be inflicted 
by the Muslim or Croatian forces. Even had the American officials referred a primarily Muslim 
victory over the Serbs within Bosnia itself, the Muslims had less ability to inflict such a defeat 
than the Croatians, and the latter had even less reason to choose Bosnia as their preferred site 
of victory. The US needed a Serbian defeat, and therefore required a Croatian army capable of 
inflicting one. Over the course of 1995, the fear that the Croatians might not fight at all 
predominated in American councils over concern that they might fight in the wrong places.  
By embracing the Croatian military buildup, along with a policy of Croat-Muslim 
military cooperation, America abandoned diplomacy in order to gamble on military success. 
Muslim leaders who had themselves admitted they had little alternative but a compromise 
settlement at the start of 1994, now had even less reason to negotiate before their military 
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position improved.736 US and European officials opposed to the formal lifting of the arms 
embargo had always highlighted the risk that the fear of a shifting balance would give the Serbs 
an incentive to seek to win the war quickly, potentially leading to them overrunning UN “Safe 
Areas” especially the isolated eastern enclaves of Srebrenica and Žepa.737 Furthermore, by the 
time new weapons were ready for use, presumably the Bosnians and Croats would feel they 
could accomplish more on the battlefield than at the negotiating table The CIA warned in 
autumn 1994 that lifting the arms embargo would “likely remove any remaining willingness on 
the part of the Croatian government to negotiate a compromise settlement [with Krajina 
Serbs].738  
Time was Croatia’s ally not just against the Serbs, but also against their Muslim allies 
and American sponsors. The longer the Croatian build-up continued, the less Zagreb needed 
active US support, or feared its withdrawal.  In early 1994, the Croats had faced in Bosnia the 
choice between a military defeat and accepting US-sponsored mediation with the Bosnian 
Muslims. From late 1994 onwards, they would prove more than able to ignore international 
pressure to accept similar mediation with the Krajina Serbs, confident in the knowledge that, if 
delayed even for a few months, such a compromise might become redundant. Even American 
support was, if not expendable, less necessary. The Croats increasingly needed the US not to 
intervene actively, (in fact, active intervention might give the US too much influence in defining 
a settlement) but merely to prevent Belgrade or anyone else from intervening against them. As 
the Muslim situation in Bosnia deteriorated in spring 1995, it would be the Americans who 
would increasingly need Croatian intervention to balance out the Serbs’ battlefield successes, a 
situation which would leave Washington poorly placed to squabble over any intervention’s 
nature.  
 
736 UNOFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT: HIRC HEARING ON IRANIAN/BOSNIA ARMS MAY 
30th 1996 (Witnesses: Ambs. Charles Redman & Peter Galbraith)  
 https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/eur50031.htm:Accessed November 25, 2019 
737 1994-10-17b - BTF Assessment: Bosnia And Croatia: The Next Six Months October 17th 1994 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5235e80d993294098d517546: Accessed November 25, 2019 
738 Implications of Lifting the UN Arms Embargo against Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia, Office of European 
Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency, November 3rd 1994 https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1994-11-
03A.pdf: Accessed September 1st 2019 
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The altered leverage within the Croat-American relationship shifted power within the 
US policy community away from the Zagreb Embassy towards Washington itself. Galbraith and 
Neitzke’s very success in winning Washington over to their policy meant that it was no longer 
their policy, but rather Washington’s. In 1995, what had been Galbraith’s policy became 
Holbrooke’s or Al Gore’s. Occupied with the wider conflict in Bosnia and its potential impact on 
both the domestic credibility of an administration that was facing elections in a little over a 
year’s time and also on America’s international credibility, Gore and his circle had little time to 
worry about “internal Croatian matters”, which is how they viewed the Knin-Zagreb conflict. Bill 
Clinton’s likely 1996 Republican opponent, Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole of Kansas had 
been one of the most vocal suporters of military intervention against Serbia since 1989, when 
he championed the Kosovo Albanians’ cause. By autumn 1994, Dole was the only force holding 
back the Nunn-Mitchell bill unilaterally lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims.739 
Dole’s personal commitment to his version of a just outcome in the region outweighed the 
political advantages that he would accrue by forcing a unilateral end to the embargo on the 
Administration, as long as he believed that US policy was leading somewhere.740  
  
 
739 Introduced by Senators Sam Nunn (D-Georgia) and George Mitchell (D-Maine, and Majority leader until January 
1995), the bill would unilaterally lift the arms embargo on Bosnia six months after the paaage of the bill. The 
Administration disliked this as it would cause a crisis with the European allies who would withdraw their troops 
from Bosnia, enrage the Russians, and act as cover for any country wishing to justify a refusal to obey the UN 
embargos on Iraq or Iran. There was also fear that it would provoke the Bosnian Serbs into destroying the Muslims 
before any arms could arrive, which would force the US either to intervene militarily on the Muslim side or stand 
by and watch their destruction. See: Bert, W., The Reluctant Superpower: United States' Policy in Bosnia, 1991-95 
(Springer: New York, 1997) p.216. 
740 Karčić, Hamza, ‘Saving Bosnia on Capitol Hill: the case of Senator Bob Dole’, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 
2015, 13:1. 
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The Limits of Initiative: Galbraith, Gore and Operation ‘Flash’ 
 
One reason for the caution of US policy-makers was that, throughout 1994 and 1995, 
the US intelligence agencies consistently overestimated Krajina Serb military capabilities, and 
Belgrade’s willingness to intervene directly to their aid. In October of 1994, the CIA warned that 
the “Croatians are confident, even overconfident of their military capabilities”, and that while 
the “Bosnian Serbs are on the defensive against the Muslims in Bosnia, thereby less able to 
assist the Krajina Serbs”, the CIA predicted that the “Yugoslav Army [Belgrade’s ] will intervene 
if the Krajina Serbs begin to lose significant ground”.741 There was a tendency to over-
emphasise the influence of equipment, and underestimate the role played by the men who 
would have to utilise that equipment. In mid-1994, the SVK had 300 tanks, 295 armoured 
vehicles, and 360 artillery pieces of 100-plus mm caliber, compared with a December 1994 total 
for the HV of 320 artillery support 105 to 203 mm pieces, and 393 armoured vehicles, out of 
which 232 were tanks.742 This parity in equipment was belied by the manpower situation 
whereby a Croatian army whose standing strength was 96,000 faced a SVK which could field 
43,000 at full mobilisation, but could muster only 20-25,000 on the eve of Operation ‘Flash’.743 
While Croatia could remedy its defects through training and arms supplied under the 
benevolent eye of the US, the Krajina economy’s collapse meant that the region was actually 
losing population.744 As part of a deliberate strategy to exhaust the Krajina Serb Army’s 
resources, the Croatian military engaged in a pattern of sabotage, raids, and mobilisations 
 
741 1994-10-17b - BTF Assessment: Bosnia And Croatia: The Next Six Months October 19th 1994 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/5235e80d993294098d517546: Accessed July 1st 2019 
742 Croatian Ministry of Defense Estimates p.46 
http://centardomovinskograta.hr/pdf/izdanja2/1-400_engleski_oluja_final_25_05_10-opt.pdf: Accessed August 
28th 2019   
743 Ibid., p.47. 
744 1995-05-01a Croatia’s Ethnic Serb Controlled Areas: A Geographic Perspective, CIA Intelligence Report, May 5th  
1995 https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/1995-05-01A.pdf: Accessed August 30th 2019 
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designed to force the Krajina Serb forces to remain on high alert.745 Knin exacerbated matters 
by expanding its limited manpower to operations in Bosnia.746  
As late as October 1994, the CIA put the likelihood of a Croatian attack on the Krajina 
at only 20% and predicted that the Croats could not win a military confrontation.747 That helps 
to explain Washington’s reaction when, in early November 1994, Sušak expressed concerns to 
Galbraith that, if Bihać fell, “Knin could focus all of its military efforts on Croatia” and  “an influx 
of up to 200,000 mostly Muslim refugees”, before informing the Ambassador that “Zagreb 
would attack the Krajina Serbs if Bosnian government forces in the Bihać enclave appear close 
to defeat”.748 Bordering Croatia, the Bihać region had become the scene of a power struggle 
between the Bosnian Fifth Corps, loyal to the Izetbegović government, and forces of Fikret 
Abdić, a Muslim leader who favoured accommodation with the Serbs and had proclaimed an 
“Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia”. Under Adif Dudaković’s command, the Bosnian 5th 
Corps not only ejected Abdić’s forces, sending him and his supporters into exile in the Krajina, 
but also undertook a highly successful offensive against the Bosnian Serbs over the course of 
July and August 1994.749 The Bosnian Serb forces counterattacked in October, not only 
reversing the Bosnian gains, but also threatening to overrun the entire enclave.750 
Galbraith claims to have lobbied for support for a Croatian attack only to have been 
instructed by Holbrooke “to tell him [Tudjman] under no circumstances would we support 
 
745 Rear Admiral Davor Damazet –“Loso” “The Military Aspect of the Strategic Determinants for Operations to 
Liberate the Occupied Areas of the Republic of Croatia” Hrvatski Vojnik, October 1996 pp. 6-13. Quoted in Central 
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360. 
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widening the war. We wouldn’t support a military campaign to relieve the siege of Bihać”.751  
Instead, the US dispatched a demarche to Milošević, threatening dire consequences if the 
Krajina Serbs did not cease their operations.752 While Washington was concerned about the 
prospects of the Yugoslav Army’s intervention, a greater hint regarding the motivations behind 
Galbraith’s instructions may lie within Tudjman’s response.753 “When informed America 
opposed Croatian intervention, Tudjman was quick to agree”, according to Galbraith, “one of 
the few times that I’d seen that Šušak and Granić had gotten together and they didn’t actually 
have Tudjman on board, which the Ambassador cited as evidence Tudjman “was not a 
bloodthirsty character”.754 US intelligence had a different view, believing that, while some 
Croatian generals were eager for action, Tudjman himself was opposed to it, preferring to wait 
until after January 20th 1995, when the UN peacekeeping mission in Croatia was due for 
renewal.755  
Galbraith might have been less quick to absolve the Croatian President from having a 
taste for blood had he been aware of the directive issued on December 5th, 1994 by General 
Janko Bobetko, the Croatian commander-in-chief, for “Operation Flash” which would see the 
Croatian Army “rescue” Bihać by attacking Western Slavonia.756 Tudjman trusted the West to 
prevent Bihać’s fall and grasped that it was Muslim military vulnerability rather than Muslim 
security which guaranteed American support for Croatia. The day when the Bosnian Muslims 
were not in danger of defeat without the prospect of Croatian intervention was the day when 
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Washington could afford to exert pressure on Zagreb. In the meantime, Tudjman did not wish 
to commit his forces fully to a stalemate in Bosnia when they could be reserved for the fait 
accompli in the Serb-controlled areas of Croatia under the cover of fulfilling American requests 
to assist the Bosnian Muslims against the Serbs.757  American officials do not appear to have 
grasped Tudjman’s unwillingness to “save Bihać”. He did not want it to fall to the Serbs, but also 
did not want to end the Serbian threat to the enclave entirely until he had used it as a 
justification for reconquering Knin. When the Americans clarified, in December 1994, that what 
Washington was vetoing was not a general attack on the Krajina, but the prospect of sending 
forces that could be used to attack the Krajina into Bosnia, he was relieved to be able to call the 
whole thing off. He had received credit for having made the offer in line with the 1994 
Washington Agreement without the burden of having to take any action. 
Tudjman had other considerations by the end of 1994. Two matters were due to come 
to a head in January; UNPROFOR renewal and the presentation of an international peace plan 
for the Krajina. Co-developed by the Ambassadors of Russia, France, the US and the European 
Community (hence the “Zagreb 4” or “Z-4” name for the process and plan), the Z-4 plan 
provided the Krajina Serbs with extensive autonomy including their own legislature, courts, 
schools, and the ability to utilise their own currency (or at least their own version of the 
Croatian Kuna). Galbraith later joked that the only Croatian institution present would be the 
“Post Office”.758 According to Hrvoje Šarinić, Tudjman believed that accepting the plan would 
mean political suicide for himself and his Party but, calculating that the Serbs were unlikely to 
agree, declined to reject the terms outright.759  While raising reservations that the “the issue 
was defined as a controversy between two equal sides, while it actually involved an issue 
regarding a minority in a national state, and even not the entire minority but only a smaller part 
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of it”, Tudjman agreed to consider the plan on January 30th.760 Meanwhile, HDZ supporters 
began organising a hostile campaign in the Croatian press against the Z-4 plan.761  Washington 
initially appeared to be fooled. “The Croats will accept the principles of the plan”, Christopher 
wrote to senior officials on February 16th, “Tudjman’s problems are with some of the specifics.” 
The important thing was that “the Croats must not get the idea that they can escape the very 
real compromises the Z-4 plan demands of them as the price of reuniting their country”.762 
Sensing an opportunity, opposition politicians, including Stipe Mesić, who had broken with 
Tudjman’s HDZ the preceding year, embraced the effort.763  
By the time the Z-4 plan was presented, Tudjman had already taken steps to render it 
stillborn. In early January, he made it known to Washington through Galbraith that he had no 
intention of renewing the mandate of the UN peacekeeping mission in Croatia.764 UN Security 
Council Resolution 743, passed on February 21st 1992, did not authorise Croatia to take this 
action unilaterally and included text which “reaffirms that the United Nations peace-keeping 
plan and its implementation is in no way intended to prejudge the terms of a political 
settlement”.765 However, it was superseded by UN Resolution 815, passed on March 30th 1993, 
clarifying that for the purposes of “resolution 743 (1992) and all subsequent resolutions relating 
to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)”, that “those territories comprising the 
United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs), are integral parts of the territory of the Republic of 
Croatia”.766 Overnight, UNPROFOR had ceased to be keeping the peace between two conflicting 
parties on the international community’s behalf, and instead was charged with performing a 
 
760 Ibid. 
761 Ibid. 
762 “Official Informal” From US Department of State to US Embassy Belgrade/Zagreb February 16th 1995 
https://foia.state.gov/searchapp/DOCUMENTS/3-FY2014/F-2007-03885ER1/DOC_0C17798531/C17798531.pdf: 
Accessed September 1st 2019 
763 Ahrens, Geert-Hinrich, Diplomacy on the Edge: Containment of Ethnic Conflict and the Minorities Working Group 
of the Conferences on Yugoslavia (Woodrow Wilson Center Press: Washington, D.C., 2007) p.166. 
764 Interview with Peter Galbraith” by Charles Stuart Kennedy” March 19th 1999, The Association for Diplomatic 
Studies and Training p.167 http://adst.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/Galbraith-Peter-W.pdf: Accessed 
September 1st 2019 
765 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 743 (1992) [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], February 
21st 1992, S/RES/743 (1992), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f1693a.html [accessed August 12th 
2019] 
766 UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 815 (1993) [Croatia], 30 March 1993, S/RES/815 (1993), 
available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f15b50.html [accessed August 12th 2019] 
 239 
peacekeeping service at the request of a member state (Croatia) entirely within its sovereign 
territory, a service which could be terminated at will by that member state. When Resolution 
815 had been passed in 1993, the Croatians were struggling to retain their limited gains around 
Maslenica Bridge, and the resolution presented a cheap way for Clinton Administration officials, 
prominently Madeline Albright, to demonstrate they were doing something about “Serb 
aggression”. In turn, the Resolution was passed due to the Russia and China’s abstention, a 
price that at the time may have appeared far cheaper than acquiescing in the lifting of the arms 
embargo on the warring parties. By 1995, the military situation had changed, and Tudjman was 
ready to collect interest on the slip of paper that Albright had handed him so casually two years 
before. As Neitzke later explained: “The main problem that anyone faced trying to broker a deal 
between Zagreb and Knin in the late 1994-1995 timeframe is that, as I earlier mentioned, the 
Security Council had already resolved the central issue; the UNPAs belonged to Croatia, period. 
…that was unacceptable to Knin”.767  
When Tudjman first sent his signals regarding UNPROFOR’s future, Peter Galbraith was 
in Washington to brief American leaders on the Z-4 process. At the January 11th “Deputies” 
meeting, Zagreb’s strongest advocates played down Tudjman’s actions’ significance and the 
“Deputies” asked Zagreb to delay any official announcement of the decision.768  Holbrooke 
prompted Galbraith to propose that the UNPROFOR issue be resolved at a private meeting 
between Tudjman and Vice President Al Gore at the UN Conference in Copenhagen, in 
exchange for extending the mandate for three months. Galbraith later elucidated that “He 
[Tudjman] could say that he had done something at the request of the Vice President and the 
Croatians agreed to extend, well, they agreed to a new UN mandate with a different 
name...However, they were fundamentally dissatisfied because they had wanted to force the 
issue with the Krajina Serbs”.769 The full significance of Tudjman’s move on the Z-4 process 
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appeared to elude US officials for the time being. On January 13th, National Security Adviser 
Anthony Lake circulated a letter to the President, Vice President and other “Principals warning: 
“Our Ambassador believes Tudjman has consciously opted for retaking the Krajina by force. The 
intelligence community, however, believes the chances of success are low – particularly if 
Milošević's forces intervene in support of the Krajina Serbs, as they are likely to do”. 
Nonetheless, Lake opposed applying too much pressure in order not “to drive Tudjman into an 
unholy alliance with Milošević to carve up Bosnia. Thus we will proceed with ongoing plans to 
accelerate diplomatic efforts aimed at a settlement that reintegrates the Krajina while 
providing substantial autonomy for the Serbs”.770 On January 18th, “The deputies decided for 
now to avoid a hard approach, and that carrots would be more productive than sticks”, and 
that “the US would encourage formally tabling the Z-4 Plan”.771 A week later they “endorsed 
the three-pronged approach outlined in the Croatia strategy paper: seek to maintain the 
essential functions of UNPROFOR in Croatia; launch a negotiating process between Serbs and 
Croats on a political settlement; and prepare to respond to the worst-case scenario, of renewed 
hostilities”.772  
The Deputies could fool themselves into believing that the Z-4 process was alive 
because, for the rest of January, Tudjman behaved as if he was fully satisfied. Mate Granić later 
admitted that establishing a direct line to the White House had been one of the goals of 
refusing to extend the UNPROFOR mandate.773 Tudjman could now afford to accept the Z-4 in 
“in principle” on January 30th because he knew that that it was already dead as became clear 
when the Krajina leaders refused to receive the Z-4 proposals unless Tudjman extended the 
UNPROFOR mandate.774 The process descended into farce when Galbraith several times 
attempted to hand a copy of the plan to Krajina President Milan Martić who refused to touch 
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the papers, while in Belgrade, the following day, Milošević also refused to see the diplomats or 
receive the plan.775 Martić subsequently convened the Krajina Serb “Parliament” on February 
8th, where it formally rejected the plan.776 Had Martić been in league with Tudjman, he could 
not have delivered a greater service to the Croatian President. By tying the plan’s rejection to 
the Croatian decision not to renew UNPROFOR, Martić also tied the question of whether there 
would be a new outbreak of fighting in Croatia, something the international community wished 
to avoid at all costs, to a decision that lay solely in Tudjman’s hands. Only Tudjman could 
extend the UNPROFOR mandate, and the Krajina Serbs, by their rejection of the Z-4 plan, 
rendered themselves bystanders to the diplomatic dance that would follow as the international 
community steadily tried to buy Tudjman’s acquiescence.  The Z-4 plan was not even discussed 
at “Principals” meeting following the Serbian rejection on February 21st and only briefly 
mentioned at the “Deputies” meeting the following day in the context of the need for a US role 
in a UNPROFOR withdrawal.777 The CIA concluded that the plan was dead on February 23rd, 
concluding: “Despite fractious personal differences, the Krajina Serb leadership adamantly 
refuses any form of reintegration, including the limited ‘autonomy’ Zagreb is willing to offer”.  
As for the Croats, “Guided by a vision of his personal historical role, mounting 
nationalist/political pressures which he has helped generate, and frustration with the 
international community, President Tudjman is now prepared to initiate large-scale military 
action to reintegrate the Krajina into Croatia. We do not have evidence Tudjman is working 
with a specific time schedule”.778 
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The sense of crisis abetted Al Gore and his circle’s efforts to portray themselves as 
heroes riding to the rescue of peace when they achieved Tudjman’s agreement in Copenhagen 
to extend the UN presence under a new title, UNCRO. Announced at a joint press conference 
with the Croatian President and American Vice President, UNCRO would receive a new 
mandate to patrol Croatia’s international borders rather than the lines of actual control dividing 
the Krajina Serb and Croatian positions.779 Having described the initial Croatian refusal to 
extend the UN presence as “the most dangerous situation Europe has seen since 1945”, 
Holbrooke would congratulate himself in front of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 
April,  on “avoiding a rockslide” in Croatia and preventing a “third Balkan war”.780  Galbraith 
was now “free to go ahead with the Z-4 negotiations to reconcile substantial Serb autonomy in 
the Krajina with the establishment of Croatian sovereignty over all of its territory.781 Gore’s 
actual discussions in Copenhagen which led to the agreement were less of a victory for peace 
than a stay of execution and rendered futile any further efforts that Galbraith might undertake 
to promote the Z-4 process. In Copenhagen, Gore promised support for the “reasonable” 
reintegration of the Krajina, recognising that the present situation was “untenable”, evidently 
without Galbraith’s knowledge, as Sušak remarked later that month. He recalled that "Galbraith 
came to  see  me  but  he  doesn't  know  anything about this”.782 By pledging support for a 
resolution of the Serb-controlled regions of Croatia’s status on Zagreb’s terms at an opportune 
moment, Gore de facto removed any reason for Tudjman to agree to the Z-4 terms.783    
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Long before Holbrooke spoke to the Senate about Gore’s success in Copenhagen, it 
was evident the Gore-Tudjman agreement had solved very little. While it had agreed on the 
existence of a new force and mission, the question of the logistics of such a mission had been 
ignored, nor did it secure in advance the agreement of either the UN, which would have to 
execute that mission, or the Krajina and Bosnian Serbs on whose border the mission would 
have to be carried out. Only five days after the Gore-Tudjman press conference in Copenhagen,  
the “Principals” “noted the “continuing difficulties-reported by Ambassador Albright with the 
Croatians on defining a realistic understanding of the mission of ‘controlling’ the international 
borders”.784  The State Department concurred: “We must try to meet minimum Croatian 
expectations that Zagreb gets something out of all the recent fuss besides a name change”,  
observing that “the UN redeployment out of the UNPAs and onto their periphery, i.e. the 
separation zone and the international border, is important. What the border force actually does 
is less important, provided it at least puts more soldiers at checkpoints than UNPROFOR did”.785  
The Croatians, however, had a different view, leading the BTF to warn in April that “senior 
policymakers do not appear as concerned as they should be about developments in Croatia”, as 
“UN negotiators have given up efforts to negotiate details of the new UNCRO force with 
Croatian and Krajina Serb authorities”.786 In a region renowned for a culture of haggling, 
Tudjman had managed the ultimate feat. He had sold the US an agreement to renew the UN 
peacekeeping mandate on conditions which required American policy-makers to abandon any 
serious efforts to pressure Croatia into accepting the Z-4 plan. Yet Tudjman had not in fact 
agreed to extend the existing UN mandate at all but rather accepted a different one with Gore. 
That new mandate, requiring the UN forces to patrol, not the border between the Serb- and 
Croatian-controlled territory within Croatia, but instead the international Bosnia-Croatian 
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border between the areas controlled by the Krajina and Bosnian Serbs was one which could 
never be implemented. The Serbs had no reason to agree, as it removed peacekeepers from the 
border they valued and moved them to one whose existence they did not recognise. With their 
refusal, Tudjman now had a justification for claiming that the Serbs were in violation of the new 
UN agreement at any time through demanding substantive rather than nominal border control. 
There is also an important symbolic gain Tudjman obtained from agreement on UNCRO: The 
acronym UNRPOFOR (UN Protection Force) had not prejudiced the Krajina’s status, while the 
new force being called UNCRO (UN Croatia) explicitly placed Krajina within Croatia. 
It is hard to believe that Tudjman managed to get the better of Gore to this degree at 
Copenhagen. Gore himself had a vested interest in substantive rather than nominal control of 
the borders between the Krajina and Bosnian Serbs. His National Security Adviser, Leon Fuerth, 
had been placed in charge of coordinating the US efforts to isolate the Bosnian Serbs 
economically through sanctions. By early 1995, Fuerth was increasingly troubled by the growing 
international pressure to trade sanctions release on Belgrade for concessions from Milošević. 
Madeline Albright recalled how, in early 1995, “Fuerth told us that, in his view, sanctions were 
going to run out in the summer. It was so difficult to maintain them that eventually they 
weren't going to work anymore. And that it was going to be tough to keep the Allies on board. 
Their shelf-life was coming to an end”.787  Fuerth perceived the open border between the 
Krajina and Bosnian Serbs as a backdoor around sanctions, one which had been worsened by 
efforts to promote trade between the Croatian-held territories and the Krajina. Such trade had 
been championed by Peter Galbraith who promoted “confidence building measures” in the 
form of economic links between the territories controlled by the two sides, including the 
opening of the Zagreb-Belgrade highway. “I considered this highway to be very important 
because it was breaking down the barriers between the Croats and the Serbs. After all, these 
people had lived together. They knew each other”, Galbraith explained.788 At the February 13th 
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Principals meeting, almost a month before the Gore-Tudjman UNCRO deal, Fuerth demanded 
“that we secure Tudjman's agreement to terminate economic relations with the Krajina Serbs, 
since this could undermine the effects of Milošević's cut-off of support to the Bosnian Serbs”.789 
The implication is clear. A month before meeting Tudjman, Gore’s national security adviser had 
demanded that the US should pressure Croatia to step up the enforcement of its international 
border with Bosnia. If the terms of the UNCRO agreement were Tudjman’s and designed to be 
unacceptable to the Krajina Serbs they were not forced onto Gore by Tudjman. If Tudjman had 
not already desired terms that would make acceptance by the Krajina Serbs impossible, Gore 
insisted on them.  
Gore and Fuerth were aware that there was little chance of the Krajina Serbs accepting 
that sort of enforcement. Indeed, Martić rejected it on March 13th.790 That did not stop them 
from pushing ideas for a border enforcement that could not be imposed peacefully.791 On April 
27th, the Principals heard “Leon Fuerth's idea to close the back-door on sanctions-traffic 
through the Krajina-by deploying Treasury Customs officials to Croatia as Sanctions Assistance 
Monitors”.792 In early 1995, Gore and Fuerth would gain nothing from improved relations 
between Knin and Zagreb. On the contrary, a successful rapprochement within Croatia would, 
at worst, free up Serb resources for use in Bosnia and, at best, undermine the Bosnian Serbs’ 
economic isolation. As the confidence-building measures were based on economic integration, 
as was Galbraith’s Z-4 strategy for peaceful political integration, that meant more goods flowing 
to the Krajina Serbs, which in turn flowed to the Bosnian Serbs, thereby undermining the 
effectiveness of the policy of sanctions that Fuerth was charged with enforcing. In the political 
climate of Washington foreign policy-making, this created a commonality of interest with 
Tudjman and made him a particularly appealing partner. American national security officials 
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outside the State Department are rarely diplomats and, except for a brief period in the 1970s 
when he had served in Zagreb, Fuerth had functioned as a political fixer, the Vice President’s 
voice on the National Security Council. Gore and Fuerth were used to “getting things done”. 
Like all politicians they were not opposed to bargaining and horse-trading to get their way. US 
politics is particularly prone to this, a tendency which was particular evident under a Clinton 
Administration with a National Security Adviser as “weak” as Anthony Lake.793 What they 
expected was that, when they reached an agreement after the horse-trading was over, that it 
would be implemented and that whatever “problem” that existed would be solved. The 
experience in the Balkans was that, whatever agreements Milošević signed, the “problem”, 
namely the Bosnian Serbs’ behavior and the conflict in Bosnia, was never solved, and Fuerth, 
who oversaw the US-side of the international efforts to trade sanctions relief for Belgrade’s 
help with various issues, must have been particularly aggrieved by this unreliability. When faced 
with another problem, that of the supply of the Bosnian Serbs through the backdoor of the 
“Krajina”, the choices were to rely on the UN, Milošević, or the Contact Group, all of whom had 
failed in the past to solve problems, or on Tudjman who had demonstrated a commitment to 
following through with action. Tudjman’s own self-interests gave him an incentive to solve this 
particular “problem”. There is little doubt that, when given the choice of approaching the issue 
through the Z-4 process or Tudjman, Gore and Fuerth gambled on Tudjman. In Copenhagen, 
they had explained the problem they wanted solving. It is unlikely that they specified military 
action as the solution. This was unnecessary. As the author himself was informed during an 
interview, the job of a staffer at the NSC is to inform superiors that problems have been 
resolved, not to bring them to their attention. Gore and Fuerth had made it clear to Tudjman 
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that, when they met in the future, they expected the “problem” of the Zagreb-Belgrade 
highway to have been “resolved”. 
If the above speculation is correct, Tudjman more than vindicated Gore and Fuerth’s 
confidence in his ability to deliver on his promises. By May 1st, the highway along with all of UN 
Sector North would be in Croatian hands following the Croatian army’s Operation ‘Flash’. The 
Croatian attack had been triggered by a series of events that probably served more as pretexts 
than actual causes.  On April 28th, a Croatian refugee stabbed a Serb at a Croatian petrol 
station. In retaliation, a group of Serbs, including the victim’s brother, opened fire on drivers 
using the highway, killing three civilians, while Krajina Serb soldiers took five more prisoners 
and closed the road.794 The prisoners were released the following morning and the Krajina Serb 
army promised to reopen the road on May 1st, only for this decision to be cancelled late on 
April 30th after several rockets had been fired on Croatia.  Hrvoje Šarinić, then head of 
Tudjman’s Presidential administration, later admitted to the Hague tribunal that Croatia had 
considered staging an incident but insisted that, in this case, this proved unnecessary as it 
occurred organically.795 Whether true or not, neither the rockets nor the decision to keep the 
highway closed could have provoked the attack, as Tudjman had already informed his Cabinet 
the previous day that Croatia would set impossible conditions and, if the Serbs met these, 
would immediately set new ones.796 It also explains why the Croatians were ready to attack at 
4:30am on May 1st, only eight and a half hours after the Serb decision to delay reopening the 
highway. Sušak was dismissive of Galbraith’s efforts to avoid a clash claiming, as usual, that 
“[Croata] want a peaceful solution, a clear sign that the Croatian leadership had received other 
indications from the United States regarding its likely reaction to military action.797  Gore and 
Fuerth had not only provided a legal pretext for Tudjman to act in the form of the March 12th 
agreement on UNCRO, but also actively encouraged the Croatians to do so by requiring the 
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policing of the Bosnian-Croatian border. While it is unclear whether Fuerth pushed Tudjman to 
attack when he did, as previously attested, Fuerth had no qualms about sharing his impatience 
to see the highway closed to the Bosnian Serbs with colleagues in Washington. American 
intelligence expected an attack, predicting on April 28th that “Croatia would soon launch an 
attack to retake the highway if the Krajina Serbs try to close it”, before concluding “even with a 
new UN mandate in place, the fundamental interests of Croatia and the Krajina Serbs almost 
certainly cannot be reconciled through negotiations, making a renewed conflict almost 
certain”.798 The most likely explanation, which reconciles Croatian motives, Šarinić’s testimony, 
and what we know from American sources, is as follows. The Croatians had long wanted to 
seize the highway. After March 12th, they knew that Gore and Fuerth wished them to do so and, 
by April 28th, they had been under American pressure for a month to do so. Tudjman was 
perfectly willing to stage an incident soon if one were required for justification, but the almost 
random and unimportant shootings, combined with the highway’s closing, provided sufficient 
pretext, rendering provocation unnecessary. The subsequent Serbian decision to delay the 
highway’s re-opening was irrelevant. No course of action by the Serbs would have prevented 
Tudjman from acting, lest the highway issue, in Croatian Prime Minister Nikola Valentić’s words, 
should “perpetuate itself”.799 
The UN Security Council condemned the Croatian operations on May 1st, demanding 
both sides cease fighting.800 By this point, such condemnation was almost a matter of routine. 
On May 4th, with the Croatian campaign a success, the Security Council relegated itself to urging 
both sides to exercise restraint and avoid escalation.801 The Croatian cause was aided 
inordinately, both in Washington and at the UN, by the Krajina Serbs’ reaction. Unable to 
respond conventionally to “Operation Flash” on the battlefield, the Krajina Serb leaders fired 
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missiles at downtown Zagreb, damaging several buildings including the American Embassy. 
Blind to the political implications, the Krajina leaders reveled in the destruction, even though it 
provided Gore and Fuerth with the basis for portraying Serbian retaliation rather than further 
Croat advances as the major threat to peace in the region.802  It helped Gore and his allies to 
blunt any American response at the May 4th Deputies meeting by redirecting anger towards the 
Serbs, who were warned “of the consequences of attacks on U.S. personnel in Zagreb”. At the 
same meeting, Fuerth pushed through a conclusion “directing that the Croatians be 
immediately informed of our deep concerns and endorsed a Vice Presidential meeting with 
President Tudjman in London as a useful forum for registering U.S. concerns about Tudjman's 
military actions”.803  Some in Washington seemed dissatisfied about leaving the matter entirely 
to Gore. “The main element of the strategy is to press all parties to halt military operations and 
exercise restraint”, wrote the BTF’s Director Norman Schindler to new CIA Director John M. 
Deutch after the May 4th meeting, adding in brackets “(I know what you're thinking!).”804 It 
showed his awareness of the irony of what followed, which placed the onus for any future 
escalation not on the Croat actions, but on the Krajina Serb response, and suggested US action 
against them if they persisted. “The NSC proposes that we consult with NATO and the UN about 
the possibility of threatening to use NATO airstrikes against Krajina Serb targets in the event of 
future attacks on Zagreb or bombing missions out of Udbina Airfield”, Schindler observed.805 
Schindler was evidently not alone, as the conclusions of the May 4th meeting were partially 
reversed three days later, when the “The Deputies agreed that Croatian President Tudjman was 
not getting the message that the US Government disapproved of Croatia's actions; they decided 
that steps should be taken to communicate US concern”.806 A  State Department demarche, 
which expressed concern about the refugees’ treatment and reminded Croatia of its obligations 
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to abide by its international commitments as well as those with the Krajina Serbs, followed. 
Nonetheless, Tudjman cound not have been excessively concerned about the demarche. It also 
stressed the close Croatia-US cooperation, as well as American support for full Croatian 
sovereignty’s restoration within its internationally-recognised borders.807 The impact was 
further limited by the decision to issue a demarche to Belgrade simultanously, warning against 
any intervention in Sector East.808 
An examination of the Croatian sources for the Gore-Tudjman meeting reveals why the 
Vice President may have provoked ire in Washington: “You had just justification for a military 
operation in Western Slavonia, and I kept defending it in Washington. You will recall that the 
two of us met in London immediately afterwards, and then we went to the US embassy to meet 
Gore”, Holbrooke reminded Tudjman in August, “Some people wanted Gore to tell you – tell us 
that you would be withdrawing from Western Slavonia and we said absolutely not. You have to 
stay there”.809 “Some people” sounds like a reference to the “Deputies”, on whose authority 
Gore was, in theory, communicating with Tudjman about their “deep concerns”, and 
Holbrooke’s statement is all but an admission that Gore ignored their decision, requiring the 
follow-up demarche. The rebuke that Gore suffered was limited, and mostly constituted what 
must have been a humiliating experience for Fuerth at the May 7th and 9th Deputies meetings. 
The demarche, to Tudjman, could only have been effective had it been followed by concerted 
action, which was not the case. If anything, the decision to pair it with threats to Belgrade had 
the reverse effect. The backlash against Gore and Fuerth appears to have been motivated less 
by ideological opposition to his policy than by bureaucratic resentment at a power-play to seize 
control of US policy in the region, excluding the State Department, NSC, and the Pentagon. The 
lesson does not appear to have been lost on Gore. In the lead-up to ‘Flash’, Gore and his team 
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appear to have kept other Washington actors in the dark. Holbrooke “used” Galbraith’s 
presence at the January 11th Principals meeting to push the Gore-Tudjman summit in 
Copenhagen, unwittingly causing the Ambassador to ruin the Z-4 plan that he was in 
Washington to promote. While the evidence is inconclusive, the discussions surrounding the 
creation of UNCRO imply that Gore and Fuerth led Washington to believe that the mission of 
patrolling the Bosnian-Croatian border would be purely symbolic, only to spend the following 
month demanding its enforcement. How else could the State Department conclude as late as 
April 11th: ”What the border force actually does is less important, provided it at least puts more 
soldiers at checkpoints that UNPROFOR did?”810  Even Albright was ambushed by the Croatian 
demands.811 True or not, it then appeared that Gore and Fuerth approved Croatian military 
action without informing their colleagues, as there is no documentary evidence of any 
awareness at either the Principals or Deputies meetings of impending Croatian action. There is, 
however, evidence of Milošević’s awareness. On April 28th, US representative in Belgrade 
Rudolf Perina received a message, stating: “President Milošević wishes to have the government 
of the United States send to Belgrade Mr. Leon Fuerth, the Assistant to the Vice President for 
National Security Affairs and Congressman Bill Richardson of New Mexico to meet with him and 
discuss in private the current Balkan crisis and possible solutions to it”. Perina described the 
message as “interesting” and expressed surprised as he “assumed Milošević would shed light 
on the reasons for the request”, a clear implication that suspicion already existed regarding the 
Vice President’s actions in the region.812 Given this suspicion, it is easy to see how Gore and 
Holbrooke’s decision openly to flout the Deputies’ May 4th instructions by praising rather than 
reprimanding Tudjman in London caused patience to snap. It seems equally clear that the anger 
was not directed against Tudjman or even Gore’s policy, but against Gore and his team 
personally. They would learn their lesson. Whereas the lead-up to ‘Operation Flash’ appears to 
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have been conducted in a freelance capacity, the process whereby American officials would 
later approve ‘Operation Storm’ would be strictly by the book. Key decisions would be made 
collectively.  
One reason why whatever reprimand Gore received following ‘Flash’ did not extend to 
his policy was that, measured on the Clinton’s team’s terms, the Croatian action was a 
spectacular success. “The offensive “sent a very clear message that there was a new sheriff in 
town, and his name was Tudjman. He was going to take some names and clean things up”, 
commented former Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Niles.813 Tudjman had gained not just 
territory from ‘Flash’ but had also successfully auditioned for the role that the interventionist 
policy-makers had been seeking in vain. The greatest obstacle to the previous proposal for 
intervention, from arms, to training, to air support, was the lack of an obvious party to back 
this. Now Tudjman had demonstrated that, at no cost in terms of Western lives, he could 
deliver results on the ground. Having faced “virtually no Serbian military resistance and no 
response either from Mladić and the Bosnian Serbs or from Milošević”, Galbraith thought “at 
that point the Croatians understood that they could take the Krajina”.814 BTF Director Schindler 
echoed those thoughts on May 8th, predicting “The Sector West operation has made all-out war 
between Knin and Zagreb a virtual certainty, although not necessarily in the immediate 
future”.815 So why did Tudjman wait? 
The answer was probably the risk of Yugoslav intervention in Sector East. If Tudjman’s 
own fait accompli in Krajina was matched by Milošević’s own one in Vukovar, the international 
critics and US policy-makers, who would have been unable to enforce a reversal of Tudjman’s 
seizure of the Krajina, might have accepted Milošević’s of Sector East. Such an exchange would 
have been seen as “resolving” the Croatian-Serbian conflict in a way that was seemingly fair to 
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Belgrade and the international community, and would be advocated as late as July 20th by 
Deputy National Security Adviser Sandy Berger.816 Tudjman could take the Krajina whenever he 
chose. Only Washington, or Milošević himself, could deliver Sector East to the Croatian 
President. It was the Bosnian Serbs’ actions, strategically understandable but breathtaking in 
their blindness to public relations, which paved the way to, not partial, but total victory for 
Tudjman. 
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The Indian Summer of the Serbian Cause 
 
 
If the Krajina Serbs were facing inescapable doom, this was not apparent for the 
Serbian cause overall at the time. In Bosnia, where international attention soon returned after 
the brief distraction of ‘Operation Flash’, it was the Serbs who seemed to be on the move. “I 
think basically Mladić decided that the summer of ‘95 was when he had to win the war and the 
way he wanted to win the war was to clean up the enclaves, particularly those in the east, 
Srebrenica, Žepa , Goražde”, Galbraith reflected years later.817 If the West, which along with 
Russia had invested so much effort in the Z-4 plan and extending the UN mandate, had stood 
aside when the Croatians moved to settle a long-running political dispute on the battlefield, 
then it was only logical to assume that the international community might welcome a similar 
situation in Bosnia, especially given that it was the Bosnian government which had violated the 
nationwide cease-fire at the end of March with a general offensive, and the enclaves which had 
torpedoed various proposed settlements.818  
After the Bosnian Muslim forces abandoned the cease-fire, the Bosnian Serbs 
responded by seizing heavy weapons which they had agreed to place under UN control around 
Sarajevo and resumed shelling the city along with Bosnian army positions.819 In response, the 
UN approved NATO air strikes on an ammunition dump near the Bosnian Serb capital of Pale on 
May 25th and 26th.820 In retaliation, Bosnian Serb forces seized 377 UN peacekeepers including 
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French personnel, forcing the bombing campaign to stop and a humiliating crisis as Western 
governments were forced to bargain with Milošević their personnel’s release.821 By taking 
French hostages, the Serbs provoked the newly-elected French President Jacques Chirac’s 
wrath, who ordered French forces to seize a bridge from Bosnian Serb forces outside Sarajevo, 
taking several POWs of their own.822 France now became an advocate for a more forceful role 
in asserting the “international community”’s authority against the Serbs and a move away from 
UNPROFOR’s focus on defensive peacekeeping.823 UNPROFOR would be withdrawn from “Safe 
Areas” where they were potential “hostages” to Serb forces, not to mention obstacles to a 
more aggressive bombing campaign, and be concentrated in a mobile “Rapid Reaction Force”, 
able to take the offensive against Serb forces as the French had on May 27th.824 That this 
implied an abandonment of responsibility for areas like Srebrenica was something that would 
become evident later.825 
The French policy threatened to usurp America’s leadership role in Europe. Since 
taking office, the Clinton Administration had based its policy of “lift and strike” on the premise 
that a combination of arms supplies to the Bosnian Muslim forces and air strikes on Bosnian 
Serb targets would suffice to coerce the Serbs on the battlefield without the need either for 
ground troops or a compromise settlement with the Serbs. Within a period of slightly over a 
month, the Serbs and French had combined to reveal the US policy premises as illusory in 
nature. Years of arms supplies had not enabled the Muslims to hold their own on the 
battlefield; on the contrary, a year after the Washington agreement, they were closer to defeat 
than ever. The taking of hostages had neutralised the air strikes’ effectiveness precisely as 
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Europeans had warned Secretary Christopher would happen during his 1993 trip. Moreover, 
the French had demonstrated that the use of ground troops could work and, with French 
proposals for a Rapid Reaction Force, the Clinton Administration faced the prospect of either 
being dragged into the deployment of American ground troops or having their purported 
hawkishness revealed as a cowardly façade by Paris. 
With Chiraq scheduled to visit Washington on June 14th, Clinton officials scrambled, 
not to build support for the French idea of a Rapid Reaction Force, but to find excuses to 
oppose it. At a June 13th meeting, the Deputies “expressed concern that the Rapid Reaction 
Force would not lead to the more robust UNPROFOR originally anticipated, but still would cost 
some $300 million”, and “agreed to tell Chirac that the Administration generally views the RRF 
favourably, but as a democracy it is essential for prior Congressional consultations before 
making a commitment”.826 The following day, the Principals “preferred to explore ways to delay 
the US response on the UN resolution, perhaps by telling the French that generally the US 
approves of the initiative and wants to vote for it, but needs time to get Congress on board”, 
while at the same time “the group agreed to inform Congress that the Administration is 
exploring ways to reduce its share of the funding”.827 Chiraq called this bluff by taking his case 
to the American Congress and public. "The quicker we can do this, the quicker the Serbs will 
realize that they cannot get away with murder”, he told journalists, adding "It is up to the U.S. 
Congress to give the green light to this initiative.”828  The French President also met with the 
new Republican leaders of both houses of Congress, House Speaker Newt Gingrich and Senate 
Majority Leader Bob Dole. While both had a long reputation for being anti-Serb, in Dole’s case 
dating back to the fights over Kosovar autonomy in the 1980s, neither could easily sell the 
prospect of spending more money on the UN to their caucuses, that had been elected on 
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opposition to government spending and international commitments. Unilaterally lifting the 
arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims, cost Congress nothing in terms of fiscal appropriations, 
and left the political and diplomatic costs of enforcement in the hated Clinton Administration’s 
hands. On July 1st, before the full implications of Srebrenica’s fall had reached the press, the 
Senate rejected a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo on a tied 50-50 vote.829  
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The Man and the Hour have met: Operation Storm and the Art of 
Indispensability 
  
 
At the Deputies meeting on June 19th, Leon Fuerth presented a request from Bosnian 
Prime Minister Harris Silajdžić for American air support for a new offensive that the Muslims 
were planning near Sarajevo. Fuerth argued that the recent decline in fighting was probably 
“because the Bosnians are consolidating their gains to date and prepositioning for the major 
offensive”, and that the Serbs were on the verge of defeat.830 Unconvinced, the Deputies 
rejected this request, informing the Muslims that, in the event of failure, they would “be on 
their own”.831 The following day, Fuerth “asked several CIA analysts to come down to his office 
for a brainStorming session on Bosnia”. According to the minutes, “he feels the fighting in 
Bosnia could open prospects for a negotiated settlement”. Revealingly, “he asked us[analysts] 
to keep our meeting with him confidential and not to tell others, probably State, that he was 
asking these questions”, implying that the Vice President’s office may have been once again 
freelancing.832 Fuerth may genuinely have believed in Muslim military prospects, or may have 
been trying to recover the influence lost in ‘Operation Flash’’s aftermath.  His freelancing would 
have tragic consequences for the Srebrenica’s residents, as it meant that Washington neither 
discouraged the Bosnian offensives, nor took steps to deter retaliatory Serb moves against the 
Eastern enclaves. Emboldened by the UNPROFOR “hostage” conflict, and having used the 
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momentum to fend off Bosnian Serb President Karadžić’s efforts to reign him in, Mladić moved 
to eliminate the Srebrenica enclave.833  
The enclave’s fall need not have proved disastrous, nor been considered a tragedy. The 
CIA’s history of the conflict describes “Nasir Orić’s [Muslim commander of Srebrenica] 
Srebrenica” as “a Hobbesian world of black-marketers and gun-toting quasi military 
commanders”, where “for the vast majority of the populace, life was miserable indeed”.834 The 
CIA concluded that Srebrenica was militarily indefensible, economically unsustainable and, if 
anything, “a political liability” for the Bosnian government, while for the “UN, the safe areas 
had become embarrassments that it could neither properly defend nor justifiably abandon”. 
835For reasons which remain controversial, however, Srebrenica’s fall was followed by a 
widespread massacre of men and boys, the first rumours of which reached Washington in mid-
July.836 Whatever military or diplomatic significance the enclave had held was quickly 
overwhelmed by these rumours’ impact on domestic American and international opinion. 
Srebrenica quickly became a household name, and the words “never again”, whether or not 
they could fairly be applied to the events that took place on the Drina that summer, became a 
byword for Clinton Administration policy. For its own electoral prospects, the Clinton 
Administration could not seen ever to allow Srebrenica to happen again.837 
The harder line reflected the President’s frustrations who, in July, informed Lake’s staff 
“We should bust our ass to get a settlement within the next few months…We’ve got to exhaust 
every alternative, roll every die, take risks…We must commit to a unified Bosnia. And if we can’t 
get that at the bargaining table, we have to help the Bosnians on the battlefield”.838 In response 
to the French initiatives, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake had already proposed a 
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general review of US policy in Bosnia, which would culminate on July 20th with the “Endgame 
Strategy”.839 Despite the mythology that has grown up around it, the new strategy was heavy 
on wishful thinking but light on practical ideas.840 The NSC’s  July 25th discussion paper on the 
plan merely listed American objectives,  called for greater assertiveness and coordination with 
the allies, and increased “pressure” on the Bosnian Serbs and Muslims for a settlement. 841 
By July 1995, there were only two places from which “pressure” could come: either 
directly from the US in the form of participation in the sort of Rapid Reaction Force proposed by 
France, or from Croatia. With the Administration still determined to avoid direct involvement, 
Croatia was the only option. As early as May, Washington’s concerns in Croatia had shifted 
from support for any sort of peace process with Knin to fears of the Croats cutting their own 
deal with the Serbs at Muslim expense. After cabling Washington about a proposed meeting 
between Tudjman and Milošević on May 21st, Galbraith was instructed to inform Tudjman that 
while “the US commitment to Croatian reintegration remains as strong as ever…support for the 
Bosnian Federation and respect for the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Hercegovina are the 
centerpiece of US policy in the Balkans”.842 While there was a chance of Muslim military 
success, American policy-makers did not want a pretext being created for Belgrade to intervene 
in Bosnia, which they feared an attack on Knin might entail. On June 14th, the “Principals 
"agreed that a strong message should be sent to Zagreb and the Croatian Ambassador to the 
UN urging the ‘Croatians to exercise restraint in their ongoing offensive operations near Knin 
lest they provoke another major clash with the Krajina Serbs”.843 Schindler’s briefing to Deutch 
included a warning about the possibility of the war expanding to Croatia: “Undoubtedly you 
have noticed that some of the Principals and Deputies continue to focus on either the war in 
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Bosnia or in Croatia without considering the linkages between the two”.844 This reference was 
probably to the majority at the June 14th meeting, who seemed merely grateful that they had 
not been forced to confront a Knin-Zagreb conflict when dealing with a series of “crises” in 
Bosnia. The problem, as Schindler noted, was that this was a mistake, and one which was not 
shared by all. Gore and Fuerth had already turned once to Zagreb to provide a “military” 
solution to a political impasse in Bosnia (the enforcement of sanctions on the Bosnian Serbs). 
Once Fuerth’s bid to use the Bosnian Muslims to provide military muscle in June had failed, it 
was only logical that he, and the circle around the Vice President, would turn to Tudjman once 
more. 
The Croatians also understood the linkage with the conflict in Bosnia, at least insofar 
as how it played out in Washington. As the prospect of having to take politically difficult choices 
mounted for the Clinton Administration through pressure from Congress to raise the arms 
embargo unilaterally and from France for the Rapid Reaction Force, the Administration was 
bound to become more desperate to reach a settlement. Even without knowledge of the 
development of the “Endgame” strategy, it was obvious that the only two ways for the Clinton 
Administration to reach such a settlement would be militarily or through diplomatic 
concessions. Fears in Zagreb began to rise that Croatia might be “sold out”, and that the US 
might agree to lift sanctions on Belgrade in exchange for a cease-fire in Bosnia without 
requiring a settlement of the Krajina. In June, Foreign Minister Granić wrote to President 
Clinton expressing concern over rumours that the US might agree to sanctions reduction on 
Belgrade without either Yugoslav recognition of Croatia within its borders, or a general 
settlement, and expressing worry over the Krajina and Bosnian Serbs’ moves towards the 
creation of a “United Serb Republic”.845 On June 8th, Strobe Talbot informed the Croats that the 
US would insist on Croatia’s recognition within its borders as a precondition for sanctions relief 
and would oppose any move towards unity between the Krajina Serbs and their Bosnian 
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compatriot. Granić also received a letter from Secretary of State Christopher, the contents of 
which remain classified.846  
Whatever reassurance Secretary Christopher’s letter contained, the Croats began 
working on their own “Endgame strategy”, in this case to resolve their outstanding differences 
with Knin before any general settlement were imposed by the international community.847  
General Janko Bobetko issued orders on June 26th to Croatian commanders including Ante 
Gotovina for an “Operation Oluja” or “Storm”, which they were to be prepared to undertake no 
later than July 15th. 848  Ostensibly, the pretext was Bihać, which was once more under threat 
and, years later, Mate Granić would maintain that Zagreb was fearful of another Srebrenica. 
This appears implausible. June 26th was well before any information about Srebrenica could 
have influenced the decision, nor did Tudjman think the Serbs would take Bihać itself, 
remarking at Bobetko’s retirement ceremony on July 17th that the Serbs were primarily 
interested in the Eastern enclaves. What concerned the Croatians was the strategic 
implications. The Croats believed that the Serbs’ goal was to neutralize the 5th Muslim corps in 
Bihać, thereby improving the Krajina’s ability to face a Croatian attack. If that presented a risk, 
they also felt that Bihać’s fall presented an opportunity to launch that attack on the Krajina, not 
on their own initiative, but at the Americans’ request. Hence their goal became somehow to 
use the threat to Bihać to generate a US request to intervene without any preconditions 
regarding the nature of such intervention.849  
Despite Bobetko having issued orders for “Storm” on June 26th, and Tudjman’s remarks 
on July 17th, it appears that, as late as July 20th the American officials were unaware of Croatia’s 
intended attack on Knin within the next fortnight. There is no mention at all of the prospect of 
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fighting in the Krajina, or potential Croatian action in the instructions that Assistant Secretary of 
State Peter Tarnoff drafted for Richard Holbrooke for the upcoming London Conference on July 
19th.850 On July 20th, the CIA concluded “Croatian President Tudjman believes there is almost no 
chance of restarting serious economic and political negotiations with Knin”, but did not expect 
the Croatians to attack before the autumn to take advantage of the harvest season.851 
Simultanously, Washington must have been aware of Croatia’s military preparations. It is 
conceivable that, while Washington was aware that the Croatians were preparing for an anti-
Knin offensive, its actual date was unknown as late as July 20th, perhaps because Tudjman 
himself had not uet decided upon a final timeline. His instructions had been for the Croatian 
Army to prepare for an attack on July 15th, but the actual attack came 18 days later. It is 
plausible that, with a different course of events over the following ten days, Tudjman might 
have delayed ‘Storm’ by weeks or even months, nor was it clear that all in Washington favoured 
action. Deputy National Security Adviser Sandy Berger circulated a memo on July 20th to the 
Principals in which he advocated that the US “broker a Belgrade-Zagreb deal whereby Milošević 
would abandon the Krajina (Sectors North and South) to Tudjman in return for a piece of Sector 
East and assurances regarding Bosnian Serb confederation with the FRY following a 
settlement”, while “strengthening UNCRO and providing increased economic assistance to 
Croatia to discourage Tudjman from launching a full-scale war in Krajina in the near term”.852 
Berger’s memo was ominous for both the Krajina Serbs and Tudjman, albeit in different ways. 
For the Krajina Serbs, it indicated that Washington had abandoned any hope for a future 
beyond reintegration on Tudjman’s terms, and now sought to trade them. Tudjman, however, 
cannot have welcomed any indications that America’s preferred reintegration method was a 
peaceful exchange that would cost Croatia Sector East. If the “peaceful” option included the 
loss of Sector East, then a military option was far more attractive. The Croats had already 
shown concern in June over US initiatives in Belgrade, and demanded reassurance that 
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Croatia’s international borders were not up for discussion.853 If Tudjman was encouraged to 
consider military action by his support in certain American quarters, other US officials’ efforts 
to reach an agreement with Milošević were an equally compelling reason to preempt any 
“trade” through unilateral action, even if Zagreb was unaware of how explicit Berger had been. 
On July 21st, Galbraith was summoned to Brioni for a meeting with President Tudjman, 
Defense Minister Sušak, and Turkish President Suleiman Demirel. Arguing that “the BiH 5th army 
corps estimated it could only last three more weeks under the current assault”, Sušak informed 
Galbraith that “President Tudjman had taken the decision to prevent the fall of the Bihać Safe 
area through direct military intervention”. At the meeting, Tudjman himself joked with Demirel 
that, like Knin, Bihać had once been a Croatian “capital”. 854 On July 22nd, Tudjman was joined in 
split by Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović, Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdžić and 
Federation President Krešimir Zubok, where Croatia concluded a formal mutual defence pact 
with Bosnia-Hercegovina, requiring Croatia to prevent attacks on Bosnian positions from within 
Croatian borders; i.e., the Krajina.855 Galbraith witnessed the agreement’s signing along with 
the German Ambassador, delaying his report to Washington for two days.856 On July 24th, 
Galbraith was received again by Deputy Foreign Minister Miomir  Žužulj, who warned him that 
“Croatia could not tolerate the fall of Bihać”, which was “even more important than Knin.857  
“War appears imminent”, Galbraith recorded on July 24th, but “unlike November 1994, we will 
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not tell the Croatians not to do it. Holbrooke bought my arguments and advanced them with 
the White House.”858  
July 24th was a significant day in Washington also. Denouncing opposition to the lifting 
of the arms embargo as an “elaborate exercise in buying time”, Senator Majority Leader Dole 
rejected pleas for delay from the White House to announce plans to bring legislation to the 
floor the following week, unilaterally ending American compliance with the arms embargo on 
Bosnia.859 Discussing the Croatian request on July 25th: 
 “Deputies noted that the Croatian government had notified Ambassador Galbraith of its 
intention to launch an attack into the Bihać sector during the early morning of July 25. 
They agreed that, given the deteriorating military situation in Bihać and the inability 
immediately to apply the London agreement to Bihać, it would be inappropriate to 
attempt to dissuade the Croatians from their plans”. 860 
The Americans felt the need to add what appears to have been a last ditch effort to 
dictate the Croatian intervention’s scope, determining “that the Croats should be warned 
against taking this opportunity to launch an attack against Knin, with the accompanying risk of a 
multifront campaign and possibly drawing Serbian Government forces into the conflict”.861 
According to Tudjman’s confidant, Hrvoje Šarinić, American officials dropped their objections to 
military action when assured that the Croatians were confident of success.862 Instead of urging 
the Croatians to desist, Christopher ordered US chief of mission in Belgrade Rudolf Perina to 
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inform Milošević that “In light of the Bosnian government request for Croatian government 
assistance to halt attacks against Bihać from Croatian territory, we do not dispute  Zagreb’s 
right to intervene militarily to protect the enclave”.863 This clearly indicated that, if a “wider 
war” broke out following a Croatian offensive and Serbia intervened, Washington would hold 
the Serbs rather than the Croats responsible. 
The last week of July 1995 saw the departure of Neitzke and US Military Attaché Lt. 
Col. Richard Herrick, both of whom left Zagreb on July 22nd 1995.864 While the former’s 
departure had been scheduled nearly a year in advance, the latter was a regular guest at 
General Gotovina’s headquarters and sufficiently familiar with the Croatian command structure 
to act as an expert witness at General Gotovina’s trial for Operation Storm.865 By this point, the 
evidence of America’s knowledge of the Croatian military preparations is overwhelming. 
Contrary to the MPRI mission’s conditions, “in the five days prior to the offensive, local press 
reported that Vuono and his men had at least ten meetings with Croat officers involved in the 
operation”, and it is hard to imagine that the former US Army Chief of Staff failed to keep 
Washington updated.866 Herrick, for one, treated Vuono almost as a replacement in his final 
reports. On July 28th, he informed the Pentagon that “Croatian analysts were surprised at the 
lack of depth of Serb defenses”, during operations around Bosanko Grahovo and Glamoč in 
Bosnia. In his final cable, Herrick praised the MPRI’s work but confessed to warning the 
Croatians “not to expect miracles”, a strange comment had Zagreb’s actions not appeared to 
need one.867 
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The Croatians had no desire for miracles at the end of July 1995. On the contrary, what 
they feared most was a diplomatic miracle which could deny them the pretext for ‘Operation 
Storm’. On July 30th, an agreement was reached between UN Representative Yasushi Akashi, 
Bernard Janvier of UNPROFOR, and the Knin leadership to withdraw the latter’s forces from 
Bihać in exchange for a cease-fire in the enclave.868 In response to the July 30th agreement, 
Tudjman declared “that the Croatian Serb proposal was not a satisfactory basis for 
negotiations”, demanding “serious negotiations about the return of Krajina; opening the Split-
Knin-Zagreb railway, and opening an oil pipeline from the Adriatic Sea that runs through 
Serbian-held territory”.869 In the unlikely event that Knin was inclined to accept these 
conditions, Tudjman also ruled out negotiations with Milan Martić due to his indictment by the 
ICYT.870  
Tudjman had cause for alarm. The agreement “saved” Bihać by removing any strategic 
value the area had for Croatia, and denied Zagreb a pretext for action against the Krajina. The 
cease-fire removed the Muslim 5th corps as a military factor, freeing up Serb forces to 
concentrate elsewhere and, with no threat to Bihać, there would be less urgency in Sarajevo 
and Washington regarding Croatian action. From a Croatian perspective, Bihać’s fall followed by 
a massacre on Srebrenica’s model would have been preferable, providing as it would political 
cover for ‘Storm’. A cease-fire in Bihać which required the Bosnian 5th Corps to cease offensive 
operations against the Serbs was potentially worse than the enclave’s fall. 
The question for Tudjman was whether Croatia could, rather than should, reject the 
July 30th agreement and proceed with ‘Storm’. Would the US still stand by Zagreb, or withdraw 
from the agreement as an excuse for delay? Already, Galbraith was showing signs of cold feet. 
Galbraith recorded in his diary on July 27th that Holbrooke “assessed my view as a reluctant 
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belief that Croatian entry into the war is better than a continuation of the status quo”. His 
championing, however, seemed to envision Croat ‘entry into war’ in the form of intervention in 
Bosnia, illustrated by the subsequent line that “if the UN won’t save Bihać, then it is better for 
the Croats to save it”.871 When it became clear that Knin was the target, the Ambassador 
recorded meeting Tudjman on July 29th “to press our point that Croatia should withhold military 
action”, which “represented a light change on our earlier position that any Croatian military 
action should be limited”.872 Tudjman and his inner circle did not need the US to tell them to 
attack the Krajina nor to help plan such an attack. Rather, they required indications that such 
moves would be viewed favourably by at least some key American figures, and that the US 
would not take any punitive action if Croatia launched an attack. 
The following day, July 31st, Miomir Žužulj met with Richard Holbrooke, Chris Hill, and 
Frasure in Washington, and received the indication Tudjman needed, along with a promise that 
the three would back Croatia in US policy circles.873 Equally importantly for Tudjman, they all 
but disavowed Galbraith. During the meeting, Žužulj was informed that the “request for 
restraint [came] largely due to request from Galbraith”.874 By clarifying that the requests for 
restraint were inserted at Galbraith’s instigation, Tudjman was all but instructed to ignore any 
requests for restraint by America’s Ambassador to Croatia. "We publicly said that we were 
concerned”, Holbrooke reminded Tudjman three weeks later, adding “However, privately, you 
knew what we wanted.”875  
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That evening, Tudjman and his generals, meeting at Tito’s old retreat at Brioni, decided 
to proceed with the attack, after which all pretence was dropped.876  A CIA briefing memo for 
the August 1st Principals meeting observed that “All indications are that the Croatians still plan 
to launch a major attack against Sectors North and South. While State has been inclined to 
accept Croatian assurances to Ambassador Galbraith that a strike would be limited to relieving 
pressure on Bihać, most other agencies accept our view--supported by intelligence--that the 
attack will be broader”. The CIA argued that there was more to fear from a failed, rather than a 
successful, Croatian attack: “If the Croatians get bogged down, Tudjman may be more inclined 
to cooperate with Milošević to secure a grand deal for Croatia and Bosnia at the expense of the 
Muslims”, whereas “If the Croatians do well, Zagreb might be more inclined to cooperate with 
the Muslims in an effort to weaken the Serbs and eventually regain Sector East”.877 Madeline 
Albright echoed these views in an August 3rd Memo, arguing that, without substantial military 
defeats, the Bosnian Serbs were unlikely ever to negotiate on the basis of the Contact Group 
map, perhaps forgetting that Knin lay within Croatia.878 
Galbraith was aware that a Croatian attack was imminent with implicit American 
support, but ignorant of exactly how explicit that support had become. On August 1st, he passed 
Akashi a note for the Krajina Prime Minister Milan Babić, requesting a meeting: “I said, ‘For 
Christ’s sake, Yasushi, there’s going to be a war in a couple of days, we’ve got to do 
something’”, he recalled.879 Akashi’s meeting with Krajina Serb President Milan Martić proved 
frustratingly unproductive. Martić subjected Akashi “to the expected histrionics throughout the 
meeting”, while, more worryingly, making demands of the Croats lest he (Martic) “escalate the 
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fighting”.880 Whether a delusion or a bluff disguised as bravado, Martić gave no impression of 
understanding that the Croatians merely needed the international community’s inaction to 
occupy Knin by force, whereas he needed their active support to deter a Croatian move. While 
concessions at this point may have been insufficient, as with the decision to reject the Z-4 plan, 
Martić again played into Tudjman’s hands, freeing the Croatian President from the onus of 
having to justify the rejection of a settlement. Babić, however, indicated that, while hostility 
prevented Galbraith from being welcome in Knin, he (Babić) would be willing to meet with 
Galbraith in Belgrade.881 Galbraith’s efforts for a last-minute settlement brought him into 
conflict with Holbrooke, who told the Ambassador “any mediation effort that I[he] undertook 
would not be helpful”, and “that I [he] shouldn’t go to Belgrade”. Holbrooke and Fraser, 
Galbraith recalled, “had agreed that Croatian military action could be a good thing and that if 
this decision which had been a hard pressed one to get through the deputies and the principals, 
if it were reversed, that the opportunity might be lost”.882 Galbraith was not entirely isolated in 
his efforts. Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights John Shattuck visited Zagreb on 
August 2nd, ostensibly to investigate reports of Bosnian Serb atrocities in Srebrenica and 
Žepa.883 At a joint press conference with Shattuck, Galbraith made a final plea that “negotiated 
settlement represents a—by far—better alternative to a war, that is going to involve many 
casualties, much destruction, and, which, even if it were successful in Krajina, would leave the 
problem of Eastern Slavonia unresolved.”884  
On August 2nd, Galbraith flew down to Belgrade to meet Babić at a near-empty US 
embassy. “We had a very good discussion and basically he accepted all of Tudjman’s conditions 
including to accept that there would be a political settlement on the basis of Krajina being 
within Croatia”, he recalled later. Babić agreed to make a public announcement supporting the 
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deal, but for it to work, Galbraith believed that he needed Milošević onboard. This proved a 
snag. Despite Babić having met with Milošević that morning to inform him what had happened 
during his meeting with Galbraith, the Serbian President had gone on holiday by that afternoon. 
According to Galbraith’s account, “Milošević wouldn’t see Perina and indeed he had refused to 
see Babić, which I think, was a pretty clear sign, well, was a clear sign that he had written off 
the Krajina Serbs, possibly further evidence of a deal with Tudjman”.885 At his trial, however, 
Milošević alleged that the Americans and French, whose Ambassador was also involved in the 
effort, made no further effort to follow this up, exclaiming “There's a saying in Serbia, Mr. 
Galbraith, and it says that a person requests something and prays to God not to get it”.886 
Milošević’s explanation here seems too pat by half, and misaligned with the instructions that 
Perina received from Tarnoff to request a meeting with Milošević “urgently”.887 Babić managed 
to reach him that morning and, by his own admission, MIlošević was aware of and endorsed the 
talks. He may not have been in Belgrade on the afternoon of August 3rd 1995, but there was no 
reason why not and every reason why he should have been had he been invested in the 
outcome. He had, after all, lobbied personally for the Vance-Owen plan in Pale two years 
previously. It is hard not to see his absence as deliberate. By the time Milošević finally received 
Perina, on August 4th, events had overtaken the demarche urging the Babić  plan’s 
endorsement. Instead, Milošević was warned to keep the Yugoslav Army out of an operation 
that was already in progress.888 
Milošević’s motives remain shroued in controversy. By 1995, the Krajina had become a 
liability. It was evident from the way Croatian protests to the United States had foiled the 
prospect of sanctions relief for Belgrade that no agreement with the United States was possible 
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without satisfying Zagreb, and the United States was unwilling to push Tudjman to accept even 
the Z-4 terms drafted in-part by America’s own Ambassador. Milošević had either been unable 
to coerce the Krajina leadership into accepting even these, or unwilling to pay the political price 
to do so, and absent even greater concessions, the prospects for a negogiated settlement were 
zero. Without such a settlement between Knin and Zagreb, there could be no peace in Bosnia, a 
perquisite to ending sanctions on Belgrade. Furthermore, cooperation between the Bosnian 
Croats and Serbs against the Muslims would be important in any post-settlement Bosnia. All in 
all, Milošević needed Tudjman more than he needed Knin. Even if the Babic-Galbraith talks held 
out the prospect of a settlement it was just that, a prospect. As much as Tudjman, Milošević 
may well have preferred certainty in August of 1995.  That does not mean Milošević did not 
take steps to keep his options open. Montenegrin President Momir Bulatović recalled that, on 
August 4th, the Yugoslav High Command “sent a cable to General Mrkšić [commander of the 
Krajina Serb forces] encouraging him to organize firm resistance for at least two more days. 
After that Yugoslavia would be able to help him with all possible assistance.”889 This does not 
indicate any commitment to “rescuing” the Krajina Serbs. It may instead be a sign of 
opportunism. If the Croatian offensive dragged on for several days or a week, there would be 
nothing militarily and very little diplomatically to prevent Milošević from seizing Eastern 
Slavonia. Tudjman would lack the forces to resist, and the international community would 
struggle to force a Yugoslav withdrawal from Sector East without requiring a similar withdrawal 
by Croat forces. As that would be unlikely, the result would either be the Serbian acquisition of 
Sector East, or the ability to trade it for something else at the peace table, most likely in Bosnia. 
Galbraith found little more support in Washington than he had in Belgrade. When he 
warned Peter Tarnoff “that the war in Croatia would be a terrible tragedy, that it would lead to 
the departure of 100,000 Serbs”, Galbraith onlg gained permission inform Tudjman that while  
“Knin’s intentions must be measured by actions not words”, if “the Krajina Serbs follow up the 
Babić announcement with actions, we believe that these points when implemented, would 
 
889 Momir Bulatović, Pravila ćutanja: istiniti politički triler sa poznatim završetkom (Belgrade: Narodna knjiga Alfa, 
2004, pp.181-82) 
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meet all your key concerns”.890 In his diary, Gailbraith complained that the demarche “seemed 
to indicate we were only going through the motions” and “could only be understood as a green 
light”. Galbraith concluded that “the people in the Krajina should not be punished to this extent 
for their bad leaders”.891  
This did not indicate that the negogiations were a farce on Galbraith’s part. The 
negotiations with Babić were not announced as having broken down, which is what Galbraith 
would have done had he wished to ensure both a pretext for a Croatian attack and an alibi for 
American support. Galbraith did everything possible to indicate that they had been successful, 
not only advising Babić to speak publicly but also informing the press himself "There is no cause 
for war now”.892 The US needed to tell Tudjman this, however, and failed to do so. Galbraith’s 
actions indicate that he was already aware of the US government’s decision that the Croatians’ 
failure to launch ‘Storm’ was worse than what Galbraith had told them “would be a terrible 
human tragedy involving thousands of dead, and a 100,000 refugees…produce an ethnically 
pure Croatia, and undermine the hope for multi ethnicity in the Balkans”.893 If Galbraith did 
everything possible to shame his superiors and Tudjman out of that choice in the final hours 
before ‘Storm’, he had spent most of the preceding two years making it possible for Tudjman to 
ignore his pleas.  
By the time of Galbraith’s meeting with Babić, other governments had concluded that 
any efforts to prevent Croatian action were futile. The British Embassy in Zagreb advised 
London, on August 3rd, that “A Croatian attack on the Krajina now appears imminent. We have 
done what we can to dissuade the Croatian government from taking such action, including two 
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demarches. We must now consider how to respond to such an attack”.894 The Germans did not 
even go that far. "We are not in a position to prevent the Croats from doing what they consider 
to be correct and necessary”, German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel told reporters in Bonn.895 
Such remarks added a sense of inevitable anticlimax when Kinkel’s representative on the spot, 
German Ambassador Horst Weissel was summoned along with Galbraith by Hrvoje ŠŠarinić at 
10.00pm on August 3rd.  Šarinić informed the diplomats that “the GOC would  initiate police and 
military action against the Krajina on August 4th”, declaring that Croatia “did not consider Babić 
to be able to take the decisions that he had announced”, and that “it was his[Šarinić] 
government’s judgement that the Krajina could not be reintegrated by any other means”.896 
The Ambassadors were also handed letters from President Tudjman to President Clinton and 
Chancellor Kohl, outlining the justifications for the Croatian action.897 Weisel remarked that “it 
was sad to see a decision for war at a time when the Krajina Serbs had been forced to 
concede”, with Galbraith declaring that “many Croatians would die for something the Croatian 
people could have received without fighting”, and warning “that the GOC had likely ensured 
that it would never recover Sector East”.898 “I tried to point out that the Serbs were Croatian 
people as well, were Croatian citizens as well, but obviously I made no headway”, the American 
Ambassador recalled.899  
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The Croatians had no reason to listen to Galbraith’s objections, as he no longer spoke 
for Washington regarding the offensive. President Clinton would state bluntly in his memoirs 
that ““I was rooting for the Croatians…[I knew] that diplomacy could not succeed until the 
Serbs sustained some serious losses on the ground”.900 Secretary Christopher echoed such 
thoughts in his usual understated way, remarking that “In hindsight, one can see that there 
were some useful results accomplished by these offensives in the Krajina”, and by Secretary of 
Defense Perry, who felt that, after ‘Storm’, “it must have been evidently clear to the [Serbs]—
with the threat of bombing being real now and with the loss to the Croats on the ground—that 
they had already passed their high-water mark and were better off by making peace”.901 While 
British officials were concerned “that events in the Krajina have reduced the prospects for 
progress in the political process, and made intensified fighting in Bosnia more likely”, American 
officials, both present and retired, celebrated the Croatian success as a step towards peace.902 
Former Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Niles, who had overseen Yugoslav policy under the 
Bush Administration saw Storm, ironically, as a vindication of the decision not to intervene 
directly, and implicitly of that to arm Croatia. “General Powell was right: you have to have 
ground forces. The difference between 1992 and 1995 was that in 1992 the only ground forces 
available would have been from the United States. In 1995, the Croatians did it”, reflected 
Niles.903 Warren Zimmerman, now a private citizen, observed in the New York Review of Books 
how the situation had changed: 
 “The lightning Croatian victory in the Krajina region of Croatia has changed the face but 
not necessarily the essence of the war in the Balkans. By force of arms, as impressive as 
it was illegal, the Croats have accomplished what years of negotiation could never have 
achieved for them—they have recovered the gateway to the Dalmatian coast, with its 
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lucrative tourist industry, without having to give political autonomy to the Krajina’s 
Serbian population”.904  
The question now was Washington could regain the initiative from Zagreb. 
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From Tudjman’s Storm to Dayton 
 
 The success of Operation Storm marked the beginning of America’s real 
“Endgame” strategy in Yugoslavia. In eliminating the Krajina, Operation Storm eliminated 
something more important than a Serb presence in Croatia, as it eliminated an obstacle that 
would have to be overcome for there to be any settlement in the region. Zagreb would reject 
any agreement which did not return the Krajina to its control and, without an agreement in 
Bosnia, Milošević could not escape international sanctions.  Storm was a brutal method of 
eliminating the obstacle posed by Knin, but was also a method which was convenient for all 
parties. It is unclear if Milošević could have secured Knin’s agreement to return to Croatian rule 
under the Z-4 conditions, far less the terms Tudjman was likely to offer realistically, and Storm 
saved the Serbian leader the trouble of trying. Washington, when faced with the choice of 
prioritising a settlement in Croatia or the Bosnian Serbs’ isolation, had chosen the latter when it 
encouraged Tudjman to undertake Operation Flash. Every party except the Knin leadership had 
accepted that the Krajina would return to Zagreb’s rule on Tudjman’s terms ultimately. 
Operation Storm merely established that end-state practically overnight.  
Most importantly, Operation Storm set a precedent for how military force could be 
used on a wider scale to accomplish what diplomacy had failed to do. Previous efforts at 
negotiated settlements in the region had generally failed not because the parties (with the 
exception of the Muslims) disagreed on the proposed agreement’s principles, but because it 
was almost impossible for the parties to sign away at the conference table territory that they 
physically controlled on the ground. By contrast, cease-fires which guaranteed existing 
territorial control had often proved far more successful. The model presented by Operation 
Storm thereby provided a precedent whereby military force, in this case Croatian, could be 
used to establish a territorial settlement initially, after which the diplomats would merely ratify 
it. The final agreement would require few concessions, as the contested territory would, by and 
large, already be under the control of the party for whom it was intended and, if not, additional 
territory would be available for an exchange. By demonstrating that territory could be removed 
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from Serbian control by force, albeit Croatian force, in Washington’s view, this paved the way 
for Serbian acceptance of a settlement on the lines of Vance-Owen. Gore had spoken with both 
Tudjman and Izetbegović following Storm.905 According to the then President of the Croatian 
Parliament Nedjeljko Mihanović, “Vice-president Gore expressed in most unequivocal fashion 
his praise and appreciation, what Storm meant for the international community and the 
unsuccessful, impotent UNPROFOR efforts to protect Bihac and its 'pink zones,' thus greatly 
contributing to the realization of the American peace initiative on the territory of former 
Yugoslavia”.906 This settlement, which would  be ratified at Dayton, would already exist on the 
ground by the time the Balkan leaders gathered in Ohio. Dayton would merely enshrine the 
existing cease-fire and implement systems for its maintenance. The actual agreement would 
already have been established on the ground by the Croatian army, and this segment of the 
Thesis will illustrate why, for the purposes of the US-Croatian relationship, Dayton itself was 
ultimately a post-script. It was the process that led up to it that matters. 
The American peace initiative was envisioned as a process, involving diplomacy and 
force, designed to end with a settlement. The actual shape of that settlement would depend on 
events. While committed to the principle of the 51%-49% division contained within the Contact 
Group Plan, American officials were not committed to the “Contact Group Map” or any specific 
map for that matter. The primary American goal would be to construct and maintain a 
“process”. In practice that meant a situation in which the Bosnian Serbs remained under 
military pressure, the Croats remained engaged in Bosnia but would not threaten Sector East, 
and sanctions would remain imposed on Belgrade until a settlement was reached. The 
“process”-based approach allowed US officials to embark on their policy almost immediately 
without the need to reach consensus among themselves on all points, far less with the actors 
themselves. For instance, an agreed position on sanctions was not reached in Washington until 
September 5th, when the “Principals agreed that we would not provide any further sanctions 
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relief for the FRY in return for interim steps such as mutual recognition”.907 By that point, US 
policy had been active for over a month. 
Another element separated this American effort from its predecessors. While 
American policy towards the Croat-Muslim war, the Federation Agreement, and various 
embargo-busting arms flows had presumed the commonality of Sarajevo and Zagreb’s military 
interests, Washington now recognised that, when it came to a political settlement, it was the 
Muslims who were out on a limb. By contrast, neither the Croats nor Serbs had any interest in a 
unitary Muslim-dominated Bosnia, and both shared Washington’s desire for a quick settlement. 
On August 5th 1995, as Croatian forces entered Knin, the US Charge in Belgrade Rudolf Perina 
was summoned by Yugoslav Foreign Minister Jovanović to receive a demarche. Jovanović 
refrained from threatening to occupy Sector East or demanding a Croatian withdrawal, merely 
complaining that the attack represented a double standard, and implying that compensation 
would be the loosening of sanctions on Belgrade.908 Describing Operation Storm as “shock 
therapy”, Perina argued, in a cable that he sent to Washington after the meeting, “At this key 
moment we have an obligation to do whatever we can to show the Serbs the right direction to 
take, both for their sake’s and everyone else’s”.909   Also on August 5th, a “visibly exuberant” 
Granić informed Galbraith that Croatian forces, now crossing into Bosnia, were “creating 
conditions for a peace agreement without a single American soldier on the ground”, and that 
“new realities in Bosnia could mean an end to the war by fall”.910  
The Bosnian Muslims defined peace differently. On August 15th, the Muslim Vice 
President Ejup Ganić delivered a sermon to the US Ambassador to Austria in which he argued 
that, of the 1.4 million Serbs who had lived in Bosnia in 1991, 200,000 lived under the Sarajevo 
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government’s control, while 700,000 had fled, leaving a mere 500,000 under  Karadžić’s rule, 
who should not be treated as Bosnia’s Serbs’ legitimate representative in any negotiations.911 
Ganić’s insistence that Karadžić be denied recognition as Bosnia’s Serbs’ representative would 
have killed any prospect for a near term settlement, and perhaps prolonged the war for years. 
Washington would have been denied the settlement it now needed, Milošević his promised 
sanction relief, and any prospect of implementing such a plan would have relied on the Croats 
using their military for an objective that they opposed -- a unitary Bosnia under Muslim rule. 
Muslim intransigence was hardly a new feature; what was new was a US decision to prioritise 
the securing of Belgrade and Zagreb’s support for the peace initiative. 
On August 9th, as Galbraith was dealing with Operation Storm’s humanitarian fallout in 
the Krajina, Anthony Lake set out on a tour of European capitals to explain the new US policy. 
Unlike Christopher’s proposal offered to Europeans during  his trip in 1993, which even the ex-
Secretary now conceded “was not consistent with global leadership”, Lake described his offer 
as “part invitation, part ultimatum”.912 On the same day, Washington instructed the Belgrade 
Embassy to deliver a démarche to Milošević urging him to show restraint especially with 
regards to Sector East, and promising that the US would launch a new peace initiative within 
the ensuing few weeks. A promise was made to send a high-level team to Belgrade to brief 
Milošević in person.913  To sweeten the deal for the Serbs, the US decided to commit to keeping 
Kosovo off the table at any future conference. “If the discussion turns to Kosovo--there is 
concern downtown that Belgrade's efforts to resettle Krajina Serb refugees there will heighten 
ethnic tensions”, BTF Chair Schindler wrote to the CIA Director before the August 18th Principals 
meeting, warning that the perception of “heightened international concern” might lead 
Albanian activists to create “trouble” in a bid to attract “international attention”.914 Richard 
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Holbrooke’s position “was that one had to resolve Bosnia first, that if the two issues [Kosovo 
and Bosnia] became intertwined they would create a Gordian knot much more difficult to 
untangle”, recalled US representative in Belgrade Rudolf Perina.915  
As for Croatia, the US was prepared to pretend that the Krajina had never existed.  Any 
perception that the US had played a role in Operation Storm could serve to justify Serbian 
demands for compensation from Washington, and therefore it became imperative to insist that 
the US had played no part in “Croatia’s recent military offensive,” which was “not endorsed by 
any of us”, according to talking points issued on August 8th 1995.916 Washington was 
determined to keep American officials as far away from the Krajina as possible, even if both 
sides requested their presence. Galbraith recalls a particularly galling example: “There were 
about 40,000 people that were trapped around Topusko by the Croatian forces. Topusko being 
a town in the northern part of the Krajina and Šušak, the Croatian defense minister, asked if I 
would help arrange a cease fire that would enable these people to, it was military forces and 
civilians that would enable these people to be evacuated. Washington didn’t want any U.S. role 
in any of this and they didn’t want any help, didn’t want me to help on arranging the cease fire 
either”.917 In his diary, Galbraith described the deputies’ attitude as “obscene”, and expressed 
his unhappiness to Frasure when the latter called him on the 7th in “something of an apology 
for my treatment over the past few days”.918 Nonetheless, the Ambassador would be relegated 
to the status of the often-sullen chaperone to Holbrooke and other senior officials who came to 
meet with Tudjman. During a meeting between Holbrooke, Frasure, and Tudjman on August 
16th, after the Croatian President expressed his view that Bosnia lacked a future and faced 
inevitable partition, Galbraith passed a note to Frasure stating “here is your fundamental 
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reshuffle of the deck,” and pressed for human rights abuses to be brought up. Holbrooke, 
however, promptly instructed the Ambassador “not here, not yet”.919 Holbrooke, at the same 
meeting, conceded to Tudjman that the Z-4 plan was now “in the past”. According to the 
Croatian notes on a meeting on August 18th, Holbrooke reminded Tudjman of the time when 
“the issue of Knin and of sectors North and South emerged. Peter was preoccupied with that 
conversation with Babić about the plan Z-4, there was a lot of confusion...You went ahead. 
From a political and a military point of view, that was a triumph. Refugees are the only 
problem”.920  
While Holbrooke and Frasure took the secret of what they actually believed about 
whether or not Storm qualified as ethnic cleansing to the grave, the exchanges on the 16th and 
18th of August, 1995, provide a hint into the source of their dispute with Carl Bildt on this 
point.921 For Bildt, writing his memoirs, it was a live issue, for which “he Tribunal has so far not 
considered anyone responsible for the massive and brutal ethnic cleansing of the Krajinas in 
August 1995.”922 For Holbrooke, however, it was by the 18th of August, 1995, already a dead 
issue. The Krajina was gone, and no one, not the United States, not Croatia, not even Milošević, 
had any wish to bring it back. The plight of refugees  was “the only problem,” and then a 
problem not in the sense that something needed to be done to ameliorate their plight because 
it was bad, but because it might pose a problem for the issues Holbrooke thought mattered in 
mid-August of 1995.923 
Holbrooke displayed recognition of Croatia’s pivotal position for any prospective 
Bosnian settlement. The Bosnian Muslims could not continue the war without Zagreb’s support. 
By providing military support to Sarajevo, Zagreb could enable the Muslims to obstruct 
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Washington and Belgrade’s efforts to reach a settlement. By cutting off that aid, Zagreb could 
force the Muslims to the table more effectively than Washington by making it impossible for 
Izetbegović to continue the war. Tudjman was happy to deliver Muslim agreement to a 
settlement in Bosnia that he desired in any case, but only at a price: first, that no action was 
taken regarding “Storm”’s humanitarian aftermath;  second, that Sector East’s future would be 
settled before any peace conference on the basis of its unconditional return to Croatia without 
the prospect of a referendum which, as we shall see, some members of the US government 
favored; and, third, that whatever settlement occurred in Bosnia would leave both the Bosnian 
Muslims and Serbs too weak to pose a threat to the Bosnian Croats. 
Sector East resembled the Krajina in many respects. Internationally-recognised as part 
of Croatia, it was hard to envision a settlement where it did not return to Croatian rule. In late 
1995, however, it was under Serbian rule and, unlike the Krajina, it directly bordered Serbia. 
The Croatian military conquest of the Krajina had saved Belgrade the political cost of 
acquiescing to its return to Croat control. It would be far harder for Belgrade to justify similar 
inaction in the case of Sector East where a Serbian military response was clearly logistically 
possible.Tudjman’s solution was to threaten to start a war he probably did not want and was 
unlikely to win, knowing that it would risk sinking US regional policy, in an effort to show that 
anything short of Sector East’s unconditional return would lead to continued war. This sabre-
rattling succeeded in unnerving Washington.  Secretary of Defense Perry had offered to “call 
[Croat] Defmin Sušak (on) August 11th “to warn him of the dangers of military movements at 
this time, whether in Sector East, inland toward Montenegro from Dubrovnik, or around Banja 
Luka”.924  Three days later, the CIA warned that “The main worry we have right now is that 
Croatia will miscalculate, go too far, and inadvertently provoke Yugoslav intervention and 
broaden the war, worsened by uncertainty about the threshold that would cause Yugoslav 
Army intervention, which could lead to Croatian miscalculation”.925 On August 25th, the Croatia 
Desk Officer at State Chris Hoh wrote to Holbrooke advising him that either he or Chris Hill 
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should call Carl Vuono, so that the latter might inform Tudjman that “Croatia has pushed the 
Serbs close to the limit of what Milošević can tolerate for now without the VJ coming in. The 
current sabre-rattling, over Sector East may be necessary to preserve Croatia's negotiating 
position in upcoming talks, but if this explodes accidentally, there will be hell to pay in relations 
with Washington”.926 In addition to revealing former US General Carl Vuono’s continuing close 
links with American officials even as he ran MPRI, nominally a private firm, the memo also 
shows an awareness that Tudjman’s priority remained firmly Sector East, not Bosnia. Vuono 
was also informed that “the conduct of Operation Storm has damaged Croatia's standing in 
Washington. We were disappointed by the burning, looting, and atrocities confirmed by our 
people and credible international observers. The fact that the Serbs behave worse does not 
help. To repair the damage, Croatia must help the War Crimes Tribunal and others bring the 
perpetrators to justice”.927 US officials were sceptical that Milošević would ultimately attach 
much value to Sector East, which remained an “economic wasteland” except as a bargaining 
chip with Tudjman or the US.928 This would not stop Tudjman from using American fears that he 
might attack Sector East as a bargaining chip against the US. After Peter Galbraith informed 
Secretary of State Christopher on September 11th that “the GOC attitude and conduct towards 
the Krajina Serb refugees has been appalling”, Christopher protested the following day to 
Foreign Minister Granić in New York.929 According to Granić, “President Tudjman’s strong 
message was that there would be no peace without solving the Eastern Slavonia problem,” and 
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that while Croatia preferred to do so through negotiation, a recourse to force was not off the 
table”.930  
If American officials were forced to haggle with Belgrade and Croatia, they did not 
even bother to do so when it came to Bosnia where, given the lack of constructive Muslim 
participation, unilateral decisions were made in American policy circles.931  To sustain any 
settlement, the American policy-makers embraced the concept of “Arm and Train”, a program 
in which NATO would arm and train Bosnian-Croat federation forces to a level of “parity” with 
Bosnian Serb forces. America’s was “to ensure that there is a rough balance of power between 
the Federation and the Bosnian Serbs by the end of the one-year peace implementation 
period,” and “that the United States should take the lead in organizing the equip-and-train 
effort so that [it] can exercise control over the types of weapons provided to the Federation 
and limit the involvement of Iran and other radical states”.932 MPRI, which had worked in 
Croatia for a year before “Storm” would be granted the contract for the Federation forces.933 
 Debates about whether the US commitment to any settlement should involve a 
promise to protect Federation territory from Serb attack and, if so, whether this should involve 
ground troops or merely air cover divided policy-makers934  The military feared the prospect of 
defending the Eastern enclaves, Muslim-controlled areas along the Drina River surrounded by 
Serb territory, should be exchanged.  Srebrenica and Žepa’s fall in July 1995 reduced the 
enclaves issue to Goražde. The Department of Defense, which would have to enforce any 
agreement, wanted the Bosnians to trade Goražde for concessions elsewhere, while the 
Department of State argued that, after Srebrenica, the symbolic cost of ceding it would be too 
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high. At an August 22nd meeting, “Secretary Perry stated that Goražde could not be included in 
Bosnian territory - too expensive and difficult to defend. Holbrooke stated the issue had to be 
worked jointly with the Bosnians who had publicly stated they would insist on inclusion of 
Goražde”.935 The DOD felt that “the United States should help the Bosnians consolidate the 
territory they had, but not support any efforts to recover lost territory”, while Madeline 
Albright and the National Security Council “supported the view that any initiative should seek to 
preserve Bosnia along lines broadly consistent with the Contact Group Plan—as a single state 
with roughly 51–49 percent territorial breakdown in favor of the Muslims. Anything less”, Lake 
wrote to the President, “would be tantamount to ratifying aggression and would, in any case, 
be rejected by the Muslims”.936 On September 4th, the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs 
reiterated their view that defending Goražde “will require a significant augmentation of the 
peace implementation force, not to mention a significant bolstering of federation forces to 
defend it once the implementation force leaves” and “they do not believe Goražde is worth this 
effort”.937  
Then, on August 19th 1995, the Armored Personnel Carrier carrying Bob Frasure, Joe 
Kruzel, and Nelson Drew went over a cliff outside Sarajevo, igniting its ammunition and killing 
all occupants.938 “In terms of staffing a new Bosnia team, it will be very difficult in the near-
term to replace the area expertise and creativity of Bob Frasure, Joe Kruzel, and Nelson Drew--
all of whom were regular BTF contacts”, the CIA directors briefing notes for the August 22nd 
Principals meeting noted, speculating that “Holbrooke may decide to carry on talks in the 
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region over the next few weeks largely by himself, accompanied by Chris Hill, who has served as 
Bob Frasure's key action officer on Bosnia.”939 
Holbrooke’s consolidation meant that the Balkan leaders would only deal with a single 
American voice, which would prove vital when it came to the settlement’s trickiest aspect from 
Washington’s perspective. That was ensuring that the war stopped at a moment that 
Washington felt was acceptable to itself and the Muslims, not merely when it was most 
convenient for Zagreb and/or Belgrade. It was a vital part of the American plan for the 
Croatians and Muslims to capture territory from the Serbs which could then be included in the 
Muslim-Croat Federation in a final settlement or traded for other territory that remained in 
Serbian hands. This would avoid the trap into which previous peace plans had fallen, in which 
the Serbs had been asked to make vast concessions of the territory they held. Yet, the US 
wanted a settlement, not Muslim victory, which would alienate the Serbs and Croats. Excessive 
success might tempt the Muslims into continuing the war to press for a total victory. Once 
NATO airstrikes against the Serbs began as part of Operation Deliberate Force at the end of 
August, the CIA feared the impression that the US was providing “air support” for the warring 
parties, warning that “if the first NATO airstrikes in Western Bosnia take place today as 
scheduled at the same time as a Croatian offensive, this will be interpreted by the Serbs as a 
coordinated attack, and the Croats may interpret it as a green light”.940  
More concerning, from Washington’s perspective, was the risk that the Muslims might 
interpret Operation Deliberate Force as a green light to reject any settlement in favor of 
pursuing total military victory.  The CIA briefing for the September 8th Deputies meeting warned 
that “the Bosnians have now received what they have tried to get for the last two years, 
Western airstrikes on their behalf. There are already signs that Sarajevo has hardened its 
positions over confederal issues and in no way is receptive to yielding Goražde . Without 
Goražde, it removes the key attraction for the Bosnian Serbs to accept the current package”.941 
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At the CIA’s urging, the Deputies, alarmed by the “Croatian offensive inland from the Dalmatian 
coast toward Jajce,” agreed “that démarches should be made to Croatian leaders to urge 
restraint, especially as there were signs that the Serbs perceived the Croatian offensive as 
occurring in concert with the ongoing NATO strikes”.942 In a memorandum for the President, 
Lake reported “We (along with the French and British) have sought to convince them [Serbs] to 
comply by pressing Izetbegović for clear assurances that Bosnian Government forces will not 
take advantage of the air campaign to gain ground around Sarajevo”, continuing, “with Mladić 
still obdurate, we may want to approach the Bosnian government again and call for concrete 
measures of restraint, such as a ‘no offensive action commitment’ in and around Sarajevo”.943 
Two weeks later, the CIA noted that “The Croatians seemed to have stopped their offensive in 
western Bosnia, but this seems to be as much as the failure of the offensive thus far as US 
demarches” and  warned that “the Bosnians are sniffing a victory and becoming increasingly 
disinclined to any concessions to bring peace”.944  On September 27th, the BTF argued that 
“recent Croat-Muslim military successes, while improving the perception of Bosnian leaders of 
their negotiating position, have made it more difficult for the Bosnians to unify behind one 
plan”.945 
Military success served to make the Muslims obstinate while simultaneously widening 
the divergence between their objectives and those of their Croat “allies”. On September 11th, 
the BTF observed that “in the near term, Croatia is focused on extending Bosnian Croat territory 
and its control in Bosnia, preventing the establishment of a strong Muslim-dominated Bosnian 
state, balancing and normalizing ties with Serbia, and achieving a peace agreement conducive 
to long-term stability”.946 Banja Luka’s military fate, the largest Serb-held city in Bosnia, which 
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looked poised to fall without external intervention, highlighted all of these concerns. On 
September 11th, the CIA  concluded that it did not “see Milošević intervening if Banja Luka 
appeared ready to fall. Should it go, however, the rest of western Bosnia becomes untenable 
and the northern corridor becomes irrelevant. A major refugee flow to Serbia could strengthen 
the hardline nationalists and complicate Milošević's lift, but we think he can still hold on”.947 
The question then was less whether the Croatians and Muslims could take the city but whether 
they wished to. They both gave every indication of doing so at the end of September, with the 
CIA reporting that “both V Corps Commander Dudaković  and the Croats have said that their 
forces would attack Banja Luka—similar to the race for Berlin?”948 The “race” for Banja Luka 
had one similarity with the “race for Berlin” insofar as only one of the participants was 
interested in taking the city. In 1945, the American leaders, concluding that the cost of 
capturing Berlin would be too high, forfeited the “race” to the Soviets. The difference in Bosnia 
was that, while its capture of the city would primarily benefit the Muslims  it was only the 
Croats who could take it and it was far from clear whether it would serve their interests to do 
so. The Croatians clearly felt no regret at eliminating any vestiges of Serb political autonomy 
within Croatia, the collapse of the Serb would pave the way for a unitary Bosnian state. As for 
the US, Washington wanted a stable settlement, which meant a government in Belgrade that 
was capable of enforcing a settlement. That required avoiding a massive refugee flow into 
Serbia, which would undermine Milošević or spark a fresh conflict in Kosovo. A report by the 
State Department’s Intelligence and Research division on the fate of the Krajina refugees, 
published on September 21st, noted that “despite Serbian government promises that these 
refugees would be evenly disbursed throughout Serbia's multiethnic state, Belgrade has settled 
more than half in the Vojvodina and Kosovo Provinces, a move that threatens to upset delicate 
ethnic balances and broaden ethnic conflict in the Balkans”.949 Croatia also had little to gain 
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from Milošević and Serbia’s destabilization, which would make it harder for Tudjman to 
normalise ties with Belgrade and secure recognition of his gains in the Krajina.  
Tudjman was ready to adopt an accommodating approach when Holbrooke arrived in 
Zagreb on September 17th, bearing instructions to urge the Croatian President to forgo the 
taking of Banja Luka.950 According to his diary, Galbraith dissented, arguing that encouraging 
the Croatians to seize the high ground around Banja Luka would place the city in a position 
“analogous to Sarajevo”, allowing for a trade to provide both cities with hinterland. In response, 
Holbrooke “angrily accuses me [Galbraith] of trying to micromanage the military operation, 
which I deny since I am just offering my assessment”. Holbrooke rapidly obtained Tudjman’s 
agreement not to take Banka Luka in exchange for assurances regarding Sector East’s future, 
leading Galbraith to remark “It is obvious Holbrooke knows little about the issue [Sector East] 
and has not read my cable explaining how far we have gotten”.951 Galbraith lamented that all 
this must have “made the Croatian leader feel as if he were co-directing US policy and without 
uttering a single threat, got what he wanted”.952 On September 20th, The Los Angeles Times 
reported that the Croatian offensive had been halted at America’s request.953  
Tudjman now needed to demonstrate that America’s desire for a stable settlement 
required arrangements for the return of Sector East to Croatia, and he needed to prove that 
anything else threatened resumed conflict. As he slowed his advance in Bosnia, Tudjman 
stepped up his sabre-rattling, managing to convince the CIA that “Croatian leaders are 
committed to reintegrating Sector East into Croatia this year and will proceed with military 
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force if the issue is not resolved to their satisfaction through negotiation”.954 The establishment 
of a cease-fire in Bosnia as a prelude to the Dayton talks forced Tudjman to step up these 
efforts, lest Washington or Sarajevo be tempted to offer some sort of compromise over Sector 
East as an inducement for Serb concessions in Bosnia. Croatia used the Bosnian cease-fire to 
ratchet up military preparations, with an October 16th briefing for the CIA Director arguing that 
“The Croats sense they have the leverage and may prefer war over peace because it allows 
them to cleanse Sector East of Serbs”.955 Perhaps embarrassed by missing the timing for both 
“Flash” and “Storm”, on October 19th, the CIA reported that “although the timing of the attack 
remains uncertain, it is clearly going to happen. Tudjman reportedly promised Holbrooke he 
wouldn't attack before  December 1st, but we could not rule out the Croatians ‘finding’ before 
then a pretext, some Serbian provocation that they simply cannot resist”.956  Warning that 
“past démarches to Croatia concerning Sectors West and then later Sectors North and South 
have not succeeded”, the agency argued, “those démarches did not carry the threat of 
sanctions as previous démarches had, the Croatians interpreted all sorts of green amber lights, 
missing the red lights intended to be sent”.957 “Tudjman and other Croatian leaders are 
increasingly prone to arrogant and authoritarian behavior, in both domestic and foreign policy, 
according to diplomatic and press reports”, the BTF complained on October 20th, while “Zagreb 
has done little or nothing to offer even minimal guarantees of rights to its Serb population and 
appears intent on creating a largely mono-ethnic state, according to US diplomats.”958 Tudjman 
could bear American frustration, as he had borne Zimmerman’s hostility during 1990-1992, 
provided that America understood that Tudjman was indispensable. US policy’s goal was a 
settlement in Bosnia, and that required Croatia’s cooperation. Ultimately, the questions of 
human rights in Croatia or how insolently Tudjman behaved over Sector East were irrelevant to 
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whether a settlement was acceptable to the US. The US had no objection to Croatian control of 
Sector East, but rather to a war fought over it. By threatening a war, Tudjman made Croatia’s 
willingness to accept Sector’s East’s “peaceful” return a concession. Before the Croatian 
President left for Dayton, he had already received Administration’s assurances for the return of 
Sector East to Croatian control after an 18-month  transition period under American 
administration.959  
As stressed in the Introduction it was impossible for this Thesis to allocate space to 
discussion on Dayton conference and its results for a number of reasons. Most importantly, the 
topic and the focus of this Thesis are the US – Croatian relations from the collapse of Yugoslavia 
to operation Storm and the evolution of US policy towards ex-Yugoslavia during this period. 
Also, the word limit imposed by Thesis regulations mandated strict adherence to focal themes 
of the Thesis. Furthermore, everything argued in this Thesis supports author’s firm conviction 
that Dayton Conference was only the concluding act of the reality created on the ground in 
Croatia and Bosnia with the Storm and in its immediate aftermath.  Notwithstanding above 
constraints, the author of this Thesis felt compelled to make at least limited and few in number 
references to the Dayton conference contextualized within the Thesis’ concluding observations. 
This Thesis concludes its narrative before Dayton precisely because from the perspective of 
Zagreb, Croatian diplomacy had already concluded its work prior to conference. This was true 
not only with regard to the future status of Sector East, which Tudjman was not willing to leave 
subject to discussion at Dayton and therefore vulnerable to whatever haggling might arise, but 
on the shape of the final settlement itself. Croatia’s objectives in the region had been to secure 
recognition of its independence within its Yugoslav-era borders not just in the form of 
diplomatic relations, but with universal acceptance that the status of anyone who lived within 
the territory claimed by Zagreb were a domestic Croatian concern, not subject to the consent of 
Washington, Belgrade or the United Nations. It was therefore not enough for Croatia to regain 
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control of Sector East, it was vital that all parties accepted that the question of Sector East was 
not subject to international discussion. Only when this principle was accepted did Croatia deign 
to attend Dayton conference. This was made possible because Croatia’s military power was 
vital for the framing and enforcing of the wider settlement in Bosnia that both Washington and 
Belgrade desired. The Dayton conference could only be held after a settlement that Zagreb and 
Belgrade could live with and which Washington was prepared to impose on the Muslims 
already existed on the ground, created firstly by the Croatian advance, and secondly by the 
cease-fire that the Muslims had no choice but to accept when the Croats threatened to 
advance no further. That Croatian arms determined the point beyond which the Muslims could 
not continue the conflict. Zagreb could set that line at a point well short of a unitary Muslim 
Bosnia. 
The Dayton conference largely ratified a situation which already existed on the ground. 
In Holbrooke’s words, Tudjman was its “king” insofar as he had created the situation on the 
ground which the Conference ratified. 960 Nonetheless, the conveying of the Conference and the 
agreement signed there by all parties  was important As the experience of the Bosnian Serbs 
had shown, territorial conquests were only valuable insofar as they could be legally ratified 
after the fact. Tudjman understood he needed legal ratification of his ownership of Sector East 
and the former Krajina. Unlike some of his regional counterparts, he was clever enough to gain 
that recognition before attending, when his vital military position provided him with the 
greatest leverage, rather than risking seeing his winnings bargained down in Ohio. Dayton is 
only of secondary  interest to our story, because by the fall of 1995 Tudjman had lost faith in 
international diplomatic processes, and had therefore taken deliberate steps to ensure that 
nothing important concerning Croatia’s interests could happen at Dayton before he allowed the 
conference to proceed.  
Tudjman was able to accomplish this objective because whatever its flaws, Dayton 
served American priorities in 1995 quite well. If concerned by the refugee flow, American 
officials were relieved that Knin’s fall removed the Krajina from the issues that needed to be 
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settled at any conference. American officials relied on Croatian intervention in Bosnia to 
achieve the 51%-49% division envisioned in the Contact Group map. Milošević and Clinton’s 
need for a settlement in Bosnia outweighed their concerns about either Sector East or a specific 
map. The Bosnian Muslims, as usual, did not want a settlement. This left Tudjman in a position 
to deliver Clinton and Milošević’s desired settlement, while extracting his price in the form of 
Sector East. By allowing his forces to advance in Bosnia, he occupied enough territory to shape 
the map that was ratified at Dayton. By halting his forces’ advance, he left the Muslims no 
choice but to accept a cease-fire and whatever map with which they were presented. Milošević 
had been ready to accept almost any terms that lifted sanctions. US policy-makers among 
themselves had then determined the enclaves’ fate and the Bosnian Federation’s future 
through “Train and Equip.” They enforced the final Bosnian map by allowing the Croats to 
advance and then asking them to halt at Banja Luka. The task at Dayton then was not to 
negotiate an agreement, but merely to secure Muslim adherence to one which was already 
largely formed.  
It is possible to perceive in Tudjman’s intransigence an effort to lock in the gains Croatia 
had already won, motivated by a fear that indispensability which had enabled those gains might 
come to an end with a genuine peace. Tudjman might have been “King of Dayton”, as 
Holbrooke remarked, but he was able to fulfill that role, as Holbrooke also noted, because 
America had used him to make Dayton possible. A map acceptable as a basis for Muslim 
agreement would have been impossible without the Croatian army, as would bringing the 
Muslims to the table., The Croatian Army had fulfilled the role that the US had assigned  it by its 
advance earlier in autumn 1995, and its final duty had been to cease its advance and not take 
Banja Luka. The greatest US preoccupation was not what Washington wanted the Croats to do, 
but what it did not want them to do; namely, use force against Sector East. Washington wanted 
Croats to do nothing more, especially in Bosnia. The American goal up to and including Dayton 
had been achieving a settlement in Bosnia and the wider region. Only with Croatian 
cooperation had that been possible. The Clinton Administration had cared more about having a 
settlement which could be sold as successfully ending the fighting in Yugoslavia domestically 
than what form that settlement took. Now those same domestic considerations made it a 
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priority for Washington to have Dayton Settlement produce a peace in Bosnia which could be 
sold as successful, with the importance reinforced by the presence of American troops. The 
idealistic metrics by which the American electorate were likely to judge success – refugee 
return, free elections, the construction of functional Bosnian national institutions – were very 
different from the metric by which Tudjman judged success in Bosnia. Namely the position of 
the Bosnian Croats. This divergence would lead to conflict between Tudjman and Washington’s 
interests in the years to come when Tudjman tried to protect the position the Bosnian Croats 
had held in 1995 from erosion. For the purpose of this Thesis, it establishes why the story of 
this phase of the US-Croatian relationship ends where it does, with Tudjman’s Storm, and the 
process by which it made a settlement possible. That was a culmination of the role that 
Tudjman sought to play from 1990 onwards, and the part envisioned for him by the US policy-
makers from 1993 until autumn of 1995. If the next phase of the relationship turned sour, it is 
not because Tudjman failed to fulfill the role envisioned for him by American policy makers 
during these years, but because they quite simply envisioned no further role for him. His role, 
as chronicled by this Thesis, was now done. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In December 2000, during an interview with Rolling Stone magazine, President Bill 
Clinton made an illuminating remark about his own role in Yugoslavia. “It took me two years to 
build a consensus among our allies for military action in Bosnia”, Clinton explained, adding 
“and, as you know, what happened there was, we did a few airstrikes and, all of a sudden, we 
were at Dayton holding peace talks.”961 The soon-to-be former President was unsure how the 
Balkan leaders had ended up at Dayton in autumn 1995, but was nevertheless certain that it 
must have been the result of US military action. The suggestion that all that was needed was a 
 
961 Wenner, Jann, S., “Bill Clinton: The Rolling Stone Interview” Rolling Stone December 28th 2000 Accessed 
October 29th 2019 https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-news/bill-clinton-the-rolling-stone-interview-2-
40256/ 
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few air strikes and “all of sudden” the combatants in a long-running conflict were talking peace 
implied that such actions might have proved equally effective in 1991 or 1993 as in 1995. It also 
insinuated that it was America’s European allies’ opposition and, implicitly, internal critics like 
General Colin Powell, who prevented Dayton from being accomplished sooner. While Clinton’s 
memoirs acknowledge Operation Storm’s role, Clinton felt “diplomacy would not succeed until 
the Serbs sustained some significant losses.”962 The conflict in Yugoslavia was not about its 
peoples, their claims, or their suffering, but the process of establishing a form of “peace” that 
was acceptable to the US. 
By summer 1995, a peace process ending in an agreement had become an end unto 
itself for the Clinton Administration. What separated Dayton from the earlier Vance-Owen and 
Owen-Stoltenberg efforts was not the shuttle diplomacy, a field where David Owen arguably 
put Richard Holbrooke to shame, nor the clarity of purpose. The Vance-Owen plan outlined a 
detailed vision of Bosnia that put to shame anything in the “Endgame” paper. The vision of 
Bosnia outlined at Dayton was put together in an ad hoc manner by American policy-makers 
with almost no input from the Bosnian Muslims. What made Dayton possible was the US 
officials’ decision to abandon any particular vision in favor of a process, and then embrace as a 
settlement wherever that process lead. 
The 1995 American initiative was conjured by providing Franjo Tudjman with the 
power militarily to eliminate the obstacles to a settlement on the ground to his liking, and then 
politically impose it on the Muslims, without the need for the US to dirty its hands on either 
point. By ruling out the use of American force, but nevertheless defining the threshold for an 
“acceptable” settlement in Bosnia in terms which required a Serbian military defeat, US officials 
left themselves little choice. The U.S-Croatian relationship and the policy process which 
culminated in 1995 demonstrated not the extent of American power but its limitations.  The US 
had the power to deliver victory or defeat to one side or the other in conflicts but not to halt 
them. Kosovo, the successful example that Bill Clinton cited to Rolling Stone, was merely the 
US-Croat example in accelerated form. The US could back the Albanians in wrestling Kosovo 
 
962 Clinton, Bill, My Life (Alfred A. Knopf,: New York, 2005): p.635. 
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from Serbia in 1999, but as events would show, could not force them to live together 
afterwards. 
An original argument of this Thesis has been that it was American weakness, rather 
than strength, which was the consistent factor in Washington’s policy-making towards the 
former Yugoslavia. It was only when American officials reconciled their objectives to the 
limitations imposed by their weakness by working through Franjo Tudjman’s Croatia, as this 
Thesis demonstrates, that they were able to bend events to their will. The concept of American 
weakness still seems paradoxical, as it also appeared at the time to many of the actors on both 
sides. Weakness, however, takes many forms. The possession of overwhelming military and 
economic power can represent strength, but only if it is possible for policy-makers to use that 
power. What Marković, and later Izetbegović failed to grasp was that the limitations imposed 
by the wider strategic interests and domestic interests meant that American policy-makers 
never had the ability to bring much of their potential power to bear in Yugoslavia. Although the 
US was more powerful than Germany, it was never going to prioritise its preferences in 
Yugoslavia over its economic, political, and military relations with Bonn. Although America 
possessed overwhelming military might, the military was unwilling to use it at the beck and call 
of policy-makers whom it did not respect. The ending of the Cold War exacerbated these 
problems, by reducing the strategic risks of Yugoslavia’s collapse. Factors like the influence of 
the Albanian American and Croatian lobby, and of the Catholic Church, came to the fore. 
Zimmerman’s own predecessor had fallen foul of Congressional sentiment for appearing 
insufficiently to champion the Kosovar Albanians’ cause. Yugoslavia’s collapse was less 
dangerous to US Congress members than running foul of the powerful domestic lobbies, as 
would have happened had they voted to provide Marković with the funding he sought for his 
program without offering concessions on Kosovo.  
It would be easy to explain the US policy’s failure in 1989-1993 solely in terms of the 
absence of a sufficient investment of political capital in Yugoslav policy. What this Thesis 
demonstrates is that this was not in fact the case but, rather, it was the failure to adapt 
American objectives to the resources which were available to accomplish them, a failure which 
was a personal one on the part of the policy-makers during the Bush years.  Much can be 
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accomplished through the power of bluff, especially by a US representative. Peter Galbraith’s 
experiences, as shown in Chapter 4, together with those of Richard Holbrook and Leon Fuerth, 
presented in Chapter 5, demonstrate what can be achieved by an accomplished poker player 
who is aware of the cards he holds. Warren Zimmerman proved to be a poor poker player, 
bluffing himself as much as the Yugoslavs. Ante Marković mistook Zimmerman’s friendship and 
support for a US commitment to his economic and political programme. Milošević perceived 
Zimmerman’s hostility and persistent focus on Kosovo as the cause rather than the 
consequence of America’s hostility to Serbia. The greatest victim was Alija Izetbegović, who 
took American opposition to the partition of Bosnia as implied American support for a unitary 
Bosnian state, and embarked on a war that very destroyed his people, based on the delusion 
that, if he did what America wanted, then America would support him.  
 When I first embarked upon this Thesis, I expected to produce a different conclusion, 
one which contrasted the Bush administration “realism” with their successors’ idealism. That 
Thesis would have concluded that the eventual American embracing of Operation Storm 
represented the Clinton team’s abandonment of idealism and recognition that their Republican 
predecessors had been correct. As my research continued, I came to understand that US policy 
progressed in a far more continuous manner than I had first believed. While the Clinton 
Administration’s fitful efforts to engage with the former Yugoslavia in the first half of 1993 were 
marked by failure, unlike the Bush Administration, Clinton’s team learnt from their failures. 
For all the charges that he was a romantic nationalist lost in the past, Croatian 
President Franjo Tudjman showed a much better grasp of realism than either the Bush 
Administration or his supposedly Machiavellian Serbian counterpart. Tudjman’s grasped that 
Slovenia was intent on departing Yugoslavia, and that other issues, whether Kosovo’s status, 
Markovic’s reform programme, or relations with his own Serbs, would be rendered redundant if 
Slovenia left. Debates over whether Tudjman intended to destroy Yugoslavia and on what 
timescale are irrelevant.  The choice never presented itself. Once Tudjman was convinced that 
the US would not prevent a Slovene secession, the only choice to be made was whether Croatia 
could remain in Yugoslavia without Slovenia. If not, the question was not whether Croatia 
would become independent but how and on what terms.  
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This grasp of cold realism also drove Tudjman’s policy towards the Serb minority 
within Croatia, prioritising the Croats’ national mobilisation over the Serbs’ appeasement. 
Reconciliation might have averted conflict within Croatia while it remained within Yugoslavia; 
no policy could have reconciled the Serbian population of the Krajina to embracing citizenship 
in an independent Croatia over remaining in Yugoslavia. Tudjman consequently did not even 
try. Rather than seeking to avoid conflict, he accepted it as inevitable and did his best to win it.   
Tudjman understood that Yugoslavia was dead by July 1991. His challenge was to 
convince international leaders, namely the US and German governments, that this was the 
case. The two strongest constituencies in both the US and Germany were a foreign policy elite 
loyal to the dream of a united Yugoslavia, if increasingly sceptical of its prospects, and a public 
that engaged when the horrors they witnessed through the media led them to demand 
intervention by their government. Contrary to legend, Tudjman placed little stock in the 
Croatian expatriates’ ability to exert an influence. Tudjman so much believed that the Western 
elites were wedded to the idea of Yugoslavia that, in 1997, he had a prohibition on “Croatian 
participation in any future Balkan regional grouping or new Yugoslavia” written into Croatia’s 
constitution.963 Tudjman’s strategy was to appeal to this sentiment. In the first half of 1991, 
Tudjman played the good Yugoslav, seeking to appear to be trying to make Yugoslavia work at a 
time when everyone else had given up. This was a safe approach for a Croatian nationalist 
precisely because it was almost certain to fail, especially after the JNA’s withdrawal from 
Slovenia on July 12th 1991. When Yugoslavia’s central institutions nevertheless proved 
impotent, it would demonstrate to the international community that Yugoslavia could not be 
reconstituted, and that the only way to end the fighting would be to recognise Croatian 
independence.  
 Germany gave up on Yugoslavia by the beginning of September 1991. The US was still 
expressing its support for the State Presidency and seeking to work directly with the Yugoslav 
Army three weeks later. American opposition to recognition was doomed, because the US 
policy-makers failed both to determine  whether and to what extent prevailing on Yugoslavia 
 
963 Moore, Patrick, “Croatia: Changes In Constitution Lead To Dispute Over Minorities” Voice of America December 
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was important to them and, if it was, to come up with a viable alternative. As Robert Hutchings 
of the NSC was quoted as reflecting in Chapter 2, “Absent a credible military alternative that 
the United States was willing to propose and then support, however, we had no answer to the 
German argument that recognition was preferable to passivity in the face of brutal 
aggression”.964 The Croatians were not innocent victims of JNA attacks, and both American and 
European observers were fully aware of that fact. Nonetheless, the JNA could withdraw from 
Croatia as they had from Slovenia only a few months before, whereas the Croatians could 
hardly be expected to withdraw from their own country. If Yugoslavia could not survive as a 
single state, then a conflict in Croatia was inevitable unless Zagreb conceded to the territorial 
demands set by the Serbs as the price for a peaceful departure. The JNA were the “aggressors” 
insofar as their continued presence in Croatia was identified by the international community as 
the cause of continued violence. It was Tudjman’s success in framing matters in this way which 
made Croatian independence inevitable. This would be a prelude to what was to come. For all 
the failures of policy implementation, the United States remained not just the most powerful 
actor in the conflict but the vital one. Only United States recognition could legitimize any 
settlement or confirm any gains as permanent. Persistent resistance to recognition of Croatia 
and Slovenia represented not American ineffectualism, but neccisity of adhering to American 
objectives in order to receive the endorsement of Washington. Tudjman grasped this. He 
framed Croatia’s pursuit of independence not in terms of “right” but rather as a prerequisite for 
a cessation of hostilities, understanding that Washington would ignore the former but required 
the latter. Tudjman’s room to maneuver existed not because Washington was willing to be 
flexible on its objectives for a political settlement, but because its absolute refusal to be left 
American officials with little choice but to settle for reducing conflict where they could. 
 
Defeat over recognition failed to make American policy-makers aware of the weakness 
of their position in the region, much less reconsider their goals. Instead,  egged on by Warren 
Zimmerman, who was writing cables mocking Slobodan Milošević’s parents’ suicides, 
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Washington determined to tie Slovenia and Croatia’s recognition to that of Bosnia, and in turn 
recogniee only Bosnia’s Muslim leadership as that country’s official representatives. Rather 
than using this as leverage against the Muslim leadership to urge a compromise domestic 
settlement, American officials from James Baker downwards made clear their opposition to any 
partition of Bosnia. Alija Izetbegović could easily be forgiven for mistaking American opposition 
to partition as a promise of American support for a Muslim-dominated unitary Bosnia. It would 
seem irrational for American policy-makers to urge on the Muslim leader a policy which would 
lead to a war he could not win if they had no plan to help him survive their advice’s 
consequences, yet that is precisely what they did. Bosnia-Hercegovina’s recognition was the 
culmination of the errors of the Bush Administration’s approach to Yugoslavia, combining all of 
the flaws in one misguided policy. 
The perception of political bankruptcy which permeated US policy towards Yugoslavia 
in the latter half of 1992 was echoed by the American electorate’s view of the Bush 
Administration. The Democratic Party had already tried to erase memories of opposition to the 
Gulf War by championing the cause of Baltic independence from the Soviet Union, and of Boris 
Yeltsin against Mikhail Gorbachev. In autumn 1991, with the Soviet Union and Gorbachev both 
spent forces, the Democrats moved their focus to Yugoslavia. Tying the Bush Administration’s 
reluctance to embrace Slovene and Croat independence to the earlier reluctance to champion 
the Baltic States, the Democrats attacked the Administration for showing weakness in the face 
of aggression. As George Bush had his nemesis in the form of Saddam Hussein, Democrats 
needed a villain and found ready-one in the form of the Serb leaders, whether obliging (in the 
case of the Bosnian Serb leaders) or inadvertently in Milošević’s case. Arkansas Governor Bill 
Clinton and Tennessee Senator Albert Gore Jr.’s campaign made criticism of “moral 
obtuseness” the core of their charges against the incumbent’s record in Yugoslavia.  
The victorious Clinton Administration found putting words into action hard. Early 
debates within it were characterised by indecision, which sent out mixed messages both at 
home and abroad, resulting in the Vance-Owen plan’s failure and an abortive effort to 
implement “Lift and Strike”. By mid-1993, the Clinton Administration’s Balkan policy seemed to 
have been a greater failure than its predecessors. However, it was a different sort of failure. 
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From the start, the Clinton Administration was aware of American weakness. Conflicts erupted 
over whether allies would support the US efforts to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia’s Muslims, 
and whether the military under Colin Powell would be willing to draw up plans to use ground 
troops or believed that air power could be of any use. It would have been hard for any Clinton 
Administration official to emerge from these debates believing that American policy had been 
successful six months into the new Administration. It would have been impossible for them to 
conclude that the greatest problem was not the weakness of the tools that America had 
available to use in the region. Furthermore, dispelling a perception of American weakness was 
itself now an objective of American policy in the region. The debates during the transition and 
early days of the Administration never obsessed over what the US wanted to do; by now victory 
was defined as a Serbian defeat. The American policy’s repeated failures had become a 
problem in and of themselves, threatening to undermine American prestige and humiliating US 
policy-makers, so it was increasingly felt that this impression could only be resolved by a 
dramatic, public Serb defeat. The Clinton Administration’s disinterest in the Vance-Owen 
process is explained by the fact that, while such an agreement might be able to deliver 
territorial or political concessions, it could not deliver the prestige boost of a Serbian defeat 
that the American leaders increasingly sought. 
American officials knew what they wanted by mid-1993; a Serbian defeat. The 
challenge was how to accomplish that with the limited means available. There were differences 
over how to solve the problem, but its nature was understood. This difference from the Bush 
Administration was to prove decisive, and nowhere more so than in Croatia. The conflation of 
the “enemy” America was facing in the region, with “Serbian Aggression” and the relative 
accessibility of Zagreb compared with Sarajevo, led to the US officials and politicians’ constant 
pilgrimage to the Croatian capital. Tudjman was always ready to receive such delegations.  
Figures like Madeline Albright, who visited Zagreb during the transition, and who mocked Colin 
Powell over his refusal to use American force against the Serbs, clearly felt that Croatian force 
could function as a supplement. When Croatia launched Operation Maslenica in early 1993, she 
helped to secure UN recognition of Croatia’s legal authority over all of the UN-patrolled 
territory. When Peter Galbraith arrived as Ambassador to Zagreb, he grasped how Croatia could 
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be used to exert pressure on the Serbs that the US could not. There was only one problem. 
Rather than being allies, the Muslims and Croats were increasingly at war in Bosnia in 1993. 
That war was resolved by the creation of the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia in 
March 1994. For the first time, American policy-makers developed a policy around the 
resources they had to hand rather than developing one only to discover that the resources 
needed for its successful implementation were non-existent. The US could offer unconditional 
support to Croatia for the recovery of the Krajina, as well as diplomatic immunity from UN 
sanctions provided it cooperated in Bosnia. Tudjman ultimately cared little for the Bosnian 
Croat leader Mate Boban and only slightly more for the Bosnian Croats than he did for 
expatriates. Tudjman embraced the Federation agreement when it became clear that the US, or 
at least several US officials, saw the Serbs’ defeat as America’s goal, and were willing to see if 
the Croats could do what the American military insisted it could not.  
The Federation Agreement represented a consensus among American policy-makers 
that US policy should henceforth be to use Croatia to exert pressure in Bosnia. Where that 
consensus broke down was over precisely what the policy-makers wanted the Croatians to do, 
and how much in turn they were willing to concede to Zagreb in order to do it. Zagreb would 
abandon support of the Bosnian Croats, and end the Muslim-Croat war, and in in exchange 
would avoid the sanctions which had befallen Serbia. Several US officials went further. At the 
signing of the Federation Agreement, US Secretary of Defense Perry and Vice President Gore 
offered to help reequip the Croatian army, a clear sign that they saw the Croatian Army as a 
tool to further their goals. Other officials may have preferred the Bosnians to fight their own 
battle but even they understood that Croatia was vital to aiding the Bosnians to avoid the arms 
embargo and openly encouraged the Croats to allow the passage of weapons, even from 
countries like Iran. Peter Galbraith championed doing everything possible for the Bosnian 
cause, including pushing Croatia to allow the flow of arms from Iran and provide military 
support, and was willing to back Croatia’s military buildup. Nevertheless, Galbraith seemed to 
have hoped that Zagreb’s strongly increased military power would negate the need for its use, 
as it would convince the Serbs in the Krajina to accept peaceful reintegration with autonomy. 
Galbraith’s plan might well have worked had it been fully committed to, but it clashed directly 
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with both Tudjman, who wanted to avoid those concessions, and those in Washington’s 
interests, who primarily saw the relationship with Croatia in terms of what Zagreb could do for 
America in terms of providing muscle in Bosnia.  When the entire system of sanctions 
threatened to collapse in spring 1994, the Vice President’s National Security Adviser Leon 
Fuerth, turned to the Croats as the solution. In March 1995, Vice President Gore, at his meeting 
with Tudjman, all but pressured the Croatian President into taking military action against the 
Zagreb-Belgrade highway. When Operation Flash occurred, it both saved and destroyed 
Fuerth’s sanctions policy. It saved it by allowing its enforcement to continue but destroyed it by 
revealing it could only be effectively maintained by Croatian military force. For Fuerth and Gore, 
the cost was worth it, but other US officials appear to have revolted. While the Croatians were 
not forced to withdraw, it was made clear that no further action was desired. The revulsion was 
not against the recourse to Croatian military action, but against the way in which Fuerth and 
Gore sought to use it to solve challenges in their own sphere of sanctions enforcement rather 
than as part of the wider US policy. The larger lesson for American policy-makers of all 
persuasions was not the process whereby the Croatians were given the go-ahead for Operation 
Flash, but the success with which the Croatian move was met, as well as the Serbs and the 
wider international community’s lack of response. Henceforth, American policy-makers could 
prefer to find alternative methods to pressure the Serbs than the Croatian army. They could not 
credibly argue that the Croatian army was not up to the task. 
After Operation Flash, it was therefore assured that, if American officials failed to find 
an alternative means of defeating the Serbs, they would inevitably be forced to choose 
between accepting “failure” in Yugoslavia, unthinkable for a superpower’s leaders with an 
election impending, or embracing the use of the Croatian army. A series of military disasters in 
the first half of 1995 revealed not only the bankruptcy of any hopes that the Bosnian Muslims 
might be able to inflict defeats on the Serbs using their own forces alone, but rebounded after  
Srebrenica’s fall in a way which humiliated the Administration in the public’s eyes. The new 
French President was hinting at a more aggressive approach, going so far as to repeat his call in 
Washington itself. Congress was moving towards a unilateral lifting of the arms embargo which 
would lead the Bosnian Muslims to abandon any prospect of a negotiated solution in favour of 
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pursuing military victory which would either extend the war past the 1996 or elections, or more 
likely, given the past experience of Muslim military effectiveness, result in a potential collapse 
that the US would be forced to intervene to prevent. By July 1995, the US needed to bring the 
war in Bosnia to an end and, to do that on acceptable terms, it needed to inflict defeats on the 
Serbs sufficient to appease Western opinion and bring them to the table, and then impose a 
settlement on the Muslims. An explicit quid pro quo, when everyone wanted the same thing, 
was unnecessary. 
While American officials did not support “Storm”’s humanitarian cost they welcomed 
its geopolitical implications. As Holbrooke would remark, everything about it was a success 
except for the refugee “issue”. Subsequent Croatian advances in Bosnia brought the Serbs to 
the table based on the 51-49% division that the US sought. The Croatian abandonment of the 
drive on Banja Luka at the US request left the Muslims with no choice but to accept. The Dayton 
settlement was defined on the ground with the Croatian Army as a demarcation tool. The 
Croatian Army was not merely an American policy tool. While Tudjman had no need to be 
defiant in Bosnia, where his and the US interests coincided, this did not apply in Sector East’s 
case. Tudjman threatened to start another war which would wreck any prospect of peace until 
the US agreed to the region’s unconditional return. It was only when the battle-lines were 
aligned with the intended settlement in Bosnia, and Tudjman had achieved his aims, that peace 
talks began in Ohio. 
With the final settlement already determined beforehand, Dayton was ratification. It 
involved late nights, last-minute phone calls, and exciting personal anecdotes. Most of it 
involved gaining the Bosnian Muslims’ signature to a deal which was already acceptable to the 
US, Croatia and Serbia. The suspense, of which there was plenty, dealt not with what sort of 
settlement would emerge but whether the Bosnians would agree to the one which was 
predetermined for them. Had they rejected it, Dayton would have failed, but there was never 
much prospect of it “succeeding” in producing a settlement that differed substantively from 
that which emerged.  
That settlement marked a capstone on a five-year period during which Tudjman had 
exploited American weakness to make a strong Croatia an American priority, and Croatia’s 
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interests America’s. Having secured those interests, he was content to allow President Clinton, 
Holbrooke and other American officials to claim Dayton as their own triumph, possibly in the 
hope that, by doing so, he would ensure that America saw Croatia’s role in the Post-Dayton 
Balkans in the same way as Washington had perceived it in paving the road to Dayton; namely, 
as the guarantor of the settlement and America’s enforcer on the ground. If so, he was to be 
disappointed. While Croatia was rewarded, Tudjman himself would rapidly find himself 
discarded. The 20 years following Dayton would see the international position that Croatia won 
in 1990-1995 consolidated by EU and NATO membership. Tudjman’s remaining years, however, 
would see a succession of defeats and setbacks, and he would die a bitter, isolated man. The 
traits which had served him well in wartime led him to approach the challenges of peace as if it 
was another type of war, where the enemy was the domestic opposition, critical voices in the 
media, NGOs, and any foreign diplomats who questioned him. Croatia was belatedly paying the 
price for the tactics Tudjman had used to secure his earlier successes. Tudjman had always 
resorted to manipulative tactics which contained elements of blackmail and extortion. His 
approach to achieving recognition during autumn 1991 involved provoking the JNA into armed 
conflict in order to demonstrate that the Yugoslav federal institutions could no longer maintain 
order. Nonetheless, Tudjman had at least paid lip service to the idea that he sought only to 
cooperate. Croatia kept Mesić in the Presidency for months after declaring independence and 
accepted every peace deal when one was offered, seeking to create the impression that the 
international mediators, whether David Owen or later American officials like Galbraith, had no 
more cooperative friends. In 1995, however, the mask had slipped, culminating in sabre-rattling 
in autumn 1995 that bordered on outright extortion. Tudjman had technically accepted the Z-4 
plan, but many were not fooled by the maneuver, and those who were, such as Secretary of 
State Christopher and Madeline Albright, felt that Tudjman, in alliance with Gore, had fooled 
them. The changing of the guard was swift. Holbrooke was exiled to the private sector until 
being belatedly appointed UN Ambassador in 1999.965 Both Anthony Lake and Secretary of 
Defense Perry also left following the 1996 election. Perry would remain steadfastly Pro-Croat, 
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and was the highest-ranked American to attend Sušak’s funeral, where he would eulogize Sušak 
as the man who brought democracy to Croatia and peace to the region, before quoting 
Shakespeare: “now there goes a man, we shall never see his like again”.966 As this Thesis 
proved, there is more truth to this quote than was recognised at the time. Neither America nor 
Croatia had any further need for a man “like” Susak, who was an embarrassment.  
Peter Galbraith never seems to have forgiven Tudjman for his treatment during 
summer 1995. By the time he left Zagreb in December 1997, the man who had once been the 
most popular diplomat in Croatia was, according to The New York Times, “despised”.967 
Tudjman and Susak may have felt they had no more need of Galbraith but would rapidly realise 
that they would need the type of friend the Ambassador had been in 1993-1994 before they 
discarded and humiliated him. The dominant voice in Clinton’s second term was that of new 
Secretary of State Madeline Albright, who appeared barely able to be in the same room with 
the Croatian President and openly consorted with the Croatian opposition. In May 1997, she 
admitted to having “frank disagreements” with the Croatian President, insisting that “we hold 
Croatia to the standards of that community, not to the standards of this region's autocratic and 
violent past”. Albright then declared “I believe that it is the appropriate role of the leadership of 
every country to provide the moral direction for the reintegration of these societies, and I asked 
President Tudjman to provide that kind of leadership”, implying strongly that he was failing to 
do so. Personal needling would become typical of Albright’s relationship with Tudjman, with 
almost every interaction including some form of attack on the Croatian President. The following 
year she described the Croatian elections as “neither free nor fair” in the official communiqué 
of a meeting with Granić, and pressed for WWII Jasenovac concentration camp commander 
Dinko Šakić’s extradition and trial. Given the association of Tudjman’s academic career with 
Jasenovac’s histography, the US government’s decision to make a final accounting for the 
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NDH’s crimes an issue inevitably appeared personal.968 In a meeting with Croatian independent 
media representatives in Zagreb in August 1998, Albright warned “that Croatia's standing and 
image in the world depend on the extent to which it welcomes the diversity of peoples, 
cultures, and beliefs that have long coexisted here” and openly compared Tudjman’s regime to 
the post-1968 rulers of her native Czechoslovakia.969 In a joint press conference with President 
Tudjman, she openly confessed to having a disagreement over “the relationship of Croatia to 
the Bosnian Croats and we believe that it is very important for the Bosnian Croats to be able to 
act independently and to be a part of their country in such a way that they can contribute to 
the development of Bosnia itself.” An enraged Tudjman proceeded to rant for several minutes, 
asserting that “at the end of 1993 and the beginning of 1994, Mr. Izetbegović personally 
offered annexing certain Croatian areas to Croatia, which I refused in the name of the Croatian 
leadership”. He further implied that the Bosnian Croats were facing demographic genocide and 
that it was a double standard if “Serbian republic officials are received in capitals from Vienna 
to Washington, while Croats in Bosnia-Hercegovina, in many ways, feel endangered and they 
are not allowed national insignias, neither in cantons, which was guaranteed by the Dayton 
agreement.”970  
Tudjman tried to fight back, withdrawing his support from American interests, for 
instance, by vigorously opposing NATO intervention in Kosovo.971 He purged moderates, 
including two former Prime Ministers, from the HDZ.972  Ultimately, this was irrelevant. The US 
 
968 Joint Statement by Secretary of State Albright and Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs Granić, Press Statement 
by James P. Rubin, Spokesman 
July 22nd 1998 Accessed October 23rd 2019 https://1997-2001.state.gov/briefings/statements/1998/ps980722.html 
969Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright 
Meeting With Independent Media Representatives, Hotel Sheraton Zagreb, Croatia, August 30th 1998 
As released by the Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State, Accessed October 23rd 2019 https://1997-
2001.state.gov/statements/1998/980830b.html 
970 Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright And Croatian President Franjo Tudjman 
Press Conference, Zagreb, Croatia, August 30th 1998 As released by the Office of the Spokesman Accessed October 
23rd 2019 
U.S. Department of State https://1997-2001.state.gov/statements/1998/980830c.html 
971 Marko Cucic “Tudjman Lectures the West” AIM Zagreb June 1st 1999, Accessed October 24th 2019 
http://www.aimpress.ch/dyn/trae/archive/data/199906/90607-001-trae-zag.htm 
972 Oh, Seung Eun, ‘The Fourth Party Convention of the HDZ and the Internal Power Struggle’, SEER: Journal for 
Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe, 1999, 2:2, pp. 37-56. JSTOR Accessed April 10th  
2019, www.jstor.org/stable/43291785. 
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no longer needed Croatia. As a consequence of a policy which identified Croatia’s interests with 
those of the US, Croatia increasingly not only did not need Tudjman, but needed to be rid of 
him. Like Moses, Tudjman had led his people to the “promised land”. The “thousand year 
dream” of an independent Croatia, linked politically and culturally to Western Europe, 
beckoned yet, also like Moses, Tudjman was too compromised by the means which he had used 
to qualify for entry into that “promised land”. Had he lived, he would have faced the choice of 
sacrificing himself to justice in the Hague or sacrificing Croatia’s dreams of European 
integration. Tudjman’s death in 1999, before the opposition ousted him in the elections 
scheduled for the following year, saved Croatia from extensive political in-fighting.  
Even in the timeliness of his death, Tudjman outfoxed his Serbian counterpart. 
Milošević, with control of the old Federation’s largest Republic, almost half the votes in the 
Federal Presidency, and extensive influence over the military, had managed to lose first 
Yugoslavia, then the Krajina, then half of Bosnia, and finally Kosovo itself. Montenegro was 
already on its way to independence when he fell. Some of that may have been due to luck and 
positioning but, fundamentally, Tudjman, driven by a historian’s belief that human motivations 
were universal, approached his rivals, whether Milošević, the Europeans, or Americans, as if 
they were driven by the same factors that drove his own actions. In the ruthless world of the 
Balkans during the early 1990s, this served him well, and ultimately made him a perfect partner 
when American policy fell into the hands of individuals desperate for a settlement and willing to 
be as ruthless and amoral in pursuing it as he was. If Tudjman understood some American 
officials, he erred in assuming that this meant he understood all Americans. Seeing Galbraith’s 
concern for human rights as alternatively pathetic or the troublemaking of an official who had 
been sidelined in an internal power struggle, Tudjman failed to realise that some Americans did 
care and, even if they did not, they cared about how they were treated. Above all, having 
established himself as the region’s arch-realist, using and discarding individuals such as Mesić 
and Galbraith at will, he failed to expect the same treatment from the US.   
Tudjman, as a historian, would have appreceited that public favor comes and goes, and 
that ultimately he would be judged on his achievements, if not internationally, then 
domestically.  Croatia did regain the Krajina and Sector East, and no amount of needling by 
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Albright or Galbraith could or sought to reverse that. Not even Tudjman’s most diehard 
opponents would have dreamt of undoing his achievements even if Stipe Mesić was more than 
happy to blacken his predecessor’s reputation after succeeding to the Presidency. Having been 
a participant in Tudjman’s assault on the common Yugoslav state, and later on the receiving 
end of Tudjman’s treatment of domestic opponents, Mesić had more motivation than almost 
anyone else to disassociate his country from the shadow of his predecessor. For a time, it 
seemed, Mesić and fellow Tudjman-critics might succeed. Mesić himself had testified before 
the ICYT as early as 1997, and in the climate of the early 2000s, Croatian public discourse was 
dominated by what seemed almost a sense of embarrassment about some of the events of the 
1990s. Tudjman’s inner circle found themselves politically isolated, and even General Gotovina, 
fresh off his acquittal at the Hague, felt that the proper tone to strike was not defiance, but of 
reconciliation. In 2012, he urged the Serbs who had fled Operation Storm to return. “ They are 
citizens of Croatia, this is their homeland in the same way it is mine… This is their home and 
they should be here if they want to,” said Gotovina.973 In the end, however, it became 
increasingly untenable to embrace the achievements of Tudjman’s tenure while condemning 
the means by which they were achieved.  By 2011, Croatia had joined the EU and NATO and did 
so as a homogenous, independent nation in the Republican borders of 1991, something most 
observers would have thought impossible. Tudjman had won, his vision had won while both the 
victims and increasingly the perpertators faded into history. If Gotovina and Mesić were too 
ashamed to take pride in the 1990s, a younger generation of Croats were more than ready to 
do so on their behalf. The popularity of the pro-Ustaša musician “Thomson” and the revivial of 
Ustaše symbolism, a symbolism that whatever accusation existed about his private sympathies, 
Tudjman expressed consistent contempt for in both his public and private utterances, began to 
adore concerts and sporting events. It is not only his critics and victims who have been 
forgotten by history. He was now the idol of those he described in 1991 as ““misled youth or 
 
973 Pavelic, Boris, “Gotovina Calls Croatian Serbs to Return” Balkan Insight November 19, 2012  
https://balkaninsight.com/2012/11/19/josipovic-serbian-reactions-not-important/ Accessed June 15, 2020 
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fanatics”.974 As then Secretary of War Stanton said while knealing over the corpse of Abraham 
Lincoln, “now he belongs to the ages.”975 
Today, Tudjman’s name adorns Zagreb’s international airport. When one contrasts 
Croatia’s fate with that of Bosnia, mired in corruption and poverty, Serbia, still awaiting EU 
ascension talks, or Montenegro, Milo Đukanović ‘s personal fiefdom, even if the latter has 
managed to coat it in Pro-Western paint to disguise the underlying autocracy. Perhaps Slovenia 
has escaped more cleanly, but it already held stronger cards. Janez Janša, Tudjman’s closest 
Slovene counterpart, has alternated between jail terms and the leadership of disruptive far-
right parties. No one today would call him the father of his country.  
What of American policy? Was it a success? That depends on how one defines the 
term. Is a Croatia which is democratic, united, and part of NATO and the EU a success for 
American policy or Croatian? It is claimed as the latter, even if the terms on which the US 
insisted (refugee return and war criminals’ prosecution) were quietly dropped. Bosnia is 
technically a single nation and peace has reigned since 1995. That is a success for US policy 
insofar as this sought to end the war in Bosnia. Whether Bosnians today feel that it was 
particularly successful is open to question.  Herein lies Tudjman’s greatest achievement. 
American policy objectives became so tied to those of Croatia during 1991-1995 that it is 
impossible to separate them after the fact. Arguably, they never diverged. It was Tudjman’s 
own personal objectives and interests which diverged from those of the US and Croatia, and the 
common interests of the latter in seeing Croatia join the EU and NATO as a full democracy. 
When that occurred, Tudjman was undone by his own achievement. US interests had become 
so intertwined with those of Croatia that, when Tudjman himself became an obstacle to 
Croatia’s success, he was judged disposable. That, perhaps, is the greatest testament to the 
Croatian policy’s success during the period 1989-1995.  
 
974 Presidential transcript of a meeting attended by Franjo TUDJMAN and Commanders of the Army of Republic of 
Croatia held on 04/03/1992 Anexx III p. 15  
http://icr.icty.org/LegalRef/CMSDocStore/Public/English/Motions/NotIndexable/IT-04-
74/MOT7245R0000324738.pdf: Accessed 12th January 2019  
975 Adam Gopnik, “Lincoln’s Language and its legacy” The New Yorker 21 May 2007 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/05/28/angels-and-ages : Accessed June 15, 2020 
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American policy’s success or failure, and those who made it, was undermined by the 
American policy-makers’ inability to learn the right lessons. Dayton was a success, but only 
because America had adapted its objectives to the resources available. Interviews like the one 
that Bill Clinton gave to Rolling Stone showed a lack of appreciation of precisely why and how 
his Administration had succeeded where Bush’s had failed. The belief in American air strikes’ 
key role, to the exclusion of the Croatian Army’s actions, and most importantly the decision to 
use the Croatian army to accomplish limited objectives designed to produce a settlement, led 
to a belief that US military power was invincible. If so, then American political objectives did not 
have to prioritise anything. There were many lessons that should have been learnt from 
Yugoslavia. I learnt many in the course of writing this Thesis. The failure to remember the right 
lessons contributed to the disastrous US invasion of Iraq and, arguably, subsequent failures in 
Afghanistan and Syria.  
This Thesis is an effort to share the lessons I learnt by reviewing the course of US-
Croatian relations during the period 1989-1995, in the hope they can correct the 
misconceptions which have falsified historical memory. This is an important story. It is one that 
has been told repeatedly in distorted form. It is one that I felt it was vital to tell correctly. Over 
the preceding three hundred pages, I hope I have done so. 
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